Javier Milei, inaugurated as Argentina’s president in December 2023, has launched a radical libertarian policy agenda aimed at dismantling decades of state intervention and addressing severe economic crises, including hyperinflation and high poverty rates .

His economic reforms are anchored in anarcho-capitalist principles, advocating for the abolition of the central bank, dollarization of the economy, and drastic reductions in government size and spending .

Upon taking office, Milei immediately dissolved several ministries, reducing their number from 18 to 9, including eliminating the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Women, Gender, and Diversity .

Fiscal austerity measures produced a fiscal surplus of 0.2% of GDP in early 2024—the first since 2008—by slashing state transfers to provinces by 75%, halting 90% of public works, and eliminating subsidies, which led to increased poverty and economic contraction .

Milei’s monetary strategy centers on devaluing the peso and replacing it with the US dollar to combat inflation, which exceeded 200% at his election, with monthly rates declining after aggressive monetary tightening, though overall inflation remains high .

Critics warn dollarization could deplete reserves and risk hyperinflation, while supporters argue it could restore stability .

His administration also pursues privatization of state-owned enterprises and deregulation, including eliminating rent controls and supermarket regulations .

Politically, Milei’s coalition holds a minority in Congress, prompting a strategy of “turbo-politics” that bypasses traditional legislative processes.

He issued a Necessity and Urgency Decree to repeal over 300 laws and facilitate privatizations, but faced Senate rejection of a major deregulation decree, highlighting institutional resistance [13168c51

Javier Milei, inaugurated as Argentina’s president in December 2023, has launched a radical libertarian policy agenda aimed at dismantling decades of state intervention and addressing severe economic crises, including hyperinflation and high poverty rates .

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Content: MercoPress, en Español

Montevideo, December 16th 2023 - 14:34 UTC

Argentina: Milei says burden on private sector is “transitory”

Saturday, December 16th 2023 - 10:05 UTC
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Argentine President Javier Milei Friday released a live broadcast through his Instagram account explaining that “The effort that falls on the private sector is transitory.” The head of state added his administration was “focused on avoiding hyperinflation.”

Milei, an economist by trade, also explained that a “hyper-orthodox adjustment with a sincere exchange market and restructuring of the Central Bank” was being implemented in order to curb the rise in prices through ”a sincere [currency] exchange market and [the]restructuring of the Central Bank (BCRA).“

He added that although the ”effort“ currently weighed ”60% on politicians“ and ”40% on the private sector,“ this situation would be ”transitory“ while pledging that this path would lead to closing ”the gap of the import exchange rate plus the PAIS tax“ and, with this, it will ”lower the country risk.“

Once the economy is rearranged, the government will begin to ”eliminate the things that we libertarian liberals do not like,“ the President went on.

”Never the night could beat the day; let's not curse the darkness. Argentina is starting to wake up and stand up,” he stressed.

The Argentine President will convene next Tuesday with all provincial governors to address the impact of the most recent measures on local economies.

Santiago del Estero declared an economic emergency and San Luis announced a contingency plan whereby public workers are to be paid their wages in installments.

In addition, the agriculturally-rich provinces of Córdoba, Santa Fe, and Entre Ríos have expressed their concerns over the increase in export duties.

The following provinces have already announced spending cuts in line with the national government's announcements: Santiago del Estero, San Luis, Córdoba, Tucumán, Santa Fe, Catamarca, Tierra del Fuego, Chubut, San Juan, Neuquén, Entre Ríos, and Santa Cruz.

Interior Minister Guillermo Francos was reported Friday to be coordinating Tuesday's gathering.

Categories: Economy, Politics, Argentina.
Tags: Javier Milei.

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Content: November 25, 2023

Following Sunday’s election results, Javier Meili is set to become Argentina’s president on December 10. Among other things, President-elect Miley has vowed to replace the peso with the US dollar, a policy known as dollarization. Some critics have argued that dollarization would deplete the Argentine central bank’s US dollar reserves, making dollarization excessively costly and ultimately resulting in hyperinflation. However, in leveling this criticism, they misinterpret Argentina’s current economic situation and fail to consider real-world cases of dollarization during an inflationary crisis.

The risk of hyperinflation in Argentina is not due to Javier Miley’s advocacy of dollarization. Instead, it is the result of years of bad monetary policies. Inflation has been rising steadily since 2007, long before Miley proposed dollarization (and almost anyone in Argentina even thought about the possibility of dollarization).

Some experts argue that, by international standards, Argentina is already experiencing hyperinflation. According to Philip Kagan’s seminal 1956 study, most economists define hyperinflation as an inflation rate greater than 50 percent monthly. To put this in perspective, the average annual inflation rate in Europe between 1950 and 1955 was 5.1 percent. In Kagan’s words, a hyperinflation country experienced monthly price increases that were ten times greater than the price increases experienced by a typical European country in a normal year.

The monetary policy landscape is very different today than in the years immediately preceding Kagan’s study. Over the five-year period ending January 2020, just before the pandemic, the EU’s average annual inflation rate was just 0.98 percent. Using Kagan’s ratio, this would mean that a country experiencing at least 9.8 percent inflation per month has hyperinflation. Argentina saw monthly inflation rates of 12.7 percent and 8.3 percent in September and October, respectively. Therefore, adjusting Cagan’s hyperinflation threshold to reflect general improvements in monetary policy elsewhere would reveal that Argentina is already experiencing hyperinflation. While there is certainly potential for further decline, critics of dollarization need to acknowledge just how serious Argentina’s inflation is in the context of the modern global economy.

International experiences show that dollarization and hyperinflation are interconnected issues, but this is not the case according to critics of dollarization. For example, Ecuador adopted dollarization in January 2000 to prevent hyperinflation. Ecuador’s dollarization proved effective. Dollarization immediately brought Ecuador’s inflation rate into alignment with that of the US and then kept it stable over the next decade, despite economic challenges and two sovereign debt defaults. Another compelling example is Zimbabwe, which adopted dollarization in January 2009 to combat hyperinflation. The result was also successful, with inflation reaching US levels by January 2010. As these cases show, dollarization may be a solution to hyperinflation. Argentina could also either resort to dollarization to prevent hyperinflation, or avoid it if inflation gets out of control.

The risk of hyperinflation in Argentina stems not from an intention to create a dollar but from a central bank that appears unable or unwilling to exercise restraint. Argentina’s historical record shows that central bank independence is absent and not easily secured. For better or worse, dollarization offers the safest path to avoid monetary collapse. This provides Argentina with an opportunity to implement much-needed reforms and move forward on a sustainable development path. Dollarization may make things worse before they get better. But to argue that monetary reform that is supposed to tame inflation will lead to hyperinflation is a distorted view of Argentina’s economic reality.

nicholas kachanowski

Dr. Kachanowski is Associate Professor of Economics and El Paso Woody L. Hunt is the director of the Center for Free Enterprise at the University of Texas in the College of Business. He is also a Fellow of the UCEMA Friedman-Hayek Center for the Study of a Free Society. He served as President of the Association of Private Enterprise Education (APEE, 2021-2022) and on the Board of Directors of the Mont Pelerin Society (MPS, 2018-2022).

He received his Licentiate in Economics from the Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina, his M.A. in Economics and Political Science from the Escuela Superior de Economía y Administración de Empresas (ESADE), and his Ph.D. M.A. in Economics from Suffolk University, Boston

Dr. Kachanowski is the author of Reflexions sobre la economia argentina (Instituto Acton Argentina, 2017), Monetary balance and nominal income targeting (Routledge, 2019), and co-author Austrian Capital Theory: A Modern Survey of Essentials (Cambridge University Press, 2019), Capital and Finance: Theory and History (Routledge, 2020), and Dollarization: Una Solution for Argentina (Editorial Claridad, 2022).

Dr. Kachanowski’s research has been published in outlets such as Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, public choice, Journal of Institutional Economics, Quarterly Review of Economics and FinanceAnd Journal of the History of Economic Thought among other outlets.

Get notified of new articles from Nicholas Kachanowski and AIER.

Source: www.aier.org

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Content: December 16, 2023

As Argentina’s new president, it took only one day for Javier Meili to get rid of the Culture Ministry. Miley was inaugurated on December 10, and the next day, the liberal economist and former television commentator delivered on her campaign promise with characteristic bravery. Also on the chopping block – or, rather, in the path of her chainsaw, which Miley wielded throughout her campaign to symbolize her intention to cut government spending – was the Ministry of Women, Gender and Diversity.

Many other ministries were reduced in size and transformed into new entities. The Ministry of Social Development, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security will be divided into a newly formed Ministry of Human Capital headed by former TV producer Sandra Pettovello. Meanwhile, the ministries of public works, transport, energy, mining and communications will be merged into a new infrastructure ministry. (It appears that the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Women, Gender and Diversity will be dissolved entirely.)

Coming out on top after a runoff election against Argentina’s former economy minister Sergio Massa, Miley is keen to show her supporters she is serious about austerity measures. The self-described “anarcho-capitalist” cut widespread subsidies for gas and electricity and canceled public projects, considering these actions necessary to bring Argentina’s economy under control. Additionally, Miley announced a plan to devalue the Argentine peso against the dollar to half its current value in an effort to prevent hyperinflation, a move lauded by the International Monetary Fund, which has held Argentina’s debt to the tune of $40 billion. More is due. Prices in Argentina have more than doubled in the past year, and 40% of the population lives below the poverty line.

Although Miley’s actions are presented as economic policy, they are also a means of exerting control. A fan of Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro (former presidents of the US and Brazil, respectively), Miley has a history of blustering, ignoring reporters, and promoting far-right views on issues such as abortion, immigration, climate change, and gun ownership. He also regularly attacks his political rivals, labeling socialists “trash” and “human excrement”. (Bolsonaro also fired his country’s cultural ministry when he took office, and Trump congratulated Miley on her victory, saying he would “make Argentina great again”.)

Miley has referred to his country’s Ministry of Education as “the Ministry of Education”, and his disparaging view of the arts and humanities extends back to history – to the public accounts of those executed and disappeared by Argentina’s 1970s military junta. Casting doubt on the numbers and mocking human rights activists. Miley’s vice president, Victoria Villarruel, a regular supporter of the junta, in September called for a tribute to the “victims” of leftist groups of the 1970s and the dismantling of the ESMA Museum and Memory Site in Buenos Aires. , a former junta prison and torture center, has recently been named a UNESCO World Heritage Site.

Source: www.theartnewspaper.com

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Content: Argentina’s Javier Milei’s “Instant Democracy” and Neoliberalism

Javier Milei, YouTube screen grab.

Self-described “anarcho-capitalist,” Javier Milei became the president of Argentina in December 2023 promising “drastic” measures to temper the inflation crisis that has gripped the country. In the weeks since his election, Milei has brought forward an ambitious neoliberal restructuring program encompassing almost every aspect of the government.

Milei’s agenda confronts considerable opposition in Congress, where his governing coalition, Libertad Avanza, holds only a fraction of the seats. To adjust to these circumstances, Milei has cultivated a strategy of “turbo-politics,” bypassing legislative processes that risk delaying the implementation of his state reorganization plans.

Milei’s approach to Congress is symbolic of a decades-old strategy I have elsewhere called “neoliberal parliamentarism.” This concept describes a pattern of deliberate efforts to reform or subvert legislative institutions as a means of facilitating neoliberal reforms that do not have sufficient popular support to be actualized through usual democratic channels. These changes, even when temporary, often leave long-term scars on institutions by weakening norms of institutional forbearance.

The Emergency Decree and the Omnibus Bill

Milei has followed this blueprint, insulating the core elements of his agenda from democratic influence. The dismantling of the Argentine state began in earnest in mid-December when the executive branch presented an 83 page Necessity and Urgency Decree (NDU) aimed at repealing over 300 various laws and regulations, facilitating the privatization of core public assets.

This “mega-decree,” Milei claimed, was necessary to “start to undo the huge number of regulations that have held back and prevented economic growth”. It includes sweeping economic deregulation, such as the elimination of regulations on Argentina’s supermarket laws, which required the guarantee of low prices on basic products. It also includes measures to eliminate rent controls. Suggested labour reforms to cut pregnancy leave and increase the job probation period were suspended by the courts in January 2024.

Less than a week after issuing the NDU, the executive branch sent a massive omnibus bill titled Foundations and Starting Points for the Freedom of the Argentine People to Congress for consideration. The bill bundles the major elements of Milei’s neoliberal restructuring initiatives under the heading of a single piece of legislation with 664 articles. It will enable the government to carry out, in a matter of weeks, what would normally take years to achieve if these reforms were considered independently and subjected to the usual legislative scrutiny.

Reforms from the 351 page bill include an extraordinary provision declaring a state of public emergency on matters related to the economy, fiscal balance, social security, defence, health, and administration.

The emergency declaration delegates more than 1,000 extraordinary powers from the legislative to the executive until December 31, 2025, with the possibility of a two-year extension. This provision would enable Milei to make major reforms without having to consult Congress, thus eliminating a major hurdle to the implementation of neoliberal reforms.

Authors of the bill are attempting to facilitate the privatization of 41 state-owned companies across various sectors including energy, aviation, port administration, and agriculture. They also enable the reorganization of public administration, including embedding regulatory cuts from the NDU into law.

Additionally, the omnibus legislation proposes substantial reforms to environmental protection laws. These changes include the weakening of the Glacier Protection Law, allowing the mining of sensitive “periglacial” areas. The bill is presently being rushed through the legislative process by way of Extraordinary sessions of Congress, leading to marathon sittings during Argentina’s usual summer recess period.

“It’s impossible for people to have an idea of the enormous number of proposals Milei has sent,” said Ricardo Gil Laverda, a constitutional lawyer and former Argentine Justice Minister. “They cover dozens and dozens and dozens of laws, often on deep topics.”

To influence negotiations, Milei has threatened to put forward a non-binding referendum if the opposition parties do not agree to the main terms of his restructuring plan. Milei has also threatened to take away social welfare rights from protesters who block streets.

Despite these efforts, however, the reality of Milei’s lack of Congressional support has led him to compromise on some elements of his agenda as it makes its way through the legislative process. Although the structure of the bill remains, opposition politicians have made more than 100 changes to it, including curtailing the scope of the President’s emergency powers to one year rather than two, and retaining YPF, the national oil and gas company, in public hands, despite allowing most other state-owned companies to remain subject to privatization.

Neoliberalism and the Decline of the Legislature

Argentina is not unique. This most recent example of legislative subversion is a familiar tactic used to accommodate neoliberal restructuring, that has been utilized repeatedly by neoliberal reformers in recent decades, including the IMF-sanctioned omnibus bill rammed through Greece’s parliament in 2014.

This approach to the legislature is the consequence of the political limitations of neoliberal policy, which is opposed by considerable segments of society. A blueprint for this strategy is spelled out by former New Zealand Minister of Finance Roger Douglas in his 1993 book, Unfinished Business. The book recalls lessons from his experience implementing a neoliberal agenda dubbed ‘Rogernomics’ in the 1980s against the headwinds of widespread social and political opposition.

Douglas claimed it is “uncertainty, not speed, that endangers the success of structural reform programmes.” Neoliberal reforms should not be passed incrementally, but as a rupture, moving in “quantum leaps” to overcome popular opposition.

Democratic processes are typically slow and deliberate, designed to enable the legislative body to scrutinize the executive, foster compromise, and encourage debate. It was necessary, therefore, to streamline the democratic process to ensure that politicians could neither interfere with, nor demand meaningful changes to, neoliberal reorganization efforts.

Neoliberal governments should confront the legislature, not as an essential element of the process of democracy, but an instrument used by politicians and vested interests to interfere with the operations of the marketplace. “Speed is essential. It is almost impossible to go too fast,” Douglas said. “Once the programme begins to be implemented, don’t stop until you have completed it.”

This tactic did not occur in a vacuum, but emerged intrinsically from the content of a neoliberal theoretical framework that views democratic institutions as an additional layer of state administration to be overcome. Neoliberal thought is deeply skeptical in the capabilities of reason to infer or predict causality. Given the limitations of the mind, society should be governed, not by conscious modelling and careful planning, but according to spontaneous or “invisible hand” forms of social organization, which are the outcome of independent, unplanned individual decisions.

This position is most clearly expressed by Friedrich Hayek, who claimed that parliamentary sovereignty was in fact the “root of the evil” in modern society, since it facilitated the growth of the state. Legislatures constituted one limb of what Milton Friedman called the “iron triangle” of politicians, bureaucrats, as well as corporate and individual special interests that were perpetually reliant upon the government for rents, and therefore had an interest in obstructing market reforms.

‘Instant Democracy’ and the Rise of ‘Neoliberal Populism’

What should we make of Milei’s approach to Congress, then? Is it reflective of a new pattern in neoliberal governance, or merely the extension of an old one? The answer is both. While Milei’s approach clearly shares categorial similarities with the neoliberal legislative blueprint built for speed, his blending of these ideas with a coarse, populist rhetoric grounded in anti-statism, signifies an intensification of these patterns.

Milei’s populist neoliberal worldview contributes to a rising trend among far-right governments around the world to use this rhetoric to rationalize the subversion of democracy. This kind of “neoliberal populism” conflates democratic institutions with political actors, claiming that they are instruments of obstruction for self-serving politicians and bureaucrats.

This is a view Milei has proudly declared. “For me, the state is an enemy, as are the politicians who live off it,” he said. “We will put an end to the parasitic, stupid, useless political caste that is sinking this country.”

Grounded in the same logic as neoliberalism’s conventional demand for freedom from the state, democratic institutions increasingly appear as impediments to the logic of the marketplace. The elimination of cumbersome legislative processes, then, removes the obstacles that restrain market forces, generating popular economic independence, and restoring common-sense. This inverts the logic of democracy, making it appear as though executive rule is necessary to protect the interests of “the People” from Friedman’s “iron triangle.”

The anti-parliamentarism at the core of the neoliberal theoretical outlook has increasingly transformed into a populist program that mobilizes a general dissatisfaction with politicians against democratic institutions as such. Neoliberal politicians, such as Milei, use this reasoning to manufacture the conditions for the ongoing use of emergency powers and the concentration of authority in the executive branch.

The global elite, sensing “the smell of a big privatization wave coming,” are said to be “infatuated” with his take-no-prisoners approach to Congress. Thus, although not a new phenomenon, Milei’s brand of “instant democracy,” which conceives of speed and flexibility as the essence of legislative governance, has the support of both the financial elite as well as a growing populist dimension, giving it the hallmarks of a burgeoning political movement of the most regressive kind.

As the institutional forbearance that restrained most neoliberal governments to stay within the confines of liberal democratic constitutional structures continues to give way to a logic that sees the legislature as subordinate to the market, it is likely that we will continue to see the erosion of democratic standards.

Tom McDowell is a Lecturer in the Department of Politics and Public Administration at Toronto Metropolitan University. He is the author of Neoliberal Parliamentarism: The Decline of Parliament at the Ontario Legislature (University of Toronto Press, 2021).

What economic issue did Milei want to address?

What economic issue did Milei want to address?

What economic issue did Milei want to address?

What economic issue did Milei want to address?

His economic reforms are anchored in anarcho-capitalist principles, advocating for the abolition of the central bank, dollarization of the economy, and drastic reductions in government size and spending .

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Content: Updated 21 mins ago - Economy

Argentine President Milei's plan to remake the economy with a wrecking ball

If your economy is broken, you can try to fix it — or you can essentially just throw it in the trash and try to build something new from scratch.

Why it matters: The latter is, broadly, the plan of anarcho-capitalist Argentine president Javier Milei, while the former is the plan of Zambian president Hakainde Hichilema.

Where it stands: Milei came in like a wrecking ball after he took office in December. He slashed the official value of the currency in half, introduced a "mega-decree" scrapping 366 separate rules, and laid off 5,000 government employees.

  • Alejandro Werner, the former head of the International Monetary Fund's Western Hemisphere department, explains that this course of "shock therapy" carries enormous risks, both to the upside and the downside.
  • The devaluation, at least for the next few months, increases the Argentine inflation rate, which was over 200% in 2023. Milei's budget cuts will also cause a plunge in household income, as well as a deep recession.
  • The economic pain will embolden Milei's opposition — including in the courts, which have already suspended many of his early decrees. A general strike is planned for Wednesday.

What we're watching: Werner is hopeful that Congress will be at least minimally cooperative, that a good agricultural harvest will help replenish foreign reserves, and that inflation will fall to an annualized rate of 50% by the end of the year.

  • Argentina being Argentina, however, Werner notes, it's entirely possible that Milei's opponents in Congress will block most of his policies and devastating hyperinflation will result.

Reality check: Argentina's action stands in stark contrast to the zugzwang in Zambia, which is trying to restructure the old-fashioned way. There, creditors find themselves in a standoff without any obvious resolution — and where even the IMF seems powerless to move things forward.

Between the lines: Milei was quite the toast of the Davos elite this week, notwithstanding the fact that he's on the record calling climate change "a socialist lie."

  • "The Argentine economy is in such bad shape that it has to be shaken up. President Milei and his team are doing exactly that," said IMF chief Kristalina Georgieva in a CNN interview.
  • Milei returned the favor, saying that the CEOs assembled for his speech were "social benefactors" and "heroes."
  • "Let no one tell you that your ambition is immoral," he added.

The bottom line: For the time being, Milei seems to be able to draw on a wellspring of support and goodwill from the international community.

  • The IMF has restarted its program in the country, which means $4.7 billion in international funds have been unlocked and default isn't imminent.
  • All the same, Argentina's bonds are still trading at roughly the same level as those of Spirit Airlines. Some kind of default remains more likely than not — just pitched as part of a bold recovery plan, rather than being draped in anti-creditor rhetoric.
Go deeper

closing the central bank
criticism of government spending
dollarizing the Argentinian currency

closing the central bank
criticism of government spending
dollarizing the Argentinian currency

closing the central bank
criticism of government spending
dollarizing the Argentinian currency

Upon taking office, Milei immediately dissolved several ministries, reducing their number from 18 to 9, including eliminating the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Women, Gender, and Diversity .

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Content: The content originally appeared on: Al Jazeera – Latin America News

Argentines are voting in a presidential election that might see a far-right populist leader, who has vowed to overhaul the Latin American country’s ailing economy, emerge victorious.

Polling stations opened their doors at 8am local time (11:00 GMT) and are expected to accept voters until 6pm local time (21:00 GMT), with results to come by late Monday.

During Sunday’s ballot, voters are also selecting members of the Congress and provincial governors, specifically 130 lower house representatives and 24 national senators.

Decades of economic decline and record inflation have propelled libertarian outsider Javier Milei, the 52-year-old far-right populist leader of the Liberty Advances party, to the front of a tight race.

The eccentric economist and first-year lawmaker, who has described himself as an “anarcho-capitalist”, had emerged as an unexpected frontrunner in the August primary election.

Milei has been compared to controversial leaders like Donald Trump in the United States and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, and has been winning support among some Argentinians by promoting radical policy changes.

Voters are angry at traditional parties for failing to address the Latin American nation’s ailing economy for decades.

Milei has mostly focused on the economy, which experts agree is perhaps the most severe challenge facing Argentina right now, with inflation standing at a whopping 138 percent in September and only expected to grow by the end of the year.

To fix the economic issues, Milei has proposed eliminating the central bank, replacing the local currency with the US dollar as Ecuador and El Salvador have done, and slashing public spending.

He has also promised cultural reforms as he has presented himself as an opponent of socialism at home and abroad, and is a staunch critic of abortion, which he has described as “murder” even though it was legalised by the country’s Congress in 2020.

Milei’s main rivals are Patricia Bullrich, a 67-year-old former security minister who is the candidate for the centre-right Together for Change coalition, and Sergio Massa, the 51-year-old incumbent economy minister who represents the governing Peronist coalition.

To win the presidential election, a candidate must secure 45 percent of the vote, or 40 percent plus a 10-point lead over their closest competitor.

Pre-election polls give Milei the best chance of winning, but they have proven notoriously unreliable in past elections.

So, it is possible that there will be two winners, which would force a second round of voting in November.

A new president and vice president are expected to take office on December 10.

Fiscal austerity measures produced a fiscal surplus of 0.2% of GDP in early 2024—the first since 2008—by slashing state transfers to provinces by 75%, halting 90% of public works, and eliminating subsidies, which led to increased poverty and economic contraction .

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Content: Argentina sees the light with Maverick Javier Milei – Ivo Vegter

In a surprising turn, libertarian firebrand Javier Milei secured Argentina’s presidency after a second-round victory against his left-wing rival. Vowing to end decades of socialist mismanagement, Milei, an outspoken economist, faces challenges in implementing radical reforms, including abolishing ministries and dollarising the economy. While hailed as the world’s first libertarian president, Milei’s uphill battle involves legislative opposition and managing economic pain amid promises of a freer, market-oriented Argentina. Skepticism remains, awaiting the true impact of his ambitious plans in a nation grappling with deep-rooted economic struggles.

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Argentinians see the light

By Ivo Vegter*

It took a second round of voting, but the libertarian Javier Milei has defeated his Peronist rival to become president of Argentina.

A month ago, Javier Milei unexpectedly lost the first round of the Argentinian general election to his left-wing Peronist rival, Sergio Massa, after the latter had cynically promised zero taxes as a way to bribe voters.

In my column on the lessons South Africa could draw from that election, I said: ‘Let’s hope Argentinians see the light before Massa and Milei face off in the run-off election.’

Happily, they did see the light.

After decades of economic malaise under a government that for most of the last 30 years has been socialist, corrupt, wasteful and incompetent, leaving Argentina eighth from last in the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World Report 2023, they elected Milei, a libertarian firebrand, in the biggest landslide since Juan Perón’s election in 1973.

Milei becomes the first libertarian president, not only of Argentina, but in the world. The closest precedent that comes to mind is that of Calvin Coolidge, the small-government conservative president during the Roaring Twenties in the US, but Milei is far more radical than that.

‘“oday the reconstruction of Argentina begins’, he said, after winning 56% of the vote in the head-to-head race. That was also his first lie as president-elect, since he doesn’t actually take office until 10 December, but we’ll let that slide.

Radical

To describe Milei as radical would be putting it mildly. He has described the country’s ruling elite as thieves and the government as ‘a criminal organisation’. He has promised to abolish ten of the government’s 18 ministries. He said he would do away with the central bank and dollarise the Argentinian economy.

‘The model of decadence has come to an end’, he told his supporters. ‘There’s no going back. We have monumental problems ahead. Inflation, lack of work, and poverty’.

Milei is an accomplished economist, and largely follows the Austrian School of individualist free-market economics. He has variously described himself as an anarcho-capitalist and a minarchist (an anarchist who accepts the legitimacy of a small government dedicated to protecting life, liberty and property).

He has been extraordinarily outspoken on the evils of socialism and statism, and how they turned Argentina from a once-wealthy world power into an over-indebted, poverty-stricken, underdeveloped basket case.

Mainstream media

The mainstream media, with its largely left-leaning bias, has compared Milei to former presidents Donald Trump of the US and Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil.

‘Argentina set for sharp right turn as Trump-like radical wins presidency’, trumpeted the Washington Post

‘Argentina Elects Javier Milei in Victory for Far Right’ was the headline in the New York Times, which added: ‘Argentina’s next president is a libertarian economist whose brash style and embrace of conspiracy theories has parallels with those of Donald J. Trump.’

The ‘embrace of conspiracy theories’ is a particularly vicious jab. Readers would have to follow a link to find an explanation, and it turns out that the Times only referred to Milei’s allegations of polling irregularities, which have not been tested.

It is entirely plausible that Argentina’s electoral system is less secure than that of the United States, and that the incumbents – who went as far as abolishing taxes in order to engineer a win – might have been involved in some electoral skulduggery.

Allegations of election fraud are very common on all sides of the political spectrum, and do not, in and of themselves, rise to the level of the debunked claims of Trump, and his attempt to derail the orderly election of his rival.

Authoritarians

More importantly, both Bolsonaro and Trump are alt-right populists. They are moral authoritarians – not liberals – and appeal to collectivist – not individualist – principles such as nationalism and protectionism. They have often, rightly, been described as fascist, which is just as antithetical to libertarians as is left-wing socialism.

That both former presidents expressed their support for Milei has a lot more to do with shared anti-socialist positions than any real congruence in their political philosophy.

Milei has himself rejected the right-wing label, and indeed, his classical liberalism (for which ‘libertarian’ in the American sense is a synonym) does not yield to a simplistic left-right analysis. Rather, it falls on the liberal end of an authoritarian-liberal scale, and on the progressive end of a conservative-progressive scale.

Sour-grape-ish

Milei does have some views that are questionable, or traditionally associated with the conservative right, such as his anti-abortion stance and his rejection of climate alarmism.

Neither define him, however, and both are issues on which libertarians can and do disagree.

By similar logic, Milei’s promise not to dismantle Argentina’s extensive social welfare programmes does not make him some sort of left-winger.

In focusing on incidental agreements between Milei and leaders like Trump and Bolsonaro, and ignoring the fundamental philosophical differences between the former’s individualist, free-market, small-government ideas and the authoritarianism, nationalism, populism and protectionism of the latter, the media does both Milei and their readers a great disservice.

That a politician does not perfectly reflect all one’s personal political or moral views is in any case far less of a concern when that very politician proposes as far as possible to keep government out of people’s personal affairs and to leave most of the world’s problems to the private sector.

‘When your response to everything that is wrong with the world is to say, “There ought to be a law,” you are saying that you hold freedom very cheap’, said Thomas Sowell.

Moreover, it seems extraordinarily petty and sour-grape-ish to complain about a few differences of opinion with a candidate who promises radical change in a country that is mired in economic crisis, thanks to the policies of its incumbent rulers.

Music to the ears

Sniping from the mainstream press aside, the rise of a truly libertarian president in one of the world’s most economically unfree countries should be music to a classical liberal’s ears.

Who doesn’t want to radically slash the size of government? Who doesn’t question the inflationary monetary policy of highly indebted countries? Who doesn’t want to see free enterprise flourish, and witness the departure of a government that strangles business with red tape and taxes, and tries to pick winners by throwing subsidies at favoured companies?

On the face of it, this should be an excellent experiment to show whether the libertarian prescriptions for government do, indeed, produce a better outcome than the socialist quagmire in which Argentina has been stuck for so long.

Pain and gain

Practically speaking, however, there are reasons to remain skeptical.

First, we’ve only seen Milei’s talk, and not his walk.

Second, making drastic changes in the structure of a country’s government and economy, as Milei proposes, will be painful.

It is arguable that the short-term pain is justified by the long-term gain, but electorates are rarely forgiving to those who inflict necessary pain. Witness Margaret Thatcher, who saved Britain from the socialist economic malaise of the 1970s, but remains hated to this day by those who bore the brunt of her reforms.

Dollarising an economy does not produce immediate results, for example. It can take years before the stabilising effect of dollarisation filters through to low inflation rates. It can, however, immediately harm people and even increase poverty levels, depending on the exchange rate at which existing deposits are converted.

Drastically reducing the size of government will also face much immediate opposition, especially from civil servants who stand to lose their jobs.

Privatising healthcare, education or other government functions is also fraught with transition difficulties. Much depends on exactly how such privatisation is carried out. It can fail, and even if the eventual outcome is a success, it could cause years of disruptions and dissatisfaction.

Then there are the entrenched patronage networks of the incumbent socialist government, who will be highly upset – and fight back vigorously – when the taps of corrupt fiscal spending get turned off.

Finally, few voters have the patience to wait five or ten years for radical free-market reforms to have a positive impact, and Argentina’s president only serves a four-year term before facing the electorate again.

Legislative opposition

A further obstacle to Milei’s reforms is that he will not be the philosopher-king of every libertarian’s dreams. He will not be a dictator.

He will simply be the head of the executive in a constitutional parliamentary democracy, with strictly circumscribed powers.

And the elections did not result in a similar landslide in the legislature.

Argentina has a 72-seat Senate, or upper house, and a 257-seat Chamber of Deputies, or lower house. Together, they make up the Argentinian National Congress.

In both houses, Milei’s libertarian coalition, Liberty Advances (La Libertad Avanza, or LLA) took more seats from the conservative coalition, Together for Change (Juntos por el Cambio, or JxC), than from the socialist Peronista coalition, Union for the Homeland (Unión por la Patria, or UxP).

In the Senate, this leaves the Peronistas as the largest coalition, with 32 seats. It would need 37 seats to command an outright majority. The conservative coalition, JxC, retains only 27 seats. As the third-largest party in the Senate, Milei’s LLA only has six seats, which even in coalition with the conservatives is not enough for an outright majority.

In the lower house, the picture is similar. UxP has 104 out of 257 seats, JxC has 93, and LLA has 38. The only difference is that here, a JxC and LLA coalition can command a simple majority.

This leaves Milei at the mercy first of the conservatives, who would welcome market-oriented reforms and a departure from socialism, but by their very nature would be reluctant to endorse Milei’s more radical, disruptive proposals. Once Milei has cleared that hurdle, he needs to gather a majority in the upper house, which will be even harder.

Argentina is also heavily indebted, including to the International Monetary Fund, and creditors are likely to have a say in how the country is run. Anything that scares them will raise the cost of credit, which Argentina can ill afford.

Wait and see

Once the initial euphoria of seeing a true libertarian in power has cleared, then, we are left with the sobering realisation that Milei may not be able to achieve anywhere near as much as he has promised.

Turning failing countries around is not for the faint-hearted, and it always comes with social upheaval and economic pain.

Even if Milei gets the good ship Argentina pointed in the right direction again, the prevailing winds and currents may still dash it – and its captain – upon the rocks.

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*Ivo Vegter is a freelance journalist, columnist and speaker who loves debunking myths and misconceptions, and addresses topics from the perspective of individual liberty and free markets.

This article was first published by Daily Friend and is republished with permission

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Title:

Content: Milei Experiment

In the tangled web of Argentine politics and economics, one figure has emerged as both a lightning rod for controversy and a beacon of hope ~ President Javier Milei.

In the tangled web of Argentine politics and economics, one figure has emerged as both a lightning rod for controversy and a beacon of hope ~ President Javier Milei. His first 100 days in office have been marked by a whirlwind of fiscal manoeuvres, bold policy shifts, and commitment to economic reform. But as Argentina teeters on the edge of uncertainty, Mr Milei’s ambitious agenda raises questions even it offers solutions. At the heart of Mr Milei’s strategy lies a radical departure from conventional wisdom.

Brandishing a chainsaw as a symbol of fiscal austerity, he has pledged to slash spending and achieve a budget surplus, a feat unheard of in a country plagued by decades of fiscal mismanagement. His unorthodox approach has garnered both praise and scepticism, as Argentines grapple with the harsh realities of rising poverty and economic contraction. The cornerstone of Mr Milei’s economic vision is the elimination of money-printing and the pursuit of a unified exchange rate. By devaluing the peso and cutting interest rates, he aims to rein in inflation and restore confidence in the economy.

Yet the path to stability is fraught with pitfalls, as the spectre of recession looms large and investors remain wary of the government’s opaque monetary policies. While Mr Milei’s commitment to reform is commendable, his political isolation poses a significant obstacle to meaningful change. With little support in the Argentine Congress and a fragmented coalition, he faces an uphill battle. The recent defeat of a sprawling omnibus bill highlights the challenges ahead, as competing interests and entrenched political factions threaten to derail Mr Milei’s ambitions. Moreover, the uncertainty surrounding Argentina’s future monetary regime adds another layer of complexity to the equation. Will Mr Milei pivot towards dollarization or pursue a more gradual approach to currency reform? The lack of clarity on this front only serves to fuel investor anxieties and exacerbate economic volatility. Amidst these challenges, Mr Milei’s fate hangs in the balance. How much economic pain can Argentines endure before turning on their unconventional leader? And can Mr Milei muster the political support needed to navigate the treacherous waters of Argentine politics?

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In the end, the trajectory of Mr Milei’s presidency hinges on the delicate balance between economic resilience and political manoeuvring. Should he manage to maintain public support and secure crucial alliances, Mr Milei could emerge as a formidable force in next year’s mid-term elections. However, any slip in popularity could spell disaster for his ambitious agenda, opening the door for his adversaries to dismantle his presidency. Whether Mr Milei’s gamble will pay off remains to be seen. But one thing is certain. In a country accustomed to political upheaval and economic turmoil, the journey towards reform is bound to be fraught with uncertainty and adversity. Only time will tell whether Mr Milei’s vision for Argentina’s future will lead to prosperity or further hardship

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Milei’s monetary strategy centers on devaluing the peso and replacing it with the US dollar to combat inflation, which exceeded 200% at his election, with monthly rates declining after aggressive monetary tightening, though overall inflation remains high .

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Content: Argentine government announces first quarterly surplus since 2008

Javier Milei celebrated the accomplishment, which achieved via a substantial reduction in government spending, including reductions in public works and redistribution to regional governments.

The Argentine government, led by President Javier Milei, announced Monday that it closed the first quarter with a fiscal surplus for the first time since 2008.

Milei broke the news on national television with marked joy. This fiscal surplus of 0.2% of GDP occurs after the first three months under the Libertarian president and his "chainsaw" method against public spending. Since coming to power, as he promised during the campaign, Milei has carried out a policy of heavy cuts to state infrastructure.

“This economic miracle of achieving a quarterly financial surplus after almost 20 years, having inherited the situation that we did, responds to what those who want the failure of this government usually say, to an enormous extent to what we called a 'chainsaw' during the campaign, and not as some say to the liquefaction of public funds, a method that has historically been used in our country," celebrated Milei from the Casa Rosada in Buenos Aires, the president's official residence. “The fiscal surplus is the cornerstone from which we will build Argentina's new era of prosperity,” he added, standing alongside several members of his government.

The fiscal surplus of 0.2% for Argentina represents about $300,000. The accomplishment comes after cuts of almost 75% of state transfers to regional governments in Argentina, as well as halting 90% of public works, and the popular policy of reducing the number of public ministries from 18, as under the previous government, to only nine. Argentine bonds increased in value shortly after the president's announcement.

For Milei, the reduction of public spending and of the large deficit was an obligatory step in his objective of restructuring the Argentine state. The president assured that public deficits cause inflation, his arch nemesis, which in 2023 in Argentina was the highest in the Americas, reaching 211.4% at the end of Alberto Fernández's presidency.

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Content: Overview:

Argentina's latest presidential election offers plenty of sensational fodder for the presses. But there's a deeper issue here, a politics of desperation, that we would do well to watch as it rises in the world.

Reading Time: 6 minutes

On November 19, Argentina elected Javier Milei as its next president, to take office this December. His politics have been compared to those of Donald Trump (in his showmanship) and Jair Bolsonaro (in his rightwing extremism and denialism), but his ideas go further than both. Milei calls himself an anarcho-capitalist (a form of libertarian), whose stated aims are “blowing up” the central bank, changing the Argentinian peso for the dollar, permitting the private sale of human organs, and closing ministries for education, health, women, and culture while slashing welfare payments.

Milei has also been called a “minarchist” for his minimal-government belief that the state’s only purpose is to protect citizens’ rights to free action. To this end, proposed bans on abortion and loosened gun laws run in lockstep with his acceptance of trans identities and desire to legalize more drugs. He denies the scale of Argentina’s brutal history of state terror in 1976 to 1983, and when he first rose in the polls, there was a panicked rush among citizens to change their pesos for dollars, fearing economic disaster.

So why did he win?

And not just by a hair, but with 56% of the vote against his runoff opponent, Sergei Massa?

The historical underpinnings run deep, but human behavior in response to the current economic moment is also not complex. Urban poverty hit 40.1% in 2023, as inflation reached 50.7% earlier this year. When the official exchange rate was devalued by 22% the day after the primaries (in which Milei’s popularity caused panic), it caused a 12.4% inflation spike. This is in an enconomy where some 48.1% are informally or self-employed, and thus without salaried protections against the greatest financial hits.

An outsider expecting rational economic actors might assume that if Milei’s presence in the polls only destabilized an already precarious situation, surely humans would avoid voting for him again. But the logic of longstanding financial stress runs deeper than traditional economic configurations of the “rational actor”: when there is no confidence in existing state structures, perhaps it is best to pull off the bandaid quickly. The immediate pain will be hard, but maybe, just maybe, the destruction of the old order will bring about something new.

This is the politics of desperation and disillusionment.

The world would do well to pay attention to its rise.

Argentinian histories of low confidence in the state

There’s a famous, apocryphal, and above all cruel expression in economics: “There have only been four types of economies in the world: advanced, developing, Japan, and Argentina.” The point driven at here is that Japan seemed to rise from the ashes, with everything working against it, after World War II and even now with an aging workforce. Meanwhile Argentina, a country with a natural bounty, seemed to destroy confidence in itself at every turn.

This is a cruel expression for a few reasons: one being that Argentina is not alone even in South America, as a country with great internal resources that has struggled to turn its holdings into wealth for its citizens. Another reason is the why. While Japan recovered from WWII by growing a commercial empire through top-down industrial relationships with surrounding countries, Argentina under labor-nationalist Juan Domingo Perón had the audacity in the 1950s to try to nationalize its British-owned railways. This choice met with swift reprisal from Western powers, thereafter unwilling to invest. Before World War II, Argentina had relied heavily on military rule. After inflation spiked and labor strikes surged as global investors pulled out, it was back to decades of fraught authoritarianism.

One of the worst coups started with a 600 percent inflation surge in 1976. That seven-year period yielded up to 30,000 disappeared human beings during the state’s “Dirty War” against leftists, and ended only after the military attempted to take the Falkland Islands from the British. This failure would yield the modern democratic state, but with a low opinion of both the military and the bureaucracy. In 1989, ahead of a massive inflation crisis of up to 4,900 percent, only 30,000 out of 30 million citizens were paying income taxes.

Now, inflation can address domestic debt, but Argentina’s massive fiscal deficit was informed centrally by external debt, in dollars to the rest of the world. During the banking crisis of 1990, banks forced client deposits into bonds under the BONEX Plan, essentially taking citizens’ savings from them with a promise that their investment in the future of the country would pay off. Citizens were not happy about this, of course.

The government then introduced the Convertibility Plan in 1991, which tried to peg the Argentinian peso to the US dollar at a 1:1 rate. This process involved Argentina embracing US neoliberal state policies: relaxing labor protections, massively privatizing industries, and otherwise bringing the world back into Argentinian markets. Did the plan reduce inflation? Yes. It also raised unemployment, reduced wages, and stratified class outcomes. And it led to more austerity measures over time, because the government’s debt kept rising, forcing more of the annual budget into “debt servicing” to other countries.

Being open to world markets also meant being more vulnerable to their downturns, such as a major wobble in 2001, which sparked labor collapse and food riots in Argentina despite its local wealth of grain and beef. The peso was unpegged in 2002, after the government had restricted bank withdrawals to keep citizens from “financial flight” into other currencies and markets. Once the peso was floating freely, though, people panicked anyway. After years of seeing the dollar as the more valuable and stable currency, they rushed to exchange their holdings (which were now all in pesos) back into US dollars by other means. That rush caused another inflationary spike.

Argentina underwent two major debt restructuring deals in that decade, but they just created more problems. A deal in 2001 allowed Argentina to pay interest only to those who had opted in to the restructuring plan, and the exclusion of “holdouts” was reasserted after 2010, when the debt plan was agreed upon by 93% of bondholders. The remaining 7% weren’t having this, though: a few hedge fund creditors sued the Argentinian government for breach of a principle of equal treatment for bondholders, pari passu. The South District Court of New York agreed with them, and even though Argentina tried to continue paying its “holdin” creditors, as per the debt restructuring plan, those payments were not permitted until Argentina paid the holdouts, too, in compliance with the court’s rulings.

Argentina was forced into a massive default in 2014. And again in 2020. And this year, analysts believe it’s on track for another soon.

Why? Because Argentina’s banking system isn’t an independent force. It is yoked to a highly litigious set of international players, and vulnerable to every global market crash as well.

Seen this way, why wouldn’t the average Argentinian want to bring it down?

Dollarization and other flawed promises

The complex problem for Argentinians voting out of desperation is twofold:

For one, as much as they might associate the days of the dollar with a period of relative stability, it was never a simple matter of pegging one currency to another. The arrangement expressly came with Argentina’s willingness to embrace neoliberal policies that yielded stark divides in civilian life and other market outcomes. For Milei to “dollarize” the country now would require a similar willingness to play ball with international institutions and their policy demands. The moment the peso is eliminated, by being exchanged in its entirety for dollars, Argentina cedes a great deal of financial policy to external players.

And yet, that is precisely the issue currently plaguing Argentina’s banks.

But also, not just Argentina, despite the glibness of the apocryphal economics saying.

The problems of our global financial system are serious enough that they will require a much more holistic reckoning with the consequences of fifty years of neoliberal policy. In July, a UN joint commission released “Soaring Debt Threatens Global Prosperity”, a report that highlights the staggering rates of debt servicing endured by 40% of the developing world. If these debts were simply between states, that would be one matter, more easily resolved; but the hyper-privatized yet undertaxed nature of our global economy has the vast majority of these countries forced into austerity measures to pay off complex debts to groups like the hedge fund creditors who pushed Argentina into default in 2014.

In other words, this will keep happening until we develop policies that can offset the private-investment predation currently facing many countries in precarity.

The second problem is one that Colombia also experienced this past year, when many on both the left (with excitement) and the right (with trepidation) expected the first leftist president to bring about dramatic reforms: Milei is just one person in his government. Just as Gustavo Petro found himself embroiled in parliamentary quarrels between competing groups, so too does Milei’s victory not come with the resounding legislative presence needed to steamroll all his grand plans into operation. He, too, is going to have to negotiate.

In practice, this means that Argentinians currently thrilled by the possibility of change are again going to meet with disillusionment. Either Milei will pull off his dollarization, and they will learn that this move makes the country no less vulnerable to global shocks and creditors, or he won’t, and amid his interim achievement of “easier” goals (e.g., the demolition of whole ministries), Argentinians will experience socioeconomic shocks that again bring them to the streets in protest… or else to live, having nowhere else to go.

GLOBAL HUMANIST SHOPTALK M L Clark is a Canadian writer by birth, now based in Medellín, Colombia, who publishes speculative fiction and humanist essays with a focus on imagining a more just world.

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Content: Monday, March 11, 2024

Javier Milei Informs Public of Labor Secretary’s Firing in Live Interview

'The consensus of the ministers was that we have to manage with our salaries frozen....'

(Matthew Doarnberger, Headline USA) Argentinian President Javier Milei recently fired Labor Secretary Omar Yasín and informed the public of his firing live on the air.

During an interview with the Argentina-based television station LN+, Milei stated that the secretary of labor had been fired.

The interviewer then asked the president when the firing had taken place.

“At this moment they’re notifying him,” was Milei’s response.

The reason for the firing stemmed from salary increases to government officials that Milei claimed were a mistake.

“This is an error that should not have been made, because moreover, this was cleared up in January,” he said. “The consensus of the ministers was that we have to manage with our salaries frozen.”

Recently, the new president—a fiscally conservative populist-libertarian folk hero and friend of U.S. Republican leader Donald Trump—rescinded a 48% pay raise for himself and his Cabinet.

Prior to that, Argentinian lawmakers had announced that they would present a bill to overturn increases of around 30% to their own salaries.

“I don’t agree with the salary raise,” the president said while speaking of the 30% lawmaker pay raise. “I understand that they might have needs, but 60% of Argentines are poor and 10% are destitute.”

Milei has previously called the nation’s congress a “rat’s nest” and accused politicians of being out of touch with the economic problems of the local population.

He has taken an aggressive approach to cutting spending since assuming office three months ago. As a result, Argentina achieved their first budget surplus in 12 years back in January.

He also fired 5,000 government employees soon after becoming president.

Yasín had been serving as Milei’s secretary of labor since the president first assumed office in December 2023.

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What economic issue did Milei want to address?

What economic issue did Milei want to address?

What economic issue did Milei want to address?

What economic issue did Milei want to address?

Critics warn dollarization could deplete reserves and risk hyperinflation, while supporters argue it could restore stability .

His administration also pursues privatization of state-owned enterprises and deregulation, including eliminating rent controls and supermarket regulations .

How will Milei's reforms impact workers?

What industries were affected by Milei's deregulations?

How will Milei's reforms impact workers?

What industries were affected by Milei's deregulations?

Politically, Milei’s coalition holds a minority in Congress, prompting a strategy of “turbo-politics” that bypasses traditional legislative processes.

He issued a Necessity and Urgency Decree to repeal over 300 laws and facilitate privatizations, but faced Senate rejection of a major deregulation decree, highlighting institutional resistance [13168c51

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Content: Javier Milei against democracy

Argentines must be patient since Javier Milei can only rely on them, not on all those supposed representatives of the people.

The Argentine president suffered a setback again after the Senate rejected the mega-decree to deregulate the country. However, for the package aimed at removing the suffocating state bureaucracy to be effectively rejected, it would also have to be rejected by the Chamber of Deputies.

As expected, the libertarian targeted the senators who voted against the decree, who were not only Peronists of various currents but also some radicals.

"Let the political class decide which side of history they want to be on," said the president. He added that it is an attempt to undermine the so-called May Pact, an agreement that Javier Milei seeks to reach with the governors of the provinces and the mayor of the city of Buenos Aires so that economic freedom reigns in Argentina instead of socialism, which has destroyed the country's economy and isolated it from the world.

Milei knew that rectifying the economy would not be a walk in the park since, although he is president, his party does not have a governor, a mayor, or a majority in any chamber. This is all amid a tough but necessary adjustment to settle the country's accounts and allow it to grow again. Therefore, if it had not been for the support of the citizens, it would surely have fallen by now.

The president, a complete outsider, must have a "political waist" to reach consensus. That is, he must enter the thick, contaminated and cumbersome mud of Argentine democracy in order to implement his plan.

But who makes up this democracy that they ask so much to respect? With whom do they ask you to reach a consensus? Well, with the same ones who have trampled on the constitution, the forms, the division of powers, etc. Those who went for everything without respecting absolutely anything today whiningly ask to be taken into account when making decisions. However, if any of the measures are effectively unconstitutional, it is not something that a legislator should decide since that is what the Supreme Court is for, right?

Javier Milei has to fight against all who make up this democracy, go through the impassable swamp that the Argentine bureaucracy represents, and that many need him to continue, even if that means hyperinflation, misery, unemployment, crime, etc. We could say that the ideal slogan for socialism would be "the worse, the better." In this way, they have the perfect excuse to intervene in the economy and in the lives of everyone in order to maintain the power and business of politics. That is, they want a country of militants, not workers. A country of officials who "love" the poor but not enough to lift them out of poverty. A country where resentment is more important than self-improvement,  where restrictions are more important than freedom and crime is justified and success demonized.

In the government, there is now an honest man who makes mistakes, whose ways are, at times, questionable, but who sincerely wants to fix the country. Who is a great economist and was able to predict with impressive success all the disasters that were coming to Argentina in previous administrations. Who has enough courage to confront the interventionist dinosaurs who seek to repeat failure, using democracy or the constitution as an excuse when it suits them, despite the fact that the majority of the supposed representatives of the people are the same ones who stand in the way of the president carrying out the changes that the majority of Argentines voted for. What democracy are they talking about?

Javier Milei, with his mistakes and successes, is on the side of the free world at a global level. He is cleansing the State of wasteful militants, reducing spending and stopping emissions. He is trying to repeal laws that have been resounding failures while being mercilessly attacked by the press, by opposition politicians who are actually coup plotters, by artists and leftist militants who only seek to continue parasitizing.

Argentines must understand that if the economic improvement takes longer than desired, it is because the dinosaurs that make up this democracy are muddying the playing field, so progress cannot be made, and they have to go back.

Argentines must be patient since Milei can only rely on them, not on all those supposed representatives of the people. The solution may take a while, but don't let it fail. This government is the last hope for Argentina. Do not miss such an opportunity, which may occur only once in history.

How will Milei's reforms impact workers?

How will Milei's reforms impact workers?