Germany's move away from nuclear energy has been driven largely by safety concerns following the 2011 Fukushima disaster, resulting in a political decision to close all nuclear power plants by the end of 2022 as part of the country's "Energiewende" (energy transition) policy.

Prior to the phase-out, nuclear plants accounted for a significant portion of Germany's electricity generation—around 12-25% depending on the year—but by 2021 only three plants remained, supplying about 6% of electricity.

The phase-out was politically motivated by anti-nuclear sentiment and environmental goals tied to carbon neutrality, intending to replace nuclear with renewables and reduce reliance on fossil fuels.

However, this transition has faced serious challenges, especially exacerbated by the Russian-Ukrainian war that has disrupted natural gas supplies from Russia, upon which Germany heavily depended.

Russia's curtailment of gas deliveries—down to about a fifth of pre-war levels—and the resulting energy price spikes have precipitated an energy crisis marked by soaring electricity costs (power prices rose over 700% since early 2022) and fears of shortages during harsh winters.

This crisis exposed Germany’s vulnerability due to the loss of nuclear baseload capacity, delayed grid expansions, and overreliance on imported fossil fuels, notably natural gas.

Coal-fired plants were temporarily restarted, and Germany rushed to build LNG terminals and scale renewables, but energy security remains fragile.

In response to these pressures, the German government has taken emergency measures, including considering short-term extensions of its last three nuclear reactors until at least mid-2023 or April 2024.

Chancellor Olaf Scholz requested a legal framework to keep the three plants operational to safeguard winter energy supply.

Although the Ministry of Economic Affairs initially denied an open-ended extension, the possibility of temporary reactivation reflects a shift in policy under crisis conditions.

Germany's move away from nuclear energy has been driven largely by safety concerns following the 2011 Fukushima disaster, resulting in a political decision to close all nuclear power plants by the end of 2022 as part of the country's "Energiewende" (energy transition) policy.

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Content: The current energy crisis, nuclear power generation is back in favor of countries
PARIS (AFP) - As global energy import bills skyrocket and the climate crisis rages, countries around the world are struggling to find alternative sources of energy, and their preference for nuclear power is rising.
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After Japan ’ s Fukushima disaster in 2011, countries scaled back investment in nuclear power amid concerns about nuclear safety, but after Russia ’ s invasion of Ukraine in February, there was a renewed trend toward nuclear power as energy supplies tightened and Europe struggled to move away from its dependence on Russian oil and gas.
Some experts argued that nuclear power should not be included in the options under consideration; others argued that in the face of so many crises, the world's energy mix must retain nuclear power.
One of the countries that is reconsidering the use of nuclear power is Japan, which shut down many nuclear reactors due to safety concerns following the 2011 Fukushima disaster.
But Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida this week called for efforts to revive nuclear power generation and build new nuclear power plants.
Other countries that had intended to move away from nuclear power have also abandoned such plans, at least in the short term.
For example, within a month of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Belgium postponed the implementation of its 2025 plan to abolish nuclear energy for 10 years.
Although nuclear power currently accounts for only 10% of the world ’ s electricity generation, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) raised its forecast for nuclear power production in September, the first time since the Fukushima disaster.
The International Atomic Energy Agency now expects global nuclear power generation to double by 2050, in the best case scenario.
Even in Germany, Europe ’ s largest economy, nuclear power is no longer a taboo topic, as the current energy crisis has reignited debate over plans to close its last three plants by 2022.
As nuclear power can replace coal-fired power generation, China, the Czech Republic, India and Poland have all expressed interest in developing nuclear infrastructure, with China now having the largest number of reactors.
Britain, France and the Netherlands have similar ideas; even US President Joe Biden ’ s proposed investment plan encourages the development of nuclear power.
Experts at the UN ’ s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) acknowledge that the use of nuclear energy “may be limited by social preferences ” because the risks of a nuclear disaster and the issue of how to safely dispose of nuclear waste remain unresolved.
But some countries still oppose the use of nuclear power, such as New Zealand, and the European Union has hotly debated whether nuclear power can be considered a green energy source.

Prior to the phase-out, nuclear plants accounted for a significant portion of Germany's electricity generation—around 12-25% depending on the year—but by 2021 only three plants remained, supplying about 6% of electricity.

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Content: ● Talk from the beginning
In October 1973, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, led by Saudi Arabia, imposed a embargo on countries supporting Israel with oil as a weapon. The embargo lasted until March 1974, when the global price of oil rose by nearly 300%, from $3 per barrel to nearly $12.
Recognizing the importance of stable energy supply and price, many countries have begun to develop nuclear power.
In that era, the development of nuclear energy in Germany and France went hand in hand. Both countries imported nuclear power technology from the United States, and both established independent nuclear power industries.
In 1979, the Three Mile Island accident in the United States did not change the Social Democratic Party's support for nuclear energy in Germany at the time, and then the 1986 Chernobyl disaster in Russia caused a major impact on Germany's nuclear energy policy. In August 1986, the Social Democratic Party passed a bill to abandon nuclear power within 10 years, Germany terminated the development plan for new reactors, and power companies dared not plan to build a nuclear power plant. Merchants.
Overall, the passage of the Act did not affect the operation of the nuclear power plants in transit in Germany, with a capacity of 20,339 and 20,583,000 megawatts in 23 years from 1986 to 2009, and a further 22.9 million megawatts in 1989.
In other words, the ruling party in Germany recognized the importance of nuclear power to the country ’ s economic development and did not implement the nuclear abolition bill hastily passed in August 1986 under the anti-nuclear passion of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster in Russia.
Obviously, the non-nuclear file, can only say, can not be done.
Non-nuclear weapons are a bargaining chip for political power
In October 1998, the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party organized a joint government and began to discuss a non-nuclear timetable with power companies. The Green Party, a small party with ideological leadership and national recognition of only 6.7%, changed the national energy policy through the power to gain the leadership of energy policies that are closely related to national security.
The assumption of power by political parties recognized by more people is the basic tenet of the operation of democratic politics.
When, in order to gain political power, different political parties used coalitions to lead to the opinions of the minority and hostage the understanding of the majority, is this the normal state of democratic politics?
Ridiculous, even more pathetic!
After numerous and varied threats, the coalition government and the power companies reached an agreement in late 2000.
The key point of the agreement is that the government will allow the units in operation at the time to continue operating until the cumulative generation of 2,623 billion kWh, equivalent to an average useful life of the units of 32 years (the power company originally expected 36 years), and that Germany will be non-nuclear by 2022.
The government is committed to ensuring the smooth operation of the nuclear power plant and the disposal of nuclear waste without political interference. In June 2001, the “Red Green ” coalition government signed an agreement with four power companies.
The agreement clearly stipulates that Germany will no longer build nuclear power plants and allow the temporary storage of used nuclear fuel at the site.
Based on the cap on nuclear power generation, a less cost-effective unit was stopped in 2003 and 2005, with a installed capacity of 640,000 MW and 340,000 MW, respectively, and it operated for 31 and 36 years.
In addition, a unit with a capacity of 1.22 million megawatts was built in 1986 on the banks of the Rhine. The unit was discontinued in 1988 due to anti-nuclear protests, and its power company abandoned the unit in 2003 to begin decommissioning work. Two units with a capacity of 771,000 megawatts and 1.26 million megawatts were suspended in 2007 and 2009, respectively, for 30 years and 25 years.
These two units are boiling water reactors, which are different from the mainstream pressurized water reactors in Germany.
Germany ’ s non-nuclear decision in 2000 was a pragmatic compromise that quelled the protests of anti-nuclear groups, kept the plant running smoothly, and provided the government with enough time to think about national energy policy.
An industrial leader reminded the government that reliable and affordable energy is an important part of Germany ’ s economic policy.
Opposition leaders in Congress said there was a chance they would change the decision.
The expectation of power companies is to increase the average operating year of all nuclear power units from 32 to 40 years, and then to 60 years depending on the situation of individual units.
● New opportunities brought about by the change
In September 2009, the new coalition government of the Christian Democrats and the Liberal Party announced plans to withdraw the "non-nuclear policy".
At this time, Germany still has 17 operational nuclear power units, but one is in a long-term state of decommissioning.
If all the units can be extended from the original agreed 32 years of operation to 60 years, it is estimated that the additional profit of the power company will be 100 billion euros, and the government must take a share, let alone 50 billion euros.
Financial negotiations took a year to complete.
The new nuclear policy allows for 40 years of operation (an additional 8 years) for units that were negotiated before 1980, and 14 years for units that were negotiated after 1980.
The government pays dividends on the extension of nuclear power plants to the national treasury under various taxes, donations and surcharges.
For example, the tax on nuclear fuel based on the weight of nuclear fuel used is increased to 2.3 billion euros per year, equivalent to 0.016 euros per kilowatt-hour.
In order to supplement the development of renewable energy, we will provide 300 million euros each in 2011 and 2012, 200 million euros each from 2013 to 2016, and 0.009 euros per nuclear power generation after 2016. The funds will also fund a recovery plan for a waste salt mine that is disposed of from nuclear waste.
Germany ’ s policy of abandoning nuclear energy has officially turned a corner.
• Planning does not change
On March 15, 2011, German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced that the new nuclear energy policy adopted only four months ago was suspended for three months. At the same time, seven units that had been negotiated before 1980 were immediately shut down. This represents a decrease of 8,336 MW, or 6.4% of the total installed capacity.
In May 2011, the German regulatory authority issued a statement saying that after various assessments, all German nuclear power units are in good condition and there are no concerns about their safety.
Despite this, the German government announced on May 30 that under pressure from anti-nuclear local governments, it will return to its original non-nuclear policy and close all nuclear power plants by 2022. At the end of June and July 8, the German House of Representatives and the Senate respectively passed decrees to expand wind power generation in response to the shutdown of nuclear power plants, while agreeing to build coal-fired power plants and gas plants without changing carbon reduction targets.
In order to solve the problem of insufficient baseload power after the nuclear power plant is stopped, electricity will be imported from France, Russia and Poland.
It ’ s all about non-nuclear policy.
Some nuclear power plants have been forced to shut down, but the nuclear power plants that continue to operate still have to pay various heavy taxes according to the 2011 revision of the Atomic Energy Law. Tax rebates of €6.3 billion between 2011 and 2016 and the suspension of tax on nuclear fuel.
The nuclear fuel tax was abolished at the end of 2016. In order to avoid the nuclear fuel tax, the fuel exchange time of five German units was postponed to January 2017, and a total of 8 billion kWh of power generation was lost from mid-December to the end of February 2016.
After 10 years of litigation, the government reached a settlement with four power companies for a total amount of 4.8 billion euros.
This amount of money is the most direct price of policy repetition.
In response to nuclear waste, in order to maintain a stable power supply, the huge investment in power generation and transmission systems is a heavier burden on society.
In May 2011, the German power grid department warned that the closure of nuclear power plants will lead to insufficient baseload power generation capacity, and renewable energy generation facilities are scattered, and renewable energy rich areas and power consumption areas are at a distance, requiring transmission networks.
The lack of power transmission capacity will make the grid fragile and unreliable, and the stability of the grid is facing great challenges. In May 2012, Germany announced a 10-year plan to expand and strengthen the grid, with a total of 26 transmission projects, with a total investment of 10 billion euros.
Germany calls the policy of increasing the proportion of renewable energy generation and phasing out nuclear energy as Energiewende (energytransition), an appropriate translation is also our slogan, "energy transition"!
For the public, the direct cost of the energy transition is that household electricity prices are the second highest in Europe and the highest in Denmark.
According to statistics, in December 2021, the price of domestic electricity in Germany was 80% higher than that of France.
Electricity prices in Germany
The electricity market in Germany is completely liberalized, and power companies sell electricity generated by various forms of electricity generation in the wholesale market. The price of electricity in the wholesale market is open information, which allows power companies to obtain electricity from the wholesale market and transmit it to consumers through the electricity network.
Taxes paid by different types of consumers are also different.
Due to various measures to reward renewable energy, distorting the market mechanism, the German wholesale electricity price is lower than other countries, and sometimes even negative, 298 hours of wholesale electricity price is negative in 2019 and 139 hours in 2021.
The average wholesale price of electricity in the German electricity market is 0.03767 euros / kWh in 2019, 0.03047 euros / kWh in 2020, and 0.09685 euros / kWh in 2021. The average price in the first half of the year is 0.054 euros / kWh, rising to 0.1380 euros / kWh in the second half of the year.
As shown in the attached figure, the Russian-Ukrainian war caused a surge in gas prices, which had a huge impact on electricity prices in Germany; in July 2022, the high price of 0.3153 euros per degree was 6.4 times that of January 2019!
The price of electricity for domestic or small commercial use in Germany is very high.
Look at the price structure of electricity for German households.
Germany ’ s household electricity price in 2006 was 0.1946 euros per kWh. It rose to 0.3216 euros per kWh in 2021, and has reached 0.3714 euros in 2022. In 2021, more than half of Germany ’ s household and small business electricity price burden came from additional taxes or fees due to energy policies. 16% is a sales tax, 20% of the renewable energy surcharge is paid to the renewable energy industry, 6% of the electricity tax (also known as the ecological tax), and there are three smaller surcharges.
If so, why not in the first place?
In 2010, Germany had 17 nuclear power units with a total installed capacity of more than 20 million megawatts, accounting for about 15% of the total installed capacity. In 2010, the total generation capacity was 133 billion kWh, accounting for about 25% of the total generation capacity. At the end of 2011, there were 9 nuclear power units with a total installed capacity of 12 million megawatts.
Compared to 1990, the total installed capacity was 1.3 times, but the power generation increased by only 11%.
Wind and photovoltaics account for nearly half of the installed capacity, but only 28% of the generation.
Nuclear power plant capacity accounted for only 4.1%, but power generation accounted for 12.4%. In 2021, three nuclear power units were shut down, and there are only three units in operation, with a total installed capacity of 4.055 million megawatts, accounting for less than 2%, and the total power generation may be about 6%. Can the economy afford to shut down the remaining three nuclear plants in 2022?
According to a news report on August 18, "Germany is facing an energy shortage crisis this winter and has planned to delay the closure of the country's last three nuclear power plants."
The decision has not yet been formally adopted by Prime Minister Bernard Shaw and may need to be passed by parliament. Details are still being discussed and a cabinet resolution will have to wait weeks for an energy demand assessment to come out, but officials believe the results are already known, according to three officials.
According to online data, Germany has eight decommissioned units that have not been in service for 40 years, and if the international consensus is that nuclear power units can be used for at least 60 years, the extension of these units can significantly reduce the dependence on imported natural gas.
It remains to be seen whether the shift in German nuclear policy will extend to these eight units.
● Other Mountain Stone
Looking at Taiwan ’ s electricity situation, the schedule summarizes Taiwan ’ s electricity data for 2019 and 2021, which can be compared with Germany ’ s data for 2019. Germany ’ s total installed capacity and total power generation in 2019 are 4.1 times and 2.2 times that of Taiwan, respectively.
The average capacity factor for electrical equipment in Germany is 30% and in Taiwan it is 56%.
Renewable energy cannot generate electricity all the time, and when the installed capacity is large, the average capacity factor will be low.
But there are other factors, in 2019, Germany ’ s natural gas installation capacity of 46 million megawatts, generating 90.8 billion kWh; Taiwan is 17.57 million megawatts and 91.2 billion kWh; the installed capacity is only 38% of Germany ’ s, but the power generation is equivalent.
Germany ’ s electricity grid is part of the European continent ’ s electricity grid, and data can be found on the network. In 2020, Germany exported 66.39 billion kWh of electricity and imported 48.05 billion kWh. About 20% of Germany ’ s domestic electricity production is exchanged with other countries.
If the exchange is not possible, it is necessary to abandon electricity when the amount of renewable energy generation exceeds the amount of electricity used or the capacity of the grid; when the renewable energy generation is insufficient, more dispatchable units are needed.
Renewable energy generation must be coupled with a power generation facility that can be scheduled, so that the power grid can be stable.
When the capacity of renewable energy installations is large, the capacity of the installations with the power generation facilities that can be adjusted will also increase.
The average capacity factor of German natural gas units is only 15%.
In other words, Germany ’ s natural gas unit is idle 85% of the time, isn ’ t that the cost of renewable energy?
When renewable energy must have a total installed capacity of 12.7 million megawatts (54.8%) of renewable energy (wind, light, water, and waste) with a capacity of 255.1 billion kWh (41.9%); the installed capacity is 16.3 times that of Taiwan ’ s 7.8 million megawatts in 2019, and the power generation capacity is 16.8 times that of Taiwan ’ s share is only 5.6%. Degrees.
From the number of renewable energy generation, Taiwan really can not be compared with Germany, but can we really develop to the realm of Germany?
Germany ’ s territory covers an area of 357,622 square kilometers, 9.9 times Taiwan ’ s 35,980 square kilometers.
Simply estimate the amount of renewable energy generated per square kilometer of land in Germany is only 1.7 times that of Taiwan.
In other words, if Taiwan ’ s renewable energy development can be as good as Germany ’ s, our renewable energy generation capacity can be doubled again! Is that enough? What does the rest rely on? Petrified fuels? Taiwan ’ s use of fossil fuels for power generation is 82.0% in 2019 and 83.3% in 2021. What should we do about the reduction of greenhouse gases? Energy can be developed, hydrogen is an energy carrier, not energy, that is, hydrogen production still depends on other sources of energy.
The Germans can ’ t take the risk, we don ’ t see it.
Germany's nuclear energy policy is all caused by natural gas, on the one hand, the source is cut off, on the other hand, the natural gas shortage caused by the soaring price of fossil fuels.
Fossil fuels account for 46.3% of Germany ’ s electricity generation, and the rise in wholesale electricity prices has been alarming. The German government has revised its nuclear energy policy once again in order to spread the risk of excessive reliance on natural gas.
In Taiwan, fossil fuel power generation accounted for 83.3% in 2021, can the impact on electricity prices be lighter than in Germany?
You can't see that Taiwan Power Company is expected to have a loss of 200 billion yuan this year, and CNOOC is also in the tens of billions!
The government is afraid to adjust the price of electricity and natural gas for fear of affecting the election.
A few days ago, the media reported that the government has compiled a budget to directly eliminate the deficit.
Do they still have the law in their eyes?
If the government respects the results of the 2018 referendum on nuclear and green energy, and four years ago it began to promote the renewal of the licenses of the four nuclear companies to transfer and operate China's power plants, Taiwan will pay a lot less in this wave of soaring fossil fuel prices.
A while ago, the military exercise across the strait, it can be seen that it is rehearsing to block Taiwan, if it is really blocked in the future, our natural gas stocks can stand for a few days! Our government seems to be old in the ground is not proper, still clinging to the god of the non-nuclear homeland, refusing to open their eyes to see the latest international energy trends.
After Germany abandoned its non-nuclear policy, the only countries in the world that have used nuclear energy, only Taiwan has a non-nuclear timetable, China, the United States, France, Japan, South Korea and India, etc., are building or planning new nuclear power plants.
The Taiwanese government should wake up.
Those who pretend to sleep cannot wake up, so let us spit on those who stand in line with those who pretend to sleep!
With the election looming, let ’ s ask the candidates whether they support nuclear power?
If not, ask him to tell you where Taiwan's energy policy should go, how Taiwan meets the requirements of international carbon reduction, what to do when Taiwan is short of power, and who pays when electricity prices surge? (The author is a Distinguished Professor of Engineering and Systems Science, National Tsing Hua University)
※ The above statements do not represent the position of Wangzhong Media Group ※
# Germany # Unit # Electricity # Euro # Nuclear

The phase-out was politically motivated by anti-nuclear sentiment and environmental goals tied to carbon neutrality, intending to replace nuclear with renewables and reduce reliance on fossil fuels.

However, this transition has faced serious challenges, especially exacerbated by the Russian-Ukrainian war that has disrupted natural gas supplies from Russia, upon which Germany heavily depended.

Title:

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How did the German model achieve an unbearable energy transition war across the sea?
【 By Fu Guanqi 】
Environmental awareness, green energy production has always been regarded as the world's superior Germany, but because of a Ukrainian-Russian war, let the bright achievements behind the unfinished business, exposed to the world.
Is this general review of energy security, ignited by war, a crisis or a turning point for Germany, which rose from the ashes of World War II? Can Germany break through the status quo and turn into a new model for a sustainable economy in the future?
Or is it a death on the road to transformation? How can Taiwan find its future direction from this “energy transition war ”?
Just after Christmas, for many Dodd families, the most wanted Christmas gift may be a heat pump to make the whole family better through the winter.
Unlike the tens of millions of domestic heating systems in Germany that still use natural gas or oil as fuel, heat pumps are powered by electricity, which can be seen as "reverse air conditioning", which has a higher thermal conversion efficiency and symbolizes energy access at a lower price.
The energy crisis caused by the Russo-Ukrainian War has become a watershed in the price of energy in Germany.
The past dependence on Russia to import a large amount of cheap energy can not be returned, and the international carbon pricing mechanism is increasingly complete, which has led Germany to realize that only green energy is the way to reduce energy prices again.
The "Vision" team traveled to Germany, in-depth interviews and observed that the consensus that permeates German society today is: "There is not much time for the energy transition, and we must accelerate progress."
German Green Party MP Till Steffen, who visited Taiwan in 2022, told Visionary that "this' energy crisis' has accelerated the 'energy transition' and become a priority for the government."
German Economy Accelerates Greening, Renewable Energy Becomes National Security Foundation
This is not just a matter of paper. At the end of 2022, Germany inaugurated the country ’ s first liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal.
Germany decided last spring to build it, and it could be completed in a few months. “This is super fast for Germany, ” Steffen said.“ We need to scale up renewable energy at the same rate. ”
If you make decisions at the slow pace of your past habits, you won ’ t be able to achieve the goals you set. ”
In the past, far less ambitious than the Green Party ’ s liberal finance minister, Christian Lindner, has also designated renewable energy as “free energy ”, emphasizing its function to enhance Germany ’ s energy security and economic independence.
In this context, the two pillars of the energy transition, "switching to renewable energy" and "improving energy efficiency", have also become the top priorities of enterprises in the country.
Even the German machine tool manufacturer MAG, a pioneer of Industry 4.0, has re-examined energy conservation and is preparing to install solar panels on its plant.
“Many investment plans are being reevaluated because of higher energy prices, ” explains Sebastian Schoning, MAG ’ s head of Europe & Americas.“ Many investments that were previously unprofitable are now justified. ”
Solar panels that can be used for their own use and can be sold for electricity have been greatly shortened, and with tax incentives, large and small businesses and families have been selling out; installation technicians are so hot that waiting in line has become a new normal in the last few months.
Yen Chien-ho, general manager of the German branch of FSP, which has been operating solar energy storage business for more than six years from Taiwan, revealed that the green energy product line is already the main revenue of the company, and it is estimated that by 2023, solar related products can grow by 50%.
Quanhan also saw the business opportunities of green energy vehicles in Europe and decided to set up a new R & D center in Germany to attack customized charging devices.
Another Taiwanese company that has been working in Germany for ten years, Servo Press Co., Ltd. is also favored by European customers due to the fact that the product consumes about 50% less power than traditional presses, and is expected to double its business performance in 2023.
Germany has been driving the energy transition for decades. The driving force of this energy crisis is mainly reflected in the change of mentality and the re-calculation of business interests.
First, in terms of mentality, Germany used to import about 60% of its energy, and is more heavily dependent on cheap fossil fuels from Russia.
However, when energy is no longer so readily available, it has also greatly changed the German society's view of energy: in the past, everyone saw renewable energy as a threat to the stability of electricity supply, and now it is an important basis for protecting national security.
Second, in the eyes of enterprises, green energy has become the only energy source that can maintain long-term competitiveness.
"We all know that there is no future for fossil fuels," said Markus Rosenthal, director of government relations at the German Association for Energy Storage Systems. He cited the withdrawal of Allianz, Germany 's largest insurance company, and the active investment of major banks in decarbonization technology as examples. The effect of greening the German economy is greater than anyone else. "
Many may have heard of Germany ’ s Energiewende vision after the Fukushima disaster.
But such a concept has taken root in Germany ’ s anti-nuclear movement since the 1970s.
Since then, the Green Party movement has developed with the greatest political influence in the world.
GREEN ENERGY GREEN ENERGY CHALLENGE 1: Lack of work, insufficient capacity of Northern Power South
The Renewable Energy Act (EEG), which came into force in 2000, made Germany the first major economy to promote renewable energy.
Over the next 20 years, the proportion of renewable energy supply has grown significantly from 6% to 46%, and this remarkable achievement has become an international model case for promoting energy transformation.
However, the model of the period of peace seems to be unable to withstand the test of war, and Germany still fell into the dilemma of energy crisis in the Russo-Ukrainian War.
Russia ’ s invasion of Ukraine and the weaponization of energy are certainly uncontrollable factors.
But the German society's caution against nuclear energy has also made Germany more dependent on relatively clean natural gas during the period of phasing out coal.
“We are over-reliant on fossil fuels and the development of renewable energy over the past few years has been too slow, ” said Malte Kuper, energy and climate policy researcher at the German Institute for Economic Research (IW).“ We must accelerate the correction of the structural errors of energy policy over the past decade. ”
Wilhelm Kiewitt, Director of Energy Economics at 50Hertz, a German power grid company, said: “We are vigorously promoting the construction of renewable energy, but we have not updated the grid infrastructure and have not ensured that the design of the electricity market is compatible.
As a result, the energy transition is not doing well. ”
Wind power located on the northern coast of Germany has so far been difficult to reach the industrial heartland of the south because the government has spent too much time coordinating with the residents of the south to accept high-voltage cables cutting through their beautiful landscapes.
The lack of capacity of Northern Power South has become a key missing piece in the German energy puzzle.
In addition, the political lobbying power of fossil fuel companies and strict regulations on onshore wind power have also slowed down the pace of transformation in Germany.
A few months ago, there was a demolition of nearby windmills to expand coal mines in North Wales. Although the efficiency of these windmills was low and they were expected to be rebuilt and upgraded, environmentalists criticized this as a retrograde policy in the midst of the energy crisis.
But the lack of urgency may be the key factor in Germany ’ s gradual deviation from its goal.
According to the German government ’ s 2021 forecast, all sectors, from energy, industry and agriculture, will not be able to meet the 2030 climate goals on the basis of current carbon reduction actions.
In terms of new technology, even if Germany began hydrogen energy research more than 30 years ago, it has not been able to enter the expansion.
Thomas Hilig, founder of THEnergy in Germany and a hydrogen energy consultant, pointed out that “we have studied hydrogen energy thoroughly and want to know everything. ”
But it may be possible to start expanding sooner.
Indeed, now is the time to launch the app. ”
The impact of high energy prices and increasingly extreme weather have become a reality in Germany, forcing the country, accustomed to sound and prudent action, to admit its mistakes and shortcomings and accelerate the progress of the energy transition.
The question is, is it in time?
Opening a recent German newspaper will find that a crisis is not necessarily a turning point.
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which account for 99% of the total number of German enterprises, are struggling, and many companies may not be able to survive.
A survey of companies released by the German Chamber of Commerce and Industry (DIHK) in the summer of 2022 shows that due to high energy prices, 1 / 4 of enterprises have completed the deployment of production reduction, 1 / 4 have reduced the scale of operations, and the remaining half have not yet begun to act, and are still thinking about the corresponding steps.
At present, the German government has finalized a nearly 100 billion euro energy bill subsidy plan, but Asha Maria Sharma, deputy director of digital services at the Foreign Trade and Investment Agency, believes that financial subsidies are only part of the solution, companies must think about how to use AI, data analysis and other technologies to save energy, in order to remain competitive in the future when energy prices are higher.
However, the resources and financial power of SMEs are not as good as those of multinational enterprises, and it is not easy to face inflation, interest rate hikes, the impact on the dollar exchange rate and energy prices, and to devote more efforts to long-term investment layout.
For example, when the Covid-19 pandemic spread, Alexander Krug, the public relations manager in charge of the Berlin Digital Center for SMEs, observed that about a third of SMEs were suspending or even cancelling strategic digital investments that would bear fruit in the medium to long term.
Moreover, in the global semiconductor shortage, many small and medium-sized enterprises are competing for similar chips with the government-supported renewable energy industry, as well as Germany ’ s powerful automotive industry.
In terms of money and resources, it is difficult to win.
Cooper said that in the long term, the energy crisis can be an accelerator of the energy transition.
But for an industrial powerhouse like Germany, which has a high proportion of energy-intensive industries, there is also a risk that “industry may decline before the green energy transition is complete. ”
Many homes waiting for solar panel technicians to install their doors also reveal another risk: lack of work.
“If you ask a business, what ’ s the biggest question about operations? Almost every time the answer is, ‘ We need people. ’ ”
Especially in the areas of green energy and digital technology, which are crucial to driving transformation, there is a particular lack of technical talent.
Many countries in Europe have a shortage of jobs.
However, in the manufacturing sector, more than 40% of enterprises in Germany are understaffed.
In comparison, France is less than 25%, and Italy and Spain are less than 10%.
Even the director of the German public broadcaster said recently: "We have to recruit people from all over the world... even the German level of the candidates is not so important."
As long as I work hard, I don ’ t worry too much that they can only speak a few words of German. ”
GREEN ENERGY GREEN ENERGY CHALLENGE 2: Higher energy costs, the United States proposed a bill to reduce inflation and siphon off international investment
The evolution of the international situation has also made the adverse situation worse.
The European war is still raging, the epidemic is still hazy, and the tensions between the United States and China have caused Germany, formerly the beneficiary of free trade and international supply chains, to reverse the situation and increase the pressure.
In particular, in August 2022, the United States passed the $369 billion Inflation Reduction Act, proposing a simpler and more attractive subsidy specification than the European Union, which is likely to siphon off more international investment at a time when Germany urgently needs to accelerate the expansion of renewable energy.
Some scholars wonder whether Germany will be able to complete the energy transition that it failed to achieve during a period of relative stability in the face of many challenges.
Only recently did Germany significantly expand public spending to help society weather the epidemic. To date, it has allocated more than 260 billion euros in response to the energy crisis.
This is almost 7% of national GDP, well above the EU average of 83 billion euros.
Meanwhile, Germany is still trying to boost its defense budget to 2% of GDP.
Even if the money is relatively abundant, it is also pressure.
Reinhard Biedermann, a professor in the Department of Global Political Economy at Tamkang University, pointed out that to develop enough renewable energy to replace traditional energy sources requires a lot of investment, manpower and even land, which Germany cannot do at the same time.
“The energy crisis is really an opportunity to expand renewable energy.
But turning the crisis into a turning point is not so simple.
Germany depends not only on imports of fossil fuels, but also on imports of renewable energy.
After the decline of the German solar industry, about 95% of the domestic solar cells are manufactured in China.
Nordex shut down Germany ’ s last wind turbine turnstile plant in June 2022, taking into account costs, causing observers to worry that the wind energy industry may be heading toward a fate similar to that of the solar industry.
Steffen said that due to competition from China, the German solar industry has lost a lot of intellectual and political power, and now is the time to reinvigorate the domestic solar value chain.
“We still have capacity in wind energy, but we can ’ t find a market in our country because Chinese products are cheaper, ” Steffen said.
In some ways, the energy crisis is just beginning.
As the Visionary team rode a high-speed rail at a speed of nearly 300 kilometers across the edge of Germany ’ s beloved forest, they were greeted by rotating fans, solar panels laid on the roof of the building, and high-voltage power towers that transmit electricity over a long distance.
This has gradually become a familiar daily scene in German society.
At this point, it may be seen as an important milestone in the final completion of Germany ’ s energy transition, but it may also be the starting point for the decline of German industry.
Looking back at the challenges of the pandemic, companies in Dodd all agree that agility, flexibility and flexibility are essential skills to survive in the current changing environment.
In particular, German industry contributes more than a quarter of the country ’ s GDP, which is higher than developed countries such as France, the United Kingdom and the United States.
But strengthening the high-priced “Made in Germany ” brand with performance, quality and stability is threatened by higher energy costs.
Steffen acknowledged that many Dodd companies use cheap Russian energy to produce and then sell their products at high prices to the U.S. and mid-market.
This is similar to the common pattern in Taiwan.
Taiwan 's green energy students > risk assessment first, transformation needs to think about the overall order
Sucheta Govil, chief commercial officer of Covestro, observed that energy is already a global issue and resource constraints are becoming the foreseeable future. “Even if you are in Asia, energy prices are still cheap, but price increases are reflected in the supply chain. ”
This advantage is diluted by rising raw material costs, even if Germany considers itself to be of excellent mechanical engineering quality. ”
Even if Germany has only recently begun to cope with the energy crisis, the effectiveness of the policy measures will have to wait for time to prove, and there are still lessons for Taiwan.
First, understand your energy security and independence and conduct a risk assessment.
Leonard believes that encouraging energy conservation by raising energy prices and using this income to invest more in renewable energy is worth considering.
“Explaining to people the higher energy costs they pay will help develop renewable energy and improve energy security. ”
Second, think about the sequence of measures for the energy transition as a whole, and put limited resources in the right place at the right time.
Hans-Joachim Ziesing, a former energy transition consultant for Germany ’ s Future Energy Plan, shared that one of Germany ’ s mistakes was to set a good goal and vision before developing policies to be achieved.
A better approach might be to take a practical approach, clarify the quantitative benefits that each policy can bring, and determine that cross-party consensus can be reached to move forward together.
It is also important to continuously monitor the performance of data and to be accountable to all departments.
Hiliger observed that Germany ’ s national hydrogen energy strategy in 2020 shows that officials have learned from the siting of renewable energy and energy transportation.
“Many projects take production and consumption into account as a whole, for example, by making good use of existing construction, refurbishing natural gas pipelines to become hydrogen pipelines, rather than placing electrolytic tanks next to wind power plants. ”
Preparing businesses and citizens to move away from fossil fuels
Finally, it is the continuation of the momentum of social change.
In the past, Germany saw natural gas as a “bridging energy ” to connect fossil fuels with renewable energy; now, losing its main source of natural gas imports, it has had to restart coal plants and lease liquid-gas receiving stations.
After doing so, it may be harder to get rid of them in the future.
Ideally, when the hydrogen energy market matures, Germany can renovate this batch of liquid natural gas receiving stations into hydrogen energy receiving stations.
But the two are different energy sources after all, and the renovation will be another expense.
Whether it can be developed according to the plan is still uncertain.
After the government finalizes the energy subsidy policy, from the beginning of 2023 to April 2024, 80% of the bill will be protected by the price cap, and users will only pay 20% of the current price.
This will change people ’ s interest.
How to make good use of the incentive mechanism to encourage society to continue to promote energy conservation and transformation at the household, business and infrastructure levels is also a big test.
Although Taiwan, which has a higher industrial share than Germany, has yet to personally feel the waves of the European energy crisis, it will be crucial to be as prepared and adapted as possible to the future of higher fossil fuel prices before the price protection umbrella for long-term contracts ends.
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Russia's curtailment of gas deliveries—down to about a fifth of pre-war levels—and the resulting energy price spikes have precipitated an energy crisis marked by soaring electricity costs (power prices rose over 700% since early 2022) and fears of shortages during harsh winters.

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Content: People 's Network > > International
German Chancellor calls for extension of three nuclear power plants
October 19, 2022 09: 58 | Source: Xinhua Network
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BEIJING, Oct. 18 (Xinhua) -- German Chancellor Olaf Scholz asked the relevant authorities to develop a legal framework to allow all three remaining nuclear power plants in Germany to operate until mid-April next year.
Schorz made the decision public in a letter to the cabinet, the German Chancellor's office said.
"I request that the relevant proposed regulations be submitted to the Cabinet as soon as possible," the letter read.
According to the German government's plan, the three remaining nuclear power plants in Germany are scheduled to go offline by the end of this year.
However, due to the drastic reduction of natural gas supplies from Russia and the sharp decline in electricity exports from neighboring France to Germany, Germany has had to adjust its energy mix.
Falling gas supplies and soaring prices have led to fears of heating and energy shortages in Germany this winter, and domestic calls for continued use of nuclear power have soared.
On July 6, German Chancellor Gerhard Scholz (front right) received a routine inquiry at the German Federal Parliament in Berlin.
Photo by Xinhua reporter Ren Pengfei
In the first quarter of this year, the three nuclear power plants accounted for about 6 percent of Germany's total electricity generation.
The ruling coalition of the Social Democratic Party, the Green Party and the Liberal Democratic Party has been divided over the suspension of the nuclear power withdrawal plan.
German Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Climate Protection Robert Haberk announced at the end of September that the “Isar 2 ” nuclear power plant in Bavaria and the Neka Westerheim nuclear power plant north of Stuttgart will be in“ standby mode ” until mid-April next year.
In the event of a power shortage, the two nuclear power plants will be reactivated.
The Associated Press quoted German officials as saying at the time that the Amslan nuclear power plant in Lower Saxony would be shut down by the end of the year.
German Finance Minister Christian Lindner welcomed Scholz ’ s latest decision to extend the operating hours of the three nuclear power plants, saying a legal framework could be set up immediately.
This is a thermal power plant on the outskirts of Berlin, Germany, photographed on September 8.
Xinhua News Agency (photo by Stefan Caiz)
"It is in the vital interest of our country and our economy that we maintain all our energy production capacity this winter," Lindner wrote on social media.
Steffi Lemke, Germany ’ s minister for environment, nature protection, nuclear safety and consumer protection, said the latest decision was clearer and reiterated the continued phasing out of nuclear power, meaning there will be no further extension of the life of nuclear power plants after mid-April next year.
Since the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis, the European Union and the United States have imposed several rounds of sanctions on Russia, but the reaction of the sanctions has plunged Europe into an energy crisis.
Germany and other European countries that are highly dependent on Russian energy, on the one hand, introduced measures to save energy, and on the other hand, looked for alternative energy sources. (Liu Xi)
(Editor: Liu Ye Ting, Liu Jieyan)
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This crisis exposed Germany’s vulnerability due to the loss of nuclear baseload capacity, delayed grid expansions, and overreliance on imported fossil fuels, notably natural gas.

Coal-fired plants were temporarily restarted, and Germany rushed to build LNG terminals and scale renewables, but energy security remains fragile.

In response to these pressures, the German government has taken emergency measures, including considering short-term extensions of its last three nuclear reactors until at least mid-2023 or April 2024.

Chancellor Olaf Scholz requested a legal framework to keep the three plants operational to safeguard winter energy supply.

Although the Ministry of Economic Affairs initially denied an open-ended extension, the possibility of temporary reactivation reflects a shift in policy under crisis conditions.

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Content: How decades of complacency have left Germany facing a cold, dark winter

Betrayed by its own elite, the country is at risk of social unrest

Germany is facing its worst winter for 75 years. The impending catastrophe risks crippling its economy, sweeping away its government and bringing chaos to the heart of Europe.

In 1946-47, perhaps half a million Germans starved or froze to death in their ruined cities. Older Germans still shudder at the memory of the “Hunger Winter”. Some blamed the Nazis, others the Allied occupation. In fact, the British sent food, fuel and clothing they could ill afford to spare themselves.

Now Europe’s largest economy is heading for a winter of recession, rationing and possible blackouts. This time, though, there is nobody to blame except Germany’s complacent – and in some cases corrupt – political establishment.

As Vladimir Putin chokes off Russian gas supplies – already down to a fifth of their pre-war level – by closing the Nord Stream 1 pipeline for “maintenance” yet again next week, the lamps are going out for Olaf Scholz and his “traffic light” coalition of Social Democrats, Liberal and Greens.

'Autumn of rage'

The Bundesbank has been predicting a recession and the latest figures show that business activity is already contracting. Inflation, which hit 8.5 per cent last month, is expected to keep rising along with the rest of the eurozone, probably into double figures.

Yet for historical reasons Germans won’t just accept high inflation as a consequence of the war in Ukraine. The world remembers the hyperinflation that undermined the Weimar Republic a century ago; only older Germans recall the hyperinflation after the Second World War, which lasted longer. For three years Germany’s only stable currency was American cigarettes. No wonder Germans have been allergic to inflation ever since.

It is true that Germans are not yet demanding big pay rises or going on strike. But energy prices are already rising exponentially. The country's one-year ahead power price has skyrocketed to almost €1,000 per megawatt-hour, a jump of more than 720pc since the start of 2022. If Putin turns off the tap, bringing the mighty German economy to a juddering halt this winter, there is a real danger of civil unrest.

Intelligence officials are warning that extremist organisations, such as the neo-Nazis of Combat 18, are planning an “autumn of rage”. As a foretaste, in the old Prussian town of Neuruppin near Berlin, there were ugly scenes this month as Scholz was shouted down by far-Left and far-Right protesters.

But the panic and indignation now brewing go far beyond the ranks of the “unteachable” extremists.

Germans sense that unaccountable elites have ceded control of their country’s destiny to Putin. The more they are must pay him for Russian gas, the bigger his war chest with which to perpetrate genocide in Ukraine.

Forcing Germany to be complicit in a colossal crime against humanity is a diabolical twist in the vengeance that Putin is now exacting upon Europe for backing Ukraine. According to The Economist’s Christian Odendahl, at present prices Germany will need to spend 8.4 per cent of its GDP on gas. Hitherto it was just 1 per cent.

Already preparations are underway for central heating to be rationed or even switched off, forcing residents to seek shelter in schools or town halls.

The country is scrambling to reduce its reliance on gas with a campaign to make households cut back, and a massive national effort has brought gas storage levels up to 81 per cent full.

Food prices, meanwhile, rose at a rate of nearly 15 per cent in July. Those who fear being unable to afford to heat their homes or feed their families are prey to angst and anger.

Actions have consequences... or do they?

Few foresaw the Russian invasion of Ukraine, let alone its devastating consequences for Europe. But it is dawning on the German people that the seeds of the present crisis were sown over the quarter of a century from 1998 to 2022, under Angela Merkel and her predecessor, Gerhard Schröder.

These were the years of plenty for Germany, when Berlin dominated the European Union, ensuring that its export-led economy benefited from the single currency while loading the social costs on to its poorer neighbours. But Germany’s dirty secret was cheap Russian energy.

Under Schröder – who went on to become one of Putin’s “useful idiots” – German industry began to abandon its postwar reliance on coal and nuclear energy in favour of Russian gas and renewables.

In 2011, after the Fukushima accident, Mrs Merkel announced that all German nuclear power plants would be closed down. It was a pyrrhic victory for the Greens but backed by all the major parties. Public opinion had been turned against nuclear energy in the 1980s by the Soviet-funded “peace movement”. Now the Greens are the keystone of the Scholz coalition.

Even in the country’s present predicament, Robert Habeck, the Green Vice-Chancellor and Environment Minister, is refusing to reverse the exit from nuclear to alleviate the energy crisis, though it is still possible over time to reactivate a number of nuclear power stations.

Yet Berlin is demanding that 26 other EU member states make huge cuts in energy use this winter to help Germany – to the irritation of the Spanish and others, who don’t depend on Russian gas and recall lectures from Berlin during the eurozone crisis about actions having consequences.

For decades, the Kremlin acted as Germany’s geopolitical drug-dealer, tempting Berlin to become ever more addicted to the energy that fuelled its manufacturing, pharmaceutical and chemical factories. Now that the Germans are about to go cold turkey, they are discovering how cynically the national interest was betrayed by their politicians and captains of industry.

With Schröder as its salesman, a new Nord Stream 2 pipeline was built under the Baltic Sea — with the blessing of Mrs Merkel, who fended off Anglo-American pressure to cancel what was regarded as a threat to European energy security.

Last year, as Russian tanks massed on the Ukrainian border and Nato warned of imminent invasion, Gazprom redoubled its efforts to keep the flagship project on track.

The Russian energy giant poured €192 million (£163m) into an environmental foundation set up by Manuela Schwesig, the Social Democratic premier of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern — the state that hosted Nord Stream 2 and stood to gain most. She proceeded to denounce the US for opposing the pipeline, claiming that American sanctions were purely self-interested.

Putin’s stooges almost succeeded in persuading Scholz to defy his Nato allies. He dithered until the eve of February’s invasion before shelving Nord Stream 2.

Now, after six months of Europe’s worst war since 1945, some German politicians are once again calling for the pipeline to be opened “so that people do not have to freeze in winter and our industry does not suffer serious damage”, as Wolfgang Kubicki, Vice-President of the German Parliament, puts it.

Meanwhile Ms Schwesig has just been re-elected as leader of the Social Democrats in her state by a large majority. Schröder has yet to be expelled from the party, let alone sanctioned.

Germany’s Achilles’ heel

This is the measure of Germany’s abject reliance, not only on Russian energy, but on the Russian state. For Putin, gas and oil were only ever a means to an end. He has always wanted to reduce the Germans — towards whom Russians have traditionally had an inferiority complex — to a status of servility.

Stalin only succeeded in dividing Germany. Putin seeks to turn the entire Federal Republic into his client state — and thereby impose his will upon Europe.

With the unerring eye of the predator, Putin grasped that energy was Germany’s Achilles’ heel. A single plant of a single corporation, the headquarters of the chemical and pharmaceutical giant BASF at Ludwigshafen, uses as much energy as Denmark.

Over the last 25 years, Germany’s craving for cheap energy led it into an unequal relationship with Russia — what the philosopher Hegel called “the dialectic of master and slave”.

Putin saw that some German politicians could be bought (Schröder), others bamboozled (Merkel), and still others bullied (Scholz). Other EU countries followed the German example by relying heavily on Moscow for energy, influenced by the evasion and ambivalence that has characterised Berlin’s policy for decades.

Germany, whose economy is substantially larger than Britain’s, has given just £1 billion in military aid to Ukraine compared to the UK’s £3.5 billion. The United States has given ten times as much as the EU. Yet Ukraine is a European country under genocidal attack.

The reluctance to provoke Putin that still prevails in wide circles of the Federal Republic is rooted in exaggerated notions of Russian military power, economic importance and cultural pre-eminence.

German fatalism about Russia’s ability to absorb casualties and yet win ultimate victory reflects folk memories of the Eastern Front. But Putin, unlike Stalin, does not have a vast conscript army at his disposal, he does not enjoy technical superiority and he cannot afford the war of attrition that he has unleashed. Nor are the Russian people united against an invading force in defence of their homeland. Only in Berlin do they think this is another Stalingrad.

This historical myopia has much to do with the long-standing German habit of subsuming the other nations that made up the Soviet Union into Russia. To this day most Germans have no awareness of the fact that the Nazis killed millions of Ukrainian civilians and devastated their country.

Ironically, many artists, writers and musicians who have fled Ukraine have found refuge in Germany. One example is the composer Valentin Silvestrov, who fled to Berlin aged 84 with one suitcase, full of his manuscripts. Once there, he discovered that Ukrainian music was unknown in Germany. Now that Silvestrov’s works are being performed, including at the Proms in London, the Germans are slowly waking up to the presence of a greater living composer than any of their own.

Many ordinary Germans, like the British, instinctively warm to the Ukrainian cause. The difference is in leadership – or lack of it. Chancellor Olaf Scholz, unlike Boris Johnson or Liz Truss, has shown only lukewarm support for Kyiv and has been implicitly rebuked by President Zelensky.

Hamburger grilled

Although there is no suggestion that Scholz has been bribed to go easy on Russia, he himself has become embroiled in a corruption scandal. He is accused of helping M.M. Warburg & Co, Germany’s oldest and largest private bank, to avoid a €47 million fine in 2016, during his time as Finance Minister in the Merkel coalition.

The Hamburg-based bank is alleged to have made up to €300 million in a capital gains tax scam which came to light while Scholz was also mayor of the city state. Just as he finds himself facing an unexpectedly grim present and a positively terrifying future, his provincial past has returned to haunt him.

Last week the Chancellor was grilled by a committee of inquiry in Hamburg. The normally meticulous Scholz claimed not to remember any details about his meetings with Warburg’s former chief, Christian Olearius, who has now been charged with tax evasion. Germany’s safe pair of hands, whom millions had entrusted with the nation’s finances, is now accused of being cosy with tax-dodging bankers and being an unimpressive, even unreliable, witness.

In other ways, too, Scholz is failing to live up to the moral example set by the two great Social Democratic Chancellors of post-war Germany, Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt. At a joint press conference with Mahmoud Abbas in Berlin earlier this month, Scholz remained tight-lipped while the Palestinian leader delivered an anti-Semitic tirade, accusing Israel of committing “many Holocausts” against his people.

Schmidt, who concealed the fact he had a Jewish grandfather from the Nazis but as Chancellor was an outspoken philosemite, would not have been impressed by his fellow Hamburger Scholz. Nor would Brandt, who famously fell to his knees at the memorial to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising.

Not for decades has anti-Semitism been such a threat in Germany: in July, Berlin’s Holocaust Memorial was desecrated with swastikas. Now, as Putin’s myrmidons massacre and deport Ukrainians near the site of Nazi genocide, while a quarter of the Russian Jewish population has emigrated in anticipation of pogroms, Germany needs a leader who is not afraid to denounce anti-Semitism even at the cost of diplomatic niceties.

After less than a year in office, Scholz’s personal ratings are plumbing depths never seen during Mrs Merkel’s 16 years at the helm. As Germans brace themselves for unprecedented hardships in peacetime, they are led by a weak and indecisive Chancellor at the head of a fragile three-party coalition.

Post-heroic, post-patriotic

Wednesday’s visit to Kyiv by Boris Johnson – his third – to mark Ukraine’s Independence Day was hugely appreciated not only by Volodymyr Zelensky but by all Ukrainians. Yet it was a gesture of solidarity that did not occur – could not have occurred – to Olaf Scholz.

The German Chancellor’s only visit to the Ukrainian capital last June, accompanied by Emmanuel Macron and Mario Draghi, was an awkward, chilly affair that yielded little more than promises. This week, Scholz posted a short video message, concluding: “Our hearts are with you.” Ulrich Speck, a German foreign policy analyst, commented: “Hearts, yes. But not weapons.”

Johnson, by contrast, knows he is among friends in Kyiv – a friendship symbolised by Zelensky awarding him Ukraine’s highest honour, the Order of Liberty. It is impossible to imagine the lugubrious German Chancellor finding the Prime Minister’s pithy words: “While people [in the West] are paying energy bills, people in Ukraine are paying with blood.” Nor would Scholz echo him in declaring: “I believe Ukraine can and will win this war.”

For his part, Zelensky told his people that they had been “reborn” in the heat of war. “We used to say: ‘Peace’. Now we say: ‘Victory’,” he declared.

Highly educated Germans find it hard to empathise with such Churchillian sentiments. Jürgen Habermas, the eminence grise of German intellectuals, makes condescending comments about Ukraine as a primitive place, still captive to the nationalist illusions of the last century, unlike more sophisticated, “post-heroic” Germany. It doesn’t occur to the 93-year-old philosopher that without the heroism of its soldiers and civilians, Ukraine would by now have ceased to exist.

Prussian military prowess has long since given way to post-patriotic pusillanimity. Where Merkel and Scholz feared to tread and even Biden was hesitant, Johnson was the first to commit himself wholeheartedly to the cause and to visit war-torn Kyiv.

Many other nations – the Poles, the Baltic states, the Scandinavians and the Canadians among them – have been more supportive than the Germans, who owe Ukrainians the greatest moral debt.

Berlin boasts of handing out a handful of howitzers while dithering over clapped-out armoured vehicles. Meanwhile British arms and training, Turkish drones and American rocket artillery systems have proved decisive on the battlefield.

Sold down the Dnieper

Although the Scholz coalition officially sides with Ukraine, the unpalatable fact remains that Germany and its EU partners are financing Russian aggression by paying vast sums for Russian gas.

Will they stand up to Putin in Germany when the enormity of the ordeal ahead becomes clear to everybody? Will public opinion continue to back even the present feeble commitment, or will the voices calling for peace at the expense of Ukrainians prevail? It is all too believable that at some point, probably early next year when gas storage facilities are empty, Berlin – and Brussels – will open negotiations with the Kremlin, regardless of Kyiv’s wishes.

Yet it is then that the ghosts of the past may rise up to intervene in the present. The thought of Germans and Russians redrawing the map of Eastern Europe at the conference table sends shivers down the spines of every Pole, Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian and, of course, Ukrainian. On August 23, 1940, exactly 82 years ago this week, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed, carving up Poland (which then included Lviv and other parts of present-day Ukraine) and the Baltic states between Russia and Germany. No German Chancellor wishes to be reminded of that precedent.

However, nor can Scholz risk presiding over an even deeper and more lasting recession than that caused by the Covid pandemic. Somehow he must steer a course between the Scylla of appeasing Putin and the Charybdis of economic ruin.

The tension between these positions is reflected in the tripartite coalition. Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and the Greens are the hawks, Finance Minister Christian Lindner and his pro-business Free Democrats are the doves, while the Social Democrats are deeply divided. The party leadership leans towards Moscow, the rank and file towards Kyiv. This explains why Scholz never says that he wants Ukraine to win the war, merely that they must not lose it.

The opposition Christian Democrats are only slightly more united. They too have a large wing that privately favours a negotiated peace, represented by their pro-business leader Friedrich Merz, and a smaller but not insignificant group led by the foreign affairs expert Norbert Röntgen, who hope for a Ukrainian victory. Merz has papered over the cracks by focusing on a campaign to reverse his predecessor Mrs Merkel’s exit from nuclear energy.

Meanwhile, the “understanding Putin” lobby has the support of both the hard Left Die Linke and anti-immigration AfD parties. German public opinion has slowly tiptoed away from its initial admiration for Ukrainian resistance and towards a compromise peace.

That subtle shift could soon become an overwhelming tide, once Germans are required to make real sacrifices. Vladimir Putin, we may be sure, is counting on it.

From October, Scholz will impose a gas levy on consumers to compensate energy companies for the cost of replacing Russian gas supplies. Germany’s biggest energy company, Uniper, was bailed out in July to the tune of £12.5 billion; it is now claiming another £18.5 billion of levies.

This policy is bound to be unpopular, since it redistributes tens of billions from the poor to the rich — curious thinking for a government of the Left. But this is nothing compared to the prospect of protests sparked by a national shutdown caused, not by a deadly virus, but by Putin’s energy politics.

A change in the air?

Modern Germany has a volatile history of popular protest. It began with the revolution that toppled the Kaiser in 1918. The Nazis mobilised the masses to carry out their “national revolution” in 1933. A workers’ uprising in East Germany was crushed by Soviet tanks in 1953. Student protests brought about a cultural revolution in 1968. Uniquely bloodless and benign was the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. This was Germany’s finest hour.

The defiance that breached the Wall and sent the Soviet army home was a blessing, but the despair that Putin’s revenge may induce this winter will surely be a curse. Gas has given the Russian dictator coercive control over the German political class, which willingly acquiesced in its fate.

In Kyiv, Boris Johnson said: “I can tell you that we in the UK will not for one second give in to Putin’s blackmail.” Olaf Scholz is incapable of speaking like this — because he does not believe it. He has failed to frame the coming ordeal as a battle in which Germans must make sacrifices for their own liberty, not just Ukraine’s. People don’t mind his lack of charisma; they do mind facing a nightmarish winter with spineless hypocrisy at the helm.

Will it become so obvious by next spring that Scholz is unequal to the task that either he or his coalition are replaced? Can the centre of German politics hold — or are we about to see a terrible revolt of the masses against a discredited political establishment? It has happened before. It can happen again.

Daniel Johnson was the Telegraph’s correspondent in Germany and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. He is now the editor of TheArticle.