The Hagia Sophia, originally constructed in the 6th century under Byzantine Emperor Justinian, served as the largest Christian cathedral in the world for over a millennium before being converted into a mosque following the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453 under Sultan Mehmed II.

In 1934, after the establishment of the secular Turkish Republic, Hagia Sophia was transformed into a museum, symbolizing coexistence and multi-faith practices, until its reconversion into a mosque by President Erdogan in 2020.

President Erdogan described the reconversion as a restoration of Islamic heritage and a national triumph for Turkey, framing it as a symbolic act tied to the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople and Turkey’s Islamic identity.

The decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia into a mosque in 2020 was met with widespread international criticism, including from UNESCO and Orthodox Christian institutions, who argued that the move undermined Turkey's commitment to preserving its multicultural heritage and religious tolerance.

UNESCO specifically criticized Turkey for making the decision without prior consultation, raising concerns about the preservation of the site's universal value as a World Heritage Site.

The reconversion also drew condemnation from Greece, the United States, and Pope Francis, who expressed grief over the decision, citing its potential impact on religious tolerance and Turkey's multicultural legacy.

Observers have noted that the reconversion aligns with Erdogan's political strategy to appeal to his Islamo-nationalist base, particularly amidst economic challenges and political pressures.

Critics argue that the move prioritizes Turkey's Islamic heritage over its diverse historical layers, including its Christian and secular past, thereby deepening the cultural divide between secularists and Islamists in Turkey.

Supporters of the reconversion view it as a symbolic assertion of Islamic identity and a fulfillment of Muslim aspirations worldwide, with Erdogan describing it as a glorious chapter in Turkish history.

However, opponents, including the Greek Orthodox Church and international critics, contend that the move undermines religious tolerance and disregards the site's multicultural heritage.

The religious implications of covering Christian mosaics and icons during prayers have also been highlighted, with critics arguing that this prioritizes Islamic heritage over the site's Byzantine Christian significance.

Arab intellectuals have engaged in extensive debates about the Hagia Sophia controversy, with some viewing the reconversion as a symbolic assertion of Islamic identity against Western cultural dominance, while others critique it as a politicized move undermining secularism and pluralism.

This controversy has sparked discussions among Arab scholars about the interplay between religion and politics, with some arguing that Erdogan's decision reflects a broader trend of using religious symbolism to consolidate political power.

Arab commentators have also noted that while the reconversion resonates with Islamic heritage, it risks alienating non-Muslim communities and undermining principles of coexistence and mutual respect in diverse societies.

Erdogan’s rhetoric surrounding the reconversion, such as comparing it to the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, reflects his neo-Ottoman vision and aims to bolster his image as a leader restoring Turkey’s historical and religious legacy.

Critics argue that the reconversion undermines Turkey's secular identity, established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923, which emphasized strict secularism and excluded religion from the public sphere.

The move has been seen as a symbolic rejection of Atatürk's secular reforms, with Erdogan leveraging the reconversion to appeal to conservative and nationalist sentiments.

Additionally, concerns have been raised about the physical preservation of Hagia Sophia, as reports of structural damage and inadequate maintenance since its reconversion highlight potential risks to its integrity as a UNESCO-listed monument.

The reconversion has significantly boosted tourism to the site, with Turkey’s tourism minister reporting 21 million visitors since the change, highlighting its appeal as a pilgrimage destination for Muslims, including those from Arab countries.

Arab tourists have shown particular interest in visiting Hagia Sophia following its reconversion, as the site now symbolizes Islamic resurgence and is viewed as a triumph for Muslim heritage.

The introduction of a $28 entrance fee for foreign tourists starting January 2024 may impact visitation from Arab countries, though the Turkish government has emphasized preserving the mosque’s accessibility for worshippers.

Hagia Sophia's architectural and cultural significance as a symbol of coexistence between Byzantine and Ottoman histories has been central to the debate over its reconversion.

Critics argue that prioritizing its Islamic past undermines its multi-faith legacy and alienates non-Muslim communities, including Orthodox Christians who still revere the site as a shrine.

The reconversion has also raised concerns about the preservation of its historical integrity, as reports of structural damage and inadequate maintenance since its conversion into a mosque highlight the challenges of balancing religious use with safeguarding its UNESCO World Heritage status.

Erdogan’s decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia into a mosque has broader geopolitical implications, signaling a shift in Turkey’s foreign policy towards pan-Islamism and neo-Ottomanism.

This move aligns with Erdogan’s broader strategy of leveraging religious symbolism to consolidate domestic support and project Turkey as a leader in the Islamic world.

However, Erdogan’s actions have also strained relations with Western countries, particularly within NATO, as his independent foreign policy and religiously charged decisions are perceived as undermining secular and democratic values.

Social media influencers from the Arab world have played a significant role in amplifying the discourse surrounding the Hagia Sophia’s reconversion, often framing it as a symbolic act of Islamic resurgence.

The reconversion has been portrayed by some influencers as a move to bolster Erdogan’s Islamo-nationalist base, leveraging the mosque’s historical and religious significance to consolidate political support amidst economic challenges.

Critics have highlighted that the reconversion aligns with Erdogan’s broader strategy of erasing multicultural elements of Turkey’s heritage, a narrative that influencers have both supported and debated.

The Hagia Sophia controversy parallels global debates on repurposing historical sites, such as the conversion of mosques into churches in post-Ottoman Europe, which some view as examples of religious and cultural appropriation.

Erdogan and his supporters justify the reconversion by framing it as a restoration of its Islamic heritage, emphasizing its symbolic importance as a site of Ottoman conquest and a representation of Turkey's Islamic identity.

Additionally, Erdogan has linked the reconversion to broader geopolitical and religio-nationalist narratives, suggesting it heralds the liberation of other Islamic sites like the al-Aqsa Mosque.

Arab media outlets have highlighted the Hagia Sophia controversy as a significant political and religious move by Erdogan, emphasizing its implications for religious coexistence and cultural heritage.

The reconversion has been portrayed in Arab media as a triumph for Islamic resurgence, with Erdogan framing it as a symbolic act of reclaiming Turkey's Islamic identity.

However, critics, including Orthodox Christian leaders, have condemned the move as undermining religious tolerance and freedom in the region.

The reconversion of Hagia Sophia into a mosque in 2020 has heightened tensions between Muslim and Christian communities globally, with many Christians viewing the move as a symbolic affront to their religious heritage.

In Turkey, the decision has been perceived by some as a political maneuver by Erdogan to consolidate support among conservative Muslim voters, while critics argue that it risks alienating secular and Christian communities.

Internationally, the reconversion has been criticized for exacerbating Islamophobia in Europe, as it is seen by some as a reinforcement of fears regarding the perceived expansion of Islamic influence.

In the Arab world, Erdogan’s move has been perceived as a symbolic act of Islamic solidarity, enhancing his stature among Islamist circles globally.

However, critics argue that the decision was politically motivated to distract from domestic economic challenges and consolidate support ahead of elections.

The legal and constitutional basis for reconverting Hagia Sophia into a mosque stems from a Turkish court ruling in July 2020, which declared the 1934 decision to turn it into a museum illegal.

Arab audiences may find the controversy compelling as it underscores the tension between secularism and Islamism, with Erdogan leveraging Hagia Sophia's reconversion to bolster nationalist and religious sentiments.

The Hagia Sophia, originally constructed in the 6th century under Byzantine Emperor Justinian, served as the largest Christian cathedral in the world for over a millennium before being converted into a mosque following the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453 under Sultan Mehmed II.

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In ATOR called an insignificant amount of €25 for the entrance to the mosque of Hagia Sophia
In ATOR warned tourists about the rise in price of tickets to the palace-museums of Istanbul
A rise in prices for tourist services in Istanbul is inevitable due to the weak position of the local currency - the lira.
This was stated in an interview with Gazeta.Ru Vice President of ATOR Arthur Muradyan, commenting on the decision of the authorities to make a visit to the Hagia Sophia mosque for foreigners paid.
From January 15, the entrance will cost €25.
“From the point of view of tourists, the amount of 25 euros, and for a family of two or four people it is 50-100 euros, can not be called some significant expenditure.
On the other hand, of course, some tourists will think about spending money on visiting this attraction.
Of course, it is a landmark for Istanbul, and I think that the Turkish authorities have approached carefully to determine the amount of fees for visiting this architectural monument, ” Muradian said.
In his opinion, following the Hagia Sophia mosque, the authorities can raise prices for entrance tickets to other museums.
“The rise in prices for tourist services is inevitable to some extent due to the not very good fate of the lira, which we have seen in the last few years.
And, of course, tourists should be ready to increase the cost of services related to the use of the tourism infrastructure of Istanbul, ” said ATOR Vice President.
On January 12, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of Turkey reported that the entrance to the Hagia Sophia mosque in Istanbul for foreign citizens from January 15, 2024 will cost €25.
The ministry explained that when setting the fee for visiting the mosque, they were guided by the recommendations of UNESCO.
Hagia Sophia, which is now called the Great Mosque of Hagia Sophia, was erected in the 6th century under the emperor Justinian and for more than a thousand years remained the largest Christian temple in the world.
In 1453, after the capture of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks, Saint Sophia was converted into a mosque.
In 1934, the temple was given the status of a museum, it retained both Christian and Muslim decoration.
In July 2020, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed a decree on the resumption of Muslim worship in Hagia Sophia.
Entrance to the mosque was free for all visitors, including tourists.
Earlier it became known about the destruction of a mosque in Gaza after Israeli shelling.
What do you think?
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How did Hagia Sophia become important for Muslims?

Sultan Mehmed II converted Hagia Sophia into a mosque,making it a key religious site for Muslims for centuries.

No--In 1934, Ataturk turned it into a museum, making it a major tourist attraction and secular symbol in Turkey.

What makes Hagia Sophia's architecture unique?

It was the world's largest church for centuries.

When was Hagia Sophia built and under whose rule?

Why is Hagia Sophia considered one of the greatest buildings in history?

Served as the central church of Byzantine Christianity,

In 1934, after the establishment of the secular Turkish Republic, Hagia Sophia was transformed into a museum, symbolizing coexistence and multi-faith practices, until its reconversion into a mosque by President Erdogan in 2020.

Title:

Content: After Hagia Sophia, Turkey converts a second ancient Byzantine church into a mosque

Hundreds of worshippers filled the narrow streets of Istanbul's Fatih district on Friday to hear the sounds of Friday prayers ringing out from the newly inaugurated Kariye Mosque.

Once known as the Chora Church, the site spent the last 79 years as a museum. But it is now the latest structure to be converted back into a mosque by the government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, following the conversion of Hagia Sophia in 2020. While viewed as a triumph by many Turkish Muslims, the Greek Orthodox Church has decried it as an "ill-advised decision" that "makes a mockery of the Turkish government's commitment to religious tolerance and religious freedom."

Chora's conversion was announced shortly after Hagia Sophia's, but its opening for prayer was delayed by years of restoration work.

The showing for the first Friday prayers at Kariye was relatively quiet compared to Hagia Sophia, which drew hundreds of thousands who filled the streets with prayer rugs for blocks and blocks away from the building. By contrast, the crowd on Friday was relatively average for a mosque in one of Istanbul's more religiously conservative neighborhoods, where Friday worshippers frequently spill out onto the streets.

Both the Chora Church and Hagia Sophia are 4th-century Byzantine constructions. They spent nearly a millennium as Christian holy sites before being converted to mosques by the Ottomans after their conquest of Constantinople in the 15th century. Despite their conversions, they remained revered by Orthodox Christians. After the founding of a secular Turkish Republic in the early 20th century, the decision was made for both to be neither mosque nor church but simply museums.

"Both Hagia Sophia and Chora embodied Byzantine and Ottoman pasts, and they became symbols of co-existence and multi-faith living practices. Their conversion fundamentally implies a hierarchy, prioritizing the Islamic past over all other layers, Greek Orthodox, Armenian, Jewish, Syriac, et al," Dr. Özgür Kaymak, a lecturer and researcher on minority rights at Istanbul's MEF University, told Religion News Service in an email.

Rededicating the sites as mosques is more than just a status change. According to Islamic tradition, artwork of human figures are forbidden in places of prayer, while in Orthodox Churches, icons of Christ, saints and other biblical figures are a defining feature.

In Hagia Sophia, the mosaics of Jesus and Mary have been covered with curtains since the conversion. While Erdoğan promised Hagia Sophia would remain fully accessible and free to all visitors, Turkey reneged on that earlier this year, reimposing an entrance fee on tourists and relegating them to the upper level, while the main floor is exclusive to Muslim worshippers.

Observers have also criticized the Turkish Directorate of Religion's caretaking of the site, noting damage that did not exist when it was under the purview of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism.

Though Chora is significantly smaller than Hagia Sophia, it is home to some of the best-preserved examples of late-Byzantine art, including mosaics, icons and frescoes, and is considered a UNESCO World Heritage site.

"For us it's a very important place because it remembers our culture and our traditions here," Father Evangelos Markantonis, an Orthodox priest who was leading a group of theology students to Chora on Friday, told Religion News Service.

"Though we cannot venerate as Orthodox Christians, we have to try to find things we can be united on. Only with dialogue and good deeds can we continue our lives," Markantonis, who is also a professor at the University of Athens, said when asked about the controversy.

Erdoğan had long refused calls from his right to convert churches like Hagia Sophia and Chora, telling supporters in 2018 to fill the nearby Sultan Ahmet Mosque (also known in English as the Blue Mosque) before they talked about needing to pray in Hagia Sophia.

Nonetheless, he made an about-turn in 2020.

"My dear nation, the conquest of Istanbul and the conversion of the Hagia Sophia into a Mosque are among the most glorious chapters in Turkish history," Erdoğan said at the time in a speech inaugurating the Hagia Sophia as a mosque.

"This is the most honorable day that Islam has been looking forward to, Greek Constantinople has become Turkish Istanbul," he added, quoting the Turkish poet Nazim Hikmet.

"The resurrection of Hagia Sophia heralds the liberation of the al-Aqsa Mosque. The resurrection of Hagia Sophia is the footsteps of the will of Muslims across the world to come out of the interregnum," Erdoğan said in his concluding remarks.

Chora's opening as the Kariye Mosque comes just weeks after Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) suffered its largest electoral defeat in two decades during Turkey's nationwide municipal elections.

"The recent conversion of Chora into a mosque may be due to Erdoğan's many problems, including his geopolitical power politics, his appeal to religio-nationalism to revive his electoral popularity after the March elections or his tactic to divert attention from Turkey's economic downturn," Kaymak said.

Many analysts have attributed the loss to AKP bleeding votes to the more Islamist-leaning New Welfare Party, which has pressured Erdogan over his response to the Israel-Hamas war and humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip.

Muslim worshippers at the mosque on Friday said they viewed its rededication as an Islamic site to be a national win for Turkey.

"This mosque is one of the symbols of the Conquest. We are proud and happy. There are very beautiful frescoes inside. They were also nicely renovated before they were closed. May it be good for our country and our nation," a bystander, Ahmet Öteyüzoğlu, told Turkish media.

"Thank God for these days. Not everyone has the opportunity in their lifetime," another bystander named Mehmet Çelik told the Turkish news service Anadolu Agency, in reference to having been able to pray at both the rededicated Hagia Sophia and Kariye Mosques.

However, Greece, the U.S. State Department and Orthodox Christian institutions worldwide have all criticized the decision to revert the structure into a mosque.

"I want to publicly express my intense dissatisfaction, interpreting the feelings of all Greek women and men, for the completely unnecessary conversion of a historic Byzantine temple, the Monastery of Chora, into a mosque. It is, I believe, an action that offends the rich history of Istanbul itself as a crossroads of cultures," Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis said shortly before leaving for Turkey for a planned meeting with Erdogan.

"We encourage the Turkish government to preserve and ensure access to sites and buildings that have hosted different religious communities in a way that respects their diverse histories," a State Department spokesperson said in response to questions from Greek media.

"The Turkish government's appropriation of both as the property of one faith group not only constitutes yet another sign of that government's contempt for Turkey's rich Orthodox Christian heritage but further imperils the religious freedom of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the remaining Christians of that land," the Archons of the Ecumenical Patriarchate said in a statement.

© Religion News Service

No--In 1934, Ataturk turned it into a museum, making it a major tourist attraction and secular symbol in Turkey.

Why did Erdogan restore Hagia Sophia as a mosque in 2020?

Because he wanted to end its 86-year museum status to return it to its original role as a mosque.

President Erdogan described the reconversion as a restoration of Islamic heritage and a national triumph for Turkey, framing it as a symbolic act tied to the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople and Turkey’s Islamic identity.

Title:

Content: Roundup of news from December 30, 2021
Erdogan the Conqueror
The Turkish president compared the transformation of Hagia Sophia into a mosque with the fall of Constantinople.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan seeks to try on the kaftan of Sultan Mehmed II, whose troops captured Constantinople in 1453.
In this regard, he, summing up the year, compared the transformation of the Hagia Sophia into a mosque with the fall of Tsargrad, reports the UOJ with reference to the publication “Vima Ortodoksiya ”.
According to the head of Turkey, the transformation of Hagia Sophia into a mosque is “as important ” for the Turks as the fall of the capital of the Byzantine Empire.
However, at the same time, many pay attention to the fact that the Turkish lira in the outgoing year fell strongly against the dollar, and this seriously hit the Turkish economy.
Responding to the criticism, Erdogan said he would “lead his people to what they deserve ” and stressed that he would“ apply the laws of Islam. ”
Thus, the Turkish authorities seek to distract their citizens from economic problems by proclaiming the Islamization of Turkey to the detriment of its secular status.
The economy of Turkey is not in the best condition, but Erdogan was again able to win the Hagia Sophia.
This is what officials in Ankara are thinking.
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What kind of domestic reaction did Erdogan's reconversion of Hagia Sophia receive?

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

The decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia into a mosque in 2020 was met with widespread international criticism, including from UNESCO and Orthodox Christian institutions, who argued that the move undermined Turkey's commitment to preserving its multicultural heritage and religious tolerance.

Title:

Content: Hagia Sophia must once again become a place of Christian worship, demands the American Council for the Liberation of Hagia Sophia.
For a start, according to the organization, it is possible to allow liturgies in Hagia Sophia, preserving its museum status.
Although Christians still perceive this cathedral captured together with Constantinople in 1453 as one of the most important shrines.
In case of refusal, the “Council ” intends to appeal to the ECHR.
However, the situation around Hagia Sophia is much more complicated; the observer of IA REGNUM Stanislav Stremidlovsky analyzes the recent events around the former main temple of Byzantium.
Erhan Elaldı – Anadolu Agency
The 564th anniversary of the conquest of Constantinople was celebrated by the Hagia Sophia as a museum.
What is the 565th anniversary?
The head of the “Council ”, American politician Chris Spirou, has already been declared a provocateur by the Turkish authorities.
Today, when Erdogan is increasingly moving away from “his overseas partners ” at least in terms of the desired image of the president, and the new owner of the White House pays much more attention to Middle Eastern Christians than Obama, the situation is clearly changing.
There are already hints that Hagia Sophia from the museum will become a mosque.
At the same time, Erdogan ’ s victory in the last referendum made the president a debtor of domestic Anatolia (at least she believes so), who gave him their votes.
The Anatolian Youth Association strongly opposes any manifestations of non-Muslim faith in Turkish society.
For three years now, they have been trying to make Hagia Sophia a mosque.
And although Erdogan is in no hurry to meet, the Association expects decisive measures from him.
Where the Turkish president is inclined and what Hagia Sophia, cathedral or mosque can become, read here: Internal Anatolia, who supported Erdogan, demands to make Hagia Sophia a mosque
Read other articles by Stanislav Stremidlovsky on the relationship of world religions.

How did Muslims and Orthodox Christians react to the reconversion?

Who was angered by the reconversion of Hagia Sophia in July 2020?

UNESCO specifically criticized Turkey for making the decision without prior consultation, raising concerns about the preservation of the site's universal value as a World Heritage Site.

Title:

Content: New rules come into force for the visit of Hagia Sophia Mosque in Turkey - Sunrise Gate
Tuesday 16 January 2024 2: 04 PM Cairo Cairo 24 °
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New rules come into effect for visiting Hagia Sophia mosque in Turkey
DBA
Published on: Tuesday 16 January 2024 - 1: 54 PM | Last updated on Tuesday 16 January 2024 - 1: 54 PM
The project for the Hagia Sophia mosque was closest to the heart of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan – but it was also the project that drew international criticism.
In the summer of 2020, Erdogan restored Hagia Sophia to be a mosque after it was originally a church, converted into an Ottoman mosque, converted into a museum.
At the time, Erdogan assured citizens that entry fees would be abolished, adding that the cultural edifice would remain open to everyone – Muslims or non-Muslims alike.
There will be another major change from January 15, with access to the Hagia Sophia restricted and visitors will have to pay fees again.
Turkish Tourism Minister Mehmet Nuri Arsoy hopes this will improve coexistence between religious and tourist visitors.
Arsoy said recently that tourist visitors are making noise and disrupting calm and prayer.
Until recently, visitors and worshippers were allowed to enter the interior of Hagia Sophia together, with barriers and signs keeping a certain distance between them.
However, from now on, worshippers and tourists will be introduced through different entrances.
Although worshippers can use the same entrances as before, tourists will be guided through an upstairs hallway.
According to Arsoy, tour guides will not be allowed to accompany visitors through the corridors, and earphones will be used instead.
“Our priority there is prayer, ” Arsoy said, noting that the building is a world cultural heritage site and should therefore remain open to all visitors around the world.
Zuleiha Duman, 29, who returned to Istanbul from Germany to see Hagia Sophia after it was converted into a mosque, said she found it taking away.
Welcoming the new rules, she said: “As long as the entrance fee isn ’ t too high, I think it ’ s acceptable. ”
“Why shouldn ’ t Turkey and the government take advantage of this place?
These funds can be channeled to preserve more religious places. ”
Hagia Sophia has been on the UNESCO World Heritage List as part of Istanbul ’ s history since 1985.
Built by Emperor Justinian, Hagia Sophia was the largest place of worship in Christianity for nearly a thousand years, it was the main church during the Byzantine Empire, and from the seventh century, the emperor was crowned inside.
After the Ottomans entered Constantinople (now Istanbul) in 1453, the Hagia Sophia was converted into a mosque.
On the orders of the founder of the Turkish Republic Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the building was converted into a museum in 1934 until the summer of 2020.
Hagia Sophia is as symbolically important to Orthodox Christians around the world as St. Peter ’ s Basilica is to Catholics.
After the building was converted into a mosque, criticism poured in from the Greek Orthodox Church.
The UNESCO Foundation also criticized the decision without consultation.
For Erdogan, turning the place into a mosque was his “childhood dream, ” as he himself said, and pleasing to religious voters.
A few external changes were made at the time, for example, a green carpet was placed above the marble floor.
It seems clear that all these things did not detract from the popularity of this teacher.
According to official statistics, some 13.6 million people visited the Hagia Sophia landmark in 2022, not all of them from Europe.
The number of visitors from Indonesia in particular has risen, Hagia Sophia Imam Binyamin Topoglu told Turkey ’ s Anadolu news agency in 2023.
The amount of the fees has not yet been determined.
Tourism Minister Ersoy says the proceeds will be spent on cultural assets, for excavation or preservation of monuments such as the Hagia Sophia.
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What was UNESCO's main complaint about the reconversion?

The reconversion also drew condemnation from Greece, the United States, and Pope Francis, who expressed grief over the decision, citing its potential impact on religious tolerance and Turkey's multicultural legacy.

Title:

Content: Erdogan invited the leaders of Muslim states to the first prayer in Hagia Sophia
13: 26 22 July Kiev, Ukraine
According to the plan, on July 24, the first prayer will be held in Hagia Sophia in Turkey, after it was decided to convert the building of the Orthodox church into a mosque.
The leaders of many Muslim countries are invited to take part in it.
Erdogan ’ s invitation came from Qatar and Azerbaijan.
The remaining heads of state have not yet responded to the Turkish president.
Remind me!
The Turkish government decided to change the status of the architectural monument and the Orthodox Church of St. Sophia and convert the room into a mosque.
The Pope said that this situation causes him grief.
The Patriarch of Ecumenical and Constantinople, who recently received a great number of churches on the territory of Ukraine, and did not demand the transfer of the museum to the Diocese of Constantinople in a timely manner, said that the creation of a mosque in the museum building can be negatively met in the Orthodox world.
It is expected that the first prayer in the new mosque will be attended by about 1000-1500 people.
All quarantine conditions will be met, participants in prayer will be given masks, and disinfectants will be placed everywhere in the cathedral so that people can treat their hands and their prayer mats.
During the prayer, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will also be present in the cathedral, along with Turkish ministers, leaders of the ruling Justice and Development Party.
As previously reported, all the frescoes and mosaics at the time of prayer will be covered with curtains.
On July 10, a Turkish court ruled that the decision to convert the mosque into a museum in 1934 was illegal.
Erdogan immediately signed a decree on assigning Hagia Sophia the status of a mosque.
The move has sparked international criticism and concern, including from Greece, the United States and Russia, as well as UNESCO and Pope Francis.
Turkey insists that the status of the architectural monument is its internal affair.

Who was angered by the reconversion of Hagia Sophia in July 2020?

Observers have noted that the reconversion aligns with Erdogan's political strategy to appeal to his Islamo-nationalist base, particularly amidst economic challenges and political pressures.

What kind of domestic reaction did Erdogan's reconversion of Hagia Sophia receive?

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

The decision aimed to rally anti-Kemalist voters.

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

Critics argue that the move prioritizes Turkey's Islamic heritage over its diverse historical layers, including its Christian and secular past, thereby deepening the cultural divide between secularists and Islamists in Turkey.

Title:

Content: Prayer Carpet and Electoral Battle in Turkey
The controversy in Turkey over the fact that opposition presidential candidate Kemal Kilicdaroglu took pictures with his shoes on the prayer mat reveals the hostility towards religion that some politicians in the Muslim world deliberately show to mobilize minorities and secular currents at home and to attract international support from abroad.
Despite the apology of the Turkish opposition leader and his claim that he did not pay attention to the existence of the carpet, the publication of another picture of him on the same carpet with one of his supporters confirmed the weakness of his position, such symbolic images that send messages in multiple directions expose the beds, and do not contradict the political direction of the CHP seeking to revive the Ataturk fighting religion again.
Surprisingly, the offending picture came weeks before the election, at a time when candidates are trying to get closer to the masses and show pride of religion and respect for customs and traditions to win votes, but loss of wisdom and lack of insight often lead to such fatal mistakes.
If Recep Tayyip Erdogan wanted to distort his rival, he would not have done what Kilicdaroglu did to himself, and Erdogan took advantage of the fall and grabbed a carpet that one of his supporters gave him in one of his election rounds and said that “this carpet is not for someone to step on with his shoes, but to pray for it, God willing, the prayer of thanks on May 15 after winning the election. ”
What Kilicdaroglu did, contemporary Arab leaders are doing to get Zionist and Christian foreign support, but the difference between them is that the leader of the Turkish opposition, for reasons we do not know, rushed this time and could not wait and mute his position on religion until the end of the electoral race; which will affect the size of support for him....
The ferocity of Turkish secularism
Turkish secularism is one of the most brutal types of secularism tyrannical. A hundred years ago after the overthrow of the Ottoman Caliphate, the Turks suffered from repression and the siege of religion and fighting it. Successive Ataturk governments have enjoyed the support of the West to keep Turkey away from its Islamic surroundings.
Due to the geographical location and importance of Turkey as a bulwark against the Russians and the commitment of the secular military to the values of Western democracy and the desire to join the European Union, the elections allowed Islamists to come to power, and each time the experiment ended with a military coup that brought them back to zero. He has the right to choose who represents him.
Erdogan and Restoring People ’ s Power
The Turkish experience is full of lessons, the Islamists dealt very intelligently in the face of brutal secular circles supported by Zionist and Western circles, did not confuse advocacy work with political struggle, so as not to pay the price of repeated political clashes, and did not resort to violence that gives their opponents legitimacy and justification for tyranny and declare emergency and storm everything.
Turkish Islamists, keen to control society from the bottom up, expanded their alliances with sincere nationalists and patriots, entered local elections and then parliamentary elections, and when they felt that the climate was ripe for the presidency, they went through the experience.
With the neutralization of the secular military agents abroad, the Turkish people were able to take the initiative, and the electoral fund became the popular means to form the political system, and the practical experience dropped many of the claims that were repeated by the enemies of freedom, such as "Islamists if they reach power, they will not leave it".
Elections and the future of the Turks
In these elections, none of the Turks said that Erdogan will win by acclamation despite all his real material achievements, as Turkey became in his reign within 20 years a militarily strong state after the manufacture of its weapons, which were tested in several wars (in Libya, Syria and Azerbaijan) and proved its superiority, but the size of international conspiracy against Erdogan and the quest to get rid of him makes the elections a decisive battle.
The elections are taking place amid major global shifts, with the war between Russia and NATO raging near the border, and no one predicting when and where to stop.
The armies of Russia, America and Europe encircle Turkey from the south, and despite what appears to be differences and conflicts between the warring world powers, they agree on the hostility to the Turkish rise, and fear the return of the Turks as a world power after a hundred years of breaking and conspiring against them.
Turkey ’ s future will depend on the outcome of these elections, either Erdogan wins to complete the advanced military industrialization project that enables Turkey to complete its liberation and independence from Western domination, or a ruler surrenders his head and neck to Turkey ’ s opponents to demolish all that has been done and dismantle the military industrial complex that has restored the Turks their international status.
Source: Al Jazeera Direct

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

Who was angered by the reconversion of Hagia Sophia in July 2020?

Supporters of the reconversion view it as a symbolic assertion of Islamic identity and a fulfillment of Muslim aspirations worldwide, with Erdogan describing it as a glorious chapter in Turkish history.

How did Muslims and Orthodox Christians react to the reconversion?

What kind of domestic reaction did Erdogan's reconversion of Hagia Sophia receive?

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

However, opponents, including the Greek Orthodox Church and international critics, contend that the move undermines religious tolerance and disregards the site's multicultural heritage.

How did Muslims and Orthodox Christians react to the reconversion?

Who was angered by the reconversion of Hagia Sophia in July 2020?

The religious implications of covering Christian mosaics and icons during prayers have also been highlighted, with critics arguing that this prioritizes Islamic heritage over the site's Byzantine Christian significance.

How did Muslims and Orthodox Christians react to the reconversion?

Who was angered by the reconversion of Hagia Sophia in July 2020?

Arab intellectuals have engaged in extensive debates about the Hagia Sophia controversy, with some viewing the reconversion as a symbolic assertion of Islamic identity against Western cultural dominance, while others critique it as a politicized move undermining secularism and pluralism.

Title:

Content: Monday, 15 January 2024 09: 32 GMT
Intellectuals and Loyalty
(MENAFN- Al Watan) Many Arab intellectuals, through a huge collection of sayings, dialogues and reviews, labored to create a special container that can contain Western intellectual theories and reproduce them in Islamic and Arab forms and contents, not content with conveying those intellectual theories as put forward by the European Enlightenment and beyond. Some of these theories were conveyed exactly as they are, but the reaction resisted and opposed it, through individuals, religious entities and other conservative entities, which stressed the need to evoke the intellectual and theoretical elements of Arab and Islamic or to be satisfied with them without introducing anything else with them.
The use of Western tools and mechanisms of criticism in Arab and Islamic artistic and intellectual issues was the largest door to the entry of Western European Enlightenment thought in contemporary Arab culture, which developed a debate over a century and an increase, from the beginning of the twentieth century until today, enabled the Arab mind to add knowledge bridges that can form a two-way movement with Orientalism, which came a few centuries after the transfer of knowledge to Europe through an Arab and Islamic medium.
Perhaps the debate with Orientalism in the critical aspects, generated a cognitive break with Arab culture among some Arab intellectuals, which led to the opposite reaction, which led those intellectuals who dealt with Western culture, to the process of finding evidence for those Western theories in the Arab and Islamic heritage, so that they can overcome the unacceptability and unpalatability of the existence of a solid Western theory within Arab knowledge. It is appropriate for the Arab who rejects the idea of   a religious scientist or a conservative intellectual that it is alien and urgent to Arab and Islamic thought, hence, for example, the attempt to combine ((democracy)) the original theory in European liberal thought, Shura that original Islamic concept, and came as well as an attempt to find knowledge documents for the question of (socialism). A great example of this, as an indication of the existence of this attempt to link, whether at the level of major theories in European thought, or its branch of small molecular questions, which came into contact with Arab and Islamic thought, or tried to penetrate through the same intellectuals who were trying to move to make a scientific and cognitive renaissance, leading to an Arab civilization renaissance, regardless of whether they were injured or not. Get in the way?!
Here, I do not misjudge our old and modern intellectuals, as some studies have done or as some intellectuals described as conservatives have done, not to mention ideologues, but I say it is a necessary level of civilizational interaction in its cognitive aspect, which is modified and corrected, or maybe it can be taken fully, through dialogue and review, away from the accusation, and above all this. I consider it a serious attempt to get closer to this (other) culture and to know it from its depth. Saad Al-Sawyan referred to this issue indirectly, when he broke the question of plagiarism of the ignorant poetry, and refuted it systematically, by decoding Nabati poetry and giving it documents indicative of the ignorant poetry, and explained the systematic disorder of Taha Hussein His imitation of the methodology of (Margaleus), (Millman Barry), and (Albert Lord), applied to the epics of the Greeks, which differ in form and content from the Arabic poem, by this transfer by Taha Hussein, who faced many controversies, and the unique methodology followed by Saad al-Suwayan, we reached the depth of Western theories in criticism, inference and analysis, but we did not She did not, as evidence of the critical project against the idea of plagiarism of ignorant poetry.
These critical and comparative cognitive processes can be taken in order to make approaches to discover vast areas of our Arab thought that are not easily discovered or revealed to the emerging intellectual generation, as well as a way to calibrate the power of our idea, and a way to detect the falsehood, intrusion and derelict of some ideas that may contribute to the disruption of the Arab mind from keeping pace with the times, and the leadership of contemporary civilization.
Considering the three determinants of culture as described by Mahmoud Shaker in his entire speech about the method in his book ((A Message on the Way to Our Culture), (2009), which is language, religion and history, we find that it is the cognitive basis for launching any intellectual project, in any scientific field or even development, and this foundation is not based on one of these determinants alone, but must be based on them. Taken together as a cognitive condition that cannot be waived, to start what can be called an Arab or Islamic intellectual project, but to reject intellectual projects based on a petition from the Western critical theory, which is based on one of these determinants excluding the rest, is wrong, and is supposed to be accepted, discussed, and critiqued by the criticism that tries to cooperate with. The correct theory within it, and the denial of what may disturb the originality of the Arab and Islamic idea, but at the same time does not deprive us of the nobility of the contemporary, which the Western theory aptly represents today, because of their epistemological leadership.
Mahmoud Shaker has published his important book (Mutanabbi), (1987) [which was first published in a special issue of the magazine of the extract, in January 1936], with words later published in a separate book, which we referred to earlier, and was intended to reveal the history that led to the corruption of literary, political, social and religious life - from his point of view - and its origins. The curricula that were and still are prevalent in literary and cultural life, which Shaker rejected, and set himself a special approach, his book (Mutanabbi), (1936) was an application to him in one way.
When you put the book Taha Hussein, in ((Jahili poetry)), (1926), with my books Mahmoud Shaker, (Mutanabbi), (1936), and Saad Sawyan, ((Arabian desert), (2010), both responded in his way to the question of plagiarism of Jahili poetry when Taha Hussein, you will find the best example of the disparity in the employment of the three determinants of culture, and different angles, between different angles. Taha Hussein ’ s obedience is almost complete, Mahmoud Shaker ’ s is perfect, Saad al-Suwayan is free, and if we compare the Western theory, we will find that the three were also two parties and a middle, Hussein ’ s is perfect, and Shaker ’ s is a complete break, and al-Suwayan ’ s is free. Hence, the idea of the article is a question of belonging to the intellectual and his loyalists. His mother ’ s culture, or his alienation from it.
The majority of the alienation of the Arab intellectual, or as expressed by Josiah Royce ("disloyalty") as in (philosophy of loyalty, 1930), is caused by the inability of the intellectual towards his society, because of the gap between the status of society and what the intellectual wishes for that society, which loses him the link to society reality, traditions and heritage, which generates a state of (disloyalty / alienation). Thought from outside its system and its surroundings, not in the form of positive and free interaction, but in the form of attracting a thought that has achieved success in an environment and heritage radically different from its environment and heritage.
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NEWSLETTER

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

This controversy has sparked discussions among Arab scholars about the interplay between religion and politics, with some arguing that Erdogan's decision reflects a broader trend of using religious symbolism to consolidate political power.

Title:

Content: Rise of the Rock of Islam
Rise of the Rock of Islam
Libyan politician and former representative of Libya to the United Nations
Dialogue, debate and even intellectual debate, with all its hotness of difference, are the fuel of life that stimulates interaction with the lifeline that does not stop, backwardness is the biggest symptom that overflows on the entity of societies that are drowning in the seas of closure and fear of moving what is on the mind by virtue of the weight of the years.
The follower these days of what is going on is a dialogue between a new Arab generation, formed in a time that belongs to it, and an old generation affected by factors of weakness, and can not jump from them with a batch of votes or lines on papers.
Social media, both written and visual, has become an open track for every rider on a small mobile device or computer, entering the equestrian arena of letter, word, sound and image.
Everything is being fitted with electronic communication horses.
History, politics, art, culture and social issues.
What we have to do, each mujtahid has a share, even if he lines his diligence on top of a plastic plate.
It is very different when the writer or speaker is a professor and may precede his name with the letter D, or give him the status of intellectual or historian, and the subject of dialogue or contention is religion.
Atheist, secular, non-religious, Quranic and infidel..
Attributes that have become widespread, not only on social media, including private video channels, but also on the book and entered the field of open public battle over religion.
We read a book entitled “Islamic Fascism ” and before it the book“ Goodbye, Heaven ”, and on a video site the same author broadcast hundreds of episodes entitled, “The Box of Islam. ”
Everyone has the right to express his opinion on anything, but all human actions are purposeful, in the sense that they have a goal to achieve.
This professor is mobilizing his forces in a battle that he calls "the abolition of the Islamic religion from its beginning to its beginning, with all its components the Qur'an, the Sunnah, and even the history as well as the names of its men and leaders."
Other voices are rising these days describing all Muslim conquests as colonial campaigns in which racist war crimes were committed.
The question is, what is the goal?
Is it to extract religion from the minds and hearts and throw it into an imaginary sea without bottomless, and to become about two billion Muslims lost beings in a world of human thoughts and beliefs formed and accumulated over the years?
There are eternal and eternal questions that can only be answered in religion.
Every religion has its own particularity, whether divine or human, and Islam has its own particularity and strength rooted in the minds and consciences that have inhabited the Muslim entity for centuries.
The common people do not see, hear or read what comes to them from those who describe themselves as philosophers or professors, and put on their voices and papers the Nishan of revolution and rebellion against religion.
We do not ignore or ignore the reactions of some to the actions of extremist terrorist groups, which raise slogans attributed to the Islamic religion; killed, bombed, raped and kidnapped.
But do those who write or speak, pray and tour the battle to eliminate Islam, do they know what percentage of terrorists who describe themselves as Muslims and commit crimes, what percentage of them are in the Muslim world?
They are less than one in a million, and if we compare them to the number of members of terrorist movements in Europe and Japan in the last century, we will see a huge difference in the number.
The Direct Action Group in France, the German Padermeinhof, the Italian Red Brigades and the Japanese Red Army, and if we add to them the extremist groups in the United States of America, we have a big difference.
Yes, in every belief there is always much to review, because man is an evolving and changing being with all that is in him.
The four Sunni doctrines, were the product of reviews and jurisprudence that answered questions born from the womb of the process of life and change by virtue of evolution, and each doctrine took from its predecessor and added to it.
Religion is neither reformed nor developed from outside, but from within, and this is confirmed by the history of all religions, heavenly and other.
The amateurs and the invitees of thought and culture are fighting their battle on horses “contrary to the known ”, and in fact they are running behind a star that has no sky, no horizon, no stars.
Ibrahim bin Siyar said: “If you want to take some knowledge, you have to give it your whole life. ”
Religion is a creed with its being and its composition, which has in its tree spawned branches that do not cease to expand, its leaves are the science that grows in the fields of life.
Reform, renewal and development, has its ways and doors, which guide the compass of the mind qualified by the wide and deep science of what is meant to renew and develop, and enlightenment in the light of what the human mind creates in all areas of life every day and even every hour.
Yes, there are questions that flow daily in the paths of life, and it is inevitable to answer them, and it is impossible to ignore or escape them.
If the questions are new, so are the answers.
We cannot answer a question posed by our time in which we live today by what a thinker or jurist once said to his grave.
The dead answers to the living questions turn into cluster fallacies that blow up heads, turn off the lights of the mind, and bring about backwardness and ruin.
Some of the so-called sheikhs or jurists give pretexts to those who ride horses to fight religion and write about the fascism of Islam.
The jurist who says that the only solution to get out of our financial crises is to declare jihad on other nations to return the spoils and captives of men to work in our fields and factories and women to enjoy us, this sign is the one who provides firewood to those who stoke the fire of hatred and war on Islam.
What if he incites young people to seek knowledge, jihad on the fronts of laboratories and scientific research, building factories and plowing farms, building a community of brotherhood, tolerance, the rule of law and achieving justice, and that our slogans should be: “Do, ”“ Seek knowledge, ” “Do not kill the soul that God has forbidden except by truth ” and“ Say, my Lord, increase me in knowledge ”?
I repeat, that dialogue, discussion and debate is a vital necessity, but the clash and calls for uprooting and raising the flags of hostility on the teeth of voices and letters, will be just bubbles of hatred, thrown by the winds of days in the vacuum of oblivion.
And we say to them what the pastor said:
Like a rock one day to soften it.
He didn ’ t hurt her, and he took the plunge.
The opinions, facts and content presented here reflect only the author.
Eye of Libya assumes no responsibility.
Libyan politician and former representative of Libya to the United Nations

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

Arab commentators have also noted that while the reconversion resonates with Islamic heritage, it risks alienating non-Muslim communities and undermining principles of coexistence and mutual respect in diverse societies.

Title:

Content: East and West or Islam and Christianity?
Interaction with the "other world" throughout history
Some claim that the confrontation between Islam and Christianity is a political-civilizational confrontation between the East and the West dating back to the beginnings of the Islamic State, and that it is part of the historical conflict, Muslims everywhere consider themselves Eastern, heirs of great empires, religions and civilizations that have always been at war with Christians who have always been Western, as the heirs of Europeans from Greece, Romans and Franks.
In contrast, some argue that the West still sees the world through the lens of Eurocentrism, which draws its basic vision from the Middle Ages without realizing that the world has changed.
In his book "An Introduction to Our History and the Other and Beyond the Relations between Islam and the West", recently published by the Arab Science House "Publishers", translated by Anas Yilman, the Turkish historian Ibrahim Kalin, looks for common points between the Islamic and Western worlds, and considers them "points of convergence and interaction".
In this approach, Galen proceeds from the shared history of Islamic and Western societies, and the author justifies this starting from the intertwining of facts with perceptions of these two histories, as identity with image, and truth with fiction.
East, East, West, West.
The author cites a famous poem by the British poet and storyteller Rudyard Kipling (1865 – 1936), the first Nobel laureate, "East East East, West West.
They'll never meet.
as the earth and the sky. "
It thus expresses one of the fundamental characteristics of the East in the sense prevailing in the Western world.
He points out that the separation of the two cultures is the natural state, while their closeness is an exceptional condition that calls for divine intervention.
Aristotle warned his student Alexander the Great (356 – 323 BC) from the East that "the way of life of the Persians carries in its essence the seeds of death and fear.
The Greeks carry the seeds of life and courage. ”
According to Gallen, Muslim societies did not see themselves as "Oriental" or "representative of the East"; the East is only an imaginary functional term that emerged to refer to Asia following Europe's definition of itself as the West.
The thinker Hassan Hanafi (1935-2021), says that it is wrong to put the contrast "Islam and the West", because Islam in the East and in the West, in Asia and Europe, in Japan and America, and the West as a model and example exists in the West and East, Islam and the West, is an overlap of population, urbanism and culture at the same time.
The historian and sociologist Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) saw the movement of history as between modern city societies and nomadic societies, and did not say that the former was Western or the latter was Eastern.
The author pointed out that the phrase in verse 115 of Sura al-Baqarah “To Allah, the East and the West … ”
The German poet Johann Goethe (1749-1832) used it as the title of his Poetic Divan West-Orientale to exalt (or perhaps to recall) this distinction between East and West. The Austrian orientalist and historian Josef von Hammer-Burgstahl (1774-1856) frequently referred to this verse in his writings and asked for it to be inscribed on his grave. Before he died.
Islam and the West.
Magic of Words
The author sketches the history of the interactions of Islam and the West by saying that modern times have caused many tremors in the Islamic world.
He believes that the Islamic world, which occupied its lands and condemned its history, civilization and culture to backwardness and absurdity, had to react to modernity originating from the West.
For two centuries, Muslim societies have viewed themselves as an actor acting out of history, suffering from the syndrome of cultural backwardness, and describing the history of Europe as a whole as a project based on the formation of the identity of the other is exaggerated.
In its infancy, Europe was greatly influenced by other cultures in Asia, the Islamic world and Africa.
The author points out that the philosophical framework of the Declaration of Independence of the United States, proclaimed on July 4, 1776, was derived from the Koran and some Islamic sources.
The copy of the Koran, known as the Jeffersonian, which is still preserved today in the Library of Congress, is one of the most vivid examples of this overlapping history.
With the colonial and imperialist tyranny of Europe ’ s political, diplomatic, commercial and cultural relations with the outside world since the 17th century, new frameworks for relations and the way history is written have been defined.
The theological challenge.
Historical confrontation
Many incidents in the early history of Islam showed a special and different relationship between Islam and Christianity as described in the book.
The first of these incidents was that a Christian monk named Beheira (Sergius) was the first to refer to the prophecy of Muhammad (peace be upon him), a Christian cleric.
The author goes on to mention that when the revelation came to the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, he went to “Warah Ibn Nawfal ”, one of the relatives of his wife Khadija (may Allah be pleased with her) Christians.
He told the Prophet that this was the divine revelation, and that he was thus a man of prophecy.
“Thus, the first scholar to preach prophecy to the apostle is a Christian scholar. ”
The author says that despite all that early bright history, the anti-Islamic theological controversy intensified in the 8th and 9th centuries, and was one of the first to address Islam, the Quran and the Prophet Muhammad from Christian theologians Beida (died 735), and John Damascene (died 749) and disciple by Theodore Abu Qara (died 820 or 830). In such writings, Muslims have become the target of violent attacks by Christian theologians.
Cultural threat
After the 9th and 10th centuries, Islamic thought and culture began to spread its influence early in the 19th century, especially in the educated sector of southern Europe, and despite the theological and political threat, the Bishop of Cordoba in 854 criticized his disciples, saying that "My Christian brothers enjoy Arabic poetry and love stories, and study the works of Muslim philosophers.
Young Christians only know Arabic.
They read Arabic books with great care and enthusiasm.
They spend a lot of money on Arabic books. ”
Galen believes that the translation of the works of many Muslim travelers of thinkers and intellectuals, into Latin, caused the emergence of new trends of intellectual movements, and a prominent example of this is the philosophical novel of the author Ibn Tufayl, and his works were translated into Latin by the English orientalist Edward Pocock (1604 – 1691), in 1727, under the title (Philosphus Autodicticus). himself. "
Spanish priest and scholar of Islamic history Miguel Assen Platheus (1871 – 1944) asserts that Dante's "Divine Comedy", one of the most important literary and theological works of the Middle Ages, was influenced by Muslim writings on Isra and Miraj.
Among the Jewish thinkers who were influenced by the principle of reflection among Muslims and inspired Jewish thought in the Middle Ages were the philosopher Ibn Maimon (d. 1204), the author of the book "The Significance of the Baffled", the philosopher Saadia Gaon (died 942), Suleiman ibn Jabirul (1070), Yahya ibn Baquda (died in the middle of the 11th century), and Ibn Kamuna (died 1284). He is the author of the book “The Wisdom of Sunshine ” by his companion Shahabuddeen Sahrawadi (v: 1191).
Ibrahim Kalin asserts that the great interaction and dialogue with Christians in the era of the Prophet Muhammad (may Allah 's peace and blessings be upon him) was a fundamental problem in the historical and ideological relations of Islamic-Byzantine relations.
Haroun Al-Rashid and Charlemagne
Historian Ibrahim Kalin argues that the political and diplomatic connections between Caliph Harun al-Rashid (died 809), known to the European reader from the Tales of One Thousand and One Nights, and Charlemagne (748-814), the most powerful emperor in Europe, show how the thought of religious conquest and jihad went beyond political realism.
The historian Galen explains that perhaps out of Charlemagne's curiosity and desire to know the character of his counterpart, nicknamed "Sultan of the East and Prince of the Faithful", he sent a delegation loaded with gifts to Harun al-Rashid in 797.
Since then, Muslim leaders and scholars have begun to transfer Greek works from Byzantine lands, having been translated and revised to suit the culture of the Muslim world.
He continues that the Abbasid caliph Abu Jaafar al-Mansur (714-775), asked the Byzantine emperor Constantine for works of ancient Greek science and thought, and the emperor sent him the Book of Elements, the most famous work of the Greek mathematician Euclid (323 – 383 BC), and within a short time this book became one of the basic scientific works of the Middle Ages.
In the same way, Jabir ibn Hayyan, one of the most important scholars and thinkers of the reign of Harun al-Rashid, asked the latter to bring him some books, and Hanin ibn Ishaq (809-873) went to Byzantine lands and returned with many Greek works.
New worlds of art, architecture and literature
In his book, the historian Gallen observes important interactions between Muslims and Byzantines in the fields of art, architecture and literature, as well as scientific and philosophical thinking.
Byzantine craftsmen worked in many Islamic works.
The author points out that some Byzantine craftsmen worked in the restoration of the Kaaba during the reign of our Lord Muhammad, peace be upon him, and that lighting the Prophet ’ s Mosque in the city with lamps was a proposal by Tamim bin Aws al-Dari, who converted from Christianity to Islam, and the Prophet called him light in this world and the Hereafter.
In Damascus, the capital of the Umayyads, a large part of the abandoned churches were converted into mosques, including the famous Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, built on the ruins of the ancient Cathedral of Our Lord Yahya (St. John the Baptist), which later became one of the greatest works of Islamic architecture.
Source: The Island

Erdogan’s rhetoric surrounding the reconversion, such as comparing it to the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, reflects his neo-Ottoman vision and aims to bolster his image as a leader restoring Turkey’s historical and religious legacy.

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

Critics argue that the reconversion undermines Turkey's secular identity, established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923, which emphasized strict secularism and excluded religion from the public sphere.

Title:

Content: The Turkish elections.
Conflict between two identities
Anyone who follows the current Turkish elections is aware that the issue of identity is one of the prominent aspects of the ongoing electoral conflict between Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his party on the one hand and the opposition, headed by Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu on the other.
The identity conflict is still at its most intense in Turkey since Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, after the end of the so-called war of independence and the declaration of the republic in 1923, a century ago, obliterated everything related to Islam and the Arabic language in Turkey and called for the adoption of everything that is Western, even if it clashes with the faith of the people of the country and their Islamic identity.
In the aftermath of the First World War, which ended with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the occupation of Turkey by the Allied forces, the Turkish elite, especially those under the influence of Western thought, became convinced that any reform under the state of Islam and the caliphate was futile and necessary to fully adopt the Western secular model in its bitterness.
In light of the successes achieved by the Turkish resistance against the invading forces, many Arabs and Muslims rejoiced at Mustafa Kemal Ataturk when they saw him leading the Turks in the War of Liberation (1918-1923) and winning victory after victory over the allied armies that had occupied the country.
God is the greatest wonder in the world.
O Khalid Al-Turk, renew Khalid Al-Arab
But the man who led the Turk to military victory quickly disappointed many when he and his associates erased everything related to Islam and the caliphate from his country, which had been home for nearly 500 years.
After the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, the Turkish state abolished the Islamic Caliphate in 1924 and Islam is no longer the religion of the state and the principle of secularism was adopted and the wearing of the cowl was forbidden because it was worn in the Ottoman era and replaced with the hat.
These and other changes came as a thunderbolt on the heads of many who had good news for Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his companions.
The fall of the Islamic Caliphate had the impact of the earthquake and a great resonance that still reverberates to this day in various parts of the Islamic world.
Shawqi wrote an obituary and reprimands himself for his former praise of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and reproaches him and his companions that they had cursed with their hands the sheet of their pride and removed from their necks the best necklace.
At the beginning of his poem, which laments the succession:
You have been caught up in minarets and pulpits.
I cried for you kingdoms and wailing
India and Egypt are sad.
She cries at you with a teardrop.
Syria asks, Iraq and Persia..
Wiped out of the land of succession, huh?
Turkish society has not succumbed to this cultural defeat, this obsession with everything that is Western, the hostility to everything that is Islamic, and the adoption of an extreme secular model in its hostility to religion, similar to the laïcité applied in France.
Although the system of government in the Islamic caliphate began a Shurian system in the era of the caliphs of the adults, as it was ruled by caliphs chosen by free allegiance, but after the end of their rule turned into a member king and a hereditary system in the era of the Umayyads and Abbasids and then the Ottomans.
Although none of these countries has denied that Islam imposes rule on the basis of allegiance, this principle of shura has not been respected or activated.
Whatever flaws may have shaped the rule of these countries, the Islamic caliphate remained in the conscience of many a symbol of the unity and dignity of Muslims and a guardian of their Sharia.
Turkish society has not succumbed to this cultural defeat and this lying in front of everything that is Western and hostile to everything that is Islamic and adopted an extreme secular model in its hostility to religion, similar to the laïcité applied in France, which excludes religion from the public sphere and considers it a private personal matter. A guardian of Ataturk and secular values was always on the lookout, with one coup after another killing any movement or attempt to regain lost identity.
When former prime minister Adnan Menderes began building Islamic schools and allowed the call to prayer to be repeated in Arabic, the army turned against him and was tried and executed in 1960.
Coups followed at a rate of about every 10 years, and the last successful coup against Islamist-leaning figures and parties was the soft coup that forced former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan to resign in 1997.
Erbakan had founded four parties, and the sooner a party was dissolved, the sooner he created a new one.
In 2001, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his comrades, like Erdogan who had been apprenticed to Erbakan and his political approach, established the Justice and Development Party (AKP).
The party won the Turkish election nearly 20 years ago and has been leading the country ever since.
Despite his criticisms of authoritarianism, authoritarianism and other accusations that have led some of his party ’ s moguls to defect from him, Erdogan and his party have much to gain.
He was able to double Turkey ’ s per capita income and GDP in a few years, and these tangible achievements helped him on the day of the coup in 2016 and many people took to the streets to resist the coup until it failed.
There is no doubt that Erdogan and his companions have learned from the head of the wolf that flew and from the experiences of those who preceded them, they did not engage in raising Islamic slogans that interfere in a direct confrontation with the army or secular elites that grew up over decades in a political environment that sees secularism as the official ideology of the state.
While Erdogan and his party, according to the language of the speech used and the slogans raised, are not considered an Islamic party in the sense that is customary in Arab and Islamic countries, the party, through its actions and achievements, may be described as such.
Unlike the movements and parties that belong to the so-called political Islam, which reject and completely reject the principle of secularism and demand the application of Islamic law, we find that the Justice and Development Party does not only accept, but declares its adherence to the line of Kemal Ataturk and the principle of secularism.
In the party, however, they have redefined it in a way that protects them from its shortcomings, by saying that they understand it as a system that guarantees democracy, freedoms and human rights, including religious freedoms.
There is no doubt that Erdogan and his companions have learned from the head of the wolf that flew and from the experiences of their predecessors did not engage in raising Islamic slogans that interfere in a direct confrontation with the army or secular elites that arose and grew up over decades in a political environment that sees secularism as the official ideology of the state and inescapable.
At the level of foreign relations, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) was keen to establish balanced political relations with the West, characterized by a degree of parity, in contrast to the policy of full political and military subordination pursued by Turkey in its relations with the West and its distance from its Arab and Islamic surroundings.
The Justice and Development Party (AKP) is reckoned to be close to the issues of Arabs and Muslims, when the Syrian crisis occurred, Erdogan opened the doors of his country to Syrian brothers fleeing the flames of a war that forced millions of them to leave their country.
However, it seems that this outstretched hand policy towards refugees, which is dictated by the rules of international law, imposed by humanitarian motives and necessitated by kinship and brotherhood in Islam, did not appeal to those who followed the footsteps of Atatürk, who rejected everything that is Arab and Islamic.
This struggle over Turkish identity between those who defend its Islamic identity and those who cling to the strict secular Ataturk line may not find a more telling picture than the scene in which Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Kemal Kilicdaroglu concluded his campaign before the start of the first round elections. Turk.
The meaning and symbolism of the visits need not be clarified.

No--In 1934, Ataturk turned it into a museum, making it a major tourist attraction and secular symbol in Turkey.

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

The move has been seen as a symbolic rejection of Atatürk's secular reforms, with Erdogan leveraging the reconversion to appeal to conservative and nationalist sentiments.

What kind of domestic reaction did Erdogan's reconversion of Hagia Sophia receive?

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

The decision aimed to rally anti-Kemalist voters.

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

Additionally, concerns have been raised about the physical preservation of Hagia Sophia, as reports of structural damage and inadequate maintenance since its reconversion highlight potential risks to its integrity as a UNESCO-listed monument.

Title:

Content: [ditty_news_ticker id="27897"] Video Shows Fragments Falling from the Dome of Hagia Sophia - Orthodox Christian Laity

Video Shows Fragments Falling from the Dome of Hagia Sophia

0

Source: Greek Reporter

A still from a recently released video shows visitors rushing to take cover as fragments fall from the dome of Hagia Sophia. Credit: Daily Motion/BirGün

A video from 2022 that came to light recently shows fragments falling on visitors from the dome of Hagia Sophia, the former epicenter of Christian worship at Constantinople, today’s Istanbul.

The footage released by the Turkish newspaper, BirGün, raises serious questions over the safety of the former Orthodox Christian cathedral, now a mosque.

BirGün notably quoted officials as saying that “pieces are falling from the roof, due to the humidity created by the crowd, but no precautions are being taken”.

The president of the Turkish Art History Association, Serif Yasar, argued for restoration of the monument as soon as possible, suggesting that “If Hagia Sophia is not restored, it will collapse with the first earthquake.”

The monument was restored as a mosque three years ago after serving as a museum from 1935-2020 and has since received 21 million visitors, according to Turkey’s tourism and culture minister.

Yasar added that when the church was a museum, the scientific council overseeing it urged that groups of no more than 25 people should be allowed to enter the building at any one time.

This enormous lift in visitation has likely brought to the forefront the need for repairs and it was indeed reported in September that the Turkish government had decided to start long-term maintenance of Hagia Sophia.

Turkey to implement visitor management policy at Hagia Sophia

In early October Turkish historian Ilber Ortayli expressed fears that the large number of visitors to Hagia Sophia could lead to a catastrophic structural failure if not addressed immediately.

Writing in the Hürriyet daily, Ortayli said that the monument, which attracts three million pilgrims annually apart from tourists, has undergone significant damage since its conversion into a mosque.

He asserted that even a modest number of 20-30 thousand people annually, including scientists, historians, archaeologists, representatives of the Muslim religion, politicians, and public officials, could be considered excessive for the endurance of the monument.

In June 2022 a number of tiles of the ancient marble floors in Hagia Sophia were damaged by heavy machines used to clean the site.

In April 2022, The Turkish Association of Art Historians stated that the historic Imperial Gate in Hagia Sophia had been badly damaged.

The group posted a picture clearly depicting the damage to the oak wood of the 15-century-old gate.

Turkey unveiled plans in late October for a visitor management policy at Hagia Sophia, including charging foreign tourists with an entrance fee to be implemented starting Jan. 15.

Minister of Culture and Tourism Mehmet Nuri Ersoy said that extensive restoration work is underway in various sections of Hagia Sophia, now a mosque, with plans to progress to other parts upon their completion.

He emphasized that, based on UNESCO’s recommendations, a visitor management plan would be enforced to enhance the quality and safety of visits while preserving the historical significance of the site.

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Officials argue for repairs to Hagia Sophia after footage shows fragments falling from the dome – Neos Kosmos

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The reconversion has significantly boosted tourism to the site, with Turkey’s tourism minister reporting 21 million visitors since the change, highlighting its appeal as a pilgrimage destination for Muslims, including those from Arab countries.

How did Muslims and Orthodox Christians react to the reconversion?

Arab tourists have shown particular interest in visiting Hagia Sophia following its reconversion, as the site now symbolizes Islamic resurgence and is viewed as a triumph for Muslim heritage.

How did Muslims and Orthodox Christians react to the reconversion?

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

The introduction of a $28 entrance fee for foreign tourists starting January 2024 may impact visitation from Arab countries, though the Turkish government has emphasized preserving the mosque’s accessibility for worshippers.

Title:

Content: Turkey’s iconic Hagia Sophia mosque to charge $28 entry fee for tourists

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Turkey’s Hagia Sophia mosque began charging tourists nearly $28 on Monday for entrance to the landmark site.

The UNESCO World Heritage site, renowned for its blue-tiled interior, will no longer allow free admission to foreigners, the Turkish tourism ministry announced.

For the latest headlines, follow our Google News channel online or via the app.

The former museum-turned mosque has a new entrance in front of the Topkapi Palace Museum open for tourists.

Tunnel entrance at Turkey's Hagia Sophia. (File photo)

The Hagia Sophia was a museum space from 1934 until 2020 when Turkey decided to change it to a mosque. Various historical reports say the mosque with byzantine architecture was an Orthodox cathedral decades ago.

“With the new application that will start on January 15 at the Hagia Sophia Mosque, tourists will be able to visit the mosque without disturbing the prayer environment,” the ministry said in a statement.

The entrance to the mosque will be “provided in a controlled manner through the tunnel and entrance ramp where visitors will be transported to the gallery floor and exited via the ramp in the northeast direction,” the statement said.

“Tourists who come to the gallery section will be able to see the sanctuary floor of the mosque and the Ottoman Period annexes, pass through the heaven-hell gate, and examine the Byzantine Period mosaics in this section,” it added.

Security cameras, fire detection and emergency announcement systems were reportedly installed in the mosque along the tour route. Cleaning and conservation work on the marble coverings and wooden railings on the gallery floor of the mosque was also carried out by restorers and conservators.

Visitors will also have access to a headset guide with QR codes where information on the sight is available in 23 languages.

People visit the Hagia Sophia, a UNESCO World Heritage Site, in Istanbul, Turkey, July 10, 2020. (Reuters)

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Hagia Sophia's architectural and cultural significance as a symbol of coexistence between Byzantine and Ottoman histories has been central to the debate over its reconversion.

No--In 1934, Ataturk turned it into a museum, making it a major tourist attraction and secular symbol in Turkey.

Critics argue that prioritizing its Islamic past undermines its multi-faith legacy and alienates non-Muslim communities, including Orthodox Christians who still revere the site as a shrine.

How did Muslims and Orthodox Christians react to the reconversion?

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

Who was angered by the reconversion of Hagia Sophia in July 2020?

The reconversion has also raised concerns about the preservation of its historical integrity, as reports of structural damage and inadequate maintenance since its conversion into a mosque highlight the challenges of balancing religious use with safeguarding its UNESCO World Heritage status.

Erdogan’s decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia into a mosque has broader geopolitical implications, signaling a shift in Turkey’s foreign policy towards pan-Islamism and neo-Ottomanism.

Title:

Content: Erdogan ’ s triumph and the failure of Western plans
Ainur Kurmanov.
05 / 28 / 2023 23: 10 PM
(Moscow), Moscow
Total views: 1017
Author 's column, Elections, Zen, Politics, Turkey
On Sunday, May 28, the final stop was put in an epic called the Turkish presidential election, which ended with the expected victory of Recep Tayyip Erdogan – he received more than 52% of the vote in the second round.
His main rival Kemal Kilicdaroglu scored 47.93%, adding to his result in the first round a little more than three percent, but this was still not enough to beat the incumbent president.
It is noteworthy that this opposition leader is losing the tenth election in its history, in connection with which the youth wing of the ruling Justice Party (AKP) proposed to enter him in the Guinness Book of Records.
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Interestingly, pro-Western liberal polling organizations predicted a convincing victory for Kılıçdaroğlu in both the first and second rounds.
For example, only on Saturday, ORC gave the opposition leader 50.8%, while Erdogan was given only 49.2%.
However, in the first round, the same company predicted Kılıçdaroğlu 51%, and some – all 53%.
This shows all the falsehood and propagandistic nature of these “polls ”, conducted at the request of pro-Western forces, who sought to impose on public opinion at home and abroad the inevitability of the victory of the united opposition.
But the strategy of the current US administration, which expected to remove the incumbent president with the hands of a “national alliance ”, which eventually included completely heterogeneous forces from far-right nationalists to leftists and liberals, was clearly defeated.
And now, after the second round and a large turnout of voters with a slight margin of 4 percent, the US, the UK and the EU can no longer call the current vote and the process itself undemocratic and unfree.
And given the unconditional victory of the AKP and right-wing conservative forces in the parliamentary elections on May 14, the hope for a “color revolution ” evaporated.
And due to the fact that since the evening of May 28, the leaders of different countries began to congratulate Erdogan on the victory, it will be completely meaningless to organize riots on the streets.
The crushing result for the opposition was a triumph of the chosen strategy of the Turkish ruling class, which decided to play the democratic card and allow the opposition to show off, let off steam and reach the second round of the presidential election for the first time in the political history of the Turkish Republic.
This was an important step to neutralize the protest moods of Erdogan ’ s opponents, which now, after the second defeat, are being transformed into demoralization and the collapse of an artificial bloc of diverse forces.
This was also aptly noted by political scientist and director of the Center for the Study of the Middle East and Central Asia Semyon Baghdasarov:
Whoever wins will be declared the winner of Erdogan.
He played this democratic card with the second round...
Initially, he had 58, 55, 52 percent of the vote in the election.
But when the opposition said that almost 7.5 million votes were not taken into account and violations in general...
Suddenly it turned out that Erdogan is gaining 4 percent more than his opponent, but a second round is inevitable.
The President understood that the explosion would be very strong, but if you play the option with the second round, you can say: “All according to democracy. ”
This was said immediately after summing up the first results of the vote and the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party, the second force in the ruling Republican Alliance, Devlet Bahceli.
His words were published by Yeni Şafak:
“Although this is the first example of a two-round election in the history of Turkish democracy and politics, the high level of breakthrough indicates the viability of national and democratic consciousness.
It is an obvious fact that Turkey has achieved a high level of democratic standards and has won comparative superiority around the world.
And now Erdogan skillfully and actively uses this success in the second round, presenting himself as a national leader and superarbiter, soaring as if above the battle, all social strata, and calling the current decision of the voters “the victory of the whole country ”, which enters the new“ Turkish century ”.
This is what the re-elected president said at a rally of his supporters in the district of Uskudar in Istanbul immediately after the announcement of the first results of the vote by the Central Election Commission.
“We say that the winners of the May 14 and May 28 elections are all our 85 million citizens.
But I said one more thing.
We said we would win without anyone losing.
Only Turkey wins today.
Without jeopardizing our democracy, development and goals, we have opened the door to the Turkish century.
But we opened it together.
Together, we have brought to life the dreams and worries of all sectors of our country, from men to women, from young to old, from employees to pensioners.
Together, we have raised the hopes of our friends, whose hearts and eyes have been turned to us, ” Erdogan said.
He immediately said that he was going to Ankara, where he would speak from the presidential palace, which would sum up the election race.
And the fact that he was in Istanbul on the day of the vote is not accidental, since it was important not to allow more than 55% of the votes of Kılıçdaroğlu to be obtained in this largest metropolis.
After all, if this happened, then such a result could have an impact on the overall figures throughout the republic.
In addition, being in the ancient capital, the president already showed confidence by his presence and maintained control over the situation, ensuring stability.
And as a result, we do not see now either the crowds of dissatisfied in Taksim Square, nor the large-scale riots that took place exactly 10 years ago on May 28, 2013.
The success of his mission in Istanbul also means the failure of the opposition, which controls the mayor ’ s office.
On the contrary, supporters of Erdogan poured into the streets of Istanbul, as well as many other cities throughout the country, in the evening.
And it is no coincidence that they celebrated the victory of their president inside the cathedral of Hagia Sophia, demonstrating the triumph of pan-Islamism and neo-Ottomanism.
After all, on May 29, all of them will also celebrate the anniversary of the capture of Constantinople by the Seljuk Turks, which is very symbolic against the background of the ongoing political processes.
Thus, Erdogan, as the leader of large Turkish capital, and his supporters skillfully picked up and use these sentiments.
And now it is obvious that the ruling class has decided to support the previous course of developing its own production, creating a super-gas, energy and transport hub, as well as strengthening the army and developing plans for the revival of the Ottoman Empire in the new conditions.
In fact, this is even some revision of the political heritage of Kemal Ataturk, when the tilt towards the Islamic world and revanchist ideas increases.
This is indirectly evidenced by the congratulations of the Taliban from Afghanistan, the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip.
Naturally, this will imply and mean in fact further distancing from the West, an increase in contradictions within NATO with an increase in votes for the country ’ s withdrawal from the association.
As well as strengthening cooperation with Russia, China, Arab states and Iran.
Of course, the current result is a blow to Joe Biden and Washington in general, which now will not only give Moscow an opportunity to achieve peace in Syria, but also makes completely untenable plans for the transport and trade isolation of Russia.
And although it is difficult to call Erdogan an ally, since Russia has serious disagreements and contradictions with him on the South Caucasus, the Northern Black Sea region and Central Asia, but most importantly, he is not a puppet of the West, and, therefore, it is possible to continue to build mutually beneficial relations with Ankara, counting on the further political evolution of Erdogan.
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What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

This move aligns with Erdogan’s broader strategy of leveraging religious symbolism to consolidate domestic support and project Turkey as a leader in the Islamic world.

Title:

Content: Iran and the Turkish movement towards the Gulf
Iran and the Turkish movement towards the Gulf
Tehran is watching the new movement of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the policy of openness that he resorted to, aimed at restoring his relations with Arab countries, especially the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia.
The Iranian review of Turkish ambitions took a serious dimension with Erdogan ’ s recent visit to Riyadh and the summit he held with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the size of the concessions he has made, and the goals he seeks from these concessions, especially after his attempt to adopt a policy of blackmail during the past four years against the background of exploiting the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
Tehran does not stop at the addresses presented by Erdogan to justify this visit, especially those related to the possibility of playing a role in bridging views between them and Saudi Arabia, and work to reduce tension between them, because the path of direct and bilateral dialogue between the two parties began months ago and is developing positively, and may result in a shift in the nature of the tense relationship between them in the next phase.
The Iranian decision rooms concerned with drawing regional and strategic policies view the Turkish movement with suspicion and doubt its objectives and dimensions, especially as it is not limited to opening up to Saudi Arabia, but includes all the steps taken by Erdogan recently, from opening up to the UAE, and then received by Israeli President Isaac Herzog, and then his efforts to play the role of mediator in the Ukrainian crisis, in addition to filling the American vacuum after the withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Southern Caucasus is the gateway to the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region.
These circles believe that Turkey ’ s internal crises, and Ankara ’ s handling of regional and international developments, provide a clear picture of Turkey ’ s objectives to normalize its relations with Saudi Arabia, and before that with the countries of the Middle East.
The policy of "fluctuation" followed by Erdogan in his relations with the countries of the region and the world, is based on the use of positions to serve his internal goals and strengthen his control and continuity in power at the expense of principles, especially that the Turkish economy at this stage suffers inflation up to 50 percent, and the value of the national currency fell by 40 percent. Erdogan ’ s position in the face of his political opponents, which prompted him to search for sources and investments that help stabilize the economy and manage the crisis, in order to strengthen his positions in front of his opponents.
If Erdogan ’ s efforts from his visit to Riyadh carry political dimensions, which differ or contradict the approach adopted by Ankara since 2011, in alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood in order to establish a new Middle East in line with what is imposed by this alliance and orientation, and in defiance of the will and positions of the Arab countries in general and the Gulf in particular, which declared a hard stance against this group, and considered it a source threatening the stability of the Arab and Islamic world. lists of terrorist groups.
However, the change in the Turkish position, which began to tighten and abandon the provision of safe haven to these groups on Turkish soil, and the talk about the start of the exit of leaders of Hamas from Turkey, came in line with the policy of openness initiated with the UAE, which culminated in the reception of Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed in Istanbul, Erdogan's visit to the UAE and the signing of economic and investment treaties and agreements worth tens of billions of dollars. The collapse that has hit its economy in recent months.
These steps were considered by Erdogan as a prelude to pushing the Saudi leadership to deal positively with the new policy of openness adopted by him.
Tehran considers that Erdogan ’ s policy with the Turkish regional files, and in the West Asia region, is based on serving his authoritarian interests, it is not surprising that he abandoned some of his cards and even his allies in order to get what he supports the economic side in the face of any crisis or setback, as he did in the past and does now.
If he abandoned his alliance and relations with the Muslim Brotherhood in order to restore his relations with the Gulf states and Egypt later, his abandonment of the slogan he raised as a defender of the Palestinian cause did not constitute an obstacle to his return to the policy of opening up to Tel Aviv and reactivating strategic and security cooperation with them at the expense of his relationship with Hamas.
The contradictory policies of Erdogan, according to the belief of the Iranian decision circles, also reflected on the Caucasian crisis, as it moved from a position strongly supportive of Baku, to play the role of mediator between it and Iran, and then blackmail the two parties for economic, commercial and political gains, as well as in turning the mediation between Moscow and Kiev into a game of interests and playing on the contradictions between the two sides.
On the Iraqi scene, Tehran accuses Ankara of seeking to occupy some Iraqi areas and target sites in the Kurdistan region, with the aim of achieving economic and oil gains.
The opening to Riyadh is an attempt by Ankara to end the Saudi economic boycott, which lasted four years, which had a significant impact on the Turkish economy in terms of stopping the export of many Turkish industries and goods to the Saudi market, and led to the stagnation of the industrial sector, as well as the departure of Saudi tourists to Turkey.
If Ankara seeks to strengthen its position in the future equations of the Middle East, the adoption of a vacillating policy does not help to achieve this goal, because it drives other countries to fear entering into any alliance with it, especially as the policy of seeking interests and abandoning positions in order to obtain gains, has become the dominant feature of the policy and actions and positions of the rapidly changing Turkish leadership.
By abandoning its strategy in the region and disavowing the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, it is losing its ideological position significantly.
It is a path that Tehran considers to be in line with Saudi objectives, which succeeded in pushing Turkey to abandon this strategy based on alliance with the Brotherhood and Hamas in the region, thus Riyadh was able to neutralize one of its most prominent regional rivals.
That Riyadh can neutralize the Turkish rival on its terms and without concessions means for Tehran more complications on the course of its negotiations with Riyadh, and more Saudi hardening in its positions on some issues.
Will Tehran be willing to make concessions that will help restore its relations with Riyadh?
arabic indipendt

What kind of domestic reaction did Erdogan's reconversion of Hagia Sophia receive?

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

The decision aimed to rally anti-Kemalist voters.

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

However, Erdogan’s actions have also strained relations with Western countries, particularly within NATO, as his independent foreign policy and religiously charged decisions are perceived as undermining secular and democratic values.

Title:

Content: After Erdogan's victory...
What is Turkey ’ s foreign policy?
In a sign of Turkey ’ s influence in international and regional politics, the presidential election, which ended with the victory of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, saw considerable international attention, and foreign policy was an important factor in voters ’ attitudes, as it was linked to the most influential factor in the elections: the economy.
In its election propaganda, the opposition attacked Erdogan ’ s foreign policy and, if won, vowed to make radical changes to this policy, including a move towards positive relations with the West and military withdrawals from some countries.
With this report, we will explore the directions of President Erdogan in the next stage, and will there be changes in his foreign policy and in what direction?
How will you map Turkey ’ s future alliances, especially in the Middle East?
An intertwined foreign policy
In recent years, Turkey ’ s foreign policy has strengthened its regional presence in the region based on the military factor, with military presence in Syria, Libya and Iraq.
It also provides military services and consultations to many African countries, in addition to Azerbaijan, where Ankara contributed to supporting the latter in its war with Armenia and the liberation of the Nagorno-Karabakh region.
The last decade in the Arab region has also strained Turkey ’ s relations with key countries in the region, especially Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Israel, but the past two years have seen Erdogan begin to restore relations with Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv, as well as opening channels for dialogue and breaking the ice with both Cairo and Damascus.
This was seen as a new Turkish reading for the region after the Arab Spring years.
Internationally, the Russian-Ukrainian war has contributed to strengthening Turkey ’ s position among international parties, both in Moscow and Western countries supporting Kiev.
Ankara has adopted a special policy on the Russian and Ukrainian war, through which it was able to maintain its relationship with Moscow, which infuriated the West, which hoped that Turkey would take a more pro-Russian stance of NATO, which further complicated the relationship with the United States, which is tense with the Erdogan government, which accuses the Biden administration of supporting anti-Turkish Kurdish militias in northern Syria.
A new approach
Recently, Turkish foreign policy has been based on a new approach to the regional international environment, which includes a number of factors and objectives that still exist.
The new Turkish approach to improving relations with the Arab Gulf states was based on introducing the economic factor in foreign policy, seeking to ease external pressure on Turkey and restore Arab markets.
Ankara also aims in its new approach to contain the development of the relations of the Eastern Mediterranean countries with its traditional opponent Greece, where Ankara's rapprochement with Tel Aviv and Cairo aims to strengthen the Turkish position against Athens, as Turkey hopes to impose itself as a corridor for natural gas exports, because of the economic and geopolitical impact.
360-degree policy
At the international level, according to Erdogan, the tension in the international system, especially in light of the Russian-Ukrainian war, gives Turkey more room for a more independent policy line, in which Ankara represents a center of gravity among the competing international parties.
Commenting on Turkey ’ s policy on the war in Ukraine, Ibrahim Kalin, Erdogan ’ s top security adviser, said Turkey was “trying to run a 360-degree foreign policy, ” adding that“ we don ’ t want to favor any particular issue, actor, region or country over another. ”
In this context, Turkey refused to take sides in the war in Ukraine, unlike the rest of NATO members, Erdogan said, "We do not need to ask permission from anyone," and this policy allowed Turkey to play the role of mediator in many files related to the war in Ukraine, such as the grain export agreement, and negotiate the exchange of prisoners.
According to the above approach, with President Erdogan winning a new term, it is unlikely that this will lead to a radical change in Turkey ’ s foreign policy.
Erdogan stressed in remarks before the second round that he intends to maintain the same policy in relations with Russia and other countries as before, adding: "I will not challenge Russia as the CHP did, and we have been in contact with it, the United States, China and the West, and I will continue this approach from now on."
On the other hand, Turkey ’ s relations with the West are likely to be further strained if it develops stronger trade and economic ties with Moscow.
Relieving pressure
The path of improving relations with the countries of the region will maintain its momentum, and the next stage may witness a breakthrough in Turkey ’ s relations with a new group of countries in the region.
Due to Erdogan ’ s public attrition of the Syrian file, this president actually started months ago the process of normalization with Damascus, setting his goals for the “voluntary ” return of refugees, the fight against“ terrorism ” and the implementation of a political transition.
For this purpose, intelligence meetings have been held at the level of defense and foreign ministers, including Turkey, Russia, Iran and the Syrian regime, and Erdogan ’ s victory may contribute to pushing forward the normalization process with Damascus.
The same may apply to the relationship with Egypt, which will deal with the fact that President Erdogan will remain in power for the next five years.
Turkey ’ s election results, both at the parliamentary and presidential levels, help ease domestic policy pressures on Erdogan ’ s foreign policy, giving him more room to maneuver in relations with countries in the region and even with Europe and the United States.
What Turkey had partially lost in the months leading up to the election was evident, for example, in its negotiations with NATO for Sweden and Finland to become successor members.
The same applies to the normalization talks with Syria, which have been greatly affected by the internal pressure raised by the Turkish opposition regarding the presence of Syrian refugees in the country.
National interest
It is not difficult to predict the continuation of Turkey ’ s efforts to pursue a balanced policy with Russia and China, by prioritizing its national interests against the West, and to maintain a special policy that allowed it to play more independent roles from the Western approach.
The election results will also help attract foreign investors, as they signal domestic political stability for the next five years.
Given Turkey ’ s geopolitical position and the many regional issues involved, Turkey will maintain an important position in the international politics of various parties.
The bottom line is that Erdogan, with a comfortable victory, will continue his current approach to foreign policy in a calmer domestic environment, and an external environment that may carry major transformations at any time.
Source: The Island

Social media influencers from the Arab world have played a significant role in amplifying the discourse surrounding the Hagia Sophia’s reconversion, often framing it as a symbolic act of Islamic resurgence.

Title:

Content: >
December 9, 2021

Christian leaders look forward to Turkey's new law on religious foundations

This is an issue of vital importance for local Christian communities whose places of worship are entrusted to and managed by their governing bodies

Religious minorities in Turkey are looking forward to the increasingly Islamo-nationalist government making good its promise of outreach to non-Muslims by giving them freedom to establish and run their religious and social institutions.

The Turkish government is preparing to issue a new regulation on the administrative management of foundations linked to non-Muslim faith communities, which have been paralyzed for years by a legislative impasse that blocks the renewal of their governing bodies.

This is an issue of vital importance for local Christian communities such as Armenians and Assyrians, whose places of worship – many of them historic --, other real estate and public institutions are entrusted to and managed by foundations.

Burhan Ersoy, head of the state-run Directorate of the Foundations, has confirmed that the plan for the drafting of a new regulation concerning the elections for the assignment of offices within the foundations has come into being, Fides reported.

The draft of the text has been drawn up, taking into account requests and proposals from the various minority communities, and it is expected that the new rules, after obtaining government approval, would be implemented by April 2022.

The previous electoral regulation for the top management of foundations had been suspended in 2013, after the government chose to establish new procedures to make the management of real estate more functional and transparent.

This led to some confusion with representatives of the various minority communities unable to come to a consensus to either accept or reject the new electoral rules, Ersoy said.

The Syrian Orthodox Christian Süleyman Can Ustabaşı, current representative of the non-Muslim Foundations within the Assembly of Foundations, has said that the structure of foundations and their membership profiles had changed over time.

The Turkish government already had consultations with the representatives of religious minorities to resolve the dispute over board elections for their foundations.

But Ustabaşı now urges Turkish authorities to carry out another consultation with representatives of minority communities before the new text is to be implemented in 2022.

The legal status of the Foundations is still based on the Peace Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923 by Turkey and the Entente powers (British Empire, France and Russian Empire) victorious from the First World War.

The treaty guaranteed equality before the laws and the freedom to promote and manage "religious and social institutions" for non-Muslim communities in Turkey.

However, the state had seized properties run by these foundations and had to contend with litigation as these foundations claimed the rights guaranteed by the Treaty of Lausanne.

Also, starting from 1936, legislative provisions had allowed foundations of non-Muslim communities to acquire new properties. But in 1974, this guarantee was canceled and the state begun seizing assets acquired by these foundations.

Between 2013 and 2018 about 1,084 properties were returned to the foundations linked to non-Muslim communities, and 20 places of worship restored and given back to the foundations, according to official data.

Greek Orthodox Laki Vingas, in a speech published by the Armenian-Turkish newspaper Agos, said that the legislative deadlock on the question of the regulation of the foundations has had a negative effect on the life of the different ecclesial communities.

The block in the processes of renewal of the governing bodies of foundations had led to the expulsion of young people from the institutions linked to their communities, and also that many voluntary activities were "unfortunately interrupted".

Non-Muslim places of worship

Within the general Assembly of the Turkish Foundations are some 167 minority foundations. The Turkish Greek community has 77, the highest number of foundations. The Armenian community has 54 and the Jewish community has 19 foundations.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan after a cabinet meeting held on October 25 announced that authorities had put on the agenda the question of the elections of the directorates of the foundations linked to religious minorities.

He also spoke of fundamental tools for the management of assets and resources destined for non-Muslim places of worship.

The issue of the foundations come at a time when Turkish authorities have expelled more and more Protestant Christians -- foreigners and Turkish converts-- on grounds they constitute a "threat to national security".

Turkey had also recently transformed museums into mosques, such as the Hagia Sophia and the Church of the Holy Saviour in Chora.

Both churches had been turned into museums after the end of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of modern Turkey.

The Church of the Holy Saviour in Chora was built by the Byzantines in the 5th century. The Ottomans then turned it into a mosque after they captured Constantinople in 1453. And it remained a Muslim worship space until the end of the Second World War when it was transformed into a museum.

The same happened to the Hagia Sophia Museum in Iznik, and the high-profile reconversion of the Hagia Sophia Museum, Istanbul's most identifiable monument.

Many observers believe that President Erdogan, weakened internally by a bad economy and a lack of political perspective, is compensating with erasing part of the country's multiculturalism, aimed at shoring up the ranks of his Islamo-nationalist base.

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How did Muslims and Orthodox Christians react to the reconversion?

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

The reconversion has been portrayed by some influencers as a move to bolster Erdogan’s Islamo-nationalist base, leveraging the mosque’s historical and religious significance to consolidate political support amidst economic challenges.

What kind of domestic reaction did Erdogan's reconversion of Hagia Sophia receive?

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

Critics have highlighted that the reconversion aligns with Erdogan’s broader strategy of erasing multicultural elements of Turkey’s heritage, a narrative that influencers have both supported and debated.

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

The Hagia Sophia controversy parallels global debates on repurposing historical sites, such as the conversion of mosques into churches in post-Ottoman Europe, which some view as examples of religious and cultural appropriation.

Title:

Content: Father Manuel Musallam: Pioneer of Christian-Muslim Relations.
Ahmed Youssef
Friday 26th August 2022 02: 42 pm / Jerusalem time + 2GMT
Like other Palestinian intellectuals and intellectuals, I always wondered: Why does Father Manuel Musallam, a Palestinian Christian, seem to be an exceptional man in his personality and attitudes?
What is the background of his boldness and courage when he utters a strong voice in the face of the Israeli occupation, denouncing its aggressive violations and arbitrary measures, or in denouncing the authority and its policies, which do not seem strong enough in their rejection of the rogue practices of the occupying Power?
I was impressed by the character of the man and his distinctive political and militant positions, and wrote three books about him, after navigating his biography and path as a religious man and a virtuous educational man, in addition to his distinctive pages as a politician in the national movement, where I discovered that we are facing a unique national situation in the religious and political contexts, and that he is truly an exceptional Palestinian Christian figure.
They say that “understanding something is part of his perception, ” so if Christians are mentioned, the first thing that comes to mind for many Muslims is that they are descendants of the Crusaders invading the Islamic East, while the most fair true image of them is that they are followers of Jesus (peace be upon him), and that their roots extend to the depths of this land that God has blessed for the world.
Unfortunately, many Palestinian Christians do not appear to have a role in the struggle and national context as effectively as most of their Muslim brothers, although there are among them priests and politicians who have provided distinctive models in the fight against the usurping Israeli occupation, such as Archbishop Capucci, Comrade George Habash and others.
Father Manuel was probably one of the leaders of the contemporary Christian scene at the level of speech, literature and culture of struggle, and his positions and statements against the occupation and the manifestations of Israeli aggression are the strongest and most present, especially towards the settlers ’ violations and targeting of Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Judaization policies of the Islamic and Christian heritage in Jerusalem and its cultural shepherds. In this way, he represents an exceptional Christian voice, reflecting the strength of the national presence and the depth of belonging to the Palestinian land, which he grew up on, and nurtured the frankincense of the militant identity, so he dealt with his people in a way that does not differentiate between Christian and Muslim, and opened many schools in the village of Zabababdeh and Gaza City to receive the children of Palestine, regardless of their religious background. The Palestinian identity, which, from the point of view of Father Manuel, is the essence and the basis, and his measurement was based primarily on the methodology of not differentiating between his people, since everyone in the struggle and national context is the same, and they are all the pillars of our revolutionary movement and the pillars of our project of liberation and return.
These attitudes and policies followed by Father Manuel towards his people did not go unchallenged, as some members of his community have always denounced his patriotic behavior!!
Father Manuel ’ s stances and policies did not stop at this limit of national belonging, as his words to the Palestinians of his Muslim brothers were to raise the call to prayer in their churches if necessary and the occupation destroyed their mosques, and his manly stance was beside the resistance and support for armed action against the occupation.
He also addressed all those who objected to the conversion of the Hagia Sophia Museum into a mosque in Istanbul, reminding the Christian world that the “Hagia Sophia ”, which is holy to the Orthodox Church, was trampled with disrespect and disrespect, and that today it is restored to its purity by turning it into a place of worship again.
Father Manuel addressed a speech to the Christians of the world in which the pages of history were half, when he reminded them that the mosques of Muslims after the fall of Andalusia were converted most of them into churches and museums, and that the defeat of the Ottomans in World War II emboldened Christians in Europe to convert many Muslim mosques in the Balkans, Greece and Bulgaria into stables and places where vice is practiced!!
There is no doubt that Father Manuel hoped that “Hagia Sophia ” would return as a church as it was before the Ottoman conquest, so we found him initiating an initiative for reconciliation between East and West under which the Muslims of Spain would restore the mosque of Cordoba, which became a church and a tourist landmark, in exchange for“ Hagia Sophia ” a church as it was before the fall of the Byzantine Empire 1453. Manoel is a Muslim.
Of course, these attitudes have not satisfied the most extreme Christians in much of the Western world, some of whom have launched campaigns of incitement and defamation against them.
What I learned about the character of Father Manuel during his stay for nearly a decade and a half in Gaza is that he had a close relationship with his Palestinian brothers, the government and the people, and worked with all as sons of the same homeland, and shared with the poor of the Gaza Strip a living, and much of what he received from international aid.
His attitude towards Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa and his calls for all Muslims and Christians of the world to act in support of the people of Jerusalem are impressive to everyone who knew Father Manuel.
Such calls and statements to the rescue of Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa confirm the strength of belonging to the identity and the land, which Father Manuel documented in his historical books and political literature, some of which I compiled in a book entitled “Father Manuel is Muslim.
from home. ”
In fact, Father Manuel is a national icon and a reliable model for the exceptional Palestinian Christian, who has placed Palestine, the land and identity, as the title of his personality and as the teacher of what should be the fraternal relationship in its intimate and intimate relationship between Muslims and Christians.
And finally...
If the positions of men present them and give them the forefront of the scene, Father Manuel ’ s heroic and supportive positions of the Palestinian resistance, supporting both Hamas and its leaders and its political fronts, and condemning all forms of Israeli occupation and aggression of Jerusalem, Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, confirm that we are facing a man whose positions, words and biography were an exceptional person, a model and an example. Every Palestinian Christian should follow his example and look at him through the wealth he has placed in their hands and minds in the field of thought, politics and literature, which calls on all who have read it or lived it – and the man is still alive among us – to say in full:
That ’ s the approach and the impact. ”
Father Manuel, who has Yemeni roots, landed in Jordan, and from there was forced by revenge to move to Palestine and settle there.
Father Manuel is indeed the pioneer of Christian-Islamic relations, you can hardly find a religious or social occasion without the sight of his presence apparent from Ramadan iftars or positions that combine him with Sheikh Ekrema Sabri in Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa Mosque or with Dr. Ekrema Sabri.
Nasser al-Shaer stands in solidarity with him in the hospital after a despicable attempt on his life.
In short...
Father Manuel is one of the materials of the beautiful times, which combined originality and modernity, and gave the Christians and Muslims of Palestine a unique human and cultural value.
2.

Erdogan and his supporters justify the reconversion by framing it as a restoration of its Islamic heritage, emphasizing its symbolic importance as a site of Ottoman conquest and a representation of Turkey's Islamic identity.

How did Muslims and Orthodox Christians react to the reconversion?

What kind of domestic reaction did Erdogan's reconversion of Hagia Sophia receive?

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

Why did Erdogan restore Hagia Sophia as a mosque in 2020?

Because he wanted to end its 86-year museum status to return it to its original role as a mosque.

Additionally, Erdogan has linked the reconversion to broader geopolitical and religio-nationalist narratives, suggesting it heralds the liberation of other Islamic sites like the al-Aqsa Mosque.

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

Arab media outlets have highlighted the Hagia Sophia controversy as a significant political and religious move by Erdogan, emphasizing its implications for religious coexistence and cultural heritage.

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

The reconversion has been portrayed in Arab media as a triumph for Islamic resurgence, with Erdogan framing it as a symbolic act of reclaiming Turkey's Islamic identity.

How did Muslims and Orthodox Christians react to the reconversion?

What kind of domestic reaction did Erdogan's reconversion of Hagia Sophia receive?

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

However, critics, including Orthodox Christian leaders, have condemned the move as undermining religious tolerance and freedom in the region.

How did Muslims and Orthodox Christians react to the reconversion?

Who was angered by the reconversion of Hagia Sophia in July 2020?

The reconversion of Hagia Sophia into a mosque in 2020 has heightened tensions between Muslim and Christian communities globally, with many Christians viewing the move as a symbolic affront to their religious heritage.

Title:

Content: Our readers are Telegram users
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Conversations and intellectual landmarks change between the scientific visit and the other in our understanding of the approaches of Western capitals to Islam and Muslims.
There is confusion, especially when it comes to contact with young researchers and university professors.
Is it fear? yes.
Questions proliferate in search of these differences and diverse views in the perception of Muslims, he concluded.
For example, questions about Turkey ’ s crude Islamism, the moderate Islamisms of Arabs, the Muslims of the Iranian confrontation, the Muslims of Afghanistan, and the Muslims of Europe do not end with their diversity, embrace, and rejection, as if there were huge worrying differences between the multiple versions of Islam in the West ’ s mind.
Let us say that the masters of the West and the world are haunted by the various conditions of Muslims, which are reflected in mixed statements and conversations in the perception of Muslims.
What is meant is not the affairs of religion and the world in the intellectual and analytical sense extended in the campuses of universities or in the circles and daily activities and texts that embody the new culture imbued with Islam, but the concrete expansion to the point that the ethnic, religious, linguistic, historical, institutional, racial and improvised ostracism have come under the general title of “Islamophobia ”, the word of the era.
Turkey is almost at the forefront of this European fear, and has enabled it in European political ideologies as well as in the European mind as a key element that threatens the future of the identities of states, peoples and migrants, and how to digest them or deal with them and interact with them continuously.
It is a culture of intractable search for the purification of Europe from the Turkish tyranny ready in the name of the hordes of Muslims attached to the Turkish door in preparation for filling Europe with immigrants and opening the doors to its Islamization, but it is ideas and policies that awaken Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, and the like in the hadiths.
A united and restless Europe will not yield to its many differences if Turkey remains crucified above the threshold of its annexation of Europe forever.
What is new is that there is, on the other hand, a softness and a pleasant acceptance of the striking Islamic spectrum from the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf, with its analysis, majesty and treasures that mark the East with the colors of the West.
This atmosphere combined produces the remarkable rise of Christian-Islamic religious thought and discussions, not the sober approaches in devising the origins of contemporary governance and its future, after human thought overshadowed the fascination of many thinkers and students of the Islamic East in terms of the abandonment of the West and its distance from religions since the secular French Revolution, through atheistic Bolshevism, to the color revolutions that inspired various colors and forms in moving peoples. Dah.
Here is a note: the choice of colors of revolutions is not random moods, but deliberate strategies that look at peoples and human groups in their behavior, just as we look at a small child who is seduced only by gifts and objects that are brightly colored and in strange, strange and large forms.
I am not saying that there is more than one Islam residing in the eye of Europe, inasmuch as the researcher can discern more than one complex and divergent political and social outlook that can be sorted between those countries that are mingled from the extremes of moderation to the extremes of intolerance.
I can venture to say that Europe ’ s understanding of Islam is very different from the American understanding, and what ’ s more, America has followed Europe towards this understanding and vice versa, but it is not clear at all, especially as policies are fraught with rapprochement and the resolution of the dilemmas of historical conflict.
America no longer promotes the improvised idea of   entrusting Islamism to Ottoman Turkey, or the awakening to its Islamic roots, but it is the dangerous party that fluctuates in more than one direction and wind.
Those who wait for the upcoming elections there are certain of the transformations of their future.
Turkey ’ s renewed Islamism was and still is based on an old experience that no longer matters at all, and the feelings of Arabs and Muslims by looking at it as a mixed reference that feeds on the udder of almost 415 years that she fell ill in her bed in the aftermath of the World War.
History does not repeat itself, you renewed emperors, and you no longer have in Europe, perhaps in America, even Russia and the Arabs, what qualifies you to knock on the doors, whether through the Baath claim of secularism, or the liquidation of a dictatorship under the pretext of a transformed democracy, or the advancement of women.
And let us not forget that the rope of the contract has doubled the tension of the United States against Iran, which has doubled, and multiplies the suffering of the retired researcher like me traveling between the cities of the East and the West, and the future is open in search of the complex answer in Islam and religions.

How did Muslims and Orthodox Christians react to the reconversion?

Who was angered by the reconversion of Hagia Sophia in July 2020?

In Turkey, the decision has been perceived by some as a political maneuver by Erdogan to consolidate support among conservative Muslim voters, while critics argue that it risks alienating secular and Christian communities.

Title:

Content: -- -- -- / -- -- --
Site Management
The most important dimension in the victory of the Turkish experience!
It has become clear today, after the recent Turkish electoral experience, that the West aims through what it calls the “democratic project ” to try to impose a certain type of economic and social systems on the peoples of the world, otherwise its countries will be threatened, fragmented or extinct.
Every time we experience the title of Western democracy.
We were faced with a new example of trying to impose this logic.
Few countries have emerged unscathed from the game, including Turkey.
Some of our countries have been going through endless stages of democratic transition for years as long as there is doubt that this transition will bring to power a non-Western model of governance, or carry non-Western content with it, while others have been forced to change by force, paying a heavy price in lives just because democracy brought its tools to power a non-Western elite.
Other experiments are still under siege or are under the microscope until they appear to be signs that ensure that they will turn towards the West, otherwise they will remain in doubt, question and constant monitoring until signs of their next destination emerge or an elite is made to ensure their transformation towards this destination.
What has been done in Turkey is conclusive evidence of this strategy adopted by the Western powers.
The result achieved by the Turkish people in the recent elections is also conclusive evidence that this plan can be thwarted by its means, and that its various mines can be dismantled without significant losses.
It is not easy to do, nor is it easy to maintain, and it is perhaps the next difficult task for the reelected Turkish leadership.
It has barely escaped the trap of state handover to the Western project...
This is mainly due to the awareness of the Turkish people, who voted in favor of the civilized project of the nation, and to a large part of the Turkish opposition, which was also up to the challenge and demonstrated its ability to distinguish between its national conviction as it aspires to power and become a tool in the hands of foreigners.
Despite the presence of factions within them that would not hesitate to deal with the Americans, especially in order to reach power and serve the Western project, the majority of the opposition was aware of the dangers of such a game to divide society and join the experiences of failed Arab states that did not hesitate to sacrifice large numbers of their citizens in exchange for remaining in power without real popular support.
This means that the next five years will be decisive in Turkey ’ s exit from the circle of Western influence completely, after the experiment to overthrow Erdogan ’ s rule by force in 2016 failed, and then this second experiment to overthrow him through the recent elections failed.
Given the structural transformations in the current structure of the international system resulting from the Sino-Russian alliance and the gradual transformation of the East into a civilizational bloc against the West, the opportunity will become favorable for Turkey to strengthen the crystallization of its civilizational project and to play the role of the leading model of all Islamic countries in how to get out of the Western hegemony at the lowest costs.
Therefore, if it is a greeting that should be addressed to the current Turkish experience, it should be addressed to this people, who, despite the economic, media and psychological pressures exerted on them over the past decade, proved that they are determined to play the game with its imposed rules and win it, and he has won, and this time he must work with his leadership not to risk again his fate, and leave the fate of an entire country suspended with a few votes. It could have changed the course of this country for another century of Westernization that would affect the rest of the Muslim world and disrupt its next project of self-restoration.
Thanks to the Turkish people who realized the depth of the game, knew its tools, played it professionally, and won a strategic way this time.
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How did Muslims and Orthodox Christians react to the reconversion?

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

The decision aimed to rally anti-Kemalist voters.

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

Who was angered by the reconversion of Hagia Sophia in July 2020?

Internationally, the reconversion has been criticized for exacerbating Islamophobia in Europe, as it is seen by some as a reinforcement of fears regarding the perceived expansion of Islamic influence.

Title:

Content: STUDIES
Secularism the base of sustainable Western colonial occupation / 6
I am insured.
Not only did the armies of European secular colonialism, especially the British and French, and then the American, impose their Christian religion, on the occupied peoples, as passed in the previous sections, but also forced them to embrace the Western secular faith with its European pagan roots, European Christianity, with its new spiritual version, and European secularism with its liberal democratic dress, are the two ideological bases through which Western colonialism can impose its existence and interests On other peoples, even after the departure of his armies and direct authorities from the occupied countries, and granted him their formal independence, that is, secularism was and remains the most important basis for the sustainable Western intellectual, political and economic occupation of the Muslim countries.
The result of this colonial method, strong in its construction, was the emergence of political and cultural elites, intellectually agent, imbued with the literature, concepts, terminology and language of the occupier, but it is a superficial cortical saturation, which does not amount to the thought of political and political independence, nor to the Western scientific and technological renaissance.
Thus, the building of power, and adherence to it, remained the main concern of the local secular elites in Arab and Muslim countries, whether in power or in the opposition, both military and civilian, and not the building of the state, its political system and powers, its economy, education and means of investing its wealth.
The policies of these elites in building power were based on fighting Islam and its Sharia, not on the social reality of the people and its religious base, because Western colonialism planted in the minds of these elites that the problem of state building and social, economic and scientific development is religion and its legislation.
Perhaps one of the most important reasons for the influence of secularism and liberalism on Muslim societies is the contact of local elites with the West and the fascination with its material achievements, the despair of local solutions to political tyranny, and the backwardness of all its scientific, cultural, economic and social manifestations.
These reasons prompted some Arab and Muslim intellectuals and politicians to seek remedies and critical ideas for reality, and some of them found in Marxism or racial nationalism or secularism and liberalism, a medicine for the diseases of Arab and Muslim societies, if we think well of these elites, and that they were not intellectual and political agents of the West and the East.
However, these intellectual and social pharmaceuticals were not suitable for every environment, but it proved that their use outside its Western environment, especially with the aim of confronting Islam and its law, leads to serious complications, because they are intellectual and social ideology, and not like medicine, engineering, agriculture and industry, which can be used everywhere and all people, regardless of the quality of religion and custom. It is in deep conflict with Islam and its law, and with the social norms and structures of Muslims.
Moreover, secularism, capitalism and liberalism are the bases on which colonialism was based in all its colors, as secularism, after expelling religion from life, the state and the law, went to occupy the lands of others and enslave peoples, in search of raw resources, natural materials and new markets.
Liberalism is the social ideology that justified to the invading colonized West all kinds of cultural and intellectual invasions of Western and Muslim societies, imposition of puppet rulers and propaganda of Western intellectuals.
Perhaps it was the luck of Western colonialism and the misfortune of Muslim peoples; the thirst of local secular elites for power and their struggles over it, and their rush to express their political labor to the West, as well as the rush of cultural elites to express their intellectual labor to the West, and their fascination with its military, scientific and technological development; have accumulated their intellectual illiteracy, so that they did not pay attention to the huge difference between Islam and Christianity. And not to pay attention to the deceit of the Western secular generalization of the concept of religion.
On the other hand, Western superiority on the side of deceit and deception, and on the military and intelligence side, played a major role in passing this Western understanding of religion, without anyone asking: What religion does the West mean?
Is it the spiritual and moral religion of Christianity, or the Islamic religion integrated in its creed and law?
Can the climates of centuries of European secular conflict with Constantinople ’ s Christianity be transferred to Muslim environments?
In fact, the cumulative local specificity of the European environment and its fabricated Christian religion makes it impossible to transfer the experience of the coup against the authoritarian European Christianity to other environments, including the Arab and Muslim countries; neither the European environment and its cumulative social and historical forms resemble the environments of Muslims and its formation paths. Because the religion of Christ is devoid of doctrinal detail and legislation, which is consistent with the reality in which the message of Christ appeared, but it is what forced the evangelist "Paul" to establish the Christian faith gradually, and write most of the Gospel decades after the return of Christ, and forced the Christian priesthood to ally with the pagan Roman Emperor Constantine I, to protect Christians and spread Christianity, in exchange for declaring him a saint and emperor. To Christians and to the world, and to preach Christianity by sword and subjugation.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the Eastern Christian elites constitute the majority of the pioneers of the secular coup against religion in the Muslim countries, given their spiritual and religious affinity with Christian Europe, and because they identify with the European elites revolting against theocratic regimes and ecclesiastical tyranny, which have come to take charge of the colonial authorities and the occupying armies of the Muslim countries. Especially.
These elites may have likened their suffering from Muslim theocracies and their general social climate, especially the Ottoman Empire, to that of their religionists liberated from Christian theocracies and ecclesiastical authoritarianism.
Perhaps the six most important Arab thinkers who led the campaign to promote secular thought and liberal doctrine in Arab societies are: Ahmed Lotfi al-Sayed, Qasim Amin, Taha Hussein, Salama Moussa, Shibli Shmeil and Farah Antoine, half of whom are Christians, which is a large number compared to the proportion of Arab Christians to the Arab Muslim population. European Mani Authoritarian.
At the same time, Muslim elites have not been immune from this dependence, as mentioned, but the emotional effects of religious kinship and the sense of religious empowerment of Christian elites have continued to play an important role.
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In the Arab world, Erdogan’s move has been perceived as a symbolic act of Islamic solidarity, enhancing his stature among Islamist circles globally.

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Content: Sections
Materials
Between Hamas and Israel: what benefits will Erdogan get from the war in Gaza
Olga Shevchenko
For the past 20 years, Turkey has tried to reach the global level of global influence, but the war in Israel has shown that Ankara has remained a marginal player.
It has no influence on Israel or Hamas.
Hamas ’ s surprise and horrific attack on October 7 and Israel ’ s disproportionate efforts to oust the group from power in the Gaza Strip represent a tipping point.
Both Israeli and Palestinian societies have been caught in the trauma of interconnected history and mutual violence.
The myth of the invincibility of the Israeli army and intelligence has been shattered.
The US government ’ s efforts to change the regional order by promoting Arab-Israeli normalization have been put on hold, if not completely stopped in the near term.
The Arab states are concerned about the widening regional conflict and the growing public discontent with Israel ’ s policies towards the occupied territories.
Many representatives of the so-called Global South are disappointed with the unconditional support given to Israel by the United States and the European Union.
Given the prevalence of anti-immigration, xenophobic and Islamophobic sentiments in the Western public, the conflict in Gaza could turn into an internal problem for the US and Europe.
Focus translated Sinem Adar ’ s article on the Turkish response to Israel ’ s actions in Gaza.
The Turkish government also views October 7 and its aftermath as a critical moment for the Middle East.
In the first hours after the attack, Ankara was cautious: the government condemned the deaths of civilians, although it did not directly attribute responsibility to Hamas, and called for restraint on both sides.
Since then, it has increasingly taken a critical stance on Israel ’ s policy in Gaza.
Unlike Turkey ’ s Western allies, Ankara does not consider Hamas a terrorist organization.
In 2018, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called it part of the Palestinian resistance defending “Palestinian territory from the occupation authorities. ”
The change in Ankara ’ s rhetoric is due to the logic of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) leadership ’ s support for the Palestinian struggle, its rejection of the US-led world order, and the government ’ s conviction that the conflict will return the United States to the region.
At the same time, this reaction demonstrates the vulnerability of Turkey ’ s Middle East policy.
Stuck between hegemonic aspirations and rapprochement attempts aimed at breaking the isolation and restoring the economy, Ankara has no influence on either Israel or Hamas.
Democracy promotion, peacemaking and leadership in the Ummah
Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize Israel in 1949.
It was also one of the first to recognize the proclamation of the State of Palestine.
Despite close economic, diplomatic and defense relations with Israel, moments of confrontation occurred even before the AKP came to power.
For example, in 2002, Prime Minister Bülent Echevit accused Israel of "non-recognition of UN resolutions" and "committing genocide", reproached the US for passivity, fraught with "Islamic radicalism" and "confrontation between East and West", and criticized "radical Palestinian elements" (Hamas) for obstructing the creation of an independent Palestinian state. "
The AKP came to power just a couple of months after Echevit escalated criticism of Israel.
The AKP is the product of Turkey ’ s Islamist nationalist Perspektiva movement, which is eager to see Palestine as a crucial component of Turkish foreign policy.
Not surprisingly, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has become an active component of the AKP ’ s Middle East policy for three reasons.
• First, Hamas won the largest number of seats in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Assembly elections, which the Middle East Quartet recognized as "free, fair and secure."
While the United States and the European Union conditioned the recognition of Hamas ’ victory on “renunciation of violence and terror, recognition of Israel ’ s right to exist and disarmament, ” Ankara took this moment as an opportunity to position itself as a supporter of democracy in the region.
• Secondly, one of the main directions of the AKP ’ s foreign policy was the desire to make Turkey “a peacemaker on the periphery of the international system. ”
The Turkish government ’ s ties with Hamas allowed Turkey to claim the role of mediator during the December 2008 – January 2009 Gaza war in a “vacuum created by the policies of the European Union and the United States ”, albeit without a concrete result.
At the same time, diplomatic relations with Israel declined after the famous “minute ” incident in 2009, and a year later after the attack on the Gaza flotilla, which killed nine pro-Palestinian Turkish activists.
After a ten-year hiatus, diplomatic relations were restored in 2022.
Finally, defending the rights of Palestine and the Palestinians is part of the AKP ’ s commitment to advancing the interests of Muslims around the world.
The party elite and its main electorate believe that the liberation of Muslims from Western cultural and political domination has already begun in Turkey (thanks to Erdogan) and may spread to other countries.
Erdogan is encouraging this rhetoric.
In 2020, after the reconstruction of Hagia Sophia into a mosque, he called it “a harbinger of the liberation of the Al-Aqsa Mosque. ”
From Civilizational Aspirations to Regional Isolation
The 2011 Arab uprisings marked a turning point in AKP leadership ambitions.
Erdogan sought to position himself and the Turkish government as the leader of the Muslim world, supporting Sunni Islamists throughout the Middle East.
The AKP justifies this policy by citing the democratic process and the reality that parties affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood are winning elections across the region.
As part of this policy, Turkey has sheltered many Islamist exiles and generously supported their organizations operating in the country.
During periods of internal controversy, such as the failed coup attempt in 2016 or the controversial constitutional referendum in 2017, the AKP, in turn, welcomed Erdogan ’ s support from Sunni Islamists.
However, ideology is not the only reason why Sunni Islamists sympathize with Erdogan (and Turkey).
Interests also matter.
Turkey has often been seen as a balancing force against the Arab autocrats of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, who see political Islam as a threat to their survival.
This view was facilitated by Ankara ’ s increasingly confrontational foreign policy and the expansion of its military presence since 2016.
However, the perception of Turkey as a destructive power has simultaneously led to cooperation between Turkey ’ s partners, its old and new rivals.
Trapped by the discrepancy between its stated ambitions and its real capabilities, Ankara is becoming increasingly isolated.
The Limits of Turkey ’ s Efforts for Regional Rapprochement
Starting in 2020, Turkey is trying to emerge from almost a decade of regional isolation.
Turkey ’ s policy shift was prompted by a number of factors, including Ankara ’ s economic problems, the election of Joseph Biden as president, the geopolitical realignment in the region following the Abraham Accords, the Syrian government ’ s rapprochement with regional authorities, and the weakening of Saudi Arabia ’ s and the United Arab Emirates ’ ties with Qatar.
In addition, Ankara viewed with caution the expansion of cooperation between Greece, the Republic of Cyprus, Israel and the Arab states in the eastern Mediterranean.
The concurrent divergence of interests between Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as the decline in confidence in further US involvement in the region, have contributed to Turkey ’ s rapprochement efforts.
As part of this policy shift, Ankara has become more cautious and distanced itself from Arab Islamists to help restore relations with regional players, including Israel.
The Turkish government has asked the Muslim Brotherhood media channels to soften the criticism.
One of the satellite TV channels operating in Istanbul, Mekameleen, announced in 2022 the termination of broadcasting and the closure of eight studios.
According to reports, Ankara also demanded that the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas members leave Turkey.
Similarly, in April of the same year, a Turkish court postponed the trial of Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi dissident killed in Turkey.
However, the latest cycle of war in the Gaza Strip has shown the limits of Turkey ’ s rapprochement efforts, especially with Israel.
In response to Turkey ’ s offer of mediation, the Israeli ambassador in Ankara made it clear that the time has not yet come.
U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has let Turkey through in his shuttle diplomacy, courting Arab countries in the region to ensure humanitarian access through the Rafah crossing, continue hostage diplomacy, and prevent a possible escalation of regional war.
Meanwhile, Ankara is increasingly making critical statements against Israel.
On the night of the controversial attack on the Arab Al-Ahli hospital, which Erdogan called "the latest example of inhumane Israeli attacks," Israel asked its citizens to leave Turkey "as soon as possible."
Demonstrations took place at the Israeli and American consulates in Istanbul, as well as at US military bases in Malatya and Adana.
Two days later, Israel expelled all its diplomats from the country.
Ankara ’ s relations with Hamas also seem insignificant.
According to one Turkish intelligence official, the Turkish government is negotiating with Hamas to release the hostages at the request of “many states, especially Western ones. ”
German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbok said her ministry was in contact with Qatar and Turkey, which "have channels for negotiations with Hamas" to secure the release of the German hostages.
However, according to Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, no concrete results have been achieved at the time of writing.
Qatar appears to be playing a crucial role in the negotiations for the release of the hostages.
Turkey and the international system
In order to return Ankara to a fragile regional order, Fidan proposed a “guarantor formula ” in an interview with the pro-government newspaper Sabah on October 17.
In accordance with the principle of two-State coexistence on the 1967 borders and with Jerusalem as its capital, this formula stipulates that one of the countries in the region, "including Turkey", will act as guarantor of the future Palestinian State.
Fidan also noted that “other countries could play the same role for Israel, ” and mentioned the importance of“ a potential common position of China and Russia as members of the UN Security Council ” in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Russia and China recently voiced support for a two-state solution that the international community until recently considered unrealistic.
Turkey ’ s insistence on the two-state solution is intertwined with criticism of the international system, which has become one of the main topics for AKP leadership in the past decade.
Ankara has often criticized the structure of the UN Security Council under the slogan “The world is bigger than five ”.
It also requires an international order that "treats every country on an equal footing, and in which every country can feel secure and be an equal partner".
This logic was at the heart of Erdogan ’ s call to the West and the international community in his conversation with British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak to “act effectively against human rights violations in Gaza ” and“ remember the promises made to the Palestinians [meaning the two-state solution] instead of engaging in provocations that would lead to a further escalation of the conflict. ”
Fidan voiced the same logic in the most direct way when he accused Israel of “stealing Palestinian land ” (referring to Israel ’ s continued expansion of settlements, which the UN considers a violation of international law).
Dissatisfaction with the US-led world order
Behind these statements is also Turkey ’ s staunch opposition to the US-led world order.
Turkey ’ s ruling elite believes that “the West lacks strategic thinking and is increasingly moving away from the rest of the world in the face of various problems, including relations with China, migration and terror, and the shift of economic gravity from West to East. ”
For Ankara, the clear and unequivocal support that the Biden administration has given to Israel confirms this belief.
By aligning the policies of Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other countries, pro-government journalists expect that the conflict will lead to greater isolation of Israel.
Most Turkish politicians, regardless of their ideological affiliation, tend to view the recent conflict in Gaza as a conflict between the so-called West (led by the United States) and the East.
After the controversial terrorist attack at the Al-Ahli hospital in Gaza City, the government was called upon to unite with the countries of the South to “stop the US-Israel alliance. ”
However, the methods proposed vary.
Speaking at an emergency meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation on October 18, Fidan called on Muslim countries to act "confidently" and "challenge the hegemonic narrative imposed on them", but without offering a concrete road map on how to do so.
Devlet Bahceli, leader of the AKP ’ s junior partner, the Nationalist Movement Party, said Turkey should intervene militarily if a ceasefire is not reached.
Those who criticize Ankara ’ s civilizational aspirations, but share its desire for a foreign policy independent from the West, call for the expulsion of the American military from the Incirlik airbase and the Kurechik radar station in Malatya.
Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean: From Gaza to Syria
While the AKP leadership does not seem to be happy with these demands, it is certainly feeling the pressure of a growing American presence in the region.
According to Erdogan, the Biden administration ’ s decision to send aircraft carriers to the Eastern Mediterranean hinders Turkey ’ s efforts to de-escalate the situation.
In addition to criticizing the lack of American leadership in putting pressure on Israel for a ceasefire, Ankara is internally concerned that the strengthening of the American presence in the Eastern Mediterranean is detrimental to its regional interests.
Pro-government journalists draw analogies to the US-led Operation Provide Comfort, launched in 1991 to protect Kurdish refugees fleeing northern Iraq after the Iraq War and deliver humanitarian aid.
In the political spectrum, there is indeed a growing consensus that the return of the United States to the region is an act of containment not only of Iran and its supporters, but also of Turkey.
The fear is that an increased American presence would further undermine Ankara ’ s efforts to prevent the creation of a Kurdish autonomy under the leadership of the Democratic Union Party and the People ’ s Protection Units in northern Syria, which Turkey views as a continuation of the Kurdistan Workers ’ Party.
The United States and Turkey consider the Kurdistan Workers ’ Party a terrorist organization.
Ankara justifies its position on Hamas with the US position on the Kurds in Syria.
Identifying Weaknesses in Turkey ’ s Foreign Policy
In general, Ankara ’ s reaction to Hamas ’ brutal attack on Israeli citizens, Israel ’ s wide-ranging retaliation, resulting in massive destruction and loss of life in Gaza, and America ’ s unequivocal and unequivocal support for Israel ’ s policies underscore Turkey ’ s limitations.
After two decades of policies aimed at expanding Turkey ’ s role in the Middle East, Ankara is in fact a marginal player.
This is partly due to the fragility of Turkey ’ s relations with Israel, Hamas and the United States.
Turkey ’ s position is also at odds with that of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which openly condemn Hamas ’ violence while criticizing Israel ’ s disproportionate retaliation and Western positions.
However, the apparent insignificance of Ankara ’ s influence also suggests that Turkey has no leverage over the warring parties in the current conflict.
Here it is appropriate to compare with Turkey ’ s position in the Black Sea.
Ankara can continue its hedging policy in the Black Sea thanks to the Montreux Convention and NATO membership.
In the case of the war in Gaza, none of these conditions will help.
Given the lack of similar tools, the state of the Turkish economy and the reputational costs that Ankara has imposed on itself in the last decade, its influence is limited to rhetorical statements.
About the author
Sinem Adar is a research fellow at the Center for Applied Research in Turkey at the German Institute for International Relations and Security.

How did Muslims and Orthodox Christians react to the reconversion?

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

However, critics argue that the decision was politically motivated to distract from domestic economic challenges and consolidate support ahead of elections.

The legal and constitutional basis for reconverting Hagia Sophia into a mosque stems from a Turkish court ruling in July 2020, which declared the 1934 decision to turn it into a museum illegal.

No--In 1934, Ataturk turned it into a museum, making it a major tourist attraction and secular symbol in Turkey.

Arab audiences may find the controversy compelling as it underscores the tension between secularism and Islamism, with Erdogan leveraging Hagia Sophia's reconversion to bolster nationalist and religious sentiments.

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Content: Earthquakes and rampant inflation: Why did Erdogan win again?
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Source: Hong Kong 01
Author: Liu Yanting
On May 28, Turkey held the second round of the presidential election.
Although Turkey's Supreme Electoral Council is not expected to announce the official results until June 1, according to preliminary election statistics, with 99.59% of the votes cast, the incumbent President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has 51.91% of the votes, defeating his opponent Kemal Kılçdaroğlu with 48.09% of the votes. Determine the rate of re-election.
This election has caused global concern.
First, people are curious about whether there will be a regime change in Turkey, changing its fierce cross-border diplomatic style.
Looking back over the past two years, since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2022, Turkey has repeatedly played a fierce swing beyond the size of medium-sized countries, including facilitating the Russian-Ukrainian foreign ministers' talks in March 2022, blocking Finland and Sweden's accession to NATO in May, and announcing the "green light" in June, leading Russia to sign the Black Sea Food Agreement in July, and negotiating energy cooperation with Russia at the CICA summit in October. For the first time since the start of the war, senior officials have talked about launching a new round of military action in Syria, implying that it may threaten Russia ’ s and Iran ’ s geopolitical interests.
In between, the outside world is surprised by Erdoğan ’ s active actions, and also uncertain about Turkey ’ s opportunistic diplomatic style.
Second, Erdogan suffered two major shocks before the election, causing the outside world to generally not optimistic about his re-election, one is in 2022 for months to break through 80% of the serious inflation, the second is the earthquake disaster.
Among them, Turkey ’ s high inflation is the sequela of the 2018 economic crisis. The deep reason is that Turkey ’ s long-term economic overheating and political interest rate cuts have caused a linked financial storm after the Federal Reserve raised interest rates in Turkey. He lost power in big cities such as Istanbul and Ankara.
And the earthquake will also affect voters' support for Erdogan.
On February 6, 2023, a 7.8-magnitude earthquake occurred in southeastern Turkey, killing nearly 50,000 people, and economic losses are even more incalculable.
After the disaster Erdoğan once faced criticism, public opinion criticized its failure to improve the phenomenon of uneven development and urban poverty, resulting in old buildings with low earthquake resistance being vulnerable to a strong earthquake, and fragile buildings are often difficult to get away from the collusion of officials and businessmen, cutting corners, the ruling Erdoğan and the positive development party are to blame.
However, from the results of this election, although the gap between the two people is less than 5%, but Krechidaloğlu is finally a step away from the door, showing that whether it is high inflation or an earthquake, can not prevent Erdogan from being re-elected.
In addition to the lack of integration of Turkish opposition forces, Erdogan ’ s success in mobilizing the new situation of “Turkey ’ s rise ” is also key.
The opposition is not well integrated.
First of all, although the polls of the Republican People's Party (CHP) party leader Krechidar Oulu once exceeded Erdoğan ’ s, making many foreign media boldly predict that Turkey will soon change, but focusing on the current state of Turkish politics, Erdoğan ’ s positive party is the strongest force, and the opposition ’ s long-term mountainous and independent government has not only offset the integration efforts to challenge Erdoğan, but also to some extent.
Looking at the interaction of Turkish opposition parties in recent years, there have been obvious signs of integration until the 2017 constitutional referendum.
At that time, Erdoğan greatly expanded the presidential power and removed the obstacles to re-election in the system, causing a collective panic among the opposition forces. The four major opposition parties, the Republican People's Party (İYü), the Good Party (İYü), the Happiness Party (SP) and the Democratic Party (DP), jointly formed the "State Union" (Millet İttifakı), advocating the restoration of the parliamentary system and abolition of the executive presidential system, hoping to curb the positive party and Erdoğan. Together with the Democratic and Progressive Party (DEVA), they formed the "Six Party Round Table" (Altılı Masa), which is seeking to jointly launch a presidential candidate representing the opposition forces and compete with Erdogan in 2023.
After all, Erdogan was the president at the time, with political resources such as the media and the judiciary, enough to crack down on various opposition forces, such as Ekrem İmamoğlu, the mayor of Istanbul from the Republican People ’ s Party, who was originally highly polled and regarded as a star of tomorrow enough to end Erdoğan ’ s 20 years in power, was sentenced to more than two years in prison in December 2022 for “suspected insult to the Supreme Electoral Council. ” He lost the right to run for president.
After Imam Oulu was forced out, the "six-party round table" did not immediately integrate new candidates, but entangled in ideological scuffles, political spoils distribution, until March 2023, it was determined to nominate CHP party leader Krechidar Oulu, but this nomination was initially not supported by the good party, the latter also threatened to withdraw from the "six-party round table".
After many days of consultations and political exchanges, Krechdarolu agreed to have Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavaş and Imam Oulu as vice presidents, and the good party agreed to stay at the "six-party round table" and support the nomination of Krechdarolu for election.
In fact, from the point of view of the composition of the structure, the only ideology that can unite the "six-party round table" is against Erdogan.
Because the Republican People's Party with the most seats is the centre-left pro-European secularism party, the Happiness Party is a Eurosceptic conservative party with Islamism, the Democratic Party is a centre-right nationalist party, the Democratic and Progressive Party is a centre-right pro-European party, the Future Party is a right-wing pro-European party, and the Good Party is a centre-right nationalist party.
In short, the parties have a combination of ideologies that straddle Islamism and secularism, and basically if Erdoğan and the AKP had not been in power for too long, the parties would have no incentive to integrate.
However, even if it is reluctantly integrated, the "six-party round table" is still divided, otherwise it will not be until two months before the election to determine the nomination of candidates; and after the confirmation of the presidential candidate, the "six-party round table" broke out in a new civil war on the list of parliamentary candidates, all parties want to strive for more security seats distribution, resulting in the continued difficulty of the list.
All these things are quite chilling in the eyes of Turkish voters: Erdoğan may have a monopoly on power and love the position of power, but the opposition forces are also only interested in the division of territory and political division of spoils, and have no intention of changing Turkey's development predicament.
Under the balance of the two, or some voters who are tired of Erdoğan, after going through a thousand turns of heart, they chose to continue to vote for the positive party and Erdoğan, instead of supporting the opposition forces whose governing ability is unknown and whose positions are mixed, resulting in the eventual defeat of Krechdar Olu by a small margin.
How Erdoğan mobilised the "rise of Turkey"
In addition to the weak integration of opposition forces and the failure to gather enough political energy, Erdoğan and the Positive Development Party are still able to gather support and call for votes under the impact of high inflation and earthquake disasters, which is also the key to the defeat of Krechdar Olu.
According to the results of the poll, voters in large cities whose wealth has been severely eroded by high inflation supported Krechdarolu in the election, including the top three cities of Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Adana, the fifth largest city; however, Bursa, the sixth largest city of Gaziantep, and the seventh largest city of Konya. (Konya) is still supporting Erdoğan, and Gaziantep is still the hardest hit area of the 2023 earthquake, but voters still vote for the current president who has been denounced by public opinion, and it is clear that Erdoğan still has a certain degree of political energy.
Looking at this source of energy, it is obvious that it is not all the economic achievements that have been downhill.
Looking back at Erdoğan ’ s path to power, he experienced high economic growth in Turkey during his term of office, which can escort him to power.
From 2008 to 2013, developed markets such as the United States, Europe and Japan adopted a number of rounds of quantitative easing policies, international "hot money" poured into emerging markets including Turkey, stimulating the latter's economic growth. Erdogan took advantage of the momentum to promote easy credit, ask the central bank to continue to cut interest rates, and promote large-scale infrastructure projects. On the altar alone, no one can resist.
However, after the US Federal Reserve released a possible interest rate hike in 2013, foreign investment was greatly withdrawn, and emerging market currencies, including the lira, began to depreciate, and Turkey ’ s economic growth continued to slow down. And...
In the process of coping with the crisis, Erdoğan obviously wants to sacrifice prices and preserve economic growth, so he used extreme economic means and insisted on cutting interest rates in the face of high inflation.
The result, while maintaining economic growth to a certain extent, has led to a sharp depreciation of the lira, soaring prices, a near collapse of the bond market, and widespread protests in major cities such as Istanbul.
But looking at Erdoğan ’ s political actions in the past 10 years, it can be seen that he has begun to actively mobilize public support in the military, historical traditions, and diplomatic fields of major powers to fill the “Turkish rise ” narrative under the slowdown in economic growth and make up for his political loss.
As far as the diplomatic tradition after the Cold War is concerned, Turkey is an intermediate power anchored in the Western world and, with its strategic position across Eurasia, moves among different groups of countries.
However, after the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2010, the outside world saw a more "eastern" and "military power" Turkey: on the Egyptian issue, its support for the Muslim Brotherhood, its involvement in the local political situation; on the battlefield of Syria and Libya, it has successively sent troops to intervene in the civil war there since 2016, and successfully achieved certain results. In the Gulf field, Turkey and Iran have maintained close interaction with Qatar, to a certain extent, prompting the 2017 Qatar severance storm, but because Turkey and Iran insisted on not retreating, the final storm ended with Saudi concessions in 2021, and Turkey successfully maintained its political achievements in the Gulf.
Of course, Turkey's foreign military operations are not all fruitful results.
Taking the Syrian battlefield as an example, Turkey launched four military operations against Syria: the Euphrates Shield from 2016 to 2017, the Olive Branch in 2018, the Peace Spring in 2019 and the Spring Shield in 2020.
Since the "olive branch" operation, the Turkish army has not only attacked the Kurdish forces, but also exchanged fire with the Syrian government forces supported by the Russian side, causing strong dissatisfaction in Moscow.
After many unsuccessful coordination, the Russian army was brazenly engaged with Turkey in 2020, resulting in the scribbled end of the "spring shield", and Turkey can only be forced to obey the Russian-led order in northern Syria.
However, under the propaganda of the Erdogan government, Turkey is not clearly aware that Turkey lost to Russia, but to see the Turkish army fighting in northern Syria in order to fight terrorism, which is very encouraging for nationalists and patriotic people.
In addition, in the historical tradition, Erdogan ’ s most classic action is to announce in July 2020 the abolition of the 1934 cabinet decree, the end of the 86 years of Hagia Sophia ’ s museum years, and the restoration of its mosque status.
Although this has caused many Western countries to criticize, but Erdoğan is not without the basis of public opinion, because in the 2015 capture of Junstenburg memorial ceremony, many Turks have held morning prayers in the museum square, in 2018, the Turkish Islamic Association is publicly applied to hold worship in the museum, although it was finally rejected, but has attracted a lot of public support.
Therefore, Erdogan's decision to "liberate St. Sophia" is aimed at the Islamic resurgence in Turkey in recent years, hoping to draw the support of anti-Kemalist voters.
And in the great power diplomatic field, Turkey's action is not to be said, in addition to the neighboring Central Asia and the Middle East, the Russian-Ukrainian war under various violent swings across Eurasia, are Erdogan's excellent election materials.
Taking the March 2022 Russian-Ukrainian Foreign Minister ’ s talks in Turkey and the landing of the Black Sea Food Agreement in July as an example, Turkish state media vigorously promoted Erdogan ’ s “peacemaker ” role; as for blocking Finland and Sweden from joining NATO, Turkish state media used Erdogan ’ s“ defense of national interests ”, “no fear of offending the West ” and“ combating Kurdish terrorism ”.
Of course, under the burden of economic decline and governance for many years, the narrative situation of mobilizing military, historical traditions and great power diplomacy can play a role in Erdoğan ’ s election, which can only be determined by the election results.
Judging from the results of 51.91% to 48.09%, although the above actions did not create a brilliant victory, they were enough to defeat the opposition forces and guarantee Erdogan another five-year term, which obviously still has some effect.
However, Turkey ’ s high economic growth has ended, and how to buffer Turkey ’ s economic storm and find new solutions outside of “Erdoğan ’ s economics ” are difficult issues that cannot be solved in the short term.
After the election, Erdoğan ’ s challenge continued.
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What kind of domestic reaction did Erdogan's reconversion of Hagia Sophia receive?

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.