The Hagia Sophia controversy surrounding its 2020 reconversion by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is a multilayered story combining historical heritage, religious symbolism, domestic politics, and international diplomacy, with distinctive resonances in the Arab world.

To understand its complexity and appeal for your Arab audience, the following expanded analysis incorporates broader regional perspectives, detailed socio-political contexts, and vivid examples and statements that capture the ongoing debate.

Historically, Hagia Sophia’s status has been fluid, symbolizing shifts in power, religion, and identity.

Constructed in the 6th century as the Byzantine Empire’s grand cathedral, it was transformed into an imperial mosque following the Ottoman conquest in 1453.

It served as a mosque for nearly 500 years until 1934, when Turkey’s secular government under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk converted it into a museum as a cornerstone of Turkey’s secular and modernist reforms.

The building became a UNESCO

World Heritage Site in 1985, celebrated globally for its unique fusion of Byzantine architecture and Ottoman Islamic artistry, representing a multicultural heritage bridging East and West.

The 2020 court decision to overturn the 1934 museum status triggered its conversion back into a mosque.

Erdogan heralded the move as restoring a “glorious chapter” in Turkish and Islamic history, positioning Turkey as a sovereign nation rejecting foreign interference and reviving Ottoman heritage and Muslim pride.

His government emphasized that the mosque remains open to visitors of all faiths outside prayer times, defending it as a peaceful coexistence symbol rooted in Turkey’s multifaceted history.

Religious reactions expose deep fissures.

Orthodox Christian communities, especially the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and Greek Orthodox Church, strongly condemned the decision.

They lamented restrictions imposed on worship and cultural access, notably the covering of Christian mosaics during Muslim prayers, which they argue diminishes the site's rich Christian legacy and threatens the rights and visibility of Christian minorities in Turkey.

Senior Christian leaders voiced concerns about the long-term safety and freedom of their communities amid what they perceive as an Islamist-nationalist trend marginalizing non-Muslims.

Within Turkey, reactions reflect significant polarization.

Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and allied Islamic scholar organizations, such as the Ulema Forum and Association of Muslim Scholars, praised the reconversion as a rightful reclamation of Turkey’s Ottoman-Islamic identity and a step toward restoring Muslim dignity.

Supporters underscore it as a proud revival aligned with Turkey’s increasing religious nationalism and sovereign aspirations.

In contrast, secularist parties, human rights activists, and minority advocacy groups criticized the decision as contradicting Turkey’s secular constitution and harming Turkey’s pluralistic fabric.

Analysts link Erdogan’s timing—after electoral setbacks in metropolitan areas and amid economic strife—to a political strategy mobilizing nationalist and conservative voters by appealing to Islamic symbolism.

Polling data reflected a rallying of the religious base but also exacerbated divisions within Turkish society.

In the Arab world, official government responses were generally measured, reflecting a diplomatic balancing act.

While Turkey enjoys strong influence and ties in many Arab countries, particularly through political Islam movements hospitable to Erdogan’s leadership style, Arab states cautiously welcomed or remained neutral to avoid straining relations.

Regional bodies like the Arab League issued reserved statements emphasizing respect for heritage and religious pluralism without explicit endorsement or condemnation.

Among Arab intellectuals, religious scholars, and social media influencers, reactions were mixed and more vocal.

Prominent Arab commentators on platforms like Twitter and YouTube expressed pride in the restoration of an Islamic monument and acknowledged Hagia Sophia’s importance in Ottoman and Muslim history.

For example, some celebrated Erdogan’s decision as a bold defiance against Western cultural interventions.

Conversely, other Arab voices—especially those concerned with regional Christian minorities—questioned the move's impact on interfaith harmony and cultural inclusive heritage.

Notably, respected Islamic institutions like Al-Azhar maintained diplomatic silence or stressed the need to preserve historic sites’ multi-religious character, reflecting nuanced positions amid political complexities.

The Turkish Christian minority community continues to face challenges exacerbated by the reconversion.

Church leaders highlight persistent issues, such as delays in legislative reforms governing religious foundations critical for minority worship and social life.

Restrictions on access to Hagia Sophia’s Christian artistic treasures symbolize broader marginalization fears.

Orthodox representatives appeal internationally for protection of religious rights, noting the reconversion as a marker in a wider pattern of Islamo-nationalist policies affecting religious minorities’ freedoms and security.

Tourism and heritage management at Hagia Sophia have transformed under the mosque status.

Entrance fees are now charged, and non-Muslim visitors no longer enjoy unrestricted access; certain prayer times limit tourism flows, with the main floor reserved for worshippers.

Conservationists and historians have raised alarms about the physical toll caused by increased foot traffic and inadequate preservation efforts.

The Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), charged with site management, has faced criticism for neglecting the site’s delicate mosaics and architectural integrity.

Calls from international conservation groups emphasize the need to balance religious use with the protection of Hagia Sophia’s irreplaceable cultural heritage.

International institutions voiced formal concern.

UNESCO stressed that changes must respect the site’s universal value as a World Heritage Site, warning that the reconversion could risk Hapgia Sophia’s protection commitments.

The European Union, US government, and many Western organizations criticized the decision, framing it as detrimental to religious freedom and Turkey’s secular, multicultural identity.

Turkey rebuffed these warnings, interpreting them as politically motivated attempts to influence its sovereign affairs, reframing the decision as a proud reclamation of dignity and historic rights.

Notable international statements illustrate the polarized perceptions.

Erdogan’s rhetoric highlighted the reconversion as restoring Istanbul’s identity to its Ottoman roots and as part of a global Muslim revival.

In stark contrast, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis condemned the decision as an affront to Istanbul’s pluralistic heritage and a source of regional tension.

The US State Department expressed concerns over religious freedoms.

The Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I framed the move as a setback for interfaith dialogue and minority protection in Turkey.

Domestically, the reconversion intensified Turkey’s ongoing identity debate between secularism and Islamism.

Erdogan’s ruling AKP, with Islamist and nationalist underpinnings, contrasts sharply with secular opposition parties such as the Republican People’s Party (CHP), who view the Hagia Sophia status change as symbolic of Turkey’s drift away from secular principles enshrined by Atatürk.

This ideological clash influences Turkish politics, media discourse, and social attitudes and shapes Turkey’s foreign relations with Arab neighbors, who closely watch Turkey’s internal religious-political balance.

The 2020 reconversion also fits into Erdogan’s broader regional diplomacy narrative, portraying Turkey as an assertive Muslim power independent of Western influence.

It sends signals within the Middle East and beyond about the restoration of Ottoman-Islamic legacy and Turkey’s self-perception as a leader of the Muslim world, resonating variably with different Arab political and religious factions.

In conclusion, the Hagia Sophia controversy remains a potent and complex subject with diverse implications for religion, politics, heritage conservation, and regional dynamics.

For your Arab audience, it offers a compelling story that touches on shared Islamic history, the challenges of religious pluralism, identity politics within Turkey and the wider Muslim world, and the tension between global heritage values and national sovereignty.

Incorporating vivid quotes from Erdogan and his critics, highlighting voices of Arab religious scholars and influencers, and exploring the impacts on local communities will enrich your content and engage your viewers with meaningful insights into this extraordinary cultural and political saga.

The Hagia Sophia controversy surrounding its 2020 reconversion by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is a multilayered story combining historical heritage, religious symbolism, domestic politics, and international diplomacy, with distinctive resonances in the Arab world.

Title:

Content: She returned Hagia Sophia to a mosque.
Turkey has challenged global trusteeship
Daily Morning
Istanbul, Turkey
Posted at 29.10.2022 10: 23
Hagia Sophia Mosque (Getty Images)
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Friday that the fact that Turkey has returned the Hagia Sophia museum from a museum to a mosque represents a major challenge to the global trusteeship.
Speaking at a ceremony announcing the vision of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) “Turkey ’ s Century ” in Ankara, Erdogan said his country was challenging global tutelage and thanked citizens for their support for the decision to return Hagia Sophia.
He noted that his party has always sought to eliminate any vestiges of guardianship and promote democracy in the country over the past 20 years.
Turkey has lived through a remarkable period in its history in general and the history of Istanbul, especially when Hagia Sophia was transformed from its status as a museum and restored to its former glory as the Grand Mosque of Hagia Sophia on July 24, 2020.
The historic building remained a church for 916 years until the conquest of Istanbul.
It was then used as a mosque between 1453 and 1934, nearly 500 years before becoming a museum for 86 years.
It is one of the most visited historical buildings in Turkey by domestic and international tourists, and Hagia Sophia was added to the UNESCO World Heritage List in 1985.
On July 10, 2020, a Turkish court overturned a 1934 ministerial decision that turned Hagia Sophia into a museum, paving the way for it to be used again as a mosque after an 86-year hiatus.

No--In 1934, Ataturk turned it into a museum, making it a major tourist attraction and secular symbol in Turkey.

To understand its complexity and appeal for your Arab audience, the following expanded analysis incorporates broader regional perspectives, detailed socio-political contexts, and vivid examples and statements that capture the ongoing debate.

Title:

Content: REPORTS
Saudi-Israeli normalization to save Netanyahu
Mahmoud Hashemi.
31 / 7 / 2023
Israel believes that the normalization projects it has concluded with some Arab countries have not changed the equation of hatred against it in the region or the world, mainly because Zionism as a religious, political and social project is based on hatred of the other, as well as the behavior of the Zionist entity towards Arab and Palestinian issues in particular represents the largest area of violations and abuses on land, human beings and holy sites.
Israel is going through the most difficult conditions in the history of its existence in the region for 75 years to the extent that its thinkers are unanimous that this entity
It will not reach the age of eighty years like the age of their (previous) projects, the resistance missiles
Its map surrounds most of the parties (Lebanon, Syria, Palestine) and without securing the other borders while the depth of resistance increases every day, and inside the country is living a crisis that threatens the complete collapse of its political and social system.
Israel now sees the only savior delaying its collapse as accepting Saudi Arabia.
Normalize with it, so it puts a lot of pressure on America.
In return, Jewish organizations will work to support the Democratic Party in the upcoming elections.
The circumstances in the region and the world have given Saudi Arabia a greater chance than others.
If you work outside of the will of the United States, you hurry.
And with remarkable activity to hold the three summits of Riyadh and the invitation of the Chinese President to them, and to reunite the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arabs in their summits and their Arab League and moved towards Syria and Iraq and restore the relationship with Iran and its eyes on Russia and the Brix and softened its grip on its people while slowing
American and Western officials in general.
Erdogan ’ s visit to Saudi Arabia gave the kingdom ’ s leaders a vision that Turkey was seeking to dominate Saudi Arabia.
The region to replace America in security and economy, so they did not react to the visit.
They may see themselves as the closest to this project, despite the announcement of economic and security agreements.
Let us read together what the Saudi writer (Ali Al-Khashiban) wrote after the Riyadh Summits (In the Riyadh Summits, the reality proved that we in Saudi Arabia have the ability, energy, vitality and adaptation to move beyond the present to the future by creating new political values capable of giving us the place we deserve in the course of international politics).
All these data and many others made Saudi Arabia realize that it always has a regional and international understanding towards its responsibility.
Even in the field of religious belief, which ruled the Kingdom for centuries, Mohammed bin Salman says that his country spread Wahhabism at the request of its allies to counter the influence of the Soviet Union.! While Wahhabi thought is now out of the equation according to the new transformations in the Kingdom.
Everyone knows, including the princes of the kingdom.
It is America that has led some Arab countries to normalize with Israel for two reasons: first, America wants to be the decision-maker and second, the countries of the region can not stand to sit with the Zionists, so Israel now finds itself only to extend a hand to Saudi Arabia.
The Saudi crown prince and his government team
They feel America ’ s (concern), and such is Israel ’ s concern, so they set conditions that seem (difficult) for both America and Israel, and then there is no Zionist guarantee and the question that may be in the mind of the rulers of the kingdom (and what is the point of normalization with the Zionists?)
Israel does not want to give up anything, and to exercise its tyranny and tyranny on the Palestinian people, as it did with the "previous printers", where it did not listen to a single letter of their demands while it has won many privileges, especially with the UAE.
The Saudi writer Ali Al-Khashiban says in the same article (Saudi Arabia is deeply aware of its preservation of the gains of the Arab and Islamic nation and supports its vital issues) in the sense of (the Palestinian cause!
The Saudis want three things from America: a NATO-style mutual defense treaty, a civilian nuclear program, and the ability to buy advanced weapons, although this declaration is known about the Palestinian cause, as Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan stressed that normalization of his country ’ s relations with Israel will not take place before “granting the Palestinians a state, ” stressing Saudi Arabia ’ s position in line with the international position calling for a“ two-state solution ” to establish a Palestinian state.
This is almost impossible under the extreme right wing government led by Netanyahu in Israel.
Saudi Arabia is preparing to host peace talks on Ukraine attended by senior officials from 30 Western countries, including India, Brazil and other countries (without Russia), on August 5-6 to sign joint principles to end the Ukrainian-Russian war.
Accordingly, Saudi Arabia now aspires to be an arena for global "crisis resolution".
Wouldn ’ t it be the first place to support the Palestinian cause instead of engaging in projects (surrender and normalization) that have lost the identity and personality of those who have already done so?
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Historically, Hagia Sophia’s status has been fluid, symbolizing shifts in power, religion, and identity.

Title:

Content: After Hagia Sophia, Turkey converts a second ancient Byzantine church into a mosque

Hundreds of worshippers filled the narrow streets of Istanbul's Fatih district on Friday to hear the sounds of Friday prayers ringing out from the newly inaugurated Kariye Mosque.

Once known as the Chora Church, the site spent the last 79 years as a museum. But it is now the latest structure to be converted back into a mosque by the government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, following the conversion of Hagia Sophia in 2020. While viewed as a triumph by many Turkish Muslims, the Greek Orthodox Church has decried it as an "ill-advised decision" that "makes a mockery of the Turkish government's commitment to religious tolerance and religious freedom."

Chora's conversion was announced shortly after Hagia Sophia's, but its opening for prayer was delayed by years of restoration work.

The showing for the first Friday prayers at Kariye was relatively quiet compared to Hagia Sophia, which drew hundreds of thousands who filled the streets with prayer rugs for blocks and blocks away from the building. By contrast, the crowd on Friday was relatively average for a mosque in one of Istanbul's more religiously conservative neighborhoods, where Friday worshippers frequently spill out onto the streets.

Both the Chora Church and Hagia Sophia are 4th-century Byzantine constructions. They spent nearly a millennium as Christian holy sites before being converted to mosques by the Ottomans after their conquest of Constantinople in the 15th century. Despite their conversions, they remained revered by Orthodox Christians. After the founding of a secular Turkish Republic in the early 20th century, the decision was made for both to be neither mosque nor church but simply museums.

"Both Hagia Sophia and Chora embodied Byzantine and Ottoman pasts, and they became symbols of co-existence and multi-faith living practices. Their conversion fundamentally implies a hierarchy, prioritizing the Islamic past over all other layers, Greek Orthodox, Armenian, Jewish, Syriac, et al," Dr. Özgür Kaymak, a lecturer and researcher on minority rights at Istanbul's MEF University, told Religion News Service in an email.

Rededicating the sites as mosques is more than just a status change. According to Islamic tradition, artwork of human figures are forbidden in places of prayer, while in Orthodox Churches, icons of Christ, saints and other biblical figures are a defining feature.

In Hagia Sophia, the mosaics of Jesus and Mary have been covered with curtains since the conversion. While Erdoğan promised Hagia Sophia would remain fully accessible and free to all visitors, Turkey reneged on that earlier this year, reimposing an entrance fee on tourists and relegating them to the upper level, while the main floor is exclusive to Muslim worshippers.

Observers have also criticized the Turkish Directorate of Religion's caretaking of the site, noting damage that did not exist when it was under the purview of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism.

Though Chora is significantly smaller than Hagia Sophia, it is home to some of the best-preserved examples of late-Byzantine art, including mosaics, icons and frescoes, and is considered a UNESCO World Heritage site.

"For us it's a very important place because it remembers our culture and our traditions here," Father Evangelos Markantonis, an Orthodox priest who was leading a group of theology students to Chora on Friday, told Religion News Service.

"Though we cannot venerate as Orthodox Christians, we have to try to find things we can be united on. Only with dialogue and good deeds can we continue our lives," Markantonis, who is also a professor at the University of Athens, said when asked about the controversy.

Erdoğan had long refused calls from his right to convert churches like Hagia Sophia and Chora, telling supporters in 2018 to fill the nearby Sultan Ahmet Mosque (also known in English as the Blue Mosque) before they talked about needing to pray in Hagia Sophia.

Nonetheless, he made an about-turn in 2020.

"My dear nation, the conquest of Istanbul and the conversion of the Hagia Sophia into a Mosque are among the most glorious chapters in Turkish history," Erdoğan said at the time in a speech inaugurating the Hagia Sophia as a mosque.

"This is the most honorable day that Islam has been looking forward to, Greek Constantinople has become Turkish Istanbul," he added, quoting the Turkish poet Nazim Hikmet.

"The resurrection of Hagia Sophia heralds the liberation of the al-Aqsa Mosque. The resurrection of Hagia Sophia is the footsteps of the will of Muslims across the world to come out of the interregnum," Erdoğan said in his concluding remarks.

Chora's opening as the Kariye Mosque comes just weeks after Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) suffered its largest electoral defeat in two decades during Turkey's nationwide municipal elections.

"The recent conversion of Chora into a mosque may be due to Erdoğan's many problems, including his geopolitical power politics, his appeal to religio-nationalism to revive his electoral popularity after the March elections or his tactic to divert attention from Turkey's economic downturn," Kaymak said.

Many analysts have attributed the loss to AKP bleeding votes to the more Islamist-leaning New Welfare Party, which has pressured Erdogan over his response to the Israel-Hamas war and humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip.

Muslim worshippers at the mosque on Friday said they viewed its rededication as an Islamic site to be a national win for Turkey.

"This mosque is one of the symbols of the Conquest. We are proud and happy. There are very beautiful frescoes inside. They were also nicely renovated before they were closed. May it be good for our country and our nation," a bystander, Ahmet Öteyüzoğlu, told Turkish media.

"Thank God for these days. Not everyone has the opportunity in their lifetime," another bystander named Mehmet Çelik told the Turkish news service Anadolu Agency, in reference to having been able to pray at both the rededicated Hagia Sophia and Kariye Mosques.

However, Greece, the U.S. State Department and Orthodox Christian institutions worldwide have all criticized the decision to revert the structure into a mosque.

"I want to publicly express my intense dissatisfaction, interpreting the feelings of all Greek women and men, for the completely unnecessary conversion of a historic Byzantine temple, the Monastery of Chora, into a mosque. It is, I believe, an action that offends the rich history of Istanbul itself as a crossroads of cultures," Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis said shortly before leaving for Turkey for a planned meeting with Erdogan.

"We encourage the Turkish government to preserve and ensure access to sites and buildings that have hosted different religious communities in a way that respects their diverse histories," a State Department spokesperson said in response to questions from Greek media.

"The Turkish government's appropriation of both as the property of one faith group not only constitutes yet another sign of that government's contempt for Turkey's rich Orthodox Christian heritage but further imperils the religious freedom of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the remaining Christians of that land," the Archons of the Ecumenical Patriarchate said in a statement.

© Religion News Service

No--In 1934, Ataturk turned it into a museum, making it a major tourist attraction and secular symbol in Turkey.

Constructed in the 6th century as the Byzantine Empire’s grand cathedral, it was transformed into an imperial mosque following the Ottoman conquest in 1453.

Title:

Content: >
December 9, 2021

Christian leaders look forward to Turkey's new law on religious foundations

This is an issue of vital importance for local Christian communities whose places of worship are entrusted to and managed by their governing bodies

Religious minorities in Turkey are looking forward to the increasingly Islamo-nationalist government making good its promise of outreach to non-Muslims by giving them freedom to establish and run their religious and social institutions.

The Turkish government is preparing to issue a new regulation on the administrative management of foundations linked to non-Muslim faith communities, which have been paralyzed for years by a legislative impasse that blocks the renewal of their governing bodies.

This is an issue of vital importance for local Christian communities such as Armenians and Assyrians, whose places of worship – many of them historic --, other real estate and public institutions are entrusted to and managed by foundations.

Burhan Ersoy, head of the state-run Directorate of the Foundations, has confirmed that the plan for the drafting of a new regulation concerning the elections for the assignment of offices within the foundations has come into being, Fides reported.

The draft of the text has been drawn up, taking into account requests and proposals from the various minority communities, and it is expected that the new rules, after obtaining government approval, would be implemented by April 2022.

The previous electoral regulation for the top management of foundations had been suspended in 2013, after the government chose to establish new procedures to make the management of real estate more functional and transparent.

This led to some confusion with representatives of the various minority communities unable to come to a consensus to either accept or reject the new electoral rules, Ersoy said.

The Syrian Orthodox Christian Süleyman Can Ustabaşı, current representative of the non-Muslim Foundations within the Assembly of Foundations, has said that the structure of foundations and their membership profiles had changed over time.

The Turkish government already had consultations with the representatives of religious minorities to resolve the dispute over board elections for their foundations.

But Ustabaşı now urges Turkish authorities to carry out another consultation with representatives of minority communities before the new text is to be implemented in 2022.

The legal status of the Foundations is still based on the Peace Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923 by Turkey and the Entente powers (British Empire, France and Russian Empire) victorious from the First World War.

The treaty guaranteed equality before the laws and the freedom to promote and manage "religious and social institutions" for non-Muslim communities in Turkey.

However, the state had seized properties run by these foundations and had to contend with litigation as these foundations claimed the rights guaranteed by the Treaty of Lausanne.

Also, starting from 1936, legislative provisions had allowed foundations of non-Muslim communities to acquire new properties. But in 1974, this guarantee was canceled and the state begun seizing assets acquired by these foundations.

Between 2013 and 2018 about 1,084 properties were returned to the foundations linked to non-Muslim communities, and 20 places of worship restored and given back to the foundations, according to official data.

Greek Orthodox Laki Vingas, in a speech published by the Armenian-Turkish newspaper Agos, said that the legislative deadlock on the question of the regulation of the foundations has had a negative effect on the life of the different ecclesial communities.

The block in the processes of renewal of the governing bodies of foundations had led to the expulsion of young people from the institutions linked to their communities, and also that many voluntary activities were "unfortunately interrupted".

Non-Muslim places of worship

Within the general Assembly of the Turkish Foundations are some 167 minority foundations. The Turkish Greek community has 77, the highest number of foundations. The Armenian community has 54 and the Jewish community has 19 foundations.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan after a cabinet meeting held on October 25 announced that authorities had put on the agenda the question of the elections of the directorates of the foundations linked to religious minorities.

He also spoke of fundamental tools for the management of assets and resources destined for non-Muslim places of worship.

The issue of the foundations come at a time when Turkish authorities have expelled more and more Protestant Christians -- foreigners and Turkish converts-- on grounds they constitute a "threat to national security".

Turkey had also recently transformed museums into mosques, such as the Hagia Sophia and the Church of the Holy Saviour in Chora.

Both churches had been turned into museums after the end of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of modern Turkey.

The Church of the Holy Saviour in Chora was built by the Byzantines in the 5th century. The Ottomans then turned it into a mosque after they captured Constantinople in 1453. And it remained a Muslim worship space until the end of the Second World War when it was transformed into a museum.

The same happened to the Hagia Sophia Museum in Iznik, and the high-profile reconversion of the Hagia Sophia Museum, Istanbul's most identifiable monument.

Many observers believe that President Erdogan, weakened internally by a bad economy and a lack of political perspective, is compensating with erasing part of the country's multiculturalism, aimed at shoring up the ranks of his Islamo-nationalist base.

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How did Hagia Sophia become important for Muslims?

Sultan Mehmed II converted Hagia Sophia into a mosque,making it a key religious site for Muslims for centuries.

No--In 1934, Ataturk turned it into a museum, making it a major tourist attraction and secular symbol in Turkey.

It served as a mosque for nearly 500 years until 1934, when Turkey’s secular government under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk converted it into a museum as a cornerstone of Turkey’s secular and modernist reforms.

Title:

Content: Turkey election: Erdogan re-elected, country continues to divide
Paul Kirby and Ece Goksedef
• BBC reporter from Ankara
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has been in power for years, won another five-year term, and his supporters celebrated all night.
“All 85 million people in the country have won, ” he told cheering crowds at his huge residence on the edge of Ankara.
But his call for unity appears hollow as he mocks his opponent, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, and targets jailed Kurdish leaders and LGBT (gay, bisexual and transgender) support policies.
The opposition leader did not publicly concede defeat.
Kirida Oru called it "the most unfair election in recent years" and said the president's party had used all the power of the government against him.
According to unofficial statistics close to the count, Erdoğan won just over 52% of the vote — nearly half of voters in a deeply polarized country who did not support his authoritarian vision for Turkey.
In the end, Krida Oru could not match the well-trained Erdogan campaign, even though he has pulled the current president into the runoff stage for the second round – the first since the Turkish president adopted direct elections in 2014.
But he failed to reverse his opponent's lead in the first round, with a gap of more than two million votes.
The Turkish president, for his part, proclaimed his victory to the greatest extent possible.
He spoke to crowds on a bus in Istanbul, the largest city, and then on the balcony of his official residence after dark, where some 320,000 people gathered in support of him.
“It ’ s not just us who won, it ’ s Turkey as a whole, ” he said, calling it one of the most important elections in Turkey ’ s history.
He taunted his defeated opponent: "Bye, Kemal." — a phrase echoed by supporters in Ankara.
He also denounced his rival allies for supporting LGBT policies, saying that he was at odds with his own family-centered principles.
Although the final result of the election was not confirmed, the Supreme Electoral Council said that the victory was no longer in doubt.
Erdoğan supporters everywhere in Ankara took to the streets to celebrate the victory, with some calling out the slogans of Islam and some laying the Turkish flag on the lawn to pray.
While some supporters say they believe Erdoğan will do better in the next five years, the president himself has acknowledged that Turkey ’ s high inflation rate is the most pressing problem at the moment – the country ’ s annual inflation rate is already close to 44%, affecting the lives of every citizen.
And the economy is not the biggest concern of Erdoğan ’ s supporters at the moment, who say they are proud of Erdoğan ’ s strong position in the world and his toughness in fighting “terrorists, ” by which they mean the Kurdish armed forces.
Despite the euphoria of supporters, the idea of unity in this torn country seems to be as far away as ever.
After the failed coup in 2016, Erdoğan had abolished the post of prime minister, with a high concentration of power, which opponents described as a step backwards.
Turkey ’ s opposition now has to regroup in order to prepare for the 2024 local elections.
A strong leader for 20 years.
From humble beginnings, Erdoğan is a giant in Turkish politics and has led the country for 20 years and is the most influential figure in the country since Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founding father of the modern republic.
Despite a series of crises, he won the 2023 election and remained in power.
It was his most precarious position in years, and his opponents believed he could defeat him.
Critics have accused his unruly economic policies of exacerbating the cost of living crisis in Turkey.
Moreover, as a combative leader who set a record in Turkey ’ s modernization, he seemed to be slow to respond to the earthquake that claimed 50,000 lives in February.
After escaping a coup d'état in 2016, he transformed the presidency into an executive role of supreme power and suppressed opponents and dissidents.
Beginning in 2003, first as prime minister and then as president by direct election since 2014, Turkey under Erdoğan ’ s leadership has been “flexing its muscles ” as a regional power, pursuing the Islamist cause and quickly overpowering its political rivals.
Although the head of a NATO member state, he placed himself in the position of mediator in the Russo-Ukrainian War, and made Sweden wait a bit longer to join the Western defense alliance.
His hard-line diplomacy angered Europe and beyond.
Erdoğan polarized his country, but he was a victorious general in the election.
His supporters refer to him as a "leader."
He accused opponents of contempt for Turkish voters and unpopular: "85 million people, we will protect our votes, our will and our future."
On the throne of power.
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was born in February 1954 on the Black Sea coast of Turkey, the son of a member of the Coast Guard. At the age of 13, his father decided to move to Istanbul, hoping for a better environment for his five children.
Young Erdoğan used to make extra money selling lemonade and sesame packets.
He attended an Islamic school and later earned a degree in management from Marmara University in Istanbul – and was a professional footballer.
In the 1970s and 1980s, he was active in Islamic circles, joining the pro-Islamic Welfare Party of Necmettin Erbakan. As the party gained popularity in the 1990s, Erdoğan was elected mayor of Istanbul in 1994, leading Turkey ’ s largest city for the next four years.
But his tenure came to an abrupt end when he was accused of openly reading nationalist poetry inciting hatred, which included phrases such as: “Mosques are our barracks, domes are our helmets, minarets are our bayonets, believers are our soldiers. ”
After a few months in prison, he returned to politics.
But his party has been banned for violating the strict secular rules of the modern Turkish government.
In 2001, he formed a new party with his ally Abdullah Gul. In 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) won a parliamentary majority, and Erdoğan was appointed prime minister the following year.
To this day, he is the chairman of the AKP.
First 10 years in power
Since 2003, he has been Prime Minister for three terms, leading a period of steady economic growth and earning international recognition as a reformer.
At a time when Erdoğan prioritized modernizing Turkey with large infrastructure projects, the middle class expanded and millions lifted out of poverty.
But critics also warn that he is becoming more authoritarian.
Protesters took to the streets in 2013, partly because of his government ’ s plan to transform a popular park in central Istanbul, but also because the population was challenging increasingly authoritarian rule.
The Prime Minister accused the protesters of being a nuisance, and people in the streets would beat pots every night at 9 o'clock to show resistance.
The sons of three cabinet allies have also been indicted on corruption charges.
The Gezi Park protests became a black and white spot for his rule.
To his critics, he acted more like an Ottoman monarch than a democratic leader.
Erdoğan also had a feud with Fethullah Gulen, an Islamic scholar based in the United States whose social and cultural movements helped Erdoğan win three consecutive elections and contributed to the military ’ s secession from politics.
The incident has caused a fierce reaction in Turkish society.
Muslim Revival
After a decade in power, Erdoğan ’ s party also worked to lift the ban on women wearing headscarves from public service imposed after the 1980 military coup.
The ban was eventually lifted, allowing women to join the police, the military and the judiciary.
Critics say he dug the walls of the secular state in Ataturk. Although Erdogan himself is a believer, he has always denied that he wants to impose Islamic values on viewers, insisting that he supports the right of Turks to express their religious beliefs openly.
However, he has repeatedly supported the criminalization of adultery.
As the father of four, he said that “no Muslim family ” should consider birth control or family planning.
“We will expand our descendants, ” he said in May 2016.
He extolled motherhood, denounced feminists, and argued that men and women could not be treated equally.
Erdoğan has long championed the cause of Islam — he is known to raise four fingers in a salute gesture to Egypt ’ s oppressed Muslim Brotherhood.
In July 2020, under his auspices, Istanbul ’ s historic Hagia Sophia was converted into a mosque, infuriating many Christians.
Built 1500 years ago, the cathedral was turned into a mosque by the Ottoman Turks, but Ataturk turned it into a museum – a symbol of the new secular state.
It is not a coincidence that, just hours after the start of the 2023 elections, the president spoke to supporters during an evening prayer.
Enhanced control
After being barred from running for prime minister, he ran for president in his first direct election in 2014, when it was a symbolic office.
He has a plan to reform this office, to create a new constitution that benefits all Turks and places their country among the top 10 economies in the world.
But in the early days of his presidency, he twice faced a shake-up in his position of power.
His party lost its parliamentary majority in a vote in 2015, and a few months later in 2016, Turkey witnessed its first violent coup attempt in decades.
The rebels almost captured the president, who was vacationing at the seaside resort, but he was safely rescued by plane. In the early hours of 16 July, he appeared victorious at Ataturk Airport in Istanbul, greeted by cheers from supporters.
They blocked the advance of the conspirators, and nearly 300 civilians were killed.
The president appeared on national television and met with supporters in Istanbul, declaring himself "commander in chief".
But the situation was also clearly tense, and he openly wept as he spoke at the funeral of a close friend who was shot dead by the rebels.
Some 150,000 civil servants were fired and more than 50,000 detained, including soldiers, journalists, lawyers, police officers, academics and Kurdish politicians.
The crackdown on critics has raised alarm abroad and soured Turkey ’ s relationship with the EU: Turkey ’ s attempts to join the EU have gone years without progress.
The controversy over the influx of migrants into Greece has also fuelled hostility.
But in his 1,000-room gleaming palace overlooking Ankara from Aksalai, President Erdoğan ’ s position seems more secure than ever.
His victory in a 2017 referendum gave the president sweeping powers, including the ability to impose a state of emergency, appoint top officials and interfere with the legal system.
A year later, he won the first presidential election.
His core votes came from small towns and rural conservative districts in Anatolia. In 2019, his party lost in three of the largest cities – Istanbul, the capital Ankara and Izmir.
In the Istanbul mayoral election, the party narrowly lost to the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) Ekrem Imamoglu, a bitter defeat for Erdoğan, who was mayor of the city in the 1990s.
He never accepted the result.
Before Imamoglu was barred from the May elections, he was ahead of the president in opinion polls.
The president and his allies have been accused of using the courts to disqualify the popular mayor.
Turkey ’ s third-largest party, the People ’ s Democratic Party of New Kurdistan (HDP), was similarly fearful of being barred from voting in parliament because of alleged links to Kurdish forces, but instead decided to run under a different name.
Like Turkish leaders in the past, Erdoğan has imposed a strong crackdown on the outlawed Kurdish Workers ’ Party (PKK).
While Turkey has accepted more than 3.5 million refugees fleeing the Syrian civil war, Ankara has also launched several operations against Kurdish forces on the other side of the border, crowding out Kurds in Turkey.
Erdogan has long had close ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has also tried to play an important mediator role in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
Although a NATO member, he bought Russia ’ s anti-missile defense system and chose Russia to build Turkey ’ s first nuclear reactor.
Before the 2023 election, he tried to win the trust of nationalists and conservative voters by accusing the West of targeting him.
“My country is going to smash this conspiracy, ” he asserted, describing it as a flashpoint.
He ended his 2023 campaign by visiting the tomb of Adnan Menderes, Turkey ’ s first democratically elected prime minister, who was executed after a military coup in 1961.
He wanted people to know: "The era of coups and warlords is over."
* Reporting by Istanbul journalist Cagil Kasapoglu

No--In 1934, Ataturk turned it into a museum, making it a major tourist attraction and secular symbol in Turkey.

The building became a UNESCO

World Heritage Site in 1985, celebrated globally for its unique fusion of Byzantine architecture and Ottoman Islamic artistry, representing a multicultural heritage bridging East and West.

The 2020 court decision to overturn the 1934 museum status triggered its conversion back into a mosque.

No--In 1934, Ataturk turned it into a museum, making it a major tourist attraction and secular symbol in Turkey.

Why did Erdogan restore Hagia Sophia as a mosque in 2020?

Because he wanted to end its 86-year museum status to return it to its original role as a mosque.

Erdogan heralded the move as restoring a “glorious chapter” in Turkish and Islamic history, positioning Turkey as a sovereign nation rejecting foreign interference and reviving Ottoman heritage and Muslim pride.

Title:

Content: Let the Turkish Revolution be a lesson to us!
Let the Turkish Revolution be a lesson to us!
Reda Al Attar
The Turkish Revolution that Mustafa Kemal Ataturk ignited in 1921 was larger than the usual revolutions, because it did not limit itself to a change in the system of government, but also to a change in the social structure of Turkish society.
Before 1914, Turkey was a vast empire, with Arab states ruled by Turks.
The sultan, the emperor in Constantinople, or present-day Istanbul, was the successor of the Muslims, although he was often the son of a concubine from Serbia, a European country that had no ties to Islam, Muslims or Arabs, and had absolute religious and political authority.
The Arab Muslim, wherever he was found, had to raise his hand in prayer, praying to God to preserve the Caliph.
This empire was living the Eastern life as we understand it from the beating of the veil on women, concubines and agricultural production without industrial production and authoritarian rule based on the will of the caliph without parliament, the fight against the views of the ascendant and the restriction of mouths and the press.
The conditions of this empire threatened to annihilate two hundred years before its death, as it had little to do with survival.
But the envy of the countries that aspire to share them prevented them all from starting to share.
Then her fear that in the death of the Ottoman Empire opened the way for the Russians to go out to the Mediterranean.
This fear was felt by Britain and France, and so they kept the Ottoman Empire as a barrier preventing Russia, this huge giant, from achieving this breakthrough.
Indeed, the colonial nations were finding in the survival of the Ottoman Empire, in its dissolution and corruption, an opportunity to exploit the Arab countries that were part of it.
All these factors made the Ottoman Empire live longer than its inevitable life even if World War I came and joined Germany against the Western nations, the latter in inciting the Arab countries against the Ottoman Empire.
with the aim of dropping it.
Britain approached King Hussein, the Sharif of Mecca, asking for his help in return for granting him independence after the war ended, and the man was deceived by her vows.
He participated in the liberation war with a 5,000-strong Bedouin army led by his son Prince Faisal and accompanied by the English officer Lawrence.
What happened after the victory.
Britain not only reneged on the covenant it had made with the Arabs, but divided Greater Syria into four states according to the traditional colonial policy of divide and rule, causing the Arab world a historic rift.
In addition, the colonial powers sought political agreements to destroy the Ottoman Empire, but kept it alive to remain a barrier against Russia.
Therefore, we saw Italy, France and Britain occupying Ottoman possessions with their armies, and we saw Greece occupying the Turkish city of Izmir, but with the sultanate remaining.
The Ottoman Empire was made of straw, a straw sultan took over and the straw culture lived.
She had given everything the victors had asked of her.
But there remained a man, who understood modern civilization, as he understood that his country was backward and far from the mainstream of modern civilization.
Its existing weakness is not addressed and its future annihilation is unavoidable, because it is not modern.
This man (Kemal Ataturk) was seeking independence for Turkey as a modern society.
He understood civilization not as Eastern or Western, but as a unit composed of degrees and that the highest degrees are found in the Western nations and the lowest degrees in the Eastern nations, not because the Orientalists differ from the Westerners in racial features, but because they left power in the hands of despotic kings who destroyed the powers of peoples through poverty, ignorance and disease.
Kemal Ataturk was in charge of the corps, which is based in the eastern Anatolia region.
When the sultan accepted the demands of Western countries, he declared that he would not surrender.
Then he marched his legion on on Izmir and drove the Greeks out of it.
But instead of rewarding him for expelling invaders from his homeland, the sultan announced a monetary reward for assassinating Ataturk.
But Ataturk, by the power of truth and by the power of power, was able to overcome the sultan and remove him from his palace with an army of female servants and men.
He forced the Western countries, having defeated them in the War of the Sea of the Archipelago, to replace the humiliating Treaty of Versailles with the just Treaty of Lausanne, and Ataturk proceeded to change the Turkish government and society.
As people began to learn and work instead of dressing in red and green and strutting on the streets and spending time talking about the pleasures of palaces, they became productive citizens, gaining wisdom from toil and sweat.
After religion preoccupied the people with matters of occultism and matters of halal and haraam, it became the religion of the people to separate between right and wrong, and they decide the right to debate and other opinion.
The Quran was then translated into Turkish and the Turks learned for the first time the truth of their religion after they were unaware of its meaning in Arabic.
Ataturk abolished the sharia courts, which no longer exist with civil marriage, and in Turkey the state no longer has a Muslim, Christian, Jew or atheist because everyone is Turkish.
The previous Khilafah regime required women to wear the hijab in such a strict manner that it was not permissible for a couple to sit side by side in one car driving down the street.
He removed the entire veil.
He employed women in the functions of the state, and Khaleda Adeeb was the first female minister.
Switzerland ’ s civil and criminal laws have been translated into Turkish and made the basis for judicial proceedings in courts.
He canceled the tekaya, the ligaments and the ridiculous religious rituals.
He referred the palaces of the sultans to museums that attract tourists and generate profits for the state.
He abolished all foreign privileges without negotiation.
Arabic letters were replaced by Latin letters.
But when he replaced the hat with the Tarboush, the sheikhs revolted against him, and he hanged them all.
Ataturk ’ s policy with the clergy was unimaginably harsh.
Those who protested and opposed his reform program and the political changes he carried out, including preachers of mosques, writers, sheikhs and clerics, who stood in his way, numbering in the thousands, mounted unseaworthy ships, to settle in the depths of the Sea of Marmara.
As for his reform work, he generalized gender equality in elections to the first modern parliament, as well as gender equality in inheritance between men and women.
And a lot of companies.
And abolish the ranks and titles.
In one of his speeches, he said, "The master of the country is not the president of the republic, but the peasant."
There is no revolution in the history of the whole world that has absorbed all this change in the governmental and popular system.
Thus, Turkey became a modern independent sovereign state, as the Turks in their cities, farms, factories and homes, even in their morals, became a modern and free nation, not intoxicated by its beliefs and indifferent to its past occurrences and traditions, but living with reason and sound opinion.
When I left Istanbul in 1953 for Germany, its eastern landmarks were still late, and most parts of the city reminded me of Baghdad ’ s popular slums.
But what was more amazing was my surprise when I visited Istanbul again in 2003, fifty years later and I came from Europe, I saw it as an extension of the cities of Europe in its development and urbanization, I watched it boast of modern civilization, and the manifestations of progress and prosperity show the eyes
· Adapted from the Book of Revolutions by Salama Musa and the last paragraph of the author of the article.
Disclaimer: All published articles represent the opinion of their authors only
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What kind of domestic reaction did Erdogan's reconversion of Hagia Sophia receive?

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

His government emphasized that the mosque remains open to visitors of all faiths outside prayer times, defending it as a peaceful coexistence symbol rooted in Turkey’s multifaceted history.

Religious reactions expose deep fissures.

Title:

Content: Turkish scientists announce support for Erdogan in elections for 40 reasons
Get to know her.
Sunday 07 May 2023 at 09: 00 AM / Marib Press - Agencies
Number of views 235
The Ulema Forum in Turkey (UMAD) and the Association of Muslim Ulema in Turkey announced support for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the upcoming presidential elections.
The two sides said in a statement on Saturday that "Turkey has achieved during the past 20 years outstanding achievements in the field of freedoms, international relations, advanced industries, high technology, development, education, sports, arts, transportation, communications, counter-terrorism and many others, and has had a say in global politics by breaking the shackles that were shackling its hands.
With God ’ s permission, Turkey ’ s new century will be with the same will and political stability. ”
The two sides continued that they will support Erdogan for his achievements, enumerating them as follows:
Protect our national and ethical values.
He has not given any opportunity to any stream that harms our families, our families and our society.
The Hagia Sophia restored a mosque in accordance with the foundation of Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror.
- Restoration of hundreds of historical monuments and mosques.
He brought freedom to Muslim women and removed the headscarf ban.
Ending the external guardianship.
- Removed the persecution suffered by students of “Imam and Khatib ” schools in relation to pursuing their university studies.
He worked on reviving the role and courses of teaching and memorizing the Holy Quran.
Support for religious education.
Fever and development of religious centers.
Optionally enter the study of the Holy Quran and the Prophet ’ s biography in the educational field.
Eliminate bureaucratic barriers for workers and employers.
Achieved giant achievements in the field of transport and the construction and construction of bridges, roads, tunnels and modern airports very important.
He became a refuge and hope for the oppressed, the deported and the exiles from their homeland.
Help the poor to own their own homes.
He has fulfilled his promises of development and reconstruction in every natural disaster that our country has witnessed.
- He marched the elections boldly despite the disaster of the century represented by the recent earthquake that hit southern Turkey.
- Supporting oil and gas research projects and achieving significant positive results.
Foundations of scientific space projects.
He was able to make a homemade Turkish car.
Connecting many states with modern high-speed trains.
Turkey has been able to get rid of a lot of external pressure.
Promote local defense industry projects.
- Launched and succeeded in the construction projects of combat warplanes, tanks, ships, frigates, missiles and satellites.
He revolutionized health and medicine in our country.
He built a lot of hospitals and medical cities.
Enact laws for the benefit of the sick, the elderly, widows, orphans and people with special needs, specifically allocating monthly salaries to them.
I have a strong and positive interest in culture, sports and education.
He built many cultural, youth and sports institutions, centers and complexes.
Take care of the students where he built them libraries and housing and allocated them scholarships.
He is a strong defender of Jerusalem and Palestine by all means possible.
- Resist and resist global injustice through its slogan (The world is greater than 5).
He has a strong reputation among world leaders.
He thwarted black projects in Azerbaijan, Libya, Cyprus, the White Sea and other countries.
He established special economic relations with African countries that have been affected by the West for hundreds of years.
He has worked to help poor countries in the areas of food, health and defense.
He was a successful mediator to help war-torn countries and was able to achieve energy and food corridors in places of war.
– Strongly protects our heritage from our ancestors and our history in the Balkans and the Caucasus.
He always enjoys the prayers and love of Muslim and oppressed peoples.
He succeeded in uniting the Turkish world in the Organization of Turkish States.
"Erdogan is our hope and the hope of our nation and all Muslims.
We are with him because he serves the Holy Quran and we will not be with those who describe the Holy Quran as a book from the Middle Ages.
We will not be with the separatists and the enemies of Islam and we will not be with the imperialists or with those who support terrorism and terrorists. ”
The statement concluded, “For all of the above.
We are with our president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who is a nightmare for every terrorist and separatist imperialist. ”
Turkey is preparing for presidential and parliamentary elections on May 14, 2023, as the world watches the event, which many have described as “the most important political event in the world for 2023. ”

Orthodox Christian communities, especially the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and Greek Orthodox Church, strongly condemned the decision.

How did Muslims and Orthodox Christians react to the reconversion?

Who was angered by the reconversion of Hagia Sophia in July 2020?

They lamented restrictions imposed on worship and cultural access, notably the covering of Christian mosaics during Muslim prayers, which they argue diminishes the site's rich Christian legacy and threatens the rights and visibility of Christian minorities in Turkey.

How did Muslims and Orthodox Christians react to the reconversion?

Who was angered by the reconversion of Hagia Sophia in July 2020?

Senior Christian leaders voiced concerns about the long-term safety and freedom of their communities amid what they perceive as an Islamist-nationalist trend marginalizing non-Muslims.

Who was angered by the reconversion of Hagia Sophia in July 2020?

Within Turkey, reactions reflect significant polarization.

Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and allied Islamic scholar organizations, such as the Ulema Forum and Association of Muslim Scholars, praised the reconversion as a rightful reclamation of Turkey’s Ottoman-Islamic identity and a step toward restoring Muslim dignity.

How did Muslims and Orthodox Christians react to the reconversion?

What kind of domestic reaction did Erdogan's reconversion of Hagia Sophia receive?

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

Supporters underscore it as a proud revival aligned with Turkey’s increasing religious nationalism and sovereign aspirations.

How did Muslims and Orthodox Christians react to the reconversion?

What kind of domestic reaction did Erdogan's reconversion of Hagia Sophia receive?

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

In contrast, secularist parties, human rights activists, and minority advocacy groups criticized the decision as contradicting Turkey’s secular constitution and harming Turkey’s pluralistic fabric.

Analysts link Erdogan’s timing—after electoral setbacks in metropolitan areas and amid economic strife—to a political strategy mobilizing nationalist and conservative voters by appealing to Islamic symbolism.

Title:

Content: Earthquakes and rampant inflation: Why did Erdogan win again?
Font Size:
Source: Hong Kong 01
Author: Liu Yanting
On May 28, Turkey held the second round of the presidential election.
Although Turkey's Supreme Electoral Council is not expected to announce the official results until June 1, according to preliminary election statistics, with 99.59% of the votes cast, the incumbent President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has 51.91% of the votes, defeating his opponent Kemal Kılçdaroğlu with 48.09% of the votes. Determine the rate of re-election.
This election has caused global concern.
First, people are curious about whether there will be a regime change in Turkey, changing its fierce cross-border diplomatic style.
Looking back over the past two years, since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2022, Turkey has repeatedly played a fierce swing beyond the size of medium-sized countries, including facilitating the Russian-Ukrainian foreign ministers' talks in March 2022, blocking Finland and Sweden's accession to NATO in May, and announcing the "green light" in June, leading Russia to sign the Black Sea Food Agreement in July, and negotiating energy cooperation with Russia at the CICA summit in October. For the first time since the start of the war, senior officials have talked about launching a new round of military action in Syria, implying that it may threaten Russia ’ s and Iran ’ s geopolitical interests.
In between, the outside world is surprised by Erdoğan ’ s active actions, and also uncertain about Turkey ’ s opportunistic diplomatic style.
Second, Erdogan suffered two major shocks before the election, causing the outside world to generally not optimistic about his re-election, one is in 2022 for months to break through 80% of the serious inflation, the second is the earthquake disaster.
Among them, Turkey ’ s high inflation is the sequela of the 2018 economic crisis. The deep reason is that Turkey ’ s long-term economic overheating and political interest rate cuts have caused a linked financial storm after the Federal Reserve raised interest rates in Turkey. He lost power in big cities such as Istanbul and Ankara.
And the earthquake will also affect voters' support for Erdogan.
On February 6, 2023, a 7.8-magnitude earthquake occurred in southeastern Turkey, killing nearly 50,000 people, and economic losses are even more incalculable.
After the disaster Erdoğan once faced criticism, public opinion criticized its failure to improve the phenomenon of uneven development and urban poverty, resulting in old buildings with low earthquake resistance being vulnerable to a strong earthquake, and fragile buildings are often difficult to get away from the collusion of officials and businessmen, cutting corners, the ruling Erdoğan and the positive development party are to blame.
However, from the results of this election, although the gap between the two people is less than 5%, but Krechidaloğlu is finally a step away from the door, showing that whether it is high inflation or an earthquake, can not prevent Erdogan from being re-elected.
In addition to the lack of integration of Turkish opposition forces, Erdogan ’ s success in mobilizing the new situation of “Turkey ’ s rise ” is also key.
The opposition is not well integrated.
First of all, although the polls of the Republican People's Party (CHP) party leader Krechidar Oulu once exceeded Erdoğan ’ s, making many foreign media boldly predict that Turkey will soon change, but focusing on the current state of Turkish politics, Erdoğan ’ s positive party is the strongest force, and the opposition ’ s long-term mountainous and independent government has not only offset the integration efforts to challenge Erdoğan, but also to some extent.
Looking at the interaction of Turkish opposition parties in recent years, there have been obvious signs of integration until the 2017 constitutional referendum.
At that time, Erdoğan greatly expanded the presidential power and removed the obstacles to re-election in the system, causing a collective panic among the opposition forces. The four major opposition parties, the Republican People's Party (İYü), the Good Party (İYü), the Happiness Party (SP) and the Democratic Party (DP), jointly formed the "State Union" (Millet İttifakı), advocating the restoration of the parliamentary system and abolition of the executive presidential system, hoping to curb the positive party and Erdoğan. Together with the Democratic and Progressive Party (DEVA), they formed the "Six Party Round Table" (Altılı Masa), which is seeking to jointly launch a presidential candidate representing the opposition forces and compete with Erdogan in 2023.
After all, Erdogan was the president at the time, with political resources such as the media and the judiciary, enough to crack down on various opposition forces, such as Ekrem İmamoğlu, the mayor of Istanbul from the Republican People ’ s Party, who was originally highly polled and regarded as a star of tomorrow enough to end Erdoğan ’ s 20 years in power, was sentenced to more than two years in prison in December 2022 for “suspected insult to the Supreme Electoral Council. ” He lost the right to run for president.
After Imam Oulu was forced out, the "six-party round table" did not immediately integrate new candidates, but entangled in ideological scuffles, political spoils distribution, until March 2023, it was determined to nominate CHP party leader Krechidar Oulu, but this nomination was initially not supported by the good party, the latter also threatened to withdraw from the "six-party round table".
After many days of consultations and political exchanges, Krechdarolu agreed to have Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavaş and Imam Oulu as vice presidents, and the good party agreed to stay at the "six-party round table" and support the nomination of Krechdarolu for election.
In fact, from the point of view of the composition of the structure, the only ideology that can unite the "six-party round table" is against Erdogan.
Because the Republican People's Party with the most seats is the centre-left pro-European secularism party, the Happiness Party is a Eurosceptic conservative party with Islamism, the Democratic Party is a centre-right nationalist party, the Democratic and Progressive Party is a centre-right pro-European party, the Future Party is a right-wing pro-European party, and the Good Party is a centre-right nationalist party.
In short, the parties have a combination of ideologies that straddle Islamism and secularism, and basically if Erdoğan and the AKP had not been in power for too long, the parties would have no incentive to integrate.
However, even if it is reluctantly integrated, the "six-party round table" is still divided, otherwise it will not be until two months before the election to determine the nomination of candidates; and after the confirmation of the presidential candidate, the "six-party round table" broke out in a new civil war on the list of parliamentary candidates, all parties want to strive for more security seats distribution, resulting in the continued difficulty of the list.
All these things are quite chilling in the eyes of Turkish voters: Erdoğan may have a monopoly on power and love the position of power, but the opposition forces are also only interested in the division of territory and political division of spoils, and have no intention of changing Turkey's development predicament.
Under the balance of the two, or some voters who are tired of Erdoğan, after going through a thousand turns of heart, they chose to continue to vote for the positive party and Erdoğan, instead of supporting the opposition forces whose governing ability is unknown and whose positions are mixed, resulting in the eventual defeat of Krechdar Olu by a small margin.
How Erdoğan mobilised the "rise of Turkey"
In addition to the weak integration of opposition forces and the failure to gather enough political energy, Erdoğan and the Positive Development Party are still able to gather support and call for votes under the impact of high inflation and earthquake disasters, which is also the key to the defeat of Krechdar Olu.
According to the results of the poll, voters in large cities whose wealth has been severely eroded by high inflation supported Krechdarolu in the election, including the top three cities of Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Adana, the fifth largest city; however, Bursa, the sixth largest city of Gaziantep, and the seventh largest city of Konya. (Konya) is still supporting Erdoğan, and Gaziantep is still the hardest hit area of the 2023 earthquake, but voters still vote for the current president who has been denounced by public opinion, and it is clear that Erdoğan still has a certain degree of political energy.
Looking at this source of energy, it is obvious that it is not all the economic achievements that have been downhill.
Looking back at Erdoğan ’ s path to power, he experienced high economic growth in Turkey during his term of office, which can escort him to power.
From 2008 to 2013, developed markets such as the United States, Europe and Japan adopted a number of rounds of quantitative easing policies, international "hot money" poured into emerging markets including Turkey, stimulating the latter's economic growth. Erdogan took advantage of the momentum to promote easy credit, ask the central bank to continue to cut interest rates, and promote large-scale infrastructure projects. On the altar alone, no one can resist.
However, after the US Federal Reserve released a possible interest rate hike in 2013, foreign investment was greatly withdrawn, and emerging market currencies, including the lira, began to depreciate, and Turkey ’ s economic growth continued to slow down. And...
In the process of coping with the crisis, Erdoğan obviously wants to sacrifice prices and preserve economic growth, so he used extreme economic means and insisted on cutting interest rates in the face of high inflation.
The result, while maintaining economic growth to a certain extent, has led to a sharp depreciation of the lira, soaring prices, a near collapse of the bond market, and widespread protests in major cities such as Istanbul.
But looking at Erdoğan ’ s political actions in the past 10 years, it can be seen that he has begun to actively mobilize public support in the military, historical traditions, and diplomatic fields of major powers to fill the “Turkish rise ” narrative under the slowdown in economic growth and make up for his political loss.
As far as the diplomatic tradition after the Cold War is concerned, Turkey is an intermediate power anchored in the Western world and, with its strategic position across Eurasia, moves among different groups of countries.
However, after the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2010, the outside world saw a more "eastern" and "military power" Turkey: on the Egyptian issue, its support for the Muslim Brotherhood, its involvement in the local political situation; on the battlefield of Syria and Libya, it has successively sent troops to intervene in the civil war there since 2016, and successfully achieved certain results. In the Gulf field, Turkey and Iran have maintained close interaction with Qatar, to a certain extent, prompting the 2017 Qatar severance storm, but because Turkey and Iran insisted on not retreating, the final storm ended with Saudi concessions in 2021, and Turkey successfully maintained its political achievements in the Gulf.
Of course, Turkey's foreign military operations are not all fruitful results.
Taking the Syrian battlefield as an example, Turkey launched four military operations against Syria: the Euphrates Shield from 2016 to 2017, the Olive Branch in 2018, the Peace Spring in 2019 and the Spring Shield in 2020.
Since the "olive branch" operation, the Turkish army has not only attacked the Kurdish forces, but also exchanged fire with the Syrian government forces supported by the Russian side, causing strong dissatisfaction in Moscow.
After many unsuccessful coordination, the Russian army was brazenly engaged with Turkey in 2020, resulting in the scribbled end of the "spring shield", and Turkey can only be forced to obey the Russian-led order in northern Syria.
However, under the propaganda of the Erdogan government, Turkey is not clearly aware that Turkey lost to Russia, but to see the Turkish army fighting in northern Syria in order to fight terrorism, which is very encouraging for nationalists and patriotic people.
In addition, in the historical tradition, Erdogan ’ s most classic action is to announce in July 2020 the abolition of the 1934 cabinet decree, the end of the 86 years of Hagia Sophia ’ s museum years, and the restoration of its mosque status.
Although this has caused many Western countries to criticize, but Erdoğan is not without the basis of public opinion, because in the 2015 capture of Junstenburg memorial ceremony, many Turks have held morning prayers in the museum square, in 2018, the Turkish Islamic Association is publicly applied to hold worship in the museum, although it was finally rejected, but has attracted a lot of public support.
Therefore, Erdogan's decision to "liberate St. Sophia" is aimed at the Islamic resurgence in Turkey in recent years, hoping to draw the support of anti-Kemalist voters.
And in the great power diplomatic field, Turkey's action is not to be said, in addition to the neighboring Central Asia and the Middle East, the Russian-Ukrainian war under various violent swings across Eurasia, are Erdogan's excellent election materials.
Taking the March 2022 Russian-Ukrainian Foreign Minister ’ s talks in Turkey and the landing of the Black Sea Food Agreement in July as an example, Turkish state media vigorously promoted Erdogan ’ s “peacemaker ” role; as for blocking Finland and Sweden from joining NATO, Turkish state media used Erdogan ’ s“ defense of national interests ”, “no fear of offending the West ” and“ combating Kurdish terrorism ”.
Of course, under the burden of economic decline and governance for many years, the narrative situation of mobilizing military, historical traditions and great power diplomacy can play a role in Erdoğan ’ s election, which can only be determined by the election results.
Judging from the results of 51.91% to 48.09%, although the above actions did not create a brilliant victory, they were enough to defeat the opposition forces and guarantee Erdogan another five-year term, which obviously still has some effect.
However, Turkey ’ s high economic growth has ended, and how to buffer Turkey ’ s economic storm and find new solutions outside of “Erdoğan ’ s economics ” are difficult issues that cannot be solved in the short term.
After the election, Erdoğan ’ s challenge continued.
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What kind of domestic reaction did Erdogan's reconversion of Hagia Sophia receive?

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

Polling data reflected a rallying of the religious base but also exacerbated divisions within Turkish society.

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

The decision aimed to rally anti-Kemalist voters.

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

In the Arab world, official government responses were generally measured, reflecting a diplomatic balancing act.

Title:

Content: The Turkish elections.
Conflict between two identities
Anyone who follows the current Turkish elections is aware that the issue of identity is one of the prominent aspects of the ongoing electoral conflict between Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his party on the one hand and the opposition, headed by Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu on the other.
The identity conflict is still at its most intense in Turkey since Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, after the end of the so-called war of independence and the declaration of the republic in 1923, a century ago, obliterated everything related to Islam and the Arabic language in Turkey and called for the adoption of everything that is Western, even if it clashes with the faith of the people of the country and their Islamic identity.
In the aftermath of the First World War, which ended with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the occupation of Turkey by the Allied forces, the Turkish elite, especially those under the influence of Western thought, became convinced that any reform under the state of Islam and the caliphate was futile and necessary to fully adopt the Western secular model in its bitterness.
In light of the successes achieved by the Turkish resistance against the invading forces, many Arabs and Muslims rejoiced at Mustafa Kemal Ataturk when they saw him leading the Turks in the War of Liberation (1918-1923) and winning victory after victory over the allied armies that had occupied the country.
God is the greatest wonder in the world.
O Khalid Al-Turk, renew Khalid Al-Arab
But the man who led the Turk to military victory quickly disappointed many when he and his associates erased everything related to Islam and the caliphate from his country, which had been home for nearly 500 years.
After the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, the Turkish state abolished the Islamic Caliphate in 1924 and Islam is no longer the religion of the state and the principle of secularism was adopted and the wearing of the cowl was forbidden because it was worn in the Ottoman era and replaced with the hat.
These and other changes came as a thunderbolt on the heads of many who had good news for Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his companions.
The fall of the Islamic Caliphate had the impact of the earthquake and a great resonance that still reverberates to this day in various parts of the Islamic world.
Shawqi wrote an obituary and reprimands himself for his former praise of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and reproaches him and his companions that they had cursed with their hands the sheet of their pride and removed from their necks the best necklace.
At the beginning of his poem, which laments the succession:
You have been caught up in minarets and pulpits.
I cried for you kingdoms and wailing
India and Egypt are sad.
She cries at you with a teardrop.
Syria asks, Iraq and Persia..
Wiped out of the land of succession, huh?
Turkish society has not succumbed to this cultural defeat, this obsession with everything that is Western, the hostility to everything that is Islamic, and the adoption of an extreme secular model in its hostility to religion, similar to the laïcité applied in France.
Although the system of government in the Islamic caliphate began a Shurian system in the era of the caliphs of the adults, as it was ruled by caliphs chosen by free allegiance, but after the end of their rule turned into a member king and a hereditary system in the era of the Umayyads and Abbasids and then the Ottomans.
Although none of these countries has denied that Islam imposes rule on the basis of allegiance, this principle of shura has not been respected or activated.
Whatever flaws may have shaped the rule of these countries, the Islamic caliphate remained in the conscience of many a symbol of the unity and dignity of Muslims and a guardian of their Sharia.
Turkish society has not succumbed to this cultural defeat and this lying in front of everything that is Western and hostile to everything that is Islamic and adopted an extreme secular model in its hostility to religion, similar to the laïcité applied in France, which excludes religion from the public sphere and considers it a private personal matter. A guardian of Ataturk and secular values was always on the lookout, with one coup after another killing any movement or attempt to regain lost identity.
When former prime minister Adnan Menderes began building Islamic schools and allowed the call to prayer to be repeated in Arabic, the army turned against him and was tried and executed in 1960.
Coups followed at a rate of about every 10 years, and the last successful coup against Islamist-leaning figures and parties was the soft coup that forced former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan to resign in 1997.
Erbakan had founded four parties, and the sooner a party was dissolved, the sooner he created a new one.
In 2001, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his comrades, like Erdogan who had been apprenticed to Erbakan and his political approach, established the Justice and Development Party (AKP).
The party won the Turkish election nearly 20 years ago and has been leading the country ever since.
Despite his criticisms of authoritarianism, authoritarianism and other accusations that have led some of his party ’ s moguls to defect from him, Erdogan and his party have much to gain.
He was able to double Turkey ’ s per capita income and GDP in a few years, and these tangible achievements helped him on the day of the coup in 2016 and many people took to the streets to resist the coup until it failed.
There is no doubt that Erdogan and his companions have learned from the head of the wolf that flew and from the experiences of those who preceded them, they did not engage in raising Islamic slogans that interfere in a direct confrontation with the army or secular elites that grew up over decades in a political environment that sees secularism as the official ideology of the state.
While Erdogan and his party, according to the language of the speech used and the slogans raised, are not considered an Islamic party in the sense that is customary in Arab and Islamic countries, the party, through its actions and achievements, may be described as such.
Unlike the movements and parties that belong to the so-called political Islam, which reject and completely reject the principle of secularism and demand the application of Islamic law, we find that the Justice and Development Party does not only accept, but declares its adherence to the line of Kemal Ataturk and the principle of secularism.
In the party, however, they have redefined it in a way that protects them from its shortcomings, by saying that they understand it as a system that guarantees democracy, freedoms and human rights, including religious freedoms.
There is no doubt that Erdogan and his companions have learned from the head of the wolf that flew and from the experiences of their predecessors did not engage in raising Islamic slogans that interfere in a direct confrontation with the army or secular elites that arose and grew up over decades in a political environment that sees secularism as the official ideology of the state and inescapable.
At the level of foreign relations, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) was keen to establish balanced political relations with the West, characterized by a degree of parity, in contrast to the policy of full political and military subordination pursued by Turkey in its relations with the West and its distance from its Arab and Islamic surroundings.
The Justice and Development Party (AKP) is reckoned to be close to the issues of Arabs and Muslims, when the Syrian crisis occurred, Erdogan opened the doors of his country to Syrian brothers fleeing the flames of a war that forced millions of them to leave their country.
However, it seems that this outstretched hand policy towards refugees, which is dictated by the rules of international law, imposed by humanitarian motives and necessitated by kinship and brotherhood in Islam, did not appeal to those who followed the footsteps of Atatürk, who rejected everything that is Arab and Islamic.
This struggle over Turkish identity between those who defend its Islamic identity and those who cling to the strict secular Ataturk line may not find a more telling picture than the scene in which Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Kemal Kilicdaroglu concluded his campaign before the start of the first round elections. Turk.
The meaning and symbolism of the visits need not be clarified.

While Turkey enjoys strong influence and ties in many Arab countries, particularly through political Islam movements hospitable to Erdogan’s leadership style, Arab states cautiously welcomed or remained neutral to avoid straining relations.

Regional bodies like the Arab League issued reserved statements emphasizing respect for heritage and religious pluralism without explicit endorsement or condemnation.

Among Arab intellectuals, religious scholars, and social media influencers, reactions were mixed and more vocal.

Title:

Content: Thursday, 04 April 2024 06: 57 GMT
Islam and a Century of Western Distortion
Subtitles by Aladdin Abou Zeina Andrew Hammond - Middle East 24 / 3 / 2024
From using it as a bulwark against the Soviet left, to telling it that opposing Israel ’ s mass murder in Gaza is wrong, the militarization of Islam for Western political purposes continues.
* * *
When Western politicians preach about Islam, as they often do, Muslims can be forgiven for their inability to distinguish themselves.
Framing Islam, as Edward Said showed in his famous treatise, is an old game.
But the extent to which radicalism has been pursued to define Islam, which is in fact a product of Western manipulation, still needs to be fully understood and assessed.
Throughout the 19th century, when Western countries found they had acquired an unprecedented ability to regulate the world, imperial thinkers began to frame Islam as an outdated, irrational and violent religion — especially because it had the power to inspire resistance to foreign oppression.
This rhetoric was so overwhelming and widespread that the German Kaiser had the Ottoman mufti issue a fatwa in 1914 declaring jihad against the Allied powers, in the faint hope that it would arouse the passions of the colonial masses against their British and French masters.
The Ottoman and German governments cooperated in a secret wartime propaganda program, in which Arab and Turkish religious scholars and intellectuals traveled to Germany, wrote pamphlets and attempted to turn Muslim prisoners of war against empires.
In fact, the great Islamic uprising was a figment of Orientalist imagination.
But when the Russian Revolution broke out in 1917, the idea first gleamed in the British imperial mind that Islam, however defined, could be useful as a bulwark against the Soviet left.
Arming Islam
As Priya Satya has shown, historians like Arnold Toynbee who work with British intelligence have developed a sudden interest in Turkey ’ s postwar political direction, fearing it would fall under the attractiveness of Soviet Russia before Ataturk takes the country down the path of radical secularism and Turkey joins NATO.
This was an important “rehearsal ” of the Cold War, when the militarization of Islam against the left reached new heights.
In the early 1950s, U.S. administrations began to engage with nascent Islamic movements and invited a delegation of mostly Arab Muslim scholars and diplomats to a 1954 conference on Islamic culture, which ended with White House participants meeting with then-President Eisenhower.
Eisenhower had a “holy war ” in mind when he issued his famous doctrine in 1957, in which he promised to help any Middle Eastern country facing the threat of what he called“ atheistic materialism, ” as espoused by the Soviets.
The most important Islamic state in the Middle East has become the bridgehead of this campaign to manipulate a world religion, developing its Islamic foreign policy in close coordination with the United States.
New Islamic bodies and associations were created to refine and polish anti-communist publications written by the CIA, and religious scholars defending the new “Salafist ” ideology, such as Nassir al-Din al-Albani, were invited to take up teaching positions at Islamic universities, and a flow of funding to crush Arab and leftist anti-colonial nationalist movements across the country. around the area.
Thus, when British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher told the Afghan mujahideen in 1981 that “the hearts of the free world are with you, ” she was building on decades of exploiting and abusing Islam for Western political purposes.
The story from there is well known.
On September 11, 2001, the United States paid a heavy price for its interference in the religious policies of others.
However, now that more than two decades have passed since 9 / 11, it ’ s as if nothing has changed.
Since October 7, the public arena in the West has been flooded with Islamophobic rhetoric on an almost unprecedented scale.
In one of the stations, a British television presenter yells at Palestinian politician Mustafa Barghouti with accusations of misogyny, while well-known anti-Muslim figures, such as Douglas Murray, declare that Israel is the main front line against the barbaric threat to Western civilization.
EXTRAORDINARY SCENE
The only permissible explanation for the Palestinians ’ defiance of occupation and oppression was religious intolerance.
Western governments go to great lengths to discredit Muslims in order to justify their chosen policies of support for the mass murder in Gaza.
On March 1, we had an unusual scene of a British prime minister taking to the stage in Downing Street to denounce the victory of the British opposition candidate in the by-election, because he had addressed Muslim anger at the British government ’ s policy on Gaza.
According to Rishi Sonak, George Galloway appealed to the "extreme political ideology of Islamism".
But Sonak, in his quest to define Islamism, could only conjure up the filler that it spreads “extremism, ” while Islam as a faith, he said, is“ peacefully practiced by millions. ”
The implication was not only that Muslims should not protest, but that any sign of one ’ s Islamism or something is de facto reactionary and anti-modern.
Sonak even linked Islamism to a long-standing critique of colonialism, claiming that Islamists “want us to accept a moral equivalence between Britain and some of the world ’ s most vile regimes. ”
It will be news to many historians that they belong to political Islam.
In the aftermath, the government unveiled new definitions of extremism that include Islamism as a “totalitarian ideology ” that calls for an“ Islamic state governed by Islamic law. ”
This is what Muslims and others who mobilize public opinion around Gaza are accused of.
Chinese political culture speaks of China ’ s “century of humiliation ” — 100 years of Western intervention and oppression, from the“ opium wars ” to independence after World War II.
But what Muslims suffered by comparison was 100 years of distortion, not only by imperial studies but also by Western governments and their intelligence agencies — targeting their faith and practices — and now their lives and their right to express their opposition to inhumane and nefarious foreign policy.
Andrew Hammond is currently teaching Turkish history at Oxford University.
He is the author of “Popular Culture in North Africa and the Middle East ” and“ The Illusion of Reform in Saudi Arabia ”, and has numerous academic articles on modern Islamic thought.
He has previously worked for the European Council on Foreign Relations, BBC Arabic and Reuters in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
Islam and a Century of Western Distortion
Spreads:
* * Raymond A.
Raymond A. Spruance is Professor of International History in the Department of History, Stanford University, specializing in the history of the British Empire and modern Britain.
She is a cultural historian of the physical and intellectual infrastructure of the modern world in the imperial era.
Her work examines the origins of state institutions, military technologies, development ideas and practices, and anti-colonial responses to understand how the imperial past shaped the present and how the ethical dilemmas it posed were understood and managed.
* * * Arnold J. Toynbee: British historian born 14 April 1889 in London and died 22 October 1975.
He is the latest and most important historian to examine the question of civilizations in detail and comprehensively, in particular in his historical encyclopaedia entitled "A Study of History", which consists of 12 volumes and spent 41 years in its authorship.
Unlike most historians who regard nations or nation states as a field of study of history, Toynbee argues that wider societies (or civilizations) in time and space are plausible areas of historical study.
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NEWSLETTER

Prominent Arab commentators on platforms like Twitter and YouTube expressed pride in the restoration of an Islamic monument and acknowledged Hagia Sophia’s importance in Ottoman and Muslim history.

How did Muslims and Orthodox Christians react to the reconversion?

What kind of domestic reaction did Erdogan's reconversion of Hagia Sophia receive?

For example, some celebrated Erdogan’s decision as a bold defiance against Western cultural interventions.

How did Muslims and Orthodox Christians react to the reconversion?

What kind of domestic reaction did Erdogan's reconversion of Hagia Sophia receive?

Conversely, other Arab voices—especially those concerned with regional Christian minorities—questioned the move's impact on interfaith harmony and cultural inclusive heritage.

Who was angered by the reconversion of Hagia Sophia in July 2020?

Notably, respected Islamic institutions like Al-Azhar maintained diplomatic silence or stressed the need to preserve historic sites’ multi-religious character, reflecting nuanced positions amid political complexities.

The Turkish Christian minority community continues to face challenges exacerbated by the reconversion.

Who was angered by the reconversion of Hagia Sophia in July 2020?

Church leaders highlight persistent issues, such as delays in legislative reforms governing religious foundations critical for minority worship and social life.

Restrictions on access to Hagia Sophia’s Christian artistic treasures symbolize broader marginalization fears.

Who was angered by the reconversion of Hagia Sophia in July 2020?

Orthodox representatives appeal internationally for protection of religious rights, noting the reconversion as a marker in a wider pattern of Islamo-nationalist policies affecting religious minorities’ freedoms and security.

How did Muslims and Orthodox Christians react to the reconversion?

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

Who was angered by the reconversion of Hagia Sophia in July 2020?

Tourism and heritage management at Hagia Sophia have transformed under the mosque status.

No--In 1934, Ataturk turned it into a museum, making it a major tourist attraction and secular symbol in Turkey.

Entrance fees are now charged, and non-Muslim visitors no longer enjoy unrestricted access; certain prayer times limit tourism flows, with the main floor reserved for worshippers.

Conservationists and historians have raised alarms about the physical toll caused by increased foot traffic and inadequate preservation efforts.

The Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), charged with site management, has faced criticism for neglecting the site’s delicate mosaics and architectural integrity.

Calls from international conservation groups emphasize the need to balance religious use with the protection of Hagia Sophia’s irreplaceable cultural heritage.

International institutions voiced formal concern.

UNESCO stressed that changes must respect the site’s universal value as a World Heritage Site, warning that the reconversion could risk Hapgia Sophia’s protection commitments.

Title:

Content: [ditty_news_ticker id="27897"] Video Shows Fragments Falling from the Dome of Hagia Sophia - Orthodox Christian Laity

Video Shows Fragments Falling from the Dome of Hagia Sophia

0

Source: Greek Reporter

A still from a recently released video shows visitors rushing to take cover as fragments fall from the dome of Hagia Sophia. Credit: Daily Motion/BirGün

A video from 2022 that came to light recently shows fragments falling on visitors from the dome of Hagia Sophia, the former epicenter of Christian worship at Constantinople, today’s Istanbul.

The footage released by the Turkish newspaper, BirGün, raises serious questions over the safety of the former Orthodox Christian cathedral, now a mosque.

BirGün notably quoted officials as saying that “pieces are falling from the roof, due to the humidity created by the crowd, but no precautions are being taken”.

The president of the Turkish Art History Association, Serif Yasar, argued for restoration of the monument as soon as possible, suggesting that “If Hagia Sophia is not restored, it will collapse with the first earthquake.”

The monument was restored as a mosque three years ago after serving as a museum from 1935-2020 and has since received 21 million visitors, according to Turkey’s tourism and culture minister.

Yasar added that when the church was a museum, the scientific council overseeing it urged that groups of no more than 25 people should be allowed to enter the building at any one time.

This enormous lift in visitation has likely brought to the forefront the need for repairs and it was indeed reported in September that the Turkish government had decided to start long-term maintenance of Hagia Sophia.

Turkey to implement visitor management policy at Hagia Sophia

In early October Turkish historian Ilber Ortayli expressed fears that the large number of visitors to Hagia Sophia could lead to a catastrophic structural failure if not addressed immediately.

Writing in the Hürriyet daily, Ortayli said that the monument, which attracts three million pilgrims annually apart from tourists, has undergone significant damage since its conversion into a mosque.

He asserted that even a modest number of 20-30 thousand people annually, including scientists, historians, archaeologists, representatives of the Muslim religion, politicians, and public officials, could be considered excessive for the endurance of the monument.

In June 2022 a number of tiles of the ancient marble floors in Hagia Sophia were damaged by heavy machines used to clean the site.

In April 2022, The Turkish Association of Art Historians stated that the historic Imperial Gate in Hagia Sophia had been badly damaged.

The group posted a picture clearly depicting the damage to the oak wood of the 15-century-old gate.

Turkey unveiled plans in late October for a visitor management policy at Hagia Sophia, including charging foreign tourists with an entrance fee to be implemented starting Jan. 15.

Minister of Culture and Tourism Mehmet Nuri Ersoy said that extensive restoration work is underway in various sections of Hagia Sophia, now a mosque, with plans to progress to other parts upon their completion.

He emphasized that, based on UNESCO’s recommendations, a visitor management plan would be enforced to enhance the quality and safety of visits while preserving the historical significance of the site.

Related Articles
Officials argue for repairs to Hagia Sophia after footage shows fragments falling from the dome – Neos Kosmos

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The European Union, US government, and many Western organizations criticized the decision, framing it as detrimental to religious freedom and Turkey’s secular, multicultural identity.

Turkey rebuffed these warnings, interpreting them as politically motivated attempts to influence its sovereign affairs, reframing the decision as a proud reclamation of dignity and historic rights.

What kind of domestic reaction did Erdogan's reconversion of Hagia Sophia receive?

Notable international statements illustrate the polarized perceptions.

Erdogan’s rhetoric highlighted the reconversion as restoring Istanbul’s identity to its Ottoman roots and as part of a global Muslim revival.

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

In stark contrast, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis condemned the decision as an affront to Istanbul’s pluralistic heritage and a source of regional tension.

The US State Department expressed concerns over religious freedoms.

The Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I framed the move as a setback for interfaith dialogue and minority protection in Turkey.

Who was angered by the reconversion of Hagia Sophia in July 2020?

Domestically, the reconversion intensified Turkey’s ongoing identity debate between secularism and Islamism.

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

Erdogan’s ruling AKP, with Islamist and nationalist underpinnings, contrasts sharply with secular opposition parties such as the Republican People’s Party (CHP), who view the Hagia Sophia status change as symbolic of Turkey’s drift away from secular principles enshrined by Atatürk.

No--In 1934, Ataturk turned it into a museum, making it a major tourist attraction and secular symbol in Turkey.

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

The decision aimed to rally anti-Kemalist voters.

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

This ideological clash influences Turkish politics, media discourse, and social attitudes and shapes Turkey’s foreign relations with Arab neighbors, who closely watch Turkey’s internal religious-political balance.

The 2020 reconversion also fits into Erdogan’s broader regional diplomacy narrative, portraying Turkey as an assertive Muslim power independent of Western influence.

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

It sends signals within the Middle East and beyond about the restoration of Ottoman-Islamic legacy and Turkey’s self-perception as a leader of the Muslim world, resonating variably with different Arab political and religious factions.

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

In conclusion, the Hagia Sophia controversy remains a potent and complex subject with diverse implications for religion, politics, heritage conservation, and regional dynamics.

For your Arab audience, it offers a compelling story that touches on shared Islamic history, the challenges of religious pluralism, identity politics within Turkey and the wider Muslim world, and the tension between global heritage values and national sovereignty.

Title:

Content: 880 hits
Khobar Code: 55265
Publication date: 08 August 2021
Tabnak _ The common advantages in the national, religious, cultural and language fields are one of the most important reasons for the rapprochement between different countries and peoples in international arenas.
On this basis, governments seek to achieve their national interests alongside alliances with countries that are close to them.
In this sense, various alliances have been formed throughout history, including the League of Arab States.
The Turan project, which aims to bring the Turkic-speaking countries closer together, is based on the aforementioned contributions, especially the common language and nationality.
The countries and peoples of the nationalities and languages involved in this project are united to achieve political, cultural and economic unity, as they seek to defend and claim their rights, and also expand their relations with other countries under the project.
The geographical boundaries of this project start from Turkey and end to East Turkestan in China and the project includes sixteen Turkic-speaking countries.
In this context, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan changed the presidential slogan of this country by placing sixteen stars, which indicate the number of member countries participating in the Turan project.
Remarkably, Erdogan used the slogan of the 16 soldiers in some of his military parades in the presidential palace.
Although the common language is the main focus of the coalition of 16 countries in this project, since the Sunni Hanafi sect constitutes the majority of the population of these countries, where they are estimated to be about 70 percent, the factor of the sect must play an important role in consolidating and strengthening the alliance.
This project is being pursued by the Turkish central government, with the comprehensive support of Western countries, especially the United States of America. The main goal behind this coalition that brought American protection is to weaken Russia, China and Iran, because most of the areas of this project are either located in these three countries or include the areas under their control.
The United States is encouraging and building an alliance with Turkic-speaking countries, whose borders extend from Turkey to East Turkistan, and focusing on the use of the concept of Turkish nationalism in the form of gray wolves.
In addition to this project, the US National Democratic Fund (NED) is implementing another project called "Red Apple", which relies on cooperation with the Uzbek Nagarh Hidayatavai and the support of the Central Intelligence Agency of this country (CIA).
By focusing on Turkish nationalism, America aims to destabilize national security in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
The total area of the countries involved in this project is more than (5 / 5) million square kilometers.
Targeted through this project
The initial target covers about (200) million people, where the population of the countries included in this project is (170) million people currently, while the number of Turks (150) million people, and the Sunni community (85) percent of the population of these countries.
Countries included in this project: Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Mongolia, Northern Cyprus.
_ The federal regions or minorities of Turkey that live and follow the target countries of the Turan project are: East Turkistan (Uyghurs living in the Xinjiang region of China), Azerbaijan, Iran, Tatarstan, Dagestan, Ingush, Chechnya, Karachay and Sharkis, Pakistan, Iran Wustan, Kabardino-Balkaria of Russia, Turkmen of Iraq and Syria, Tuwa, Juashestan, Jagozia (located on the border of Mongolia), Western Turka (located on the border of Turkey and Bulgaria), Kerm Peninsula of Ukraine and other areas of Hungary, Belarus Iran and Tajikistan.
• Turan Project Designer
Turkey with the support of the United States and Britain.
· Implementers
1.
The Turkish state.
2.
Council of Cooperation of Turkic-speaking Countries (Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Mongolia, Northern Cyprus).
3.
Turkish national currents.
4.
United Nations Fund for Democracy (NED).
5.
Project (Red Apple) through cooperation with (Najara Hidayatawa) of Uzbekistan.
6.
Israeli and Western non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that are among the implementers of this project.
· The main objectives of the Turan project
- The development of strategic depth with its historical and geographical dimensions to reshape the Turkish countries.
- Balance and coordination among Member States in regional and international matters.
- Strengthening economic, commercial, political, security, military and cultural relations.
- Attempting to distance the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus from Russia, Iran and China.
- Targeting Iran, China and Russia to weaken and divide them.
- Creating an unstable region in Russia, China and Iran in order to create a state of conflict and confrontation between these countries.
- The expansion of the territory of Turkey at the expense of the borders of China and Russia as a member state of NATO.
- To promote religious activities with the support of the Sunnis who support the achievement of the objectives of the project.
Effects of the implementation of the Grand Turan Project
1.Strategic effects
- Increasing Turkish influence and focusing on the discourse of Turkish nationalism.
- The weakening of the axis of the East (Iran, Russia and China).
2.Security effects
- Increasing national and sectarian conflicts in the targeted countries.
- Attempts to separate Turkish minorities from the targeted countries.
- Promoting extremist activities within targeted countries that are supported by Turkey.
- Creating and instilling fear and hatred of Russia, China and Iran.
- Reviving the unified army of Turkic-speaking countries (Turkey, Azerbaijan, Mongolia and Kazakhstan).
3.Economic effects
- Eliminating the Silk Road project and replacing it with the Lazuli Road.
- Deletion of Russian and Iranian power lines.
- The establishment of a cooperation council for economic alliances among the Turkic-speaking countries.
4.Cultural effects
- Focusing on attracting elites in targeted countries by establishing local schools and giving scholarships to university students.
- Expansion of ISTANBUL TURKISH as a mother tongue and as a native language in the TORAN project (the teaching and teaching of ISTANBUL TURKISH in Iranian language schools in recent years is part of this project).
- Increasing the demand and focus on Turkish media (such as soap operas, movies and...).
- Targeting countries by making the Turkish culture prevail in those countries.
· Implementation measures of the project
- Formation of a cooperation council for Turkic-speaking countries.
- Holding meetings at the level of presidents and ministers of foreign affairs and attempts to expand the number of members.
- Holding a cultural and sports Olympiad among Turkic-speaking countries.
- Supporting scholarships for Turkish students with facilities in this regard (taking half of the tuition fees from Turkish and Azerbaijani students).
- Intervention in areas under Russian and Chinese control (Nagorno-Karabakh, Crimea, Xinjiang, China) as well as various countries that have good relations with Iran (Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan).
- To intensify the cultural and educational activities of the Turkish organizations "Yunus Emre" and "Teka" by focusing on the construction of mosques, medical centers and other facilities.
- Commencement of the construction of a steel rail connecting Kars - Nakhchivan and extension of gas pipelines between Nakhchivan and Erzurum.
- Holding annual joint exercises with Azerbaijan and supporting this country in the Karabakh war.
- Conducting military and security cooperation with the member states of the project and training their military personnel.
- Increasing the production of Turkish films and series in the targeted countries.
- Strong Turkish media presence in the targeted countries.
- Paving the conditions for the establishment of a unified Turkish army among Turkic-speaking countries (Turkey, Mongolia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan).
- Threats to Iranian and Russian national security (Erdogan ’ s provocations, the first visit of Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar and Turkish politician and economist Mevlüt Çavışoğlu to the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea and the meeting with Turkish deputies and representatives).
As part of the follow-up to Turan ’ s expansionist project led by Turkey, a series of measures – which can be analyzed in the long term – have focused on targeting many areas in recent years under the silence and disregard of the United States.
Turkey ’ s recent interventions are not limited to the security areas associated with Iran (such as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan and other countries), but they have included areas under Russian and Chinese control.
This may imply cooperation and coordination between the two countries and Turkey ’ s dangerous role in the larger Middle East project.
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