The controversy surrounding Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s 2020 decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia from a museum back into a mosque centers on its complex historical, religious, cultural, and political significance.

Originally built in the 6th century as a Byzantine cathedral, Hagia Sophia served as the largest Christian worship site for nearly a millennium until it was converted into an Ottoman mosque in the 15th century.

In 1934, under the founder of modern Turkey Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, it was secularized and turned into a museum, symbolizing Turkey’s commitment to secularism and multi-faith coexistence.

It also holds the status of a UNESCO World Heritage Site, underscoring its global cultural importance .

Erdogan’s decision to restore Hagia Sophia’s status as a mosque provoked wide criticism.

Symbolically, for many Orthodox Christians worldwide, Hagia Sophia remains a sacred Byzantine cathedral with profound spiritual significance, comparable to St. Peter’s Basilica for Catholics.

After the reconversion, Christian mosaics depicting Jesus and Mary were covered with curtains to comply with Islamic traditions prohibiting human images in places of worship, provoking concerns about erasing Christian historical layers .

Critics argue that this move prioritizes Islamic heritage over the site's multi-faith history, undermining its symbolic role as a place of religious tolerance and coexistence.

The Greek Orthodox Church, the Ecumenical Patriarchate, Greece, the U.S. State Department, and Orthodox Christian institutions have expressed strong disapproval, labeling the reconversion as disrespectful and “offensive” to Istanbul's rich, multicultural history.

Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis called it a "completely unnecessary conversion" that offends Istanbul’s identity as a crossroads of cultures.

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The controversy surrounding Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s 2020 decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia from a museum back into a mosque centers on its complex historical, religious, cultural, and political significance.

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Content: New rules come into force for the visit of Hagia Sophia Mosque in Turkey - Sunrise Gate
Tuesday 16 January 2024 2: 04 PM Cairo Cairo 24 °
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New rules come into effect for visiting Hagia Sophia mosque in Turkey
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Published on: Tuesday 16 January 2024 - 1: 54 PM | Last updated on Tuesday 16 January 2024 - 1: 54 PM
The project for the Hagia Sophia mosque was closest to the heart of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan – but it was also the project that drew international criticism.
In the summer of 2020, Erdogan restored Hagia Sophia to be a mosque after it was originally a church, converted into an Ottoman mosque, converted into a museum.
At the time, Erdogan assured citizens that entry fees would be abolished, adding that the cultural edifice would remain open to everyone – Muslims or non-Muslims alike.
There will be another major change from January 15, with access to the Hagia Sophia restricted and visitors will have to pay fees again.
Turkish Tourism Minister Mehmet Nuri Arsoy hopes this will improve coexistence between religious and tourist visitors.
Arsoy said recently that tourist visitors are making noise and disrupting calm and prayer.
Until recently, visitors and worshippers were allowed to enter the interior of Hagia Sophia together, with barriers and signs keeping a certain distance between them.
However, from now on, worshippers and tourists will be introduced through different entrances.
Although worshippers can use the same entrances as before, tourists will be guided through an upstairs hallway.
According to Arsoy, tour guides will not be allowed to accompany visitors through the corridors, and earphones will be used instead.
“Our priority there is prayer, ” Arsoy said, noting that the building is a world cultural heritage site and should therefore remain open to all visitors around the world.
Zuleiha Duman, 29, who returned to Istanbul from Germany to see Hagia Sophia after it was converted into a mosque, said she found it taking away.
Welcoming the new rules, she said: “As long as the entrance fee isn ’ t too high, I think it ’ s acceptable. ”
“Why shouldn ’ t Turkey and the government take advantage of this place?
These funds can be channeled to preserve more religious places. ”
Hagia Sophia has been on the UNESCO World Heritage List as part of Istanbul ’ s history since 1985.
Built by Emperor Justinian, Hagia Sophia was the largest place of worship in Christianity for nearly a thousand years, it was the main church during the Byzantine Empire, and from the seventh century, the emperor was crowned inside.
After the Ottomans entered Constantinople (now Istanbul) in 1453, the Hagia Sophia was converted into a mosque.
On the orders of the founder of the Turkish Republic Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the building was converted into a museum in 1934 until the summer of 2020.
Hagia Sophia is as symbolically important to Orthodox Christians around the world as St. Peter ’ s Basilica is to Catholics.
After the building was converted into a mosque, criticism poured in from the Greek Orthodox Church.
The UNESCO Foundation also criticized the decision without consultation.
For Erdogan, turning the place into a mosque was his “childhood dream, ” as he himself said, and pleasing to religious voters.
A few external changes were made at the time, for example, a green carpet was placed above the marble floor.
It seems clear that all these things did not detract from the popularity of this teacher.
According to official statistics, some 13.6 million people visited the Hagia Sophia landmark in 2022, not all of them from Europe.
The number of visitors from Indonesia in particular has risen, Hagia Sophia Imam Binyamin Topoglu told Turkey ’ s Anadolu news agency in 2023.
The amount of the fees has not yet been determined.
Tourism Minister Ersoy says the proceeds will be spent on cultural assets, for excavation or preservation of monuments such as the Hagia Sophia.
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No--In 1934, Ataturk turned it into a museum, making it a major tourist attraction and secular symbol in Turkey.

Originally built in the 6th century as a Byzantine cathedral, Hagia Sophia served as the largest Christian worship site for nearly a millennium until it was converted into an Ottoman mosque in the 15th century.

How did Hagia Sophia become important for Muslims?

Sultan Mehmed II converted Hagia Sophia into a mosque,making it a key religious site for Muslims for centuries.

No--In 1934, Ataturk turned it into a museum, making it a major tourist attraction and secular symbol in Turkey.

What makes Hagia Sophia's architecture unique?

It was the world's largest church for centuries.

When was Hagia Sophia built and under whose rule?

Why is Hagia Sophia considered one of the greatest buildings in history?

Served as the central church of Byzantine Christianity,

In 1934, under the founder of modern Turkey Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, it was secularized and turned into a museum, symbolizing Turkey’s commitment to secularism and multi-faith coexistence.

Title:

Content: Turkey election: Erdogan re-elected, country continues to divide
Paul Kirby and Ece Goksedef
• BBC reporter from Ankara
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has been in power for years, won another five-year term, and his supporters celebrated all night.
“All 85 million people in the country have won, ” he told cheering crowds at his huge residence on the edge of Ankara.
But his call for unity appears hollow as he mocks his opponent, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, and targets jailed Kurdish leaders and LGBT (gay, bisexual and transgender) support policies.
The opposition leader did not publicly concede defeat.
Kirida Oru called it "the most unfair election in recent years" and said the president's party had used all the power of the government against him.
According to unofficial statistics close to the count, Erdoğan won just over 52% of the vote — nearly half of voters in a deeply polarized country who did not support his authoritarian vision for Turkey.
In the end, Krida Oru could not match the well-trained Erdogan campaign, even though he has pulled the current president into the runoff stage for the second round – the first since the Turkish president adopted direct elections in 2014.
But he failed to reverse his opponent's lead in the first round, with a gap of more than two million votes.
The Turkish president, for his part, proclaimed his victory to the greatest extent possible.
He spoke to crowds on a bus in Istanbul, the largest city, and then on the balcony of his official residence after dark, where some 320,000 people gathered in support of him.
“It ’ s not just us who won, it ’ s Turkey as a whole, ” he said, calling it one of the most important elections in Turkey ’ s history.
He taunted his defeated opponent: "Bye, Kemal." — a phrase echoed by supporters in Ankara.
He also denounced his rival allies for supporting LGBT policies, saying that he was at odds with his own family-centered principles.
Although the final result of the election was not confirmed, the Supreme Electoral Council said that the victory was no longer in doubt.
Erdoğan supporters everywhere in Ankara took to the streets to celebrate the victory, with some calling out the slogans of Islam and some laying the Turkish flag on the lawn to pray.
While some supporters say they believe Erdoğan will do better in the next five years, the president himself has acknowledged that Turkey ’ s high inflation rate is the most pressing problem at the moment – the country ’ s annual inflation rate is already close to 44%, affecting the lives of every citizen.
And the economy is not the biggest concern of Erdoğan ’ s supporters at the moment, who say they are proud of Erdoğan ’ s strong position in the world and his toughness in fighting “terrorists, ” by which they mean the Kurdish armed forces.
Despite the euphoria of supporters, the idea of unity in this torn country seems to be as far away as ever.
After the failed coup in 2016, Erdoğan had abolished the post of prime minister, with a high concentration of power, which opponents described as a step backwards.
Turkey ’ s opposition now has to regroup in order to prepare for the 2024 local elections.
A strong leader for 20 years.
From humble beginnings, Erdoğan is a giant in Turkish politics and has led the country for 20 years and is the most influential figure in the country since Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founding father of the modern republic.
Despite a series of crises, he won the 2023 election and remained in power.
It was his most precarious position in years, and his opponents believed he could defeat him.
Critics have accused his unruly economic policies of exacerbating the cost of living crisis in Turkey.
Moreover, as a combative leader who set a record in Turkey ’ s modernization, he seemed to be slow to respond to the earthquake that claimed 50,000 lives in February.
After escaping a coup d'état in 2016, he transformed the presidency into an executive role of supreme power and suppressed opponents and dissidents.
Beginning in 2003, first as prime minister and then as president by direct election since 2014, Turkey under Erdoğan ’ s leadership has been “flexing its muscles ” as a regional power, pursuing the Islamist cause and quickly overpowering its political rivals.
Although the head of a NATO member state, he placed himself in the position of mediator in the Russo-Ukrainian War, and made Sweden wait a bit longer to join the Western defense alliance.
His hard-line diplomacy angered Europe and beyond.
Erdoğan polarized his country, but he was a victorious general in the election.
His supporters refer to him as a "leader."
He accused opponents of contempt for Turkish voters and unpopular: "85 million people, we will protect our votes, our will and our future."
On the throne of power.
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was born in February 1954 on the Black Sea coast of Turkey, the son of a member of the Coast Guard. At the age of 13, his father decided to move to Istanbul, hoping for a better environment for his five children.
Young Erdoğan used to make extra money selling lemonade and sesame packets.
He attended an Islamic school and later earned a degree in management from Marmara University in Istanbul – and was a professional footballer.
In the 1970s and 1980s, he was active in Islamic circles, joining the pro-Islamic Welfare Party of Necmettin Erbakan. As the party gained popularity in the 1990s, Erdoğan was elected mayor of Istanbul in 1994, leading Turkey ’ s largest city for the next four years.
But his tenure came to an abrupt end when he was accused of openly reading nationalist poetry inciting hatred, which included phrases such as: “Mosques are our barracks, domes are our helmets, minarets are our bayonets, believers are our soldiers. ”
After a few months in prison, he returned to politics.
But his party has been banned for violating the strict secular rules of the modern Turkish government.
In 2001, he formed a new party with his ally Abdullah Gul. In 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) won a parliamentary majority, and Erdoğan was appointed prime minister the following year.
To this day, he is the chairman of the AKP.
First 10 years in power
Since 2003, he has been Prime Minister for three terms, leading a period of steady economic growth and earning international recognition as a reformer.
At a time when Erdoğan prioritized modernizing Turkey with large infrastructure projects, the middle class expanded and millions lifted out of poverty.
But critics also warn that he is becoming more authoritarian.
Protesters took to the streets in 2013, partly because of his government ’ s plan to transform a popular park in central Istanbul, but also because the population was challenging increasingly authoritarian rule.
The Prime Minister accused the protesters of being a nuisance, and people in the streets would beat pots every night at 9 o'clock to show resistance.
The sons of three cabinet allies have also been indicted on corruption charges.
The Gezi Park protests became a black and white spot for his rule.
To his critics, he acted more like an Ottoman monarch than a democratic leader.
Erdoğan also had a feud with Fethullah Gulen, an Islamic scholar based in the United States whose social and cultural movements helped Erdoğan win three consecutive elections and contributed to the military ’ s secession from politics.
The incident has caused a fierce reaction in Turkish society.
Muslim Revival
After a decade in power, Erdoğan ’ s party also worked to lift the ban on women wearing headscarves from public service imposed after the 1980 military coup.
The ban was eventually lifted, allowing women to join the police, the military and the judiciary.
Critics say he dug the walls of the secular state in Ataturk. Although Erdogan himself is a believer, he has always denied that he wants to impose Islamic values on viewers, insisting that he supports the right of Turks to express their religious beliefs openly.
However, he has repeatedly supported the criminalization of adultery.
As the father of four, he said that “no Muslim family ” should consider birth control or family planning.
“We will expand our descendants, ” he said in May 2016.
He extolled motherhood, denounced feminists, and argued that men and women could not be treated equally.
Erdoğan has long championed the cause of Islam — he is known to raise four fingers in a salute gesture to Egypt ’ s oppressed Muslim Brotherhood.
In July 2020, under his auspices, Istanbul ’ s historic Hagia Sophia was converted into a mosque, infuriating many Christians.
Built 1500 years ago, the cathedral was turned into a mosque by the Ottoman Turks, but Ataturk turned it into a museum – a symbol of the new secular state.
It is not a coincidence that, just hours after the start of the 2023 elections, the president spoke to supporters during an evening prayer.
Enhanced control
After being barred from running for prime minister, he ran for president in his first direct election in 2014, when it was a symbolic office.
He has a plan to reform this office, to create a new constitution that benefits all Turks and places their country among the top 10 economies in the world.
But in the early days of his presidency, he twice faced a shake-up in his position of power.
His party lost its parliamentary majority in a vote in 2015, and a few months later in 2016, Turkey witnessed its first violent coup attempt in decades.
The rebels almost captured the president, who was vacationing at the seaside resort, but he was safely rescued by plane. In the early hours of 16 July, he appeared victorious at Ataturk Airport in Istanbul, greeted by cheers from supporters.
They blocked the advance of the conspirators, and nearly 300 civilians were killed.
The president appeared on national television and met with supporters in Istanbul, declaring himself "commander in chief".
But the situation was also clearly tense, and he openly wept as he spoke at the funeral of a close friend who was shot dead by the rebels.
Some 150,000 civil servants were fired and more than 50,000 detained, including soldiers, journalists, lawyers, police officers, academics and Kurdish politicians.
The crackdown on critics has raised alarm abroad and soured Turkey ’ s relationship with the EU: Turkey ’ s attempts to join the EU have gone years without progress.
The controversy over the influx of migrants into Greece has also fuelled hostility.
But in his 1,000-room gleaming palace overlooking Ankara from Aksalai, President Erdoğan ’ s position seems more secure than ever.
His victory in a 2017 referendum gave the president sweeping powers, including the ability to impose a state of emergency, appoint top officials and interfere with the legal system.
A year later, he won the first presidential election.
His core votes came from small towns and rural conservative districts in Anatolia. In 2019, his party lost in three of the largest cities – Istanbul, the capital Ankara and Izmir.
In the Istanbul mayoral election, the party narrowly lost to the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) Ekrem Imamoglu, a bitter defeat for Erdoğan, who was mayor of the city in the 1990s.
He never accepted the result.
Before Imamoglu was barred from the May elections, he was ahead of the president in opinion polls.
The president and his allies have been accused of using the courts to disqualify the popular mayor.
Turkey ’ s third-largest party, the People ’ s Democratic Party of New Kurdistan (HDP), was similarly fearful of being barred from voting in parliament because of alleged links to Kurdish forces, but instead decided to run under a different name.
Like Turkish leaders in the past, Erdoğan has imposed a strong crackdown on the outlawed Kurdish Workers ’ Party (PKK).
While Turkey has accepted more than 3.5 million refugees fleeing the Syrian civil war, Ankara has also launched several operations against Kurdish forces on the other side of the border, crowding out Kurds in Turkey.
Erdogan has long had close ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has also tried to play an important mediator role in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
Although a NATO member, he bought Russia ’ s anti-missile defense system and chose Russia to build Turkey ’ s first nuclear reactor.
Before the 2023 election, he tried to win the trust of nationalists and conservative voters by accusing the West of targeting him.
“My country is going to smash this conspiracy, ” he asserted, describing it as a flashpoint.
He ended his 2023 campaign by visiting the tomb of Adnan Menderes, Turkey ’ s first democratically elected prime minister, who was executed after a military coup in 1961.
He wanted people to know: "The era of coups and warlords is over."
* Reporting by Istanbul journalist Cagil Kasapoglu

No--In 1934, Ataturk turned it into a museum, making it a major tourist attraction and secular symbol in Turkey.

It also holds the status of a UNESCO World Heritage Site, underscoring its global cultural importance .

Title:

Content: The Zionist Kufiyya and the Crusader Sword
A few days ago, the press in Tel Aviv celebrated the news that an Israeli diver had found a sword from the time of the Crusades.
The news seems ordinary and does not need this much celebration and handling, to be exported on the pages of the State Department and then to be dealt with by many American and Western media, as well as printed Arabic.
And close to the news that has become repeated in the Western media and is no stranger to the official orientations of these major countries supporting the Israeli occupation.
But what is strange is the Arab and then the international deficit towards the human and historical heritage, the homelands may steal and occupy, but the culture and language is difficult to forge and name without its name, the language will remain evidence of identity, clothing, customs and folklore popular evidence of culture and civilization, but at this time the theft is complete and followed by the world in silence without any action or reaction. The occupied land of Palestine, as part of the heritage, history and folklore of the state of the usurper occupier, and this news passes us unnoticed and may be circulated by Arab sites in the pages of culture, tourism and arts as if nothing happened.
It is the occupation in its search for a culture, history, heritage or civilization, and it is proof that Zionism has failed to prove the Jewishness of the state, and the authenticity of its history since the Jews were religious on this land.
Here they are looking for a history of a heritage of a culture of existence, proving that Judaism, if they embrace it, is not their heritage or Christianity, if they embrace it, it is not their history or Islam, and if they occupy their homes, it is not their civilization.
There is no doubt that they are bankrupt, and thus every occupation is one religion, whatever its slogan or religion is hiding behind.
Crusaders, Zionists, Mongols or Franks have no present and no history but blood and tyranny.
The submissive international system
Israel, rather than being described in the international and Arab media as an entity with the highest rate of attacks and violations in the world, against the Palestinian people, where these violations start with ethnic cleansing and forced settlement, from expelling Palestinians from their homes, usurping their land and building settlements on it. This is, of course, in light of the Arab normalization campaigns, which began to land their journeys in shameful scenes under the name of tourism and cultural exchange.
In this article, I am not concerned with conveying the contradictions presented by the international system and its institutions, which only condemn these Zionist practices, towards the arts, history and antiquities.
Or what we read annually on the World Day for the Protection of Human Heritage, according to the agreement adopted by the World Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in Paris in 1972, but I try to read the real Arab deficit, which is losing every day not only its land and history, but also its culture and identity.
If we accept that the subservient international system requires formal conventions, including the United Nations Convention on Education, Science and Culture, which classifies human heritage into two types; cultural and includes monuments and urban architectural works of value, the Convention stipulates in its declaration that the protection of these heritage properties rests with the international community as a universal heritage.
The second classification is the national and regional aspect, which is the identity and heritage of each people, whose Arab reality has become shameful and disgusting. Even Al-Aqsa Mosque has become a reality that nearly two billion Muslims around the world and about 63 Muslim countries do not have the right to preserve its heritage. One fifth of the earth's population.
The occupier initiated and the Zionists registered falafel as a food meal in their name and we smile!
They returned the ball and recorded the Palestinian keffiyeh as a folklore symbol in their name and we wonder!
We attribute the Islamic and Christian monuments to them and we are surprised, worried, condemned, denounced and denounced!
Today, it is no wonder that an occupied state emerged, in 1948, to declare that the history of the Crusades is attributed to it and that a sword they found on the bottom of the sea dates back to their distant history.
Meet the days.
You as an Arab will try hard to convince your children in the coming days that the sword of Saladin was a sword of Muslim Mujahideen, and that the old city was a city of the three religions and Zionism was not originally appeared and that both sides of the war at the time were the Arab Muslim Mamluks, and the Franco-Christian crusades coming from Europe. The Arab Zionists, who today hear them say, “This land was once ruled by the Jews and lived in it! ”
It is as if occupied Zionism today is an extension of a city that brought together the three religions of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in a harmonious heritage, cultural and human coexistence, and that we are the occupiers and they are the owners of the land, history and civilization.
On the other hand, you will not be able to describe the historical fact that the Jews and Muslims were all persecuted by the Crusader occupation, where they were killed, captured and persecuted. As a result of these Crusader massacres, the Jews fled from the Palestinian lands and returned only with the conquest of the city of Jerusalem by Sultan Saladin in 583 AH / 1187. This was followed by the Ottoman Empire, where the Jews were greatly expanded, and until the declaration of the Zionist occupation, which presented an oppressive project in which the secure and stable Jewish presence there was exploited.
You will find it difficult to prove that this common history and heritage is called the Arab and Islamic heritage, even if it was shared by Christians and Jews, and that without the preservation of diversity, this civilization would not have existed, and this heritage would not have existed if the occupying Zionists were the rulers.
Here you will return to what Dr. Abdul Wahab Al-Misseri said in the Encyclopedia, where the difference between the definition of Judaism and Zionism and the distinction was also on the basis of history and common human heritage, the Zionist occupiers, even if they were Jews, did not have a history or heritage in Palestine, and the Crusaders occupied, even if they were Christians, did not have a heritage or history in Palestine.
Today, as you read the news that the Zionist “Shlomi Katzin ” found a sword of a Crusader occupier at the bottom of the sea, you will understand that there is a message behind this effect that tells every occupier, no matter how long it lasts. May ” Zionist today, will be replaced by a machine gun of a settler inscribed on it in Hebrew, and will remain at the bottom of the sea until discovered by a diver inevitably will be a free Arab, this machine gun, which the world will consider at the time a valuable artifact, that it is the remnants of Zionist occupation gone irrevocably, and left of it only ruins and a trace.
Perhaps the truth of this Crusader sword won by “Shlomi ” is originally an Arab sword looted from it and plundered by the Crusader occupier, as the Zionists today (falafel, kufiya, rosary and even Arabic songs and melodies).
“History has many facets and is often written by the victors, ” they said, while the human heritage may be disputed by humans, but culture and influence are entrenched and engraved on every door and stone.
Source: Al Jazeera Direct
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Erdogan’s decision to restore Hagia Sophia’s status as a mosque provoked wide criticism.

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Content: After Hagia Sophia, Turkey converts a second ancient Byzantine church into a mosque

Hundreds of worshippers filled the narrow streets of Istanbul's Fatih district on Friday to hear the sounds of Friday prayers ringing out from the newly inaugurated Kariye Mosque.

Once known as the Chora Church, the site spent the last 79 years as a museum. But it is now the latest structure to be converted back into a mosque by the government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, following the conversion of Hagia Sophia in 2020. While viewed as a triumph by many Turkish Muslims, the Greek Orthodox Church has decried it as an "ill-advised decision" that "makes a mockery of the Turkish government's commitment to religious tolerance and religious freedom."

Chora's conversion was announced shortly after Hagia Sophia's, but its opening for prayer was delayed by years of restoration work.

The showing for the first Friday prayers at Kariye was relatively quiet compared to Hagia Sophia, which drew hundreds of thousands who filled the streets with prayer rugs for blocks and blocks away from the building. By contrast, the crowd on Friday was relatively average for a mosque in one of Istanbul's more religiously conservative neighborhoods, where Friday worshippers frequently spill out onto the streets.

Both the Chora Church and Hagia Sophia are 4th-century Byzantine constructions. They spent nearly a millennium as Christian holy sites before being converted to mosques by the Ottomans after their conquest of Constantinople in the 15th century. Despite their conversions, they remained revered by Orthodox Christians. After the founding of a secular Turkish Republic in the early 20th century, the decision was made for both to be neither mosque nor church but simply museums.

"Both Hagia Sophia and Chora embodied Byzantine and Ottoman pasts, and they became symbols of co-existence and multi-faith living practices. Their conversion fundamentally implies a hierarchy, prioritizing the Islamic past over all other layers, Greek Orthodox, Armenian, Jewish, Syriac, et al," Dr. Özgür Kaymak, a lecturer and researcher on minority rights at Istanbul's MEF University, told Religion News Service in an email.

Rededicating the sites as mosques is more than just a status change. According to Islamic tradition, artwork of human figures are forbidden in places of prayer, while in Orthodox Churches, icons of Christ, saints and other biblical figures are a defining feature.

In Hagia Sophia, the mosaics of Jesus and Mary have been covered with curtains since the conversion. While Erdoğan promised Hagia Sophia would remain fully accessible and free to all visitors, Turkey reneged on that earlier this year, reimposing an entrance fee on tourists and relegating them to the upper level, while the main floor is exclusive to Muslim worshippers.

Observers have also criticized the Turkish Directorate of Religion's caretaking of the site, noting damage that did not exist when it was under the purview of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism.

Though Chora is significantly smaller than Hagia Sophia, it is home to some of the best-preserved examples of late-Byzantine art, including mosaics, icons and frescoes, and is considered a UNESCO World Heritage site.

"For us it's a very important place because it remembers our culture and our traditions here," Father Evangelos Markantonis, an Orthodox priest who was leading a group of theology students to Chora on Friday, told Religion News Service.

"Though we cannot venerate as Orthodox Christians, we have to try to find things we can be united on. Only with dialogue and good deeds can we continue our lives," Markantonis, who is also a professor at the University of Athens, said when asked about the controversy.

Erdoğan had long refused calls from his right to convert churches like Hagia Sophia and Chora, telling supporters in 2018 to fill the nearby Sultan Ahmet Mosque (also known in English as the Blue Mosque) before they talked about needing to pray in Hagia Sophia.

Nonetheless, he made an about-turn in 2020.

"My dear nation, the conquest of Istanbul and the conversion of the Hagia Sophia into a Mosque are among the most glorious chapters in Turkish history," Erdoğan said at the time in a speech inaugurating the Hagia Sophia as a mosque.

"This is the most honorable day that Islam has been looking forward to, Greek Constantinople has become Turkish Istanbul," he added, quoting the Turkish poet Nazim Hikmet.

"The resurrection of Hagia Sophia heralds the liberation of the al-Aqsa Mosque. The resurrection of Hagia Sophia is the footsteps of the will of Muslims across the world to come out of the interregnum," Erdoğan said in his concluding remarks.

Chora's opening as the Kariye Mosque comes just weeks after Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) suffered its largest electoral defeat in two decades during Turkey's nationwide municipal elections.

"The recent conversion of Chora into a mosque may be due to Erdoğan's many problems, including his geopolitical power politics, his appeal to religio-nationalism to revive his electoral popularity after the March elections or his tactic to divert attention from Turkey's economic downturn," Kaymak said.

Many analysts have attributed the loss to AKP bleeding votes to the more Islamist-leaning New Welfare Party, which has pressured Erdogan over his response to the Israel-Hamas war and humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip.

Muslim worshippers at the mosque on Friday said they viewed its rededication as an Islamic site to be a national win for Turkey.

"This mosque is one of the symbols of the Conquest. We are proud and happy. There are very beautiful frescoes inside. They were also nicely renovated before they were closed. May it be good for our country and our nation," a bystander, Ahmet Öteyüzoğlu, told Turkish media.

"Thank God for these days. Not everyone has the opportunity in their lifetime," another bystander named Mehmet Çelik told the Turkish news service Anadolu Agency, in reference to having been able to pray at both the rededicated Hagia Sophia and Kariye Mosques.

However, Greece, the U.S. State Department and Orthodox Christian institutions worldwide have all criticized the decision to revert the structure into a mosque.

"I want to publicly express my intense dissatisfaction, interpreting the feelings of all Greek women and men, for the completely unnecessary conversion of a historic Byzantine temple, the Monastery of Chora, into a mosque. It is, I believe, an action that offends the rich history of Istanbul itself as a crossroads of cultures," Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis said shortly before leaving for Turkey for a planned meeting with Erdogan.

"We encourage the Turkish government to preserve and ensure access to sites and buildings that have hosted different religious communities in a way that respects their diverse histories," a State Department spokesperson said in response to questions from Greek media.

"The Turkish government's appropriation of both as the property of one faith group not only constitutes yet another sign of that government's contempt for Turkey's rich Orthodox Christian heritage but further imperils the religious freedom of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the remaining Christians of that land," the Archons of the Ecumenical Patriarchate said in a statement.

© Religion News Service

How did Muslims and Orthodox Christians react to the reconversion?

Who was angered by the reconversion of Hagia Sophia in July 2020?

Symbolically, for many Orthodox Christians worldwide, Hagia Sophia remains a sacred Byzantine cathedral with profound spiritual significance, comparable to St. Peter’s Basilica for Catholics.

No--In 1934, Ataturk turned it into a museum, making it a major tourist attraction and secular symbol in Turkey.

Who was angered by the reconversion of Hagia Sophia in July 2020?

Why is Hagia Sophia considered one of the greatest buildings in history?

Served as the central church of Byzantine Christianity,

After the reconversion, Christian mosaics depicting Jesus and Mary were covered with curtains to comply with Islamic traditions prohibiting human images in places of worship, provoking concerns about erasing Christian historical layers .

Who was angered by the reconversion of Hagia Sophia in July 2020?

Critics argue that this move prioritizes Islamic heritage over the site's multi-faith history, undermining its symbolic role as a place of religious tolerance and coexistence.

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

The Greek Orthodox Church, the Ecumenical Patriarchate, Greece, the U.S. State Department, and Orthodox Christian institutions have expressed strong disapproval, labeling the reconversion as disrespectful and “offensive” to Istanbul's rich, multicultural history.

How did Muslims and Orthodox Christians react to the reconversion?

Who was angered by the reconversion of Hagia Sophia in July 2020?

Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis called it a "completely unnecessary conversion" that offends Istanbul’s identity as a crossroads of cultures.

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Between Hamas and Israel: what benefits will Erdogan get from the war in Gaza
Olga Shevchenko
For the past 20 years, Turkey has tried to reach the global level of global influence, but the war in Israel has shown that Ankara has remained a marginal player.
It has no influence on Israel or Hamas.
Hamas ’ s surprise and horrific attack on October 7 and Israel ’ s disproportionate efforts to oust the group from power in the Gaza Strip represent a tipping point.
Both Israeli and Palestinian societies have been caught in the trauma of interconnected history and mutual violence.
The myth of the invincibility of the Israeli army and intelligence has been shattered.
The US government ’ s efforts to change the regional order by promoting Arab-Israeli normalization have been put on hold, if not completely stopped in the near term.
The Arab states are concerned about the widening regional conflict and the growing public discontent with Israel ’ s policies towards the occupied territories.
Many representatives of the so-called Global South are disappointed with the unconditional support given to Israel by the United States and the European Union.
Given the prevalence of anti-immigration, xenophobic and Islamophobic sentiments in the Western public, the conflict in Gaza could turn into an internal problem for the US and Europe.
Focus translated Sinem Adar ’ s article on the Turkish response to Israel ’ s actions in Gaza.
The Turkish government also views October 7 and its aftermath as a critical moment for the Middle East.
In the first hours after the attack, Ankara was cautious: the government condemned the deaths of civilians, although it did not directly attribute responsibility to Hamas, and called for restraint on both sides.
Since then, it has increasingly taken a critical stance on Israel ’ s policy in Gaza.
Unlike Turkey ’ s Western allies, Ankara does not consider Hamas a terrorist organization.
In 2018, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called it part of the Palestinian resistance defending “Palestinian territory from the occupation authorities. ”
The change in Ankara ’ s rhetoric is due to the logic of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) leadership ’ s support for the Palestinian struggle, its rejection of the US-led world order, and the government ’ s conviction that the conflict will return the United States to the region.
At the same time, this reaction demonstrates the vulnerability of Turkey ’ s Middle East policy.
Stuck between hegemonic aspirations and rapprochement attempts aimed at breaking the isolation and restoring the economy, Ankara has no influence on either Israel or Hamas.
Democracy promotion, peacemaking and leadership in the Ummah
Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize Israel in 1949.
It was also one of the first to recognize the proclamation of the State of Palestine.
Despite close economic, diplomatic and defense relations with Israel, moments of confrontation occurred even before the AKP came to power.
For example, in 2002, Prime Minister Bülent Echevit accused Israel of "non-recognition of UN resolutions" and "committing genocide", reproached the US for passivity, fraught with "Islamic radicalism" and "confrontation between East and West", and criticized "radical Palestinian elements" (Hamas) for obstructing the creation of an independent Palestinian state. "
The AKP came to power just a couple of months after Echevit escalated criticism of Israel.
The AKP is the product of Turkey ’ s Islamist nationalist Perspektiva movement, which is eager to see Palestine as a crucial component of Turkish foreign policy.
Not surprisingly, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has become an active component of the AKP ’ s Middle East policy for three reasons.
• First, Hamas won the largest number of seats in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Assembly elections, which the Middle East Quartet recognized as "free, fair and secure."
While the United States and the European Union conditioned the recognition of Hamas ’ victory on “renunciation of violence and terror, recognition of Israel ’ s right to exist and disarmament, ” Ankara took this moment as an opportunity to position itself as a supporter of democracy in the region.
• Secondly, one of the main directions of the AKP ’ s foreign policy was the desire to make Turkey “a peacemaker on the periphery of the international system. ”
The Turkish government ’ s ties with Hamas allowed Turkey to claim the role of mediator during the December 2008 – January 2009 Gaza war in a “vacuum created by the policies of the European Union and the United States ”, albeit without a concrete result.
At the same time, diplomatic relations with Israel declined after the famous “minute ” incident in 2009, and a year later after the attack on the Gaza flotilla, which killed nine pro-Palestinian Turkish activists.
After a ten-year hiatus, diplomatic relations were restored in 2022.
Finally, defending the rights of Palestine and the Palestinians is part of the AKP ’ s commitment to advancing the interests of Muslims around the world.
The party elite and its main electorate believe that the liberation of Muslims from Western cultural and political domination has already begun in Turkey (thanks to Erdogan) and may spread to other countries.
Erdogan is encouraging this rhetoric.
In 2020, after the reconstruction of Hagia Sophia into a mosque, he called it “a harbinger of the liberation of the Al-Aqsa Mosque. ”
From Civilizational Aspirations to Regional Isolation
The 2011 Arab uprisings marked a turning point in AKP leadership ambitions.
Erdogan sought to position himself and the Turkish government as the leader of the Muslim world, supporting Sunni Islamists throughout the Middle East.
The AKP justifies this policy by citing the democratic process and the reality that parties affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood are winning elections across the region.
As part of this policy, Turkey has sheltered many Islamist exiles and generously supported their organizations operating in the country.
During periods of internal controversy, such as the failed coup attempt in 2016 or the controversial constitutional referendum in 2017, the AKP, in turn, welcomed Erdogan ’ s support from Sunni Islamists.
However, ideology is not the only reason why Sunni Islamists sympathize with Erdogan (and Turkey).
Interests also matter.
Turkey has often been seen as a balancing force against the Arab autocrats of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, who see political Islam as a threat to their survival.
This view was facilitated by Ankara ’ s increasingly confrontational foreign policy and the expansion of its military presence since 2016.
However, the perception of Turkey as a destructive power has simultaneously led to cooperation between Turkey ’ s partners, its old and new rivals.
Trapped by the discrepancy between its stated ambitions and its real capabilities, Ankara is becoming increasingly isolated.
The Limits of Turkey ’ s Efforts for Regional Rapprochement
Starting in 2020, Turkey is trying to emerge from almost a decade of regional isolation.
Turkey ’ s policy shift was prompted by a number of factors, including Ankara ’ s economic problems, the election of Joseph Biden as president, the geopolitical realignment in the region following the Abraham Accords, the Syrian government ’ s rapprochement with regional authorities, and the weakening of Saudi Arabia ’ s and the United Arab Emirates ’ ties with Qatar.
In addition, Ankara viewed with caution the expansion of cooperation between Greece, the Republic of Cyprus, Israel and the Arab states in the eastern Mediterranean.
The concurrent divergence of interests between Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as the decline in confidence in further US involvement in the region, have contributed to Turkey ’ s rapprochement efforts.
As part of this policy shift, Ankara has become more cautious and distanced itself from Arab Islamists to help restore relations with regional players, including Israel.
The Turkish government has asked the Muslim Brotherhood media channels to soften the criticism.
One of the satellite TV channels operating in Istanbul, Mekameleen, announced in 2022 the termination of broadcasting and the closure of eight studios.
According to reports, Ankara also demanded that the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas members leave Turkey.
Similarly, in April of the same year, a Turkish court postponed the trial of Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi dissident killed in Turkey.
However, the latest cycle of war in the Gaza Strip has shown the limits of Turkey ’ s rapprochement efforts, especially with Israel.
In response to Turkey ’ s offer of mediation, the Israeli ambassador in Ankara made it clear that the time has not yet come.
U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has let Turkey through in his shuttle diplomacy, courting Arab countries in the region to ensure humanitarian access through the Rafah crossing, continue hostage diplomacy, and prevent a possible escalation of regional war.
Meanwhile, Ankara is increasingly making critical statements against Israel.
On the night of the controversial attack on the Arab Al-Ahli hospital, which Erdogan called "the latest example of inhumane Israeli attacks," Israel asked its citizens to leave Turkey "as soon as possible."
Demonstrations took place at the Israeli and American consulates in Istanbul, as well as at US military bases in Malatya and Adana.
Two days later, Israel expelled all its diplomats from the country.
Ankara ’ s relations with Hamas also seem insignificant.
According to one Turkish intelligence official, the Turkish government is negotiating with Hamas to release the hostages at the request of “many states, especially Western ones. ”
German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbok said her ministry was in contact with Qatar and Turkey, which "have channels for negotiations with Hamas" to secure the release of the German hostages.
However, according to Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, no concrete results have been achieved at the time of writing.
Qatar appears to be playing a crucial role in the negotiations for the release of the hostages.
Turkey and the international system
In order to return Ankara to a fragile regional order, Fidan proposed a “guarantor formula ” in an interview with the pro-government newspaper Sabah on October 17.
In accordance with the principle of two-State coexistence on the 1967 borders and with Jerusalem as its capital, this formula stipulates that one of the countries in the region, "including Turkey", will act as guarantor of the future Palestinian State.
Fidan also noted that “other countries could play the same role for Israel, ” and mentioned the importance of“ a potential common position of China and Russia as members of the UN Security Council ” in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Russia and China recently voiced support for a two-state solution that the international community until recently considered unrealistic.
Turkey ’ s insistence on the two-state solution is intertwined with criticism of the international system, which has become one of the main topics for AKP leadership in the past decade.
Ankara has often criticized the structure of the UN Security Council under the slogan “The world is bigger than five ”.
It also requires an international order that "treats every country on an equal footing, and in which every country can feel secure and be an equal partner".
This logic was at the heart of Erdogan ’ s call to the West and the international community in his conversation with British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak to “act effectively against human rights violations in Gaza ” and“ remember the promises made to the Palestinians [meaning the two-state solution] instead of engaging in provocations that would lead to a further escalation of the conflict. ”
Fidan voiced the same logic in the most direct way when he accused Israel of “stealing Palestinian land ” (referring to Israel ’ s continued expansion of settlements, which the UN considers a violation of international law).
Dissatisfaction with the US-led world order
Behind these statements is also Turkey ’ s staunch opposition to the US-led world order.
Turkey ’ s ruling elite believes that “the West lacks strategic thinking and is increasingly moving away from the rest of the world in the face of various problems, including relations with China, migration and terror, and the shift of economic gravity from West to East. ”
For Ankara, the clear and unequivocal support that the Biden administration has given to Israel confirms this belief.
By aligning the policies of Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other countries, pro-government journalists expect that the conflict will lead to greater isolation of Israel.
Most Turkish politicians, regardless of their ideological affiliation, tend to view the recent conflict in Gaza as a conflict between the so-called West (led by the United States) and the East.
After the controversial terrorist attack at the Al-Ahli hospital in Gaza City, the government was called upon to unite with the countries of the South to “stop the US-Israel alliance. ”
However, the methods proposed vary.
Speaking at an emergency meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation on October 18, Fidan called on Muslim countries to act "confidently" and "challenge the hegemonic narrative imposed on them", but without offering a concrete road map on how to do so.
Devlet Bahceli, leader of the AKP ’ s junior partner, the Nationalist Movement Party, said Turkey should intervene militarily if a ceasefire is not reached.
Those who criticize Ankara ’ s civilizational aspirations, but share its desire for a foreign policy independent from the West, call for the expulsion of the American military from the Incirlik airbase and the Kurechik radar station in Malatya.
Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean: From Gaza to Syria
While the AKP leadership does not seem to be happy with these demands, it is certainly feeling the pressure of a growing American presence in the region.
According to Erdogan, the Biden administration ’ s decision to send aircraft carriers to the Eastern Mediterranean hinders Turkey ’ s efforts to de-escalate the situation.
In addition to criticizing the lack of American leadership in putting pressure on Israel for a ceasefire, Ankara is internally concerned that the strengthening of the American presence in the Eastern Mediterranean is detrimental to its regional interests.
Pro-government journalists draw analogies to the US-led Operation Provide Comfort, launched in 1991 to protect Kurdish refugees fleeing northern Iraq after the Iraq War and deliver humanitarian aid.
In the political spectrum, there is indeed a growing consensus that the return of the United States to the region is an act of containment not only of Iran and its supporters, but also of Turkey.
The fear is that an increased American presence would further undermine Ankara ’ s efforts to prevent the creation of a Kurdish autonomy under the leadership of the Democratic Union Party and the People ’ s Protection Units in northern Syria, which Turkey views as a continuation of the Kurdistan Workers ’ Party.
The United States and Turkey consider the Kurdistan Workers ’ Party a terrorist organization.
Ankara justifies its position on Hamas with the US position on the Kurds in Syria.
Identifying Weaknesses in Turkey ’ s Foreign Policy
In general, Ankara ’ s reaction to Hamas ’ brutal attack on Israeli citizens, Israel ’ s wide-ranging retaliation, resulting in massive destruction and loss of life in Gaza, and America ’ s unequivocal and unequivocal support for Israel ’ s policies underscore Turkey ’ s limitations.
After two decades of policies aimed at expanding Turkey ’ s role in the Middle East, Ankara is in fact a marginal player.
This is partly due to the fragility of Turkey ’ s relations with Israel, Hamas and the United States.
Turkey ’ s position is also at odds with that of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which openly condemn Hamas ’ violence while criticizing Israel ’ s disproportionate retaliation and Western positions.
However, the apparent insignificance of Ankara ’ s influence also suggests that Turkey has no leverage over the warring parties in the current conflict.
Here it is appropriate to compare with Turkey ’ s position in the Black Sea.
Ankara can continue its hedging policy in the Black Sea thanks to the Montreux Convention and NATO membership.
In the case of the war in Gaza, none of these conditions will help.
Given the lack of similar tools, the state of the Turkish economy and the reputational costs that Ankara has imposed on itself in the last decade, its influence is limited to rhetorical statements.
About the author
Sinem Adar is a research fellow at the Center for Applied Research in Turkey at the German Institute for International Relations and Security.