President Javier Milei of Argentina has embarked on a highly ambitious and radical policy agenda rooted in libertarian and neoliberal principles, aiming to fundamentally reshape the country’s economic, political, and institutional landscape.

His approach centers on drastic market liberalization, sharp fiscal austerity, and a reduction of state intervention, reflecting his self-identification as an anarcho-capitalist influenced by Austrian School economics.

This agenda seeks to address Argentina’s chronic economic instability, hyperinflation, and economic stagnation by dismantling many of the traditional mechanisms of government control and social welfare.

Economically, Milei’s flagship reform is his push to dollarize the Argentine economy by abolishing the Argentine Central Bank and replacing the peso with the US dollar.

This move is designed to stem hyperinflation, which reached an alarming 138% in 2023, and stabilize the currency system.

Alongside dollarization, he advocates for sharp cuts in public spending with the goal of achieving a budget surplus, a drastic fiscal austerity measure considered unprecedented in recent Argentine history.

Milei’s economic reforms include issuing an Executive Emergency Decree and an omnibus legislative bill to repeal over 300 laws, significantly deregulating multiple key sectors such as energy, aviation, ports, agriculture, and labor.

His government plans to privatize 41 state-owned enterprises, representing one of the most extensive privatization drives in Argentina's contemporary history.

Additionally, he has proposed weakening environmental protections, exemplified by attempts to modify the Glacier Protection Law, further signaling his prioritization of economic growth over regulatory safeguards.

Politically, Milei’s approach is marked by bypassing the opposition-led Congress to accelerate reform implementation.

Lacking a congressional majority, his coalition holds only a small minority in the legislature, which has necessitated a reliance on emergency powers delegating legislative authority to the executive branch.

This strategic “turbo-politics” or what has been dubbed “neoliberal parliamentarism” allows the government to implement reforms quickly, circumventing prolonged legislative debates.

However, this concentration of power in the executive has provoked accusations of authoritarian tendencies and anti-democratic governance.

The political environment around these reforms has been volatile, with violent protests erupting amid parliamentary sessions and social unrest spurred by fears over erosion of labor rights, social protections, and workers’ welfare.

Institutionally, Milei seeks to radically shrink government by abolishing more than half of the ministries—cutting 10 out of 18 ministries—and dismantling welfare programs.

This constitutes a profound departure from Argentina's historical reliance on an expansive state apparatus.

His agenda also proposes shutting down Argentina’s National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET), which finances a significant portion of the country’s scientific research.

The plan is to replace public science funding with private investment, aligned with his broader privatization agenda.

This move has been strongly criticized by the scientific community, with concerns about potential brain drain and setbacks to Argentina's scientific capabilities.

Socially, Milei’s reforms have sparked widespread and intense contention.

Large-scale protests have emerged in opposition to public spending cuts, privatizations, and perceived attacks on labor and pension rights.

The government has responded with stringent law enforcement measures, including laws that empower federal forces to disperse protests without judicial orders.

Additionally, his administration has increased prices for basic services and terminated short-term public employee contracts, further fueling discontent.

Milei’s political rhetoric is characterized by a populist disdain for the political establishment, which he frequently brands as parasitic, and an adversarial view of the state as a barrier to economic freedom.

This fusion of radical market liberalization with populist discourse serves to justify strong executive action and the circumvention of democratic legislative processes.

He promotes a vision of “instant democracy,” emphasizing rapid decision-making and governance efficiency at the expense of deliberative legislative debate.

This neoliberal populism combines anti-establishment sentiments with aggressive market fundamentalism.

Nevertheless, Milei faces significant constraints and challenges.

The fragmented Congress with a minority coalition presence forces ongoing negotiation and compromises with opposition parties, mainly Peronists and labor unions, which have mobilized strong resistance due to fears over the dismantling of labor protections and social rights.

Despite initial endorsements from some financial sectors and the International Monetary Fund, skepticism persists about the viability and social cost of Milei’s reforms.

There are concerns regarding the opacity of policy implementation, the risk of a deep recession due to fiscal austerity, and the potential for protracted social unrest.

The opposition is organized and vocal, and certain reforms face legal challenges and require legislative approval, limiting the speed and scope of changes.

Milei’s political ascent taps into widespread public disillusionment with the traditional political class and decades of economic crisis, hyperinflation, and rising poverty in Argentina.

His promises of radical change and economic freedom resonate particularly with younger demographics and those alienated from the dominant Peronist and center-right parties.

However, his governance style and policy program have also generated polarization and uncertainty about Argentina’s future trajectory.

In summary, President Javier Milei’s policy agenda in Argentina is a bold experiment in applying libertarian and neoliberal economic principles in a context marked by deep structural problems and social vulnerabilities.

His proposal to stabilize the economy through dollarization, extensive deregulation, privatization, and fiscal austerity represents a sharp break from Argentina’s traditional role of an interventionist welfare state.

Politically, his reliance on executive emergency powers to circumvent legislative gridlock challenges democratic norms and fuels polarization.

The social repercussions are profound, with growing resistance from labor, scientific sectors, and social movements concerned about the erosion of social protections and public services.

The success and sustainability of Milei’s reforms remain uncertain due to institutional constraints, political opposition, and the socioeconomic risks associated with rapid adjustment in a historically volatile economy.

The unfolding developments will be critical in shaping Argentina’s institutional framework, economic prospects, and societal cohesion in the years ahead.

President Javier Milei of Argentina has embarked on a highly ambitious and radical policy agenda rooted in libertarian and neoliberal principles, aiming to fundamentally reshape the country’s economic, political, and institutional landscape.

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Content: Argentina’s Javier Milei’s “Instant Democracy” and Neoliberalism

Javier Milei, YouTube screen grab.

Self-described “anarcho-capitalist,” Javier Milei became the president of Argentina in December 2023 promising “drastic” measures to temper the inflation crisis that has gripped the country. In the weeks since his election, Milei has brought forward an ambitious neoliberal restructuring program encompassing almost every aspect of the government.

Milei’s agenda confronts considerable opposition in Congress, where his governing coalition, Libertad Avanza, holds only a fraction of the seats. To adjust to these circumstances, Milei has cultivated a strategy of “turbo-politics,” bypassing legislative processes that risk delaying the implementation of his state reorganization plans.

Milei’s approach to Congress is symbolic of a decades-old strategy I have elsewhere called “neoliberal parliamentarism.” This concept describes a pattern of deliberate efforts to reform or subvert legislative institutions as a means of facilitating neoliberal reforms that do not have sufficient popular support to be actualized through usual democratic channels. These changes, even when temporary, often leave long-term scars on institutions by weakening norms of institutional forbearance.

The Emergency Decree and the Omnibus Bill

Milei has followed this blueprint, insulating the core elements of his agenda from democratic influence. The dismantling of the Argentine state began in earnest in mid-December when the executive branch presented an 83 page Necessity and Urgency Decree (NDU) aimed at repealing over 300 various laws and regulations, facilitating the privatization of core public assets.

This “mega-decree,” Milei claimed, was necessary to “start to undo the huge number of regulations that have held back and prevented economic growth”. It includes sweeping economic deregulation, such as the elimination of regulations on Argentina’s supermarket laws, which required the guarantee of low prices on basic products. It also includes measures to eliminate rent controls. Suggested labour reforms to cut pregnancy leave and increase the job probation period were suspended by the courts in January 2024.

Less than a week after issuing the NDU, the executive branch sent a massive omnibus bill titled Foundations and Starting Points for the Freedom of the Argentine People to Congress for consideration. The bill bundles the major elements of Milei’s neoliberal restructuring initiatives under the heading of a single piece of legislation with 664 articles. It will enable the government to carry out, in a matter of weeks, what would normally take years to achieve if these reforms were considered independently and subjected to the usual legislative scrutiny.

Reforms from the 351 page bill include an extraordinary provision declaring a state of public emergency on matters related to the economy, fiscal balance, social security, defence, health, and administration.

The emergency declaration delegates more than 1,000 extraordinary powers from the legislative to the executive until December 31, 2025, with the possibility of a two-year extension. This provision would enable Milei to make major reforms without having to consult Congress, thus eliminating a major hurdle to the implementation of neoliberal reforms.

Authors of the bill are attempting to facilitate the privatization of 41 state-owned companies across various sectors including energy, aviation, port administration, and agriculture. They also enable the reorganization of public administration, including embedding regulatory cuts from the NDU into law.

Additionally, the omnibus legislation proposes substantial reforms to environmental protection laws. These changes include the weakening of the Glacier Protection Law, allowing the mining of sensitive “periglacial” areas. The bill is presently being rushed through the legislative process by way of Extraordinary sessions of Congress, leading to marathon sittings during Argentina’s usual summer recess period.

“It’s impossible for people to have an idea of the enormous number of proposals Milei has sent,” said Ricardo Gil Laverda, a constitutional lawyer and former Argentine Justice Minister. “They cover dozens and dozens and dozens of laws, often on deep topics.”

To influence negotiations, Milei has threatened to put forward a non-binding referendum if the opposition parties do not agree to the main terms of his restructuring plan. Milei has also threatened to take away social welfare rights from protesters who block streets.

Despite these efforts, however, the reality of Milei’s lack of Congressional support has led him to compromise on some elements of his agenda as it makes its way through the legislative process. Although the structure of the bill remains, opposition politicians have made more than 100 changes to it, including curtailing the scope of the President’s emergency powers to one year rather than two, and retaining YPF, the national oil and gas company, in public hands, despite allowing most other state-owned companies to remain subject to privatization.

Neoliberalism and the Decline of the Legislature

Argentina is not unique. This most recent example of legislative subversion is a familiar tactic used to accommodate neoliberal restructuring, that has been utilized repeatedly by neoliberal reformers in recent decades, including the IMF-sanctioned omnibus bill rammed through Greece’s parliament in 2014.

This approach to the legislature is the consequence of the political limitations of neoliberal policy, which is opposed by considerable segments of society. A blueprint for this strategy is spelled out by former New Zealand Minister of Finance Roger Douglas in his 1993 book, Unfinished Business. The book recalls lessons from his experience implementing a neoliberal agenda dubbed ‘Rogernomics’ in the 1980s against the headwinds of widespread social and political opposition.

Douglas claimed it is “uncertainty, not speed, that endangers the success of structural reform programmes.” Neoliberal reforms should not be passed incrementally, but as a rupture, moving in “quantum leaps” to overcome popular opposition.

Democratic processes are typically slow and deliberate, designed to enable the legislative body to scrutinize the executive, foster compromise, and encourage debate. It was necessary, therefore, to streamline the democratic process to ensure that politicians could neither interfere with, nor demand meaningful changes to, neoliberal reorganization efforts.

Neoliberal governments should confront the legislature, not as an essential element of the process of democracy, but an instrument used by politicians and vested interests to interfere with the operations of the marketplace. “Speed is essential. It is almost impossible to go too fast,” Douglas said. “Once the programme begins to be implemented, don’t stop until you have completed it.”

This tactic did not occur in a vacuum, but emerged intrinsically from the content of a neoliberal theoretical framework that views democratic institutions as an additional layer of state administration to be overcome. Neoliberal thought is deeply skeptical in the capabilities of reason to infer or predict causality. Given the limitations of the mind, society should be governed, not by conscious modelling and careful planning, but according to spontaneous or “invisible hand” forms of social organization, which are the outcome of independent, unplanned individual decisions.

This position is most clearly expressed by Friedrich Hayek, who claimed that parliamentary sovereignty was in fact the “root of the evil” in modern society, since it facilitated the growth of the state. Legislatures constituted one limb of what Milton Friedman called the “iron triangle” of politicians, bureaucrats, as well as corporate and individual special interests that were perpetually reliant upon the government for rents, and therefore had an interest in obstructing market reforms.

‘Instant Democracy’ and the Rise of ‘Neoliberal Populism’

What should we make of Milei’s approach to Congress, then? Is it reflective of a new pattern in neoliberal governance, or merely the extension of an old one? The answer is both. While Milei’s approach clearly shares categorial similarities with the neoliberal legislative blueprint built for speed, his blending of these ideas with a coarse, populist rhetoric grounded in anti-statism, signifies an intensification of these patterns.

Milei’s populist neoliberal worldview contributes to a rising trend among far-right governments around the world to use this rhetoric to rationalize the subversion of democracy. This kind of “neoliberal populism” conflates democratic institutions with political actors, claiming that they are instruments of obstruction for self-serving politicians and bureaucrats.

This is a view Milei has proudly declared. “For me, the state is an enemy, as are the politicians who live off it,” he said. “We will put an end to the parasitic, stupid, useless political caste that is sinking this country.”

Grounded in the same logic as neoliberalism’s conventional demand for freedom from the state, democratic institutions increasingly appear as impediments to the logic of the marketplace. The elimination of cumbersome legislative processes, then, removes the obstacles that restrain market forces, generating popular economic independence, and restoring common-sense. This inverts the logic of democracy, making it appear as though executive rule is necessary to protect the interests of “the People” from Friedman’s “iron triangle.”

The anti-parliamentarism at the core of the neoliberal theoretical outlook has increasingly transformed into a populist program that mobilizes a general dissatisfaction with politicians against democratic institutions as such. Neoliberal politicians, such as Milei, use this reasoning to manufacture the conditions for the ongoing use of emergency powers and the concentration of authority in the executive branch.

The global elite, sensing “the smell of a big privatization wave coming,” are said to be “infatuated” with his take-no-prisoners approach to Congress. Thus, although not a new phenomenon, Milei’s brand of “instant democracy,” which conceives of speed and flexibility as the essence of legislative governance, has the support of both the financial elite as well as a growing populist dimension, giving it the hallmarks of a burgeoning political movement of the most regressive kind.

As the institutional forbearance that restrained most neoliberal governments to stay within the confines of liberal democratic constitutional structures continues to give way to a logic that sees the legislature as subordinate to the market, it is likely that we will continue to see the erosion of democratic standards.

Tom McDowell is a Lecturer in the Department of Politics and Public Administration at Toronto Metropolitan University. He is the author of Neoliberal Parliamentarism: The Decline of Parliament at the Ontario Legislature (University of Toronto Press, 2021).

His approach centers on drastic market liberalization, sharp fiscal austerity, and a reduction of state intervention, reflecting his self-identification as an anarcho-capitalist influenced by Austrian School economics.

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Content: Argentina sees the light with Maverick Javier Milei – Ivo Vegter

In a surprising turn, libertarian firebrand Javier Milei secured Argentina’s presidency after a second-round victory against his left-wing rival. Vowing to end decades of socialist mismanagement, Milei, an outspoken economist, faces challenges in implementing radical reforms, including abolishing ministries and dollarising the economy. While hailed as the world’s first libertarian president, Milei’s uphill battle involves legislative opposition and managing economic pain amid promises of a freer, market-oriented Argentina. Skepticism remains, awaiting the true impact of his ambitious plans in a nation grappling with deep-rooted economic struggles.

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Argentinians see the light

By Ivo Vegter*

It took a second round of voting, but the libertarian Javier Milei has defeated his Peronist rival to become president of Argentina.

A month ago, Javier Milei unexpectedly lost the first round of the Argentinian general election to his left-wing Peronist rival, Sergio Massa, after the latter had cynically promised zero taxes as a way to bribe voters.

In my column on the lessons South Africa could draw from that election, I said: ‘Let’s hope Argentinians see the light before Massa and Milei face off in the run-off election.’

Happily, they did see the light.

After decades of economic malaise under a government that for most of the last 30 years has been socialist, corrupt, wasteful and incompetent, leaving Argentina eighth from last in the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World Report 2023, they elected Milei, a libertarian firebrand, in the biggest landslide since Juan Perón’s election in 1973.

Milei becomes the first libertarian president, not only of Argentina, but in the world. The closest precedent that comes to mind is that of Calvin Coolidge, the small-government conservative president during the Roaring Twenties in the US, but Milei is far more radical than that.

‘“oday the reconstruction of Argentina begins’, he said, after winning 56% of the vote in the head-to-head race. That was also his first lie as president-elect, since he doesn’t actually take office until 10 December, but we’ll let that slide.

Radical

To describe Milei as radical would be putting it mildly. He has described the country’s ruling elite as thieves and the government as ‘a criminal organisation’. He has promised to abolish ten of the government’s 18 ministries. He said he would do away with the central bank and dollarise the Argentinian economy.

‘The model of decadence has come to an end’, he told his supporters. ‘There’s no going back. We have monumental problems ahead. Inflation, lack of work, and poverty’.

Milei is an accomplished economist, and largely follows the Austrian School of individualist free-market economics. He has variously described himself as an anarcho-capitalist and a minarchist (an anarchist who accepts the legitimacy of a small government dedicated to protecting life, liberty and property).

He has been extraordinarily outspoken on the evils of socialism and statism, and how they turned Argentina from a once-wealthy world power into an over-indebted, poverty-stricken, underdeveloped basket case.

Mainstream media

The mainstream media, with its largely left-leaning bias, has compared Milei to former presidents Donald Trump of the US and Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil.

‘Argentina set for sharp right turn as Trump-like radical wins presidency’, trumpeted the Washington Post

‘Argentina Elects Javier Milei in Victory for Far Right’ was the headline in the New York Times, which added: ‘Argentina’s next president is a libertarian economist whose brash style and embrace of conspiracy theories has parallels with those of Donald J. Trump.’

The ‘embrace of conspiracy theories’ is a particularly vicious jab. Readers would have to follow a link to find an explanation, and it turns out that the Times only referred to Milei’s allegations of polling irregularities, which have not been tested.

It is entirely plausible that Argentina’s electoral system is less secure than that of the United States, and that the incumbents – who went as far as abolishing taxes in order to engineer a win – might have been involved in some electoral skulduggery.

Allegations of election fraud are very common on all sides of the political spectrum, and do not, in and of themselves, rise to the level of the debunked claims of Trump, and his attempt to derail the orderly election of his rival.

Authoritarians

More importantly, both Bolsonaro and Trump are alt-right populists. They are moral authoritarians – not liberals – and appeal to collectivist – not individualist – principles such as nationalism and protectionism. They have often, rightly, been described as fascist, which is just as antithetical to libertarians as is left-wing socialism.

That both former presidents expressed their support for Milei has a lot more to do with shared anti-socialist positions than any real congruence in their political philosophy.

Milei has himself rejected the right-wing label, and indeed, his classical liberalism (for which ‘libertarian’ in the American sense is a synonym) does not yield to a simplistic left-right analysis. Rather, it falls on the liberal end of an authoritarian-liberal scale, and on the progressive end of a conservative-progressive scale.

Sour-grape-ish

Milei does have some views that are questionable, or traditionally associated with the conservative right, such as his anti-abortion stance and his rejection of climate alarmism.

Neither define him, however, and both are issues on which libertarians can and do disagree.

By similar logic, Milei’s promise not to dismantle Argentina’s extensive social welfare programmes does not make him some sort of left-winger.

In focusing on incidental agreements between Milei and leaders like Trump and Bolsonaro, and ignoring the fundamental philosophical differences between the former’s individualist, free-market, small-government ideas and the authoritarianism, nationalism, populism and protectionism of the latter, the media does both Milei and their readers a great disservice.

That a politician does not perfectly reflect all one’s personal political or moral views is in any case far less of a concern when that very politician proposes as far as possible to keep government out of people’s personal affairs and to leave most of the world’s problems to the private sector.

‘When your response to everything that is wrong with the world is to say, “There ought to be a law,” you are saying that you hold freedom very cheap’, said Thomas Sowell.

Moreover, it seems extraordinarily petty and sour-grape-ish to complain about a few differences of opinion with a candidate who promises radical change in a country that is mired in economic crisis, thanks to the policies of its incumbent rulers.

Music to the ears

Sniping from the mainstream press aside, the rise of a truly libertarian president in one of the world’s most economically unfree countries should be music to a classical liberal’s ears.

Who doesn’t want to radically slash the size of government? Who doesn’t question the inflationary monetary policy of highly indebted countries? Who doesn’t want to see free enterprise flourish, and witness the departure of a government that strangles business with red tape and taxes, and tries to pick winners by throwing subsidies at favoured companies?

On the face of it, this should be an excellent experiment to show whether the libertarian prescriptions for government do, indeed, produce a better outcome than the socialist quagmire in which Argentina has been stuck for so long.

Pain and gain

Practically speaking, however, there are reasons to remain skeptical.

First, we’ve only seen Milei’s talk, and not his walk.

Second, making drastic changes in the structure of a country’s government and economy, as Milei proposes, will be painful.

It is arguable that the short-term pain is justified by the long-term gain, but electorates are rarely forgiving to those who inflict necessary pain. Witness Margaret Thatcher, who saved Britain from the socialist economic malaise of the 1970s, but remains hated to this day by those who bore the brunt of her reforms.

Dollarising an economy does not produce immediate results, for example. It can take years before the stabilising effect of dollarisation filters through to low inflation rates. It can, however, immediately harm people and even increase poverty levels, depending on the exchange rate at which existing deposits are converted.

Drastically reducing the size of government will also face much immediate opposition, especially from civil servants who stand to lose their jobs.

Privatising healthcare, education or other government functions is also fraught with transition difficulties. Much depends on exactly how such privatisation is carried out. It can fail, and even if the eventual outcome is a success, it could cause years of disruptions and dissatisfaction.

Then there are the entrenched patronage networks of the incumbent socialist government, who will be highly upset – and fight back vigorously – when the taps of corrupt fiscal spending get turned off.

Finally, few voters have the patience to wait five or ten years for radical free-market reforms to have a positive impact, and Argentina’s president only serves a four-year term before facing the electorate again.

Legislative opposition

A further obstacle to Milei’s reforms is that he will not be the philosopher-king of every libertarian’s dreams. He will not be a dictator.

He will simply be the head of the executive in a constitutional parliamentary democracy, with strictly circumscribed powers.

And the elections did not result in a similar landslide in the legislature.

Argentina has a 72-seat Senate, or upper house, and a 257-seat Chamber of Deputies, or lower house. Together, they make up the Argentinian National Congress.

In both houses, Milei’s libertarian coalition, Liberty Advances (La Libertad Avanza, or LLA) took more seats from the conservative coalition, Together for Change (Juntos por el Cambio, or JxC), than from the socialist Peronista coalition, Union for the Homeland (Unión por la Patria, or UxP).

In the Senate, this leaves the Peronistas as the largest coalition, with 32 seats. It would need 37 seats to command an outright majority. The conservative coalition, JxC, retains only 27 seats. As the third-largest party in the Senate, Milei’s LLA only has six seats, which even in coalition with the conservatives is not enough for an outright majority.

In the lower house, the picture is similar. UxP has 104 out of 257 seats, JxC has 93, and LLA has 38. The only difference is that here, a JxC and LLA coalition can command a simple majority.

This leaves Milei at the mercy first of the conservatives, who would welcome market-oriented reforms and a departure from socialism, but by their very nature would be reluctant to endorse Milei’s more radical, disruptive proposals. Once Milei has cleared that hurdle, he needs to gather a majority in the upper house, which will be even harder.

Argentina is also heavily indebted, including to the International Monetary Fund, and creditors are likely to have a say in how the country is run. Anything that scares them will raise the cost of credit, which Argentina can ill afford.

Wait and see

Once the initial euphoria of seeing a true libertarian in power has cleared, then, we are left with the sobering realisation that Milei may not be able to achieve anywhere near as much as he has promised.

Turning failing countries around is not for the faint-hearted, and it always comes with social upheaval and economic pain.

Even if Milei gets the good ship Argentina pointed in the right direction again, the prevailing winds and currents may still dash it – and its captain – upon the rocks.

Read also:

*Ivo Vegter is a freelance journalist, columnist and speaker who loves debunking myths and misconceptions, and addresses topics from the perspective of individual liberty and free markets.

This article was first published by Daily Friend and is republished with permission

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How will Milei's reforms impact workers?

This agenda seeks to address Argentina’s chronic economic instability, hyperinflation, and economic stagnation by dismantling many of the traditional mechanisms of government control and social welfare.

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In initial victory for Argentine President Milei, Senate gives overall approval to key reform bills

By ISABEL DEBRE
Associated Press

BUENOS AIRES, Argentina (AP) — Argentina’s Senate has approved key state overhaul and tax bills proposed by President Javier Miliei, delivering an initial legislative victory to the libertarian leader in his efforts to deliver on his promises of radical change.

Senators voted 37 to 36 late Wednesday to give their overall approval to the overhaul bill after 11 hours of heated debate as protesters urging lawmakers to reject Milei’s harsh austerity clashed with police outside Congress. The lawmakers still must approve individual measures in an article-by-article vote that will stretch throughout the night.

In a reflection of the fierce backlash to the legislation and deep polarization gripping Argentina’s Congress, Vice President and head of the Senate Victoria Villarruel cast the tiebreaking vote in favor of Milei’s agenda.

The legislation delegates broad powers to the president in energy, pensions, security and other areas and includes several measures seen as controversial, including a generous incentive scheme for foreign investors, tax amnesty for those with undeclared assets and plans to privatize some of Argentina’s state-owned firms.

If the Senate approves the articles with modifications, the lower house still has to okay them before Milei can claim passing his first law since entering office last December.

As Senators pored over the bills, protesters in downtown Buenos Aires hurled sticks, stones and Molotov cocktails at police who fired water cannons and tear gas to disperse the crowds.

The fiery right-wing economist rose to power on promises he would resolve Argentina’s worst economic crisis in two decades, with annual inflation climbing toward 300% and a recession deepening.

But his political party of relative novices holds just a tiny minority of seats in Congress and he has struggled to strike deals with the opposition.

Senators approved two bills, a tax package that lowers the income tax threshold and a 238-article state reform bill that passed the lower house of Congress in late April after weeks of negotiations.

Initially dubbed the “omnibus bill” because of its more than 600 articles, the watered-down version at hand still delegates broad legislative powers to the president in energy, pensions, security and other areas.

The proposal’s immense scope — and staunch opposition to it — has limited progress.

“We have the weakest president we’ve ever seen who is trying to pass the biggest bill we’ve ever seen,” said Ana Iparraguirre, an Argentina-based analyst at Washington strategy firm GBAO. “That’s the contradiction.”

Unlike previous Argentine leaders since the return of democracy in 1983, Milei has failed to pass a single piece of legislation during his first six months in office. Instead, the populist outsider has relied on executive powers to slash state spending and sweep away economic restrictions.

“Today, it’s almost more important for Milei to demonstrate that he can pass laws in Congress than what he passes,” said Lucas Romero, director of Synopsis consultancy.

The package has faced tough resistance from the left-leaning Peronist movement loyal to former president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, which has dominated Argentine politics for the last two decades and holds sway over the country’s powerful trade unions.

Thousands of bankers, teachers, truckers and workers from a range of other unions converged around Congress throughout the day, banging drums, blasting trumpets and chanting, “Our country is not for sale!” and “We will defend the state!”

“If this law passes, we are going to lose so many of our labor and pension rights,” said 54-year-old teacher Miriam Rajovitcher protesting alongside her colleagues, middle-class Argentines who say they’ve had to reconfigure their lives since Milei slashed their school budgets and devalued the currency, sending inflation soaring. “I am so much wor0se off.

The rally took a tense turn when hundreds of riot officers pushed back with their shields against angry protesters trying to surge through a barrier.

Police used pepper spray, water cannons and tear gas against the huge crowds while demonstrators set two overturned cars ablaze and threw Molotov cocktails.

Dozens of protesters were being treated by medics in the streets and police said 20 officers had been injured in the clashes. At least five Peronist lawmakers said they were hospitalized after police sprayed pepper spray in their eyes.

“Today the government is declaring war on the Argentine people,” Peronist lawmaker Cecilia Moreau told reporters outside Congress.

The presidency called protesters “terrorists” and accused them of “attempting to carry out a coup d’état” by disrupting Congress.

The Peronist bloc controls 33 out of 72 seats in the Senate while Milei’s party, Freedom Advances, holds just seven seats. The bill needed 37 votes from the 72 total legislators in the Senate to get a majority and ended up with a 36-36 tie.

Analysts say that foreign investors and the International Monetary Fund, to which Argentina owes a staggering $44 billion, are closely watching Wednesday’s vote to see whether Milei can build consensus with his opponents to deliver on his ambitions.

Wednesday’s article-by-article vote will stretch for hours, with analysts expecting lawmakers to further weaken the most divisive sections of the bills.

One of the most contested measures is an incentive program to spur foreign investments that offers lucrative tax breaks for 30 years, no import tariffs and other perks for big corporations that critics say go too far.

“What this law is hurting most are the pockets of workers, not the big companies that are just going to get richer,” said 36-year-old Juan Barreto, a bank employee jostling amid crowds of his fellow union members.

Argentina’s unions have also voiced vehement opposition to measures that would make it easier for companies to fire employees as well as plans to privatize some state-owned companies. The question of which ones will head to auction has generated intense debate.

Backlash to the tax bill has centered on an amnesty that would allow Argentines to register undeclared assets at home and abroad without paying heavy taxes, as well as a lower income tax threshold to boost revenue.

Frustrated by legislative resistance, the president has moderated his previous all-or-nothing approach. Earlier this month, in a bid to break the impasse, Milei fired his politically inexperienced Cabinet chief and replaced him with Interior Minister Guillermo Francos, a career politician skilled at congressional wheeling and dealing.

In recent weeks, Argentina has gotten a taste of what awaits if Congress fails to pass the bills.

Sovereign bonds have tumbled. The country’s currency, the peso, has depreciated as well, widening the gap between the official and black market exchange rate to nearly 40%. The peso was trading at 1,255 per greenback on the informal market Wednesday, a rate far lower than earlier this year.

Even as the IMF has praised Milei’s agenda and released tranches of frozen loans, the fund has held back from striking a new deal with Argentina.

Meanwhile, Milei has been in Silicon Valley rubbing shoulders with billionaire tech executives Elon Musk, Tim Cook and Mark Zuckerberg. The meetings however, have not produced any announcements of substantial investments.

“What you’re seeing in the last three weeks is the market and investors getting a little nervous,” said Marcelo J. García, Americas director at geopolitical risk firm Horizon Engage. “The market is saying, ‘Show me that you can govern.’”

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What economic issue did Milei want to address?

suspended 366 decrees to ease economic controls and reduce spending.

Economically, Milei’s flagship reform is his push to dollarize the Argentine economy by abolishing the Argentine Central Bank and replacing the peso with the US dollar.

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Content: The content originally appeared on: Al Jazeera – Latin America News

Argentines are voting in a presidential election that might see a far-right populist leader, who has vowed to overhaul the Latin American country’s ailing economy, emerge victorious.

Polling stations opened their doors at 8am local time (11:00 GMT) and are expected to accept voters until 6pm local time (21:00 GMT), with results to come by late Monday.

During Sunday’s ballot, voters are also selecting members of the Congress and provincial governors, specifically 130 lower house representatives and 24 national senators.

Decades of economic decline and record inflation have propelled libertarian outsider Javier Milei, the 52-year-old far-right populist leader of the Liberty Advances party, to the front of a tight race.

The eccentric economist and first-year lawmaker, who has described himself as an “anarcho-capitalist”, had emerged as an unexpected frontrunner in the August primary election.

Milei has been compared to controversial leaders like Donald Trump in the United States and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, and has been winning support among some Argentinians by promoting radical policy changes.

Voters are angry at traditional parties for failing to address the Latin American nation’s ailing economy for decades.

Milei has mostly focused on the economy, which experts agree is perhaps the most severe challenge facing Argentina right now, with inflation standing at a whopping 138 percent in September and only expected to grow by the end of the year.

To fix the economic issues, Milei has proposed eliminating the central bank, replacing the local currency with the US dollar as Ecuador and El Salvador have done, and slashing public spending.

He has also promised cultural reforms as he has presented himself as an opponent of socialism at home and abroad, and is a staunch critic of abortion, which he has described as “murder” even though it was legalised by the country’s Congress in 2020.

Milei’s main rivals are Patricia Bullrich, a 67-year-old former security minister who is the candidate for the centre-right Together for Change coalition, and Sergio Massa, the 51-year-old incumbent economy minister who represents the governing Peronist coalition.

To win the presidential election, a candidate must secure 45 percent of the vote, or 40 percent plus a 10-point lead over their closest competitor.

Pre-election polls give Milei the best chance of winning, but they have proven notoriously unreliable in past elections.

So, it is possible that there will be two winners, which would force a second round of voting in November.

A new president and vice president are expected to take office on December 10.

dollarizing the Argentinian currency
closing the central bank

This move is designed to stem hyperinflation, which reached an alarming 138% in 2023, and stabilize the currency system.

What economic issue did Milei want to address?

Alongside dollarization, he advocates for sharp cuts in public spending with the goal of achieving a budget surplus, a drastic fiscal austerity measure considered unprecedented in recent Argentine history.

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Content: Milei Experiment

In the tangled web of Argentine politics and economics, one figure has emerged as both a lightning rod for controversy and a beacon of hope ~ President Javier Milei.

In the tangled web of Argentine politics and economics, one figure has emerged as both a lightning rod for controversy and a beacon of hope ~ President Javier Milei. His first 100 days in office have been marked by a whirlwind of fiscal manoeuvres, bold policy shifts, and commitment to economic reform. But as Argentina teeters on the edge of uncertainty, Mr Milei’s ambitious agenda raises questions even it offers solutions. At the heart of Mr Milei’s strategy lies a radical departure from conventional wisdom.

Brandishing a chainsaw as a symbol of fiscal austerity, he has pledged to slash spending and achieve a budget surplus, a feat unheard of in a country plagued by decades of fiscal mismanagement. His unorthodox approach has garnered both praise and scepticism, as Argentines grapple with the harsh realities of rising poverty and economic contraction. The cornerstone of Mr Milei’s economic vision is the elimination of money-printing and the pursuit of a unified exchange rate. By devaluing the peso and cutting interest rates, he aims to rein in inflation and restore confidence in the economy.

Yet the path to stability is fraught with pitfalls, as the spectre of recession looms large and investors remain wary of the government’s opaque monetary policies. While Mr Milei’s commitment to reform is commendable, his political isolation poses a significant obstacle to meaningful change. With little support in the Argentine Congress and a fragmented coalition, he faces an uphill battle. The recent defeat of a sprawling omnibus bill highlights the challenges ahead, as competing interests and entrenched political factions threaten to derail Mr Milei’s ambitions. Moreover, the uncertainty surrounding Argentina’s future monetary regime adds another layer of complexity to the equation. Will Mr Milei pivot towards dollarization or pursue a more gradual approach to currency reform? The lack of clarity on this front only serves to fuel investor anxieties and exacerbate economic volatility. Amidst these challenges, Mr Milei’s fate hangs in the balance. How much economic pain can Argentines endure before turning on their unconventional leader? And can Mr Milei muster the political support needed to navigate the treacherous waters of Argentine politics?

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In the end, the trajectory of Mr Milei’s presidency hinges on the delicate balance between economic resilience and political manoeuvring. Should he manage to maintain public support and secure crucial alliances, Mr Milei could emerge as a formidable force in next year’s mid-term elections. However, any slip in popularity could spell disaster for his ambitious agenda, opening the door for his adversaries to dismantle his presidency. Whether Mr Milei’s gamble will pay off remains to be seen. But one thing is certain. In a country accustomed to political upheaval and economic turmoil, the journey towards reform is bound to be fraught with uncertainty and adversity. Only time will tell whether Mr Milei’s vision for Argentina’s future will lead to prosperity or further hardship

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dollarizing the Argentinian currency
criticism of government spending

What economic issue did Milei want to address?

What issue did Milei want to address without printing money?

Milei’s economic reforms include issuing an Executive Emergency Decree and an omnibus legislative bill to repeal over 300 laws, significantly deregulating multiple key sectors such as energy, aviation, ports, agriculture, and labor.

How will Milei's reforms impact workers?

What industries were affected by Milei's deregulations?

His government plans to privatize 41 state-owned enterprises, representing one of the most extensive privatization drives in Argentina's contemporary history.

How many state-owned companies would be privatized under Milei's mega bill?

Additionally, he has proposed weakening environmental protections, exemplified by attempts to modify the Glacier Protection Law, further signaling his prioritization of economic growth over regulatory safeguards.

Politically, Milei’s approach is marked by bypassing the opposition-led Congress to accelerate reform implementation.

Lacking a congressional majority, his coalition holds only a small minority in the legislature, which has necessitated a reliance on emergency powers delegating legislative authority to the executive branch.

This strategic “turbo-politics” or what has been dubbed “neoliberal parliamentarism” allows the government to implement reforms quickly, circumventing prolonged legislative debates.

However, this concentration of power in the executive has provoked accusations of authoritarian tendencies and anti-democratic governance.

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Argentina’s Javier Milei Is Looking To Bluff His Political Rivals

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And just like that, Argentina’s ultra-libertarian president, Javier Milei, sent the whole socio-political-economic ecosystem into disarray

Praised for his moderation and pragmatism during the first few weeks of his presidency, the self-proclaimed anarcho-capitalist has now put in place a series of controversial measures which have divided public opinion, generating a new iteration of Argentina’s infamous “grieta,” our very own version of the polarization that has now become the norm across the so-called ‘Western World.’ But, it’s no longer about the antagonism between Kirchnerites and their opponents, mainly represented by Mauricio Macri and the Juntos por el Cambio coalition, but about those blindly in favor of the wild-haired economist and those denouncing his every move as a diabolic, anti-democratic part of a ferocious plan to tear down the tenets of Argentine society.

Both sides seem to agree that he is executing a carefully crafted plan that will either elevate Argentina back to the lost status of “global power” of the late 19th century or ravage the nation in order put it on the chopping-block and conduct a fire sale to hand over the crown jewels to global financial elites. Those with access to the Casa Rosada tell a different story though, one of amateurism and incomplete staffing that would suggest the La Libertad Avanza coalition is acting more out of necessity than Machiavellian genius.

Milei finally broke out of his honeymoon period with those who didn’t vote for him after launching a massive package of reforms through a “decreto de necesidad y urgencia,” an emergency decree (DNU) which has become the standard practice for presidents seeking to bypass Congress and is generally used for less ambitious projects. The DNU is truly massive, with 366 articles including the repeal of multiple laws which call into question the constitutionality of the measure, even if governing via DNU is already contrary to the spirit of the Constitution and something that has happened in each of the last several administrations. It was quickly followed by the Omnibus law, equally as massive in its scope and ambition, and its capacitiy to divide the political field.

Put together by liberal economist Federico Sturzenegger, who ran the Central Bank under Macri and helds no role in the Milei-Villaruel administration until after the project was presented, the “mega-decree” was announced by national (and obligatory) broadcast several weeks in a dramatic scene that had Milei as the protagonist in the foreground and his whole team standing behind, statue-like, as the president read sternly.

Earlier that day they had scored a political victory with Security Minister Patricia Bullrich’s “anti-picket” protocol making its debut, effectively diluting the first public protest against the government. Some reports indicated there was more security than 'piquetero' protesters. Weeks later, the General Confederation of Labor united the pan-Peronist opposition in a massive march that managed to remain cordial, respecting Bullrich's protocol by trying to show political muscle in the streets.

The reform package conformed by DNU and Omnibus bill immediately generated the reaction of Milei's political opponents, along with a substantial portion of the population who took to the streets for a traditional “cacerolazo,” a protests with pots and pans reminiscent of the worst days of the 2001 crisis. There are no coincidences. Congressional leaders from the pan-Peronist Unión por la Patria coalition spoke with union strongmen from the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) umbrella union group. Members of the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) warned of unconstitutionality and specialist lawyers indicated Milei was trampling all over the Constitution by failing to respect the separation of powers. Buenos Aires Province governor Axel Kicillof, probably the leading member of the Peronist opposition, and his government decided to ignore Bullrich’s “anti-picket” protocol claiming it violated the constitutional right to protest. A few weeks before, Economy Minister Luis ‘Toto’ Caputo unveiled the government’s initial economic plan, generating a similar reaction in the political field which didn’t seem to make its way to the general population. The situation is beginning to change and as the actual implications of the Milei administration’s actions make an impact, social and political actors will begin to respond.

There should be few doubts that one of the strongest points of La Libertad Avanza’s electoral strategy had to do with communications, particularly on social media. These early moves suggest they will try and double down, betting on the use of their skills to try and compensate for the lack of political support, despite a strong victory over both Sergio Massa and the Peronists, and Bullrich and Juntos por el Cambio. Toto Caputo, however, is known to be particularly uncomfortable with the media. His pre-recorded message several weeks ago announcing tough economic measures — many of which contradicted Milei’s campaign promises, particularly tax hikes — was delayed several times reportedly due to the need for multiple takes and Milei’s direct involvement (or maybe indirectly through sister Karina). The second measure he announced, for example, was a year-long reduction of government advertising to zero – a direct strike to the beleaguered media industry and a measure that has practically zero impact on the deficit but high popular approval. The over-dramatization of the security operation to contain a moderate-to-small protest early into the presidency, together with pictures of Milei and Bullrich supervising from police headquarters, allowed them to take advantage of the far-left Partido Obrero to score an easy win and show his electorate that they can control the streets. Yet, controlling a couple of thousand protesters is one thing. The CGT protest that brought together the political and social power of the unions remained under control, and that's a win for the government, but it was a political protest. If the middle class begins to lose its temper, and expectations, Milei could face a much more difficult scenario.

The “basis for the reconstruction of the Argentine economy” reform package could be another attempt to win the communications game and take the spotlight to appear active in the eyes of the public opinion. With absolute minorities in both chambers of Congress and several controversial reforms included in a massive package passed by Milei’s mega-DNU, it's difficult to imagine that it will quickly pass in the Chamber of Deputies, despite an early win at the commission level with the help of the former Juntos por el Cambio coalition. Furthermore, several interest groups are putting together legal arguments to dispute the issue in court, especially the labor reform which has been stayed. It could quickly make its way to a Supreme Court that has already proven eager to interject politically.

Ultimately, most, if not all, of the regulations, laws, and measures included in the decree will have to make their way through Congress and will therefore be subject to negotiations and amendments. Yet, Milei has shown initiative and wants to maintain, or extend, the popular support which took him to victory in the run-off and has already generated a circumstantial majority in the Senate to defeat the Peronist caucus and at the commissions to get the Omnibus bill past the first obstacle.

There are risks that the ultra-libertarian could prove authoritarian and anti-democratic. He’s shown some of that in the past, particularly by claiming he would govern by plebiscite if he didn’t have the support of Congress (something Hugo Chávez did to amend the Venezuelan constitution) and by picking a dictatorship denialist as his running-mate. Many of his detractors have pointed to signs that suggest Argentina could descend into a state of totalitarianism, and this emergency decree fuels their suspicion.

It’s not clear whether the conditions for such a situation are in place. For now, he seems to be bluffing his political opponents. We’ll see if someone calls his hand.

This piece was originally published in the Buenos Aires Times, Argentina's only English-language newspaper.

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The political environment around these reforms has been volatile, with violent protests erupting amid parliamentary sessions and social unrest spurred by fears over erosion of labor rights, social protections, and workers’ welfare.

How will Milei's reforms impact workers?

Who has opposed Milei's proposed layoff order?

Institutionally, Milei seeks to radically shrink government by abolishing more than half of the ministries—cutting 10 out of 18 ministries—and dismantling welfare programs.

This constitutes a profound departure from Argentina's historical reliance on an expansive state apparatus.

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Content: Overview:

Argentina's latest presidential election offers plenty of sensational fodder for the presses. But there's a deeper issue here, a politics of desperation, that we would do well to watch as it rises in the world.

Reading Time: 6 minutes

On November 19, Argentina elected Javier Milei as its next president, to take office this December. His politics have been compared to those of Donald Trump (in his showmanship) and Jair Bolsonaro (in his rightwing extremism and denialism), but his ideas go further than both. Milei calls himself an anarcho-capitalist (a form of libertarian), whose stated aims are “blowing up” the central bank, changing the Argentinian peso for the dollar, permitting the private sale of human organs, and closing ministries for education, health, women, and culture while slashing welfare payments.

Milei has also been called a “minarchist” for his minimal-government belief that the state’s only purpose is to protect citizens’ rights to free action. To this end, proposed bans on abortion and loosened gun laws run in lockstep with his acceptance of trans identities and desire to legalize more drugs. He denies the scale of Argentina’s brutal history of state terror in 1976 to 1983, and when he first rose in the polls, there was a panicked rush among citizens to change their pesos for dollars, fearing economic disaster.

So why did he win?

And not just by a hair, but with 56% of the vote against his runoff opponent, Sergei Massa?

The historical underpinnings run deep, but human behavior in response to the current economic moment is also not complex. Urban poverty hit 40.1% in 2023, as inflation reached 50.7% earlier this year. When the official exchange rate was devalued by 22% the day after the primaries (in which Milei’s popularity caused panic), it caused a 12.4% inflation spike. This is in an enconomy where some 48.1% are informally or self-employed, and thus without salaried protections against the greatest financial hits.

An outsider expecting rational economic actors might assume that if Milei’s presence in the polls only destabilized an already precarious situation, surely humans would avoid voting for him again. But the logic of longstanding financial stress runs deeper than traditional economic configurations of the “rational actor”: when there is no confidence in existing state structures, perhaps it is best to pull off the bandaid quickly. The immediate pain will be hard, but maybe, just maybe, the destruction of the old order will bring about something new.

This is the politics of desperation and disillusionment.

The world would do well to pay attention to its rise.

Argentinian histories of low confidence in the state

There’s a famous, apocryphal, and above all cruel expression in economics: “There have only been four types of economies in the world: advanced, developing, Japan, and Argentina.” The point driven at here is that Japan seemed to rise from the ashes, with everything working against it, after World War II and even now with an aging workforce. Meanwhile Argentina, a country with a natural bounty, seemed to destroy confidence in itself at every turn.

This is a cruel expression for a few reasons: one being that Argentina is not alone even in South America, as a country with great internal resources that has struggled to turn its holdings into wealth for its citizens. Another reason is the why. While Japan recovered from WWII by growing a commercial empire through top-down industrial relationships with surrounding countries, Argentina under labor-nationalist Juan Domingo Perón had the audacity in the 1950s to try to nationalize its British-owned railways. This choice met with swift reprisal from Western powers, thereafter unwilling to invest. Before World War II, Argentina had relied heavily on military rule. After inflation spiked and labor strikes surged as global investors pulled out, it was back to decades of fraught authoritarianism.

One of the worst coups started with a 600 percent inflation surge in 1976. That seven-year period yielded up to 30,000 disappeared human beings during the state’s “Dirty War” against leftists, and ended only after the military attempted to take the Falkland Islands from the British. This failure would yield the modern democratic state, but with a low opinion of both the military and the bureaucracy. In 1989, ahead of a massive inflation crisis of up to 4,900 percent, only 30,000 out of 30 million citizens were paying income taxes.

Now, inflation can address domestic debt, but Argentina’s massive fiscal deficit was informed centrally by external debt, in dollars to the rest of the world. During the banking crisis of 1990, banks forced client deposits into bonds under the BONEX Plan, essentially taking citizens’ savings from them with a promise that their investment in the future of the country would pay off. Citizens were not happy about this, of course.

The government then introduced the Convertibility Plan in 1991, which tried to peg the Argentinian peso to the US dollar at a 1:1 rate. This process involved Argentina embracing US neoliberal state policies: relaxing labor protections, massively privatizing industries, and otherwise bringing the world back into Argentinian markets. Did the plan reduce inflation? Yes. It also raised unemployment, reduced wages, and stratified class outcomes. And it led to more austerity measures over time, because the government’s debt kept rising, forcing more of the annual budget into “debt servicing” to other countries.

Being open to world markets also meant being more vulnerable to their downturns, such as a major wobble in 2001, which sparked labor collapse and food riots in Argentina despite its local wealth of grain and beef. The peso was unpegged in 2002, after the government had restricted bank withdrawals to keep citizens from “financial flight” into other currencies and markets. Once the peso was floating freely, though, people panicked anyway. After years of seeing the dollar as the more valuable and stable currency, they rushed to exchange their holdings (which were now all in pesos) back into US dollars by other means. That rush caused another inflationary spike.

Argentina underwent two major debt restructuring deals in that decade, but they just created more problems. A deal in 2001 allowed Argentina to pay interest only to those who had opted in to the restructuring plan, and the exclusion of “holdouts” was reasserted after 2010, when the debt plan was agreed upon by 93% of bondholders. The remaining 7% weren’t having this, though: a few hedge fund creditors sued the Argentinian government for breach of a principle of equal treatment for bondholders, pari passu. The South District Court of New York agreed with them, and even though Argentina tried to continue paying its “holdin” creditors, as per the debt restructuring plan, those payments were not permitted until Argentina paid the holdouts, too, in compliance with the court’s rulings.

Argentina was forced into a massive default in 2014. And again in 2020. And this year, analysts believe it’s on track for another soon.

Why? Because Argentina’s banking system isn’t an independent force. It is yoked to a highly litigious set of international players, and vulnerable to every global market crash as well.

Seen this way, why wouldn’t the average Argentinian want to bring it down?

Dollarization and other flawed promises

The complex problem for Argentinians voting out of desperation is twofold:

For one, as much as they might associate the days of the dollar with a period of relative stability, it was never a simple matter of pegging one currency to another. The arrangement expressly came with Argentina’s willingness to embrace neoliberal policies that yielded stark divides in civilian life and other market outcomes. For Milei to “dollarize” the country now would require a similar willingness to play ball with international institutions and their policy demands. The moment the peso is eliminated, by being exchanged in its entirety for dollars, Argentina cedes a great deal of financial policy to external players.

And yet, that is precisely the issue currently plaguing Argentina’s banks.

But also, not just Argentina, despite the glibness of the apocryphal economics saying.

The problems of our global financial system are serious enough that they will require a much more holistic reckoning with the consequences of fifty years of neoliberal policy. In July, a UN joint commission released “Soaring Debt Threatens Global Prosperity”, a report that highlights the staggering rates of debt servicing endured by 40% of the developing world. If these debts were simply between states, that would be one matter, more easily resolved; but the hyper-privatized yet undertaxed nature of our global economy has the vast majority of these countries forced into austerity measures to pay off complex debts to groups like the hedge fund creditors who pushed Argentina into default in 2014.

In other words, this will keep happening until we develop policies that can offset the private-investment predation currently facing many countries in precarity.

The second problem is one that Colombia also experienced this past year, when many on both the left (with excitement) and the right (with trepidation) expected the first leftist president to bring about dramatic reforms: Milei is just one person in his government. Just as Gustavo Petro found himself embroiled in parliamentary quarrels between competing groups, so too does Milei’s victory not come with the resounding legislative presence needed to steamroll all his grand plans into operation. He, too, is going to have to negotiate.

In practice, this means that Argentinians currently thrilled by the possibility of change are again going to meet with disillusionment. Either Milei will pull off his dollarization, and they will learn that this move makes the country no less vulnerable to global shocks and creditors, or he won’t, and amid his interim achievement of “easier” goals (e.g., the demolition of whole ministries), Argentinians will experience socioeconomic shocks that again bring them to the streets in protest… or else to live, having nowhere else to go.

GLOBAL HUMANIST SHOPTALK M L Clark is a Canadian writer by birth, now based in Medellín, Colombia, who publishes speculative fiction and humanist essays with a focus on imagining a more just world.

His agenda also proposes shutting down Argentina’s National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET), which finances a significant portion of the country’s scientific research.

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Content: Javier Milei’s Radical Agenda Threatens Argentina’s Scientific Community

As the 22 October presidential election in Argentina draws near, scientists in the country are growing increasingly concerned about the potential implications of front runner Javier Milei’s radical agenda. One of his most controversial proposals is the complete shutdown of the National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET), the country’s main science agency and a critical source of funding for over 12,000 researchers across 300 institutions.

Milei, a libertarian candidate often compared to former US President Donald Trump and former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, argues that shutting down CONICET and relying on private investment for scientific research could alleviate Argentina’s ongoing fiscal crisis. He has also proposed privatizing other sectors, including health and the environment, and even suggested allowing individuals to sell their organs for profit.

The scientific community in Argentina, home to Latin America’s third-largest economy, is deeply alarmed by the potential consequences of Milei’s presidency. The National Academy of Exact, Physical and Natural Sciences in Buenos Aires has stressed the importance of state investment in science, highlighting that leading developed countries heavily invest in scientific research as a means to drive economic development and tackle poverty.

Milei’s rise to prominence has been fueled by Argentina’s economic turmoil, with high inflation rates, escalating debt to international creditors, and significant levels of poverty. While he may currently be leading in the polls, experts remain skeptical of the figures, and his opponents are still actively campaigning to garner support.

If Milei were to become president, many fear a massive brain drain as talented researchers seek opportunities abroad. Argentina has a long history of struggling with brain drain during times of economic crises, with previous instances leading to mass emigration of scientists to Europe and the United States. While Argentina still maintains a relatively high number of researchers per capita in Latin America, the loss of these talented individuals would undoubtedly hinder the country’s scientific progress.

As the election date approaches, the fate of Argentina’s scientific community hangs in the balance. The outcome will determine not only the future of CONICET but also the country’s ability to sustain scientific advancements and retain its brightest minds. It is a critical moment for the scientific community as they await the decision that could shape Argentina’s trajectory in the years to come.

The plan is to replace public science funding with private investment, aligned with his broader privatization agenda.

What does Milei promote in terms of healthcare and education?

This move has been strongly criticized by the scientific community, with concerns about potential brain drain and setbacks to Argentina's scientific capabilities.

Socially, Milei’s reforms have sparked widespread and intense contention.

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Content: Streets of Argentina Ablaze with Dissent as Milei’s Controversial Reforms Ignite Outrage

In a stunning turn of events, Argentina has become a battleground for public discontent following President Javier Milei’s introduction of a series of controversial proposals. Thousands of Argentinians have taken to the streets, enraged by the president’s push for drastic cuts to public spending.

Milei’s latest measures, unveiled on Wednesday evening, aim to revolutionize Argentina’s struggling economy through a variety of initiatives. These include deregulating the government and opening up state-run industries for privatization in order to spur both exports and investment.

However, the people’s outrage has manifested in widespread protests, often met with a heavy police presence. Gathering in front of the Argentine Congress, hundreds of demonstrators made their opposition to Milei’s proposals known.

Undeterred by the dissent, Milei appeared on national television to defend his agenda and offer reassurances of a prosperous future. He asserted, “Our objective is to rebuild our nation, restore individual freedom and autonomy, and dismantle the myriad of regulations that have impeded our economic growth for far too long.”

Acknowledging the mounting protests, Milei’s security minister, Patricia Bullrich, announced new measures aimed at maintaining public order. These measures grant federal forces the power to disperse protesters blocking streets without requiring a judicial order, and authorize the police to use video or digital evidence to identify and hold accountable those obstructing public thoroughfares. Moreover, the legislation empowers the state to apportion the costs of mobilizing security forces to the protesters themselves.

Milei’s presidential victory was built upon a campaign centered around reducing public spending. Since assuming office, he has already made significant changes to the country’s financial landscape. The value of the Argentinian currency has been adjusted, contracts of public employees with less than one year of service have been terminated, and the prices of basic services and public transportation have seen notable increases.

FAQ:

Q: What are President Milei’s proposals?

A: President Milei’s proposals include deregulating the government and allowing the privatization of state-run industries to boost exports and investment.

Q: Why are Argentinians protesting?

A: Thousands of Argentinians are protesting against Milei’s proposals due to their belief that the drastic cuts to public spending will adversely impact their lives.

Q: How is the government responding to the protests?

A: In response to the protests, the government has announced new measures to maintain public order, empowering federal forces to disperse protesters without a judicial order and enabling the identification of those obstructing public thoroughfares through video or digital means.

Q: What changes has Milei already implemented?

A: Since taking office, Milei has adjusted the value of the Argentinian currency, terminated contracts of public employees with less than one year of service, and increased the prices of basic services and public transportation.

(Sources: Information gathered from local news outlets)

Who has opposed Milei's proposed layoff order?

Large-scale protests have emerged in opposition to public spending cuts, privatizations, and perceived attacks on labor and pension rights.

How will Milei's reforms impact workers?

The government has responded with stringent law enforcement measures, including laws that empower federal forces to disperse protests without judicial orders.

Additionally, his administration has increased prices for basic services and terminated short-term public employee contracts, further fueling discontent.

How will Milei's reforms impact workers?

Milei’s political rhetoric is characterized by a populist disdain for the political establishment, which he frequently brands as parasitic, and an adversarial view of the state as a barrier to economic freedom.

This fusion of radical market liberalization with populist discourse serves to justify strong executive action and the circumvention of democratic legislative processes.

He promotes a vision of “instant democracy,” emphasizing rapid decision-making and governance efficiency at the expense of deliberative legislative debate.

This neoliberal populism combines anti-establishment sentiments with aggressive market fundamentalism.

Nevertheless, Milei faces significant constraints and challenges.

The fragmented Congress with a minority coalition presence forces ongoing negotiation and compromises with opposition parties, mainly Peronists and labor unions, which have mobilized strong resistance due to fears over the dismantling of labor protections and social rights.

How will Milei's reforms impact workers?

Who has opposed Milei's proposed layoff order?

Despite initial endorsements from some financial sectors and the International Monetary Fund, skepticism persists about the viability and social cost of Milei’s reforms.

There are concerns regarding the opacity of policy implementation, the risk of a deep recession due to fiscal austerity, and the potential for protracted social unrest.

The opposition is organized and vocal, and certain reforms face legal challenges and require legislative approval, limiting the speed and scope of changes.

Who has opposed Milei's proposed layoff order?

Milei’s political ascent taps into widespread public disillusionment with the traditional political class and decades of economic crisis, hyperinflation, and rising poverty in Argentina.

What economic issue did Milei want to address?

His promises of radical change and economic freedom resonate particularly with younger demographics and those alienated from the dominant Peronist and center-right parties.

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Content: MercoPress, en Español

Montevideo, April 19th 2022 - 20:23 UTC

The Washington Post says Milei could be Argentina's next President

Tuesday, April 19th 2022 - 20:05 UTC
Full article 0 comments

Days after Argentine Deputy Javier Milei announced he planned to run for President in 2023, The Washington Post published Monday a report saying he might even win the race.

The newspaper from the US capital carried a profile of Milei under the headline “He raffles off his salary. He could be Argentina's next president.”

Milei has promised that, if elected, he would ”end the [political] ruling class, reduce the government and close the Central Bank (...).“ He has already kept his word when he ran for Congress last year and now every month he raffles off his pay as a lawmaker.

Read also: “Argentina never created conditions for Falkland Islanders to become Argentine citizens”, lawmaker Milei

WaPo writer David Feliba highlighted that when Milei became a Deputy, more than 2.4 million people registered to win the Congressman's allowance and that someone whose ideas were outside mainstream local politics was the leading candidate in the first polls for next year's presidential elections, with support from voters of all social backgrounds.

In a country deeply polarized between the leftist Peronism of President Alberto Fernandez and the center-right coalition of his predecessor Mauricio Macri, Milei's emergence would be the consequence of ”a new opening of the besieged Argentines to a third way“.

Feliba quoted researcher Lucas Romero, director of the consulting firm Synopsis, who explained that Milei ”articulates people's anger better than any other“ candidate and his support arises from his discourse against the traditional political leadership and the poor economic results of the last decade.

The Post article stresses that perhaps Milei is the most radical of a group of libertarians who made gains in the 2021 midterm elections and that, in a country long ruled by variants of Peronism, it was the first time in decades that the philosophy of small government attracted considerable support.

Milei has garnered support even among low-income Argentines, who have traditionally been the stronghold of Peronism. Milei's ideas are well received among the younger generations. The liberal economist lures crowds to public conferences and social media where influencers ”amplify his ideas,“ Romero explained.

The Washington Post also quoted a 24-year-old Argentine who voted for Macri in 2015 and for Alberto Fernández in 2019. ”For me, it's Milei or a one-way ticket” out of the country, he said.

(Source: Clarín)

Tags: Javier Milei.

However, his governance style and policy program have also generated polarization and uncertainty about Argentina’s future trajectory.

In summary, President Javier Milei’s policy agenda in Argentina is a bold experiment in applying libertarian and neoliberal economic principles in a context marked by deep structural problems and social vulnerabilities.

His proposal to stabilize the economy through dollarization, extensive deregulation, privatization, and fiscal austerity represents a sharp break from Argentina’s traditional role of an interventionist welfare state.

How will Milei's reforms impact workers?

What does Milei promote in terms of healthcare and education?

Politically, his reliance on executive emergency powers to circumvent legislative gridlock challenges democratic norms and fuels polarization.

The social repercussions are profound, with growing resistance from labor, scientific sectors, and social movements concerned about the erosion of social protections and public services.

How will Milei's reforms impact workers?

Who has opposed Milei's proposed layoff order?

The success and sustainability of Milei’s reforms remain uncertain due to institutional constraints, political opposition, and the socioeconomic risks associated with rapid adjustment in a historically volatile economy.

The unfolding developments will be critical in shaping Argentina’s institutional framework, economic prospects, and societal cohesion in the years ahead.