India and Russia have a Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership, with Russia providing global support to India.

Most of India's military equipment is of Russian origin, and India relies heavily on Russia for military equipment despite US sanctions threats.

The India-Russia relationship has evolved under Modi and Putin, focusing on regional security, defense, and economy.

Russia views India as a great power and a time-tested friend with a special strategic partnership.

India will buy the S-400 missile system from Russia, despite potential US sanctions, which is crucial for India's national security, particularly in countering China.

India and Russia aim for $50 billion in investments and $30 billion in trade by 2025, and are cooperating on energy projects, including nuclear power and discounted oil and gas supplies.

India is buying discounted Russian oil despite Western sanctions, and imports $60 billion of goods from Russia annually, a relationship dating back to the Cold War.

The US has concerns about India's Russia ties, and has warned India against increasing Russian oil imports, but India plans to use a rupee-ruble payment system to bypass sanctions.

India views Russia as a central pillar of its foreign policy, and maintains strong defense ties with Russia and neutrality in the Ukraine conflict to preserve its independence.

Russia supports India's bid for a UN Security Council permanent seat, and India and Russia prioritize equality in their relations.

India's rivalry with China affects its relationship with Russia, which prioritizes its own interests, and India-Russia cooperation can shape regional security in South Asia, building on their longstanding relationship.

India is seeking to counter China's growing influence in South Asia, largely through loans and infrastructure, by shifting its focus from Pakistan to China and the maritime theater, and engaging with partners like the Quad.

India and Russia have a Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership, with Russia providing global support to India.

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Old friends

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On Monday, PM Modi spoke over the phone with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The phone call reportedly was a follow-up on many of the issues raised during Putin's recent India visit on December 6. According to a statement by the PMO, the two leaders have agreed to remain in regular touch with each other on a range of issues covered under the India-Russia Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership. Insofar as visits from foreign dignitaries and leaders go, Putin's visit to India earlier this month was arguably the most consequential development for India in the field of foreign affairs for quite some time. India, as may be known, has a long and storied relationship with Russia and its precursor, the Soviet Union. From the earliest days, the friendship between the two nations had a strong strategic undertone with both sides supporting each other on the world stage whenever necessary. Indeed, the Soviet Union was undeniably India's greatest ally in the 20th century against the machinations of the western powers like the US that did not take kindly to India announcing itself to be a 'socialist' nation. From Kashmir to the Bangladesh Liberation War, Russia has stood by India in defence of its strategic interests. As a proof of the relationship, a majority of military equipment India currently possesses was either directly supplied by Moscow or is otherwise of Russian origin. In recent years, with the fall of the Soviet Union and India's move towards liberalising its economy, India has ventured out into the world to make a new set of friends. This time around, it is India and the US that are getting along like a house on fire. India has deliberately sought to widen its field diplomatically and militarily in order to not be tied down to a single nation with the rather pragmatic understanding that there are no permanent relationships in international politics. In more recent times, Russia and India have somewhat drifted further apart as Russia bands together with India's rival China to take on the hegemony of the western world that is held up by the US. While India has no interest in joining the US in its power games against Russia, it is very much interested in leveraging its relationship with the west in its struggle to contain a belligerent China. It is here that India has had to perform a tremendous tight-rope walk, particularly following the 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia. On the one hand, you have America that wishes to limit or even extinguish India's strategic relationship with Russia. On the other, you have Russia that is increasingly concerned and agitated by India drawing ever closer to the US's sphere of influence as it joins America in endeavours like the Quad grouping. Of particular concern to both sides is India's continuing dependence on Russia for military equipment. The US, already having sanctioned Turkey for the same, looks on menacingly as it threatens India with sanctions for buying the S-400 missile system. Russia, of course, is not only interested in keeping its old defence ties but even expanding them, as it has been recently teasing India with the possibility of being the first nation in the world to buy the improved S-500 missile system. In this regard, Putin's visit to India could be termed as symbolic. Since the beginning of the pandemic, Putin has only ventured out twice from his country, with the second trip being the one to India. His tone and body language during the meeting with PM Modi spoke volumes of the importance he attaches to maintaining the ties with India. Aside from underscoring the good working relationship he has with India's PM, the visit also highlighted that despite the recent turns of history, the two nations still have much to share and collectively work towards. Common concern in regards to the Taliban and Afghanistan is one such area that the two sides are looking to cooperate on in the near future. Another is strengthening existing defence ties between the two nations. Underscoring its strategic independence, India has decided to continue with its defence dealings with Russia, discussing the purchase of the S-400 missile system while also finalising a long-pending Rs 5,000 crore deal for the production of over five lakh AK-203 rifles in a joint Indo-Russian deal. But all said and done, the future of India's relationship with Russia still has some shades of uncertainty. Primary amongst them is the ongoing escalation between Moscow and NATO in regards to Ukraine and eastern Europe. If Russia should choose to brave threats of western sanctions to take action in Ukraine, where does this leave India? Can India still continue its balancing game between east and west at a time when geopolitics are heating up to a boiling point? That remains to be seen.

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In what fields are India and Russia cooperating?

What do Putin and Modi officially characterize Russia/ India relationship as?

Most of India's military equipment is of Russian origin, and India relies heavily on Russia for military equipment despite US sanctions threats.

How did India react to the war between Russia and Ukraine?

India did not join the Western sanctions against Russia

In what fields are India and Russia cooperating?

The India-Russia relationship has evolved under Modi and Putin, focusing on regional security, defense, and economy.

Title:

Content: Russia-India coordination, balance, US-India approach?
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Source: Global Times
Author: Wang Shida
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke by telephone with Russian President Vladimir Putin on the 20th to further develop the "special and privileged strategic partnership" between the two countries.
At the beginning of this month, Russia and India held an annual leaders' summit, launched the first "2 + 2" dialogue between foreign ministers and defense ministers, and agreed to strengthen cooperation and coordination on bilateral and multilateral issues, and signed up to 28 cooperation agreements.
In just two weeks, the summit had two interactions, which sent a signal that Russian-Indian relations were more special than before.
From the interaction on the 6th, Putin led a strong delegation to visit India and held the annual Russian-Indian leaders' summit.
This is Putin's second overseas visit since the outbreak of the COVID-19 epidemic, highlighting the importance he attaches to the "special and privileged strategic partnership" between the two countries.
During the visit, Russia and India held their first "2 + 2" meeting, which will help deepen mutual understanding and strengthen the special and privileged strategic partnership between the two countries.
The most important of the 28 cooperation agreements signed by Russia and India is the Agreement on Military Technical Cooperation 2021-2031.
The document will provide guidance for Russian-Indian military cooperation in the next 10 years, especially to promote joint development and production of weapons and equipment.
It can be said that the foundation for the next stage of military interaction between Russia and India has been laid.
In addition, Russia and India are also actively discussing the signing of a military logistics agreement similar to the memorandum of understanding on logistics exchange between the two countries to facilitate the use of each other's military bases.
Once signed in the future, the Russian-Indian military relations will take another step forward.
The two leaders discussed how to implement the agreement reached at the December 6 meeting, agreed to maintain regular contact on all aspects covered by the Russian-Indian “special and privileged strategic partnership ”, continue to deepen bilateral cooperation and consultation and coordination in multilateral forums, and exchange views on international stability and security issues, including the situation in the Asia-Pacific region.
Since taking office as US president at the beginning of the year, Biden has inherited and strengthened the Indo-Pacific strategy of his predecessor, Trump, and has courted India as the key to its success.
To this end, Biden has made efforts to promote the upgrading and implementation of the four-nation mechanism.
In March this year, the four-nation mechanism held its first video summit, issued a joint declaration, and established three working groups to implement the summit consensus.
In September, the four-nation mechanism held its first offline summit, reiterating the implementation of cooperation in the fields of vaccines and high-quality infrastructure, and proposing to jointly train scientific and technological talents to create a "closed loop of scientific and technological talents of the four countries".
For example, the United States has continued to deepen the "comprehensive global strategic cooperative partnership" between the United States and India.
On March 19, U.S. Defense Secretary William Austin visited India, calling the U.S.-India relationship "a key pillar of a free and open Indo-Pacific."
Under the continued cozying up of the Biden administration, India's attitude of strategic autonomy has become blurred, and it has clearly moved closer to and tilted toward the United States in implementing its foreign policy of "multi-faceted alliance."
During his visit to the United States in September, Modi said that "the relationship between the United States and India has entered a critical transition period".
In the face of the continuous promotion of the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" by the United States and the drift and deviation of India in the two strategic directions of the Indo-Pacific Ocean and the Eurasian continent, Russia is certainly alert.
As early as the Cold War, Russia and India established a relatively special strategic cooperative partnership, even reaching the level of quasi-allies.
At the end of the Cold War, Russia pushed India to join strategic designs such as the "trilateral dialogue between China, Russia and India" in an attempt to promote the establishment of a fair and multipolar world order.
Russia also sees India as an important partner in the Indian Ocean region and an important contributor to the effects of radiation in the Indian Ocean region.
To this end, Russia has taken a series of actions, Foreign Minister Lavrov and other high-level leaders directly expressed opposition to the United States using the "Indo-Pacific strategy" as a tool to contain China and Russia and create regional division.
This round of Russian-Indian strategic coordination is also the proper meaning of Russia's anti-Indo-Pacific strategy.
In particular, Russia and India signed a major defense cooperation order, began the delivery of S-400 air defense system, and will soon sign a military logistics agreement, which is conducive to consolidating defense and military cooperation between the two countries, hedging the penetration and erosion of the traditional Russian arms market by the United States in the past 10 years, and preventing India from falling into the "Indo-Pacific camp" because of increased dependence on weapons and equipment.
Therefore, Russian-Indian interaction is conducive to maintaining the relative balance between the two camps of the Eurasian continent and the Indo-Pacific Ocean, as well as to global strategic stability and peace.
(The writer is deputy director of the South Asia Institute of the Chinese Institute of Modern International Relations)
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In what fields are India and Russia cooperating?

Russia views India as a great power and a time-tested friend with a special strategic partnership.

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'India great power and a time-tested friend', says Russia's Vladimir Putin

India, Russia hold 21st summit, and first 2+2 dialogue; sign 28 agreements

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indian government | India-Russia ties | Narendra Modi

Ajai Shukla  |  New Delhi

Prime Minister Narendra Modi receives Russian President Vladimir Putin at Hyderabad House in New Delhi, on Monday (Photo: PTI)

New Delhi and Moscow on Monday issued to the world a high-visibility reminder about their “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership”, as Prime Minister and Russian President held the 21st India-Russia Summit, an annual ritual missed only in 2020 due to the pandemic.

Leading into the 21st summit meeting, India and Russia held their first-ever 2 + 2 Ministerial Dialogue, in which External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar and Defence Minister Rajnath Singh together held strategic discussions with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu.

“We perceive India as a great power, a friendly nation and a time-tested friend. The relations between our countries are growing and I am looking into the future,” Putin said in his initial comments.

Putin also expressed concern over the developments in Afghanistan and said India and Russia will continue to coordinate on major challenges facing the region.

Modi said Putin’s second visit abroad during the Covid-19 pandemic reflected his personal commitment to the and that the special and privileged strategic partnership between the two sides was getting stronger. In the last few decades, the world witnessed many fundamental changes and different kinds of geopolitical equations and variables, but the friendship of India and Russia remained constant, Modi said. “Your visit to India is a reflection of your commitment to ties with India,” the PM said.

Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla said 28 agreements were concluded between India and Russia after Modi-Putin meet. After the 2+2 meeting, Jaishankar tweeted: “A productive exchange of perspectives on cross-cutting and inter-related issues. Will be reporting it to the Annual Summit later today.”

Earlier on Monday, there was a meeting of the apex body that governs defence relations between the two: The Indo-Russian Inter-Governmental Commission on Military Technical Cooperation (IRIGC-MTC), co-chaired by the two defence ministers, Singh and Shoigu.

India’s military uses Russian weaponry extensively, such as Sukhoi-30MKI fighter aircraft, T-90S tanks and BMP infantry combat vehicles, Talwar-class frigates, and Kilo-class submarines. The two sides have jointly produced the highly regarded BrahMos cruise missile system.

During the 17th annual summit, the two countries concluded deals on India’s procurement of five units of the S-400 air defence systems for an estimated ~37,000 crore, constructing Talwar-class frigates under Project 1135.6, and a shareholders’ agreement on a joint venture (JV) to manufacture Kamov-226T helicopters in India.

The S400 is regarded as the world’s premier long-range missile system, with the ability to shoot down enemy aircraft at ranges up to 400 kilometres. During the confrontation over the last two years between the Chinese and Indian armies in Ladakh, China deployed the S400 along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

On March 3, 2019, in Amethi, Modi announced another JV —Indo-Russian Rifles — that would manufacture 750,000 AK-203 assault rifles in Korwa under the “Make in India” programme for an estimated $687 million. Russia is also competing for a ~40,000-crore deal for building six submarines in India under Project 75I, and a ~50,000-60,000 crore agreement to manufacture 114 fighter aircraft in India.

To ensure that Russian defence equipment was not hampered by any shortfall in maintenance or spare parts, the two sides agreed during the 20th Annual Summit in Vladivostok in September 2019 to cooperate in producing spare parts for Russian/Soviet military equipment.

The India-Russia defence partnership is being tested by Washington, especially through the piece of legislation the US Congress passed in 2017, titled CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act). This provides for US sanctions on countries that have significant defence or intelligence relations with Russia, Iran, or North Korea. India’s purchase of the S400 missile system is regarded as a potential trigger for Washington to impose sanctions.

While the US Congress has created a “CAATSA waiver” for close partners such as India, the US president is required to determine whether to exercise that waiver. So far, President Joe Biden has not stated a preference.

India, which faces a growing threat from China, is determined to buy the S400 from Russia. Asked whether New Delhi would bow to CAATSA pressure, India’s foreign ministry spokesperson said last week: “India and the US have a special global strategic partnership. And we also have a very special and privileged strategic partnership with Russia. And as you’re all aware, we pursue an independent foreign policy. This applies to our defence acquisitions, and supplies which are and will continue to be guided by our security interest.”

New Delhi and Moscow have identified trade and economic relations as a priority area. Modi and Putin have set a bilateral investment target of $50 billion and a bilateral trade target of $30 billion by 2025. (With inputs from PTI)

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First Published: Tue, December 07 2021. 01:24 IST
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What do Putin and Modi officially characterize Russia/ India relationship as?

India will buy the S-400 missile system from Russia, despite potential US sanctions, which is crucial for India's national security, particularly in countering China.

In what fields are India and Russia cooperating?

Why is maintaining a relationship with Russia important for India?

India and Russia aim for $50 billion in investments and $30 billion in trade by 2025, and are cooperating on energy projects, including nuclear power and discounted oil and gas supplies.

How has trade level between India and Russia changed under Modi and Putin?

In what fields are India and Russia cooperating?

India is buying discounted Russian oil despite Western sanctions, and imports $60 billion of goods from Russia annually, a relationship dating back to the Cold War.

Title:

Content: While the United States frequently forces China and India to denounce Russia, China and India stand together!
Obviously, this has made some people in the West and some media uneasy.
Because, it seems to be a classic case of the United States being strategically self-defeating.
The United States was too anxious to cause the action to deform.
Since this was the first visit by a Chinese foreign minister to India after the conflict in the Galvan Valley, it sent a special signal for Sino-Indian relations.
Some US media are worried that the US-India-Japan-Australia "four-party mechanism" alliance carefully crafted by Washington will be weakened as a result, and even affect the overall promotion of the US "Indo-Pacific strategy".
1
Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi will visit India on the 25th.
The news, issued by Reuters in the United Kingdom on the 23rd, has aroused the attention of international public opinion.
The report quoted an Indian official as saying that "although neither side has made an official announcement, this will be the highest level visit since the border conflict between the two countries worsened relations two years ago."
Wang Yi ’ s trip to South Asia began with a meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in Pakistan, followed by a visit to Afghanistan, then a trip from Afghanistan to India on the 25th, and a visit to Nepal on the 25th.
It can be said that the horse does not stop.
The Indian government source, who asked to remain anonymous, told Reuters that Wang is expected to meet with Indian Foreign Minister Atal Bihari Sujssen and Indian national security adviser Doval, and while the agenda is not yet clear, it is expected to discuss the conflict in Ukraine.
The Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs would not comment on the news.
A spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry said at a regular press briefing on the 23rd that he had no information to provide at this time.
Relations between China and India became tense between May and June 2020, when there were confrontations between border guards in places such as the Galvan Valley on the Sino-Indian border.
In particular, on 15 June 2020, a deadly clash in the Galvan Valley killed 20 Indian and four Chinese soldiers.
Since then, Sino-Indian relations have been strained for a time, and Indian border patrol officers have even broken the rules that have been observed for decades and fired warning shots, even in confrontations with Chinese personnel.
Since then, India has restricted many Chinese companies from doing business in India, and has also stopped dozens of Chinese-developed apps.
However, the "knots" between the two countries always need to be unraveled, and both sides have this desire.
On the 11th of this month, the Chinese and Indian armies held the 15th round of military-level talks.
According to official information released after the meeting, the two sides followed the leaders' guidance on resolving the remaining issues as soon as possible. The two sides also reiterated that achieving a settlement of the remaining issues will help restore peace and tranquillity in the West Line of Actual Control and promote the development of bilateral relations.
In the meantime, both sides agreed to maintain security and stability on the frontline in the Western Sector. They agreed to maintain dialogue through military and diplomatic channels to reach a mutually acceptable solution as soon as possible.
According to some analysts, from the Indian side, on December 8, 2021, a Mi-17V5 helicopter flown by India's then defense chief Rawat and his wife crashed in the Gunur region of Tamil Nadu, killing 13 people including Rawat.
Rawat was a representative of the "hardliners" in the Indian Army, and his death weakened the faction.
So the mood in India is changing as well.
2
Of course, from the current reality, China and India have a very big "common point", that is, after the Russia-Ukraine conflict, neither followed the footsteps of the United States and the West, blindly condemning and sanctioning Russia.
Because both China and India have maintained a neutral attitude toward peace, the United States and the West have put public criticism and diplomatic pressure on China and India.
Some media in the United States claim that this is China's intention to hold India at a critical time.
India also has border issues, military needs, and traditional strategic considerations of “non-alliance ”.
Since Russia ’ s “special military action ” against Ukraine, India has twice abstained from voting on Russia-Ukraine issues in the United Nations Security Council.
Russia, on the other hand, has always regarded India as a friendly country.
Since the beginning of the Cold War, the Soviet Union has established diplomatic and economic relations with India.
Moreover, Pakistan had close ties with the United States, and India maintained the security balance in South Asia by its proximity to the Soviet Union and the weapons and security assistance it received from the Soviet Union.
Until today, India ’ s active aircraft carriers were purchased second-hand from Russia, and were only deployed after the Russians had been refitted; India was a nuclear-powered attack submarine leased from Russia when it did not have a domestic nuclear submarine.
Look at the main fighter aircraft of the Indian Air Force, almost two-thirds of which are made by Russia.
Therefore, even some American scholars studying South Asia have to admit that India does not want to distance itself from its main supplier of defense equipment, Russia.
A clear example is that the United States has threatened to sanction India several times before, but India has insisted on purchasing the S-400 anti-aircraft missile system from Russia, which has frustrated Washington.
In addition, Russia has provided India with military platforms that other countries cannot provide, such as joint development of fifth-generation fighter aircraft and joint development of advanced cruise missiles with India.
In particular, when the United States and the United Kingdom waved the "stick" of sanctions against Russian oil, and when European countries also followed the sanctions against Russia and withdrew from the Russian market, India, the world's third-largest energy consumer, increased its purchases of Russian oil.
The data shows that in March, India imported nearly four times the average monthly amount of oil to Russia last year.
It can be seen that India's thinking is very simple, the more critical the moment, the more can not choose the side team.
Under no circumstances do you want to put all the eggs in the Western basket.
Therefore, in order to maintain a non-aligned presence in order to find space between East and West, India sees Russia as an important part of helping India achieve this goal.
However, at this time, some Western politicians and media, including some pro-Western forces in India, have exerted considerable internal and external pressure on the Modi government to adopt such a posture.
In particular, U.S. President Joe Biden on March 21 called India “shaky ” in its response to Russia ’ s invasion of Ukraine.
India does not want to be isolated, while China faces similar attacks and smears from Western politicians and the media.
Therefore, India and China have a natural need to come together.
What the United States and some Western countries are most worried about now is that China and India continue to trade with Russia in their currencies at a time when they are crazy about economic sanctions against Russia.
This will bring some challenges to the West.
The United States has found that the "four-party mechanism" that the United States, India, Japan and Australia have promoted in order to consolidate their leadership in the Asia-Pacific region has a variable on this point in India.
Will America ’ s efforts be wasted?
The United States threatened and warned other countries that it would face sanctions and retaliation if it helped Moscow.
But if India is doing this, will the United States sanction India?
The United States has been threatening to sanction India because of India ’ s purchase of Russia ’ s S-400 air defense system, but it has also remained a verbal threat.
Will the US impose sanctions on India this time?
3
Huang Jing, an adjunct professor at Shanghai Overseas Studies University, said India ’ s main security concerns lie in the northern Asian hinterland (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia and the Middle East).
After the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, India ’ s security concerns in the region have increased dramatically, while US influence in the region has decreased dramatically.
On the sea, India ’ s security concerns are in the Indian Ocean, while the US is bent on maintaining hegemony in the West Pacific. As the misalignment between US and India ’ s security interests grows, India ’ s pursuit of cooperation with Russia in geopolitical, national security and energy supply becomes more pragmatic.
At the same time, the Russian-Ukrainian war has greatly increased Europe ’ s strategic value to the United States, while India ’ s strategic value has significantly decreased. Since the Ukraine crisis, India ’ s “non-aligned ” neutrality has been so determined that the United States has even threatened to impose sanctions on India.
Qian Feng, director of the Research Department of the National Institute of Strategic Studies at Tsinghua University, said that Foreign Minister Wang Yi's visit to India for the first time since the Sino-Indian border conflict and the outbreak of the COVID-19 epidemic is of great significance.
The world under the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is increasingly divided into several camps, and China and India, as two independent and independent powers, have made similar policy choices based on the merits of the incident itself and their own interests.
As representatives of the two major developing and emerging countries, China and India share many common interests in maintaining international peace and stability, and are more consistent in their "three views" on many major international issues.
At present, many regional issues, including Afghanistan, have not cooled, and Foreign Minister Wang Yi's visit to South Asia shows that China, as a responsible power, will continue to play a constructive role in regional stability. It also shows that China is willing to work with India to implement the consensus between the two leaders and repair bilateral relations, so as to avoid local differences between the two countries from escalating into strategic disputes.
Qian Feng believes that the two countries' positions on the Russia-Ukraine conflict are highly similar, they are calling for a ceasefire as soon as possible, advocating persuasion and promoting talks, avoiding the selection of side teams, and believing that the legitimate and reasonable security demands of all parties should be paid attention.
The Indian government is not willing to submit to the pressure of the United States and the West in the interests of its own country and the well-being of its people.
India's ruling and opposition parties and the public have a deep friendship with Russia, and basically support the government's policy toward Russia.
Russia and India have long been the cornerstone of India 's defense development. More than half of India' s military equipment comes from Russia. Without Russia, India 's aircraft can' t fly, and its warships can 't move.
In the past, China and India often displayed different perceptions of bilateral issues and international issues.
On the one hand, China and India have remained divided, guarded against and quarreled over some issues affecting bilateral relations.
On the other hand, there are many similar and similar views on important international issues such as safeguarding the interests of the broad development of China, calling for strengthening global governance, reforming and improving the current international political and economic order.
However, the conflicting aspects of the two countries' relations over the past two years have overshadowed the consistency of international cooperation between the two countries.
This conflict between Russia and Ukraine objectively brought about an opportunity to improve relations between the two countries.
In the next step, although bilateral issues such as many border disputes cannot be resolved satisfactorily in the short term, China and India can create more conditions for repairing the foundation of mutual trust and resolving bilateral differences in a mutually beneficial manner by expanding mutually beneficial cooperation in international affairs.
(Source of this article: "Patch knife" public number, authorized by China Times News Network)
※ The above statements do not represent the position of Wangzhong Media Group ※
# India # Russia # USA # Question # China

How did India react to the war between Russia and Ukraine?

India did not join the Western sanctions against Russia

India did not directly oppose Russia's actions

How has Russia/ India trade evolved since the start of the war in Ukraine?

India's purchases of Russian oil increased

How has trade level between India and Russia changed under Modi and Putin?

In what fields are India and Russia cooperating?

Why is maintaining a relationship with India important for Russia?

The US has concerns about India's Russia ties, and has warned India against increasing Russian oil imports, but India plans to use a rupee-ruble payment system to bypass sanctions.

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Content: Homepage

Modi's Russia visit shows India isn't worried about making the US mad

  • In a move likely to anger the US, Modi is visiting Russia.
  • The move signals strong ties between Delhi and Moscow, and shows the world India is pursuing its own agenda.
  • Modi is aiming to correct the trade imbalance and address China's Indo-Pacific activities.
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In a move likely to anger the US, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is visiting Russia on Monday for his first bilateral trip after winning a historic third term in office.

Modi's two-day visit to Russia — where he is scheduled to meet with President Vladimir Putin — is significant in that it signals strong ties between Delhi and Moscow. It also shows the world that India is not afraid to pursue its own agenda.

Vinay Kwatra, India's foreign secretary, told reporters in New Delhi that issues between Russia and India have "piled up" and "need to be addressed," per Bloomberg.

Russia's relationship with India goes back to the Cold War, and trade between the two countries has grown since Russia started the war in Ukraine. India is a major buyer of Russian oil. Russia is also India's biggest arms supplier.

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Kwatra underscored that the two countries' trade relationship has remained "resilient."

Still, Modi's trip will "rankle many Western observers," Ved Shinde, a researcher and contributor to Australia's Lowy Institute think tank, wrote in a note on Wednesday.

"Since the Ukraine war began, India's purchase of cheap oil from Russia has been seen as profiting from troubles in the heart of Europe," Shinde added.

Modi's visit to Russia will make the US look bad

Just like Putin's visit to supply-chain hot spot Vietnam, India's engagement with Russia isn't a good look for the US, as it comes while Washington is isolating Putin's regime.

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The US has raised "some concerns" about India's relationship with Russia with New Delhi, Kurt Campbell, the US Deputy Secretary of State, said last month.

However, Washington acknowledges that India's ties with Russia are different from its ties with the US.

"We have many areas of alignment, but it is not surprising that there would be areas where we've had perhaps different perspectives, views, historical ties," Campbell said about America's relationship with India.

India, for its part, is looking to balance its relationship with the world's key powerbrokers — the US, Russia, and China.

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"There are different degrees in India's multi-alignment. Make no mistake — the United States and its allies are more consequential for India's future than its relationship with Russia," wrote Shinde.

India needs to leverage its historical ties with Russia to secure its economy and security, so Modi isn't just in Russia for a goodwill trip.

Reducing the trade imbalance

A key agenda item for the visit is to reduce a huge bilateral trade imbalance, said Kwatra.

India imports about $60 billion of goods a year from Russia, but Russia buys less than 10% of this amount from India, per Bloomberg.

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Modi may also touch on China's activities in the Indo-Pacific region, said Kwatra.

India is trying to manage its relationship with China, which has been testy since a border dispute in 2020. Modi skipped the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Kazakhstan last week.

There's also the matter of Russia's ties with China.

At the summit last week, Putin said Russia's relationship with China is in the "best period in history."

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Modi now needs to cozy up to Putin to counter China's advances.

"The reason for the time-tested stability in India-Russia ties is to maintain a continental balance in the Eurasian heartland. That is, to balance China," wrote Shinde.

"Or to put it another way, don't go around making new adversaries when there are already two open fronts — China and Pakistan," Shinde added.

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How did India react to the war between Russia and Ukraine?

India did not join the Western sanctions against Russia

India did not directly oppose Russia's actions

How has Russia/ India trade evolved since the start of the war in Ukraine?

rupee-ruble payments were introduced to avoid western sanctions on Russia

India's purchases of Russian oil increased

In what fields are India and Russia cooperating?

India views Russia as a central pillar of its foreign policy, and maintains strong defense ties with Russia and neutrality in the Ukraine conflict to preserve its independence.

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Biden: It ’ s not in India ’ s interest to increase Russian oil imports
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US President Joe Biden told Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during a virtual meeting on Monday that it was not in India ’ s interest to increase energy imports from Russia.
White House spokeswoman Jen Pasaki described the meeting as productive and constructive rather than “hostile, ” but declined to say whether Biden had asked for any specific commitments from India on energy imports.
Biden also told Modi that the United States stands ready to help India diversify its energy imports, Psaki said, noting that India ’ s imports from the United States are already much larger than those from Russia.
"The president has made it clear that it is not in their interest to increase that," she said.
Oil of Russia (Expressionist)
At the same time, a senior administration official said the president discussed issues related to Ukraine, including Indian energy purchases from Russia, with the Indian prime minister in a virtual meeting, but did not make a “concrete request. ”
The official said India would make its own decisions, but the United States believes India should not accelerate energy purchases from Russia after its military operation in Ukraine.
The official also said the two leaders had a productive and frank conversation that lasted an hour.
Strategic Partnership
The Biden administration wants to strengthen U.S. alliances in the Asia-Pacific region to counter China, especially the relaunch of the so-called Quadruple Alliance between the United States, India, Australia and Japan, which is embarrassed by New Delhi ’ s positioning since the start of the war in Ukraine.
While India abstained from voting on resolutions condemning Moscow at the United Nations, it said it was "deeply disturbed" by the "killing" of civilians in the Ukrainian city of Pocha.
New Delhi describes Moscow as a "central pillar" of Indian foreign policy because of its "strategic partnership" for its national security.
Virtual meeting between Biden and Modi (AFP)
Rupiah and Ruble
The United States has warned that any country that helps Russia circumvent international sanctions will face "consequences."
India and Russia are seeking to set up a rupee and ruble payment mechanism to facilitate trade and circumvent Western sanctions on Russian banks, according to media reports.
New Delhi and Moscow have had close ties since the Cold War, and Russia remains India ’ s biggest arms supplier.
Besides oil and weapons, India imports fertilizers and rough diamonds from Russia, and exports pharmaceuticals, tea and coffee.
The White House is well aware of India ’ s reliance on Russia militarily, but intends to maintain a close dialogue with New Delhi.
Balanced approach
He recently sent Joe Biden ’ s top security adviser, Dalip Singh, to the Indian capital for talks that were later described as “productive. ”
The visit coincided with a visit by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to New Delhi to praise India ’ s balanced approach to the war in Ukraine.
On the U.S. side, efforts are being made to convince India that betting on Russia will ultimately weaken it against China, while New Delhi shares the West ’ s concern about Beijing ’ s growing influence in the Asia-Pacific region.
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In what fields are India and Russia cooperating?

Russia supports India's bid for a UN Security Council permanent seat, and India and Russia prioritize equality in their relations.

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Content: 30 Oct, 2023 18:06

Andrey Sushentsov: Here’s the main problem in Russia-India relations, and it might surprise you

There are no problems that directly concern both states and that means that they often aren't at the forefront of each other's thoughts

Moscow and New Delhi have no major issues of mutual concern and this is a challenge because the absence of contentious divisions suggests a degree of mutual detachment.

Russian-Indian strategic cooperation has been developing successfully for many decades. The USSR was one of the key countries that provided assistance and support to the young Indian Republic during its formation. Over the years of bilateral relations, Moscow has made significant efforts to develop the country’s economy, industry, and education, and has actively developed military-technical cooperation programs. The first Indian cosmonaut was sent into orbit aboard a Soviet spacecraft. To this day, Russia and India enjoy the fruits of their longstanding cooperation in various fields, including international and political cooperation.

The Russian-Indian partnership is based on mutual respect for the civilizational identity of both. We recognize the uniqueness of the civilizational choices of our peoples and understand the value of the special path that our countries have chosen. This attitude is a diminishing value in modern global politics, which seeks to standardize and unify all approaches to the interaction of states, presenting them as identical billiard balls.

Moscow and New Delhi support the strengthening of national sovereignty and non-interference in each other’s affairs. Russia and India also respect each other’s interests in international relations, recognize their legitimacy, and share an emphasis on equality in relations with each other and with other countries.

This is particularly important in an environment where international relations are beginning to be defined by a narrow circle of states that feel entitled to dictate their will.

Finally, Moscow and New Delhi share a common interest in the formation of a polycentric system of international relations, in which cooperation is based on reliance on several major regional centers of power. In this context, Russia supports India’s bid for permanent membership in the UN Security Council and is actively working with New Delhi through BRICS to explore ways of strengthening this organization.

Russia and India have no major issues of mutual concern. This is a challenge, because the absence of contentious divisions also indicates a degree of mutual detachment. From the experience of Russia’s complex relations with major players in its neighborhood – Turkey, Iran, and China – we can see that bilateral interaction has been developed and strengthened by overcoming major disagreements of various kinds: Economic, territorial, political, and strategic. The process of overcoming these problems has led to the establishment of strong bilateral relations between Moscow and Istanbul, Tehran, and Beijing, which are resistant to external impulses. At present, Russia and India do not have any major differences to overcome, but this may remain a circumstance that leaves the two countries in a situation of mutual detachment. If the two sides can find the strength to recognize this state of affairs as a problem in itself, this will be the first step towards overcoming it. It is time to see in each other an opportunity to address the challenges facing our societies and elites at the international level.

Russia and India mutually reinforce each other in their dialogue on multilateral platforms. Our common interest in the formation of polycentricity, the preservation of strategic autonomy and subjectivity in an increasingly dense international environment, added to our intention not to give in to the pressure of external forces that call for foreign policy strategy to be channeled in a direction favorable to them, should unite our countries.

In order to explore the potential of bilateral relations between Moscow and New Delhi, it is necessary to give this area of foreign policy a high priority by establishing national offices for India in Russia and Russia in India at the deputy prime minister level of the federal government. This organizational step would not only indicate the strategic nature of bilateral relations, but would also formulate a targeted task at the state level to vigorously search for ways and means of strengthening interaction that can take our cooperation in the 21st century to a truly strategic level.

This article was first published by Valdai Discussion Club, translated and edited by the RT team

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In what fields are India and Russia cooperating?

What formal frameworks do India and Russia cooperate within?

India's rivalry with China affects its relationship with Russia, which prioritizes its own interests, and India-Russia cooperation can shape regional security in South Asia, building on their longstanding relationship.

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Content:     The Economic Times daily newspaper is available online now.

    Putin makes Europe expand NATO rally

    Synopsis

    Turkiye and Hungary's backing of Sweden's Nato membership boosts Sweden's bid. Sweden, along with Finland, seeks to join Nato due to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Sweden's entry will strengthen Nato with its advanced military capabilities. The entry of Sweden and Finland provides Europe with a firmer footing. A weakened Russia allied with China could change Putin's ambitions under Beijing's guidance, which is a concern for India and the Indo-Pacific.

    Sweden's attempt to join Nato got a boost this week, with Turkiye and Hungary agreeing to back the Scandinavian nation's candidature. Both have been opposing Sweden's entry for the last two years. For a new country to join the military alliance, which also includes the US and Canada, existing members must approve it. Sweden, like Finland, has not fought a war in two centuries, staying neutral through World Wars and the Cold War. But their neutrality was put to test after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, and there was a growing public demand in both countries to join Nato. Finland's bid was cleared in 2023.

    Vladimir Putin had long expressed concerns about the expansion of Nato - set up in 1949 to provide security against the Soviet Union - citing it as a factor in his war with Ukraine. Ironically, the war has only pushed Sweden and Finland to join the alliance. Sweden's entry will strengthen Nato further because it has consistently invested in defence. Stockholm will bring considerable military capabilities equipped with modern weaponry on land, sea and air, and it will alter the political strength of the alliance in favour of Europe.

    While the prospect of a second term for Donald Trump - his animosity towards Nato and all security alliances the US is part of is well known - is growing and a growing concern, entry of Sweden and Finland puts Europe on firmer footing. Irrespective of the outcome in Ukraine, Putin is unlikely to give up on his ambitions. While Europe is fortified, a weakened Russia closely allied with China could give a new direction to Putin's ambitions under Beijing's gentle guidance. That is something that India, and the Indo-Pacific, need to keep in mind.

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India is seeking to counter China's growing influence in South Asia, largely through loans and infrastructure, by shifting its focus from Pakistan to China and the maritime theater, and engaging with partners like the Quad.

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Content: The End of South Asia

Happymon Jacob

For decades, policymakers and scholars have been trained in the West and elsewhere to think of the countries of the Indian subcontinent as part of a coherent region: South Asia. Home to around a quarter of the world’s population, the region consists of eight countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Its diverse peoples speak hundreds of different languages and follow numerous different religious traditions, but they have shared histories, including the experience of British colonialism, and shared cultural connections, including a love of the sport of cricket and Bollywood films, ethnic ties, and musical and culinary practices, for instance. In the late twentieth century, South Asian leaders sought to deepen links within the region, with the greater goal of integration in line with that pursued in nearby Southeast Asia under the auspices of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or in Europe under the European Union. South Asia, too, they imagined, could become a consequential regional bloc in global geopolitics.

But that never happened. In the last four decades, South Asia has managed to build little security, economic, or policy cohesion. Mistrust and enmity, notably that between India and Pakistan, have made integration a pipe dream. Worse, at the most fundamental level, the notion of belonging to South Asia has lost any of the traction it ever had. South Asians no longer look to one another for connection and solidarity but rather gaze farther afield, to the Middle East, Southeast Asia, or the West. Not many South Asians (outside those tens of millions living in diaspora around the world) would even think to consider themselves South Asians in the first place. The term today does not denote a coherent regional identity but is merely a mundane geographical demarcation used mostly by those outside the region. The dream of a united South Asia is over, with important implications for geopolitics on the subcontinent that policymakers and analysts of the region have yet to fully grasp.

WHAT’S IN A NAME?

As a term, “South Asia” has its origins far from the subcontinent. Academic analysts and policymakers in the Westbegan using the term in the late 1950safter the emergence of independent postcolonial states from British India in 1947. During the Cold War, when the United States maintained closer ties to Pakistan than it did to ostensibly nonaligned India, the term allowed Washington to speak about the region without underlining India’s local predominance. Universities in the West followed suit, with academics using South Asia as a neutral term to describe India and its neighbors. Over time, Indians themselves started using the term in certain rarefied circles, but few people in the region conceived of themselves as South Asian.

In the late 1970s, General Ziaur Rahman, who had come to power in Bangladesh through a military coup in 1975, started floating the idea of a regional organization. Although the smaller states immediately warmed to the idea, India and Pakistan were initially more skeptical but decided to entertain the Bangladeshi proposal. The proposal found formal expression in 1985 with the creation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, a group that included Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. SAARC sought to create a “better climate of understanding” and foster cooperation among member states.

As a term, “South Asia” has its origins far from the subcontinent.

For around three decades, SAARC enjoyed considerable support in the region, albeit with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Indian leaders became more receptive toward SAARC beginning in the late 1990s, particularly Prime Ministers Inder Kumar Gujral (1997 to 1998), Atal Bihari Vajpayee (1998 to 2004), and Manmohan Singh (2004 to 2010). They pushed ahead even as many in New Delhi warned that India’s rivalry and disputes with Pakistan would severely curb SAARC’s ability to function, never mind its ability to integrate the region. For their part, Pakistani leaders have long been wary of SAARC, fearing it could become a vehicle for the exercise of India’s influence, but Islamabad still participated in the summits and other platforms associated with the group. Smaller states in the region, such as Bhutan, the Maldives, and Nepal, were the keenest advocates of SAARC, convinced that their membership in such a multilateral platform granted them greater geopolitical agency.

But after an initial period of activity, SAARC has crept perilously close to obsolescence. Of the 18 SAARC summits held so far, six were staged during the first six years of its existence. The group has held only six summits between 2005 and 2014and none at all in the last decade. During the group’s heyday from the 1990s into the first decade of the twenty-first century, member countries set up and explored several ambitious ventures, including the South Asia Free Trade Area (a free-trade agreement signed in 2004), a customs union, a common regional market, and a common economic and monetary union. But over time, these grand ambitions have fallen by the wayside. The partial progress achieved in implementing the free-trade area has been stalled since 2014, when Pakistan blocked the signing of an agreement about motor vehicles. Other closer forms of regional integration remain pipe dreams.

The South Asian University, set up by the SAARC countries in New Delhi in 2010, is today a ghost of what it was originally meant to be. Visa restrictions and financial constraints have hampered its growth, and the institution has not helped foster a sense of regional identity through higher education as its founders imagined it would. Attempts by the region’s elites and civil society to encourage regionalism in South Asia through nongovernmental organizations, such as the South Asia Free Media Association and South Asians for Human Rights, or think tanks, such as the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, have not gained much traction either. SAARC and these organizations express an elite-level desire for greater connection within South Asia, but that desire has failed to produce meaningful integration in the region.

THE CENTER DOES NOT HOLD

Part of South Asia’s problem is its lopsidedness. India is the region’s biggest and most powerful country. Its dominance has had a paradoxical impact on the development of regional structures. At its core, South Asia consists of India and six countries that share a border with India but not with one another. (The exception is Afghanistan, which shares a border with Pakistan but not with India.) In that sense, South Asia is primarily the sum of interactions among India’s neighbors with India and India with its neighbors.

The fact of Indian centrality has meant that New Delhi does not always see the value of building regional structures, as such structures cannot add to the predominance India already enjoys in the region. Even though a number of Indian prime ministers saw merit in SAARC, the Indian bureaucracy and strategic establishment have never been convinced of its value. They have long feared that the creation of regional structures could potentially check India’s dominance in its own backyard. Since SAARC functions based on consensus, India’s vote on affairs on the subcontinent would count as much as that of Bhutan and the Maldives, the smallest countries in the region. As a result, it makes little sense for Indian decision-makers to support the creation of structures that could undermine their country’s influence in the region. That sentiment has a corollary among Indian strategists and foreign policy analysts; they, too, look beyond the region and think of South Asia’s inherent conflicts as a millstone around India’s neck.

That South Asia is increasingly becoming an arena of geopolitical competition not only makes further regional integration less likely; such competition also threatens to undo even the limited regional cohesion that exists today. In recent decades, China has built up its influence among India’s neighbors. Take Sri Lanka, for instance, whose largest bilateral creditor is China and to whom China has provided loans to build highways, an airport, and a port. In Bangladesh, China has been using loans and infrastructure development assistance to gain influence. And China is jostling there not just with India but with the United States. In 2021, the United States placed sanctions on an elite paramilitary unit in Bangladesh for its alleged human rights violations and extrajudicial killings. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin rebuked this policy when he reiterated in 2023 that the Chinese“firmly support Bangladesh in safeguarding its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, upholding independent domestic and foreign policies, and pursuing a development path that suits its national realities.” In sum, China’s growing profile in South Asia marks a clear change from Beijing’s initial decision, dating back to the inception of the People’s Republic of China, of leaving the region to India. Today, China no longer sees India as a peer, nor is it willing to accept India’s primacy in the subcontinent.

Intraregional trade in South Asia is meager: it contributes to only five percent of the region’s overall trade totals—by contrast, intraregional trade among the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations accounts for 25 percent of the region’s overall trade. Moreover, China’s fast-growing trade with South Asia is eclipsing India’s own trade with its neighbors.

In recent decades, China has built up its influence among India’s neighbors.

The inhabitants of the region themselves are not clamoring for stronger ties. Indeed, a shared history and cultural heritage doesn’t necessarily produce strong connections, let alone thriving bonds. India’s growing, prosperous middle class has little interest in South Asia, nor does it feel that it has much in common with people in neighboring countries. In the minds of this aspirational class of around 430 million people, many of whom have connections to diasporic communities in the West, the Middle East, and elsewhere in Asia, India is meant for bigger things than its immediate neighborhood.

Cultural exchange within the region is also on the wane. In 2019, Pakistan bannedIndian content on local television and FM radio channels. Turkish TV shows increasingly fill the vacuum in Pakistan left in the absence of content from India. In India, there are hardly any Pakistani artists in the Bollywood film industry, and Pakistani cricketers no longer play in India’s money-spinning Indian Premier League, the sport’s most lucrative league.

South Asians are not working or studying in one another’s countries as much as they used to.Since 1990, there has been a consistent decline in intraregional migration. For instance, India has long been a favored destination for Nepali workers, but they now are venturing to the Gulf countries and Malaysia, with India often serving just as a transit point. People across the region are going to places where they can secure higher wages than they can in South Asia, namely Australia, Malaysia, the Middle East, western Europe, and North America.

Few South Asians study in one another’s countries, except in India. South Asian students still make up half the total foreign student population in India, but these numbers have stagnated in the past decade. A 2020 Brookings India report showed that the annual growth rate of foreign South Asian students in India decreased from 30 percent in the 2011–12 academic year to just nine percent in 2018–19. India’s loss has been China’s gain. The number of students from India’s neighboring countries studying in China increased by 176 percent between 2011 and 2016, the Brookings report stated. In 2016, for example, there were three times as many Bangladeshis studying in China as in India.

South Asians face a very clear impediment to travel within the region: hard borders. Only the tourist-friendly Maldives offers visas on arrival for all SAARC member countries. Bhutan and Nepal have a visa-free travel agreement with India. But apart from these deals, regional travel is difficult. Given that India is the only geographical connection among many of the countries of the region, New Delhi’s decision to open or close borders determines the fate of intraregional connectivity in South Asia. The decrease in intra-South Asian connectivity in trade, tourism, and education is, unsurprisingly, being made up for by China: consider the growing amount of connectivityin trade, tourism, and education between China and Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The more India neglects South Asia, the more China embraces it. It’s not a zero-sum game; it’s a walkover for China. And it may well be too late for India to reassert itself as a regional hub.

A REGION UNBOUND

Thanks to the decision of many South Asian states to leverage China to balance India’s primacy, South Asia is no longer the India-centric region it used to be. Paradoxically, however, India’s loss of regional primacy also means that South Asia is losing its salience as a geopolitical entity, with smaller countries strengthening economic, political, diplomatic, and cultural ties with China and drifting away from India. In other words, the smaller South Asian states that once hoped to benefit from greater regional integration have made such integration more unlikely; by using China to balance India, they have undermined the coherence and potential unity of South Asia.

The end of South Asia as both a geopolitical entity and an epistemological category has implications that go beyond university departments or nongovernmental organizations that might have to reimagine how they frame their agendas. Despite India’s primacy in the region, Indian thinkers have come to believe that entanglement in South Asia limits the country’s ambitions. In the last decade, India has reoriented its strategic focus from Pakistan to China and from the continental theater to the maritime one. It has embarked on a wider economic journey by signing and negotiating several important free-trade agreements with countries farther afield, such as Switzerland. New Delhi seeks a larger geopolitical space for itself. In contemporary Indian strategic thinking, South Asia is at best a small place and at worst a limitation.

There is little value for India in pouring in resources to either regain exclusive primacy or balance China in a space in which it is geopolitically weaker and somewhat contained. Although New Delhi’s concerns about Beijing’s growing power are understandable, frantic attempts to win back South Asia or compete with China for regional dominance are unlikely to work. Another option available to India is to work with China in the region, as many of India’s neighbors would prefer, but it won’t be too long before an ambitious and aggressive China seeks to relegate India to the rank of a second-rate power in South Asia. Already, India has struggled to set and enforce redlines among its neighbors, for example, with Chinese spy ships docking in Sri Lanka in recent years.

Indian thinkers believe that entanglement in South Asia limits their country’s ambitions.

A wiser option for New Delhi would be to think more broadly and see South Asia as only a part of its neighborhood rather than the entirety of it. This doesn’t mean that India should give China a free hand in South Asia. On the contrary, it should encourage countries and groupings outside South Asia to take a more active role in the region. It could, for instance, invite friendly and wealthy Gulf states to work with India in South Asia to help address climate change or provide disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. It could take a more active role in the security partnership known as the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), that brings together Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, encouraging forms of cooperation between the Quad and smaller South Asian island states, such as the Maldives and Sri Lanka, as well as landlocked ones, such as Bhutan and Nepal. India could proactively engage partners such as Japan, the United States, the EU, and other like-minded powers to help curb China’s growing influence in the region by countering Chinese economic and political narratives and providing alternative transparent development models. In so doing, India would widen its sense of its own backyard and check the Chinese quest for hegemony.

The end of South Asia is a key marker in the history of the region and offers geopolitical opportunities and choices for India and its partners. For India, finally relinquishing the region and not worrying about primacy there allows it to forge a dynamic geopolitical relationship between South Asia and regions and countries farther afield. It is not that India should stop engaging with its neighbors but that it should see them in a wider geopolitical context, not merely as denizens of the subcontinent they happen to share.

The same is true for the United States and its allies. Although they may have viewed smaller South Asian countries as irrelevant or at best marginal to their wider interests, they should understand that the likes of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are enmeshed in the broad geopolitical competition. Encouraging the participation of these smaller countries in larger frameworks and coalitions, such as the Quad, will help rein in Chinese influence and give these countries alternatives to the political and economic support offered by China. The countries of South Asia may not compose a coherent region, but they will play integral roles in shaping the wider Asian balance of power in the years to come.

courtesy : foreignaffairs