Avon, for instance, shifted towards an MLM model, focusing on recruiting salespeople rather than direct sales, which led to a decline in revenue and stock value.

Tupperware also faced similar challenges, becoming a "walking dinosaur" in the industry.

Educational Development Corporation (EDUC), for example, saw an increase in sales as home-based learning became more prevalent, and unemployment led more people to seek part-time work as sales consultants.

The model relies heavily on recruitment, and the majority of profits are concentrated among the top 1% of participants.

This structure has led to criticism and accusations of being akin to pyramid schemes.

However, the high churn rates and low success rates for most participants highlight the risks involved.

Avon, for instance, shifted towards an MLM model, focusing on recruiting salespeople rather than direct sales, which led to a decline in revenue and stock value.

Title:

Content: 'Direct Selling' - Avon, Tupperware - Is Extinct

Nov. 18, 2022 11:25 AM ETHLF, MED, NTCO, NUS, PRI, TUP, USNA3 Comments
Robert FitzPatrick
394 Followers

Summary

  • Direct Selling became obsolete generations ago. So how is it that millions today get recruited for "income opportunity" in "direct selling" and billions are traded on "direct selling" stocks?
  • Avon and Tupperware are cited by "multi-level marketing," or MLM, promoters as "proof" that MLM, e.g., Amway, Herbalife, is "direct selling."
  • Usable data on actual income and churn rates of MLM "direct sellers," market saturation, and retail sales to actual customers are not provided.
  • In fact, Avon and Tupperware for years have been walking dinosaurs, still trying to do "person-to-person" sales to end-users with commodity products, while MLMs hype "unlimited" income.
  • The shrunken and devolved state of Avon and Tupperware today reveals that direct selling is extinct. MLM is not, and never was, direct selling.

It is generally accepted that "direct selling" was killed off generations ago by mass merchandising, big box stores, mail-order and then the internet, among other societal changes. The "Fuller Brush man" is long gone. No one's at home. No one wants or needs or has time for a "personal" salesperson. Everything's in stores or online. And, even when "direct selling" still lived, no one ever went into that tough line of work thinking they would get rich from it.

Yet, each year, millions are recruited, and pay thousands, for the "opportunity" to work as "direct sellers," with promises and expectations of "unlimited" income. The number involved today is many, many times greater than ever worked in that "extinct" field decades ago. Billions are being traded on Wall Street for shares of "direct selling" companies. How can this be?

In my book, Ponzinomics, the Untold Story of Multi-Level Marketing, I document the death of "direct selling" and the 1945 invention of "multi-level marketing," or MLM. I describe how "MLM" falsely assumed direct selling's revered old identity. I trace MLM from its Adam, a little California-based company called "Nutrilite," to today's "industry" led by Amway, Herbalife (HLF) down 64% YTD, Nuskin (NUS) down 31%, USANA Health Sciences (USNA) down 49%, Primerica, Inc. (PRI) down 13%, and Medifast (MED) down 45%. MLM's financial solicitations for consumers to become "direct sellers" have reached into – and led to losses for – virtually every household in America.

In the newly invented "MLM," the main source of revenue shifted from end-user customers to the salespeople themselves who are incentivized to "be their own customer" by buying their own products. Obviously, no one makes money purchasing their own inventory, but MLM offered a unique reason to do so – "unlimited" income potential.

No More Need to Knock on Doors

All MLM "direct sellers" can potentially gain "unlimited" income by recruiting an "endless" chain of other "direct sellers." No need to pound the pavement and get rudely rejected at front doors any more. Each "direct seller" on the chain has to meet a quota to "qualify" for future rewards from their recruits who, in turn, are their "own customers" and recruiters too, ad infinitum. The chain can grow without continuous personal effort. The qualifying quota can usually be met by just making a personal monthly purchase of inventory. "Commissions" on all these transactions, all the way down to the "last ones in," flow up the chain. In the MLM pay plan, most of the total commissions go to the top 1%. So, all new "direct sellers" try mightily to recruit (and buy) their way to those top ranks. Of course, only a tiny few can ever be at the top.

Some people argued this is a pyramid recruiting scheme, inherently unfair and deceptive, and a counterfeit of direct selling. In the design and the pay plan, bottom ranks – the vast majority – will inevitably lose. They said constantly adding salespeople in any area destroys profitable retail selling potential, if any exists to start with. They cited data on 90-99% loss rates and huge churn rates among new "recruits" and asked, where are the retail "customers"?

While offering no data on retail customers or salespeople losses or market saturation, MLM promoters offered "proof" that MLM is direct selling by pointing to two long-established and respected direct selling companies in their ranks, Avon and Tupperware (TUP). Both companies were members of the Direct Selling Association, DSA, and both were "direct selling" icons, Avon for its "ladies" and Tupperware for its "parties." To any pyramid scheme accusations, MLM promoters indignantly countered: "Are you calling Avon and Tupperware pyramid schemes?"

Walking Dinosaurs

The truth for both companies is very different from the MLM-spin. Avon and Tupperware used to have differentiated products and real consumer demand. Their salespeople made money from their own retail sales. But moving into the 21st Century, Avon and Tupperware became walking dinosaurs, vestiges of the extinct era of "direct selling." They were still trying to base their businesses on their historical brands and on person-to-person retail sales to real customers, as direct selling companies always used to do.

Despite MLM's citing Avon and Tupperware, and thereby bestowing legitimacy on the "MLM" members of the Direct Selling Association, deep differences between those icons of the old era and MLM burst into public view in 2013-14. The two companies publicly quit the Direct Selling Association, charging ethics violations and DSA-member connections to pyramid schemes.

Avon's Long Good-Bye

Avon had been a true direct seller for decades before MLM was invented. But as the door-to-door model faded, Avon began a long decline. In 2000, Avon began shifting its focus to "incentivizing" salespeople to recruit more salespeople and getting them to buy inventory, MLM-style. In 2009, during the Great Recession, Avon ran its most expensive ad in history, on television during the Super Bowl. The ad never mentioned any Avon products! It only solicited "salespeople." Still, global revenue dropped continuously over the next 10 years. Avon stock value fell from over $30 to just over $3.

Finally, Avon split off its faltering North American business and sold it to the Korean company, LG Household & Health Care. Avon claimed to have 250,000 sales representatives in North America. The remaining global business was later sold to the Brazilian MLM, Natura (NTCO) down 50% YTD, which also owns the retailer, Body Shop. Though Avon global was much larger, Avon shareholders traded 3 shares of Avon for just one in Natura.

The Korean-owned segment of Avon in North America is now classic MLM, selling the proverbial MLM "income opportunity" along with "health" supplements, make-up, jewelry, clothing, scented candles, even toothpaste.

On the Canadian Avon website, Avon promotes the "income opportunity," urging prospects in large bold black type: "Think big. Sell Avon part-time, full-time, you decide how much! It’s your business, your way!"

A disclosure (legally required in Canada, but not in the USA) appears midway down a long webpage in tiny, barely visible gray lettering: "The 2020 earnings of a typical Avon Leadership Representative was between $0 and $2,620 in commissions and bonuses." That's $0 to $50 a week, before subtracting all costs! And the "disclosure" does not break out how much of that tiny return comes from personal sales or the "downline."

Avon quietly rejoined the Direct Selling Association. The Brazilian company, Natura, which took over Avon's global business in 2020, has lost over 60% of its stock value in the last year.

Tupperware on the Brink

Tupperware was one of the first "party plan" companies, which are technically a small subset of MLM. They employ an "endless" recruiting chain, but are more rooted in retail sales transacted at "parties." Tupperware used to have a popular brand with innovative, differentiated products. But, as true direct selling began to disappear, Tupperware went into decline. It added MLM-type "health and beauty" commodities to bolster recruiting appeal but then deleted them. This year, it began also selling its products in Target department stores. Its kitchen-related goods are generally not distinct from other brands. A 10-months "Income disclosure" for Canada (not published in the USA) showed that half the "party planners" were classified "inactive," earning less than $30 for the period on average. 94% of the "active" ones reportedly received about $12 a week on average, before expenses.

In the last 5 years, the stock value of Tupperware has dropped over 90%. Its latest financials warned investors the company may violate loan agreements, setting off speculation Tupperware might declare bankruptcy.

The shrunken and devolved state of Avon and Tupperware, the most famous brand-icons of "direct selling," makes citing them as a defense of "multi-level marketing" as extinct as their old business model.

This article was written by

394 Followers
Robert L. FitzPatrick is the author of the new book, Ponzinomics, the Untold Story of Multi-Level Marketing (2020),the first comprehensive history and analysis of the "MLM" phenomenon, addressing its political influence, propaganda techniques and use of cult persuasion. FitzPatrick is an expert in examining and revealing deception and fraud in Ponzi schemes, pyramid schemes and bogus home-based businesses. He served as expert or consultant in more than 30 court cases involving pyramid schemes and multi-level marketing. He is co-author of False Profits (1997), an examination of the values and beliefs that support the delusions of pyramid schemes. He was featured on NBC Dateline, ABC World News, and CBS 60 Minutes, the documentary film, Betting on Zero and the podcast, The Dream.He has been quoted in many newspapers around the world, including the New York Times and Wall Street Journal. His booklet, Pyramid Nation, has been translated to Chinese and used by government regulators in writing China's first laws on pyramid schemes. His booklet, "The 10 Big Lies of Multi-Level Marketing", has been translated into four languages and posted on numerous websites. His White Paper, "The Main Street Bubble", which details the extensive influence-buying of the direct selling industry was featured in a CNBC Documentary, Selling the American Dream. In 2005, he delivered a seminar to in Colombo, Sri Lanka to central banking representatives from that country as well as India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal. Robert FitzPatrick has developed informational resources for consumers, journalists, academics and regulators including a multi-media PowerPoint presentation and a statistical analysis of the losses suffered by participants in pyramid selling schemes. He also published a widely read booklet on the landmark federal case brought against the Amway Corporation. He is a expert network member of GLG Research, and Coleman Research Group, as well as other networks of experts who are referred to clients for consultation, speaking and report writing. In this capacity, he has provided expert consultation to financial many analysts who sought information about multi-level marketing companies and pyramid and Ponzi schemes. Robert FitzPatrick co-founded and serves as president of Pyramid Scheme Alert, the first international organization to expose and prevent pyramid scheme fraud. He personally responds to hundreds of consumer and news media inquiries each year. He has served as consultant and expert witness for Attorney General or State Attorney offices in four states, the US Dept. of Justice, and in numerous cases involving distributor fraud and pyramid schemes. Robert FitzPatrick is not an investor in multi-level marketing companies. He has never owned and never plans to own stocks of multi-level marketing companies. He has never been compensated based on any stock's performance. He does not offer investment advice and he is not an attorney.

Disclosure: I/we have no stock, option or similar derivative position in any of the companies mentioned, and no plans to initiate any such positions within the next 72 hours. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it. I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

Additional disclosure: This article is for educational purposes only. It discusses fundamentals of the "direct selling" business model and the evolution of "multi-level marketing."

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Tupperware also faced similar challenges, becoming a "walking dinosaur" in the industry.

Educational Development Corporation (EDUC), for example, saw an increase in sales as home-based learning became more prevalent, and unemployment led more people to seek part-time work as sales consultants.

Title:

Content: Educational Development Corp.: Growth Risk Might Be Overblown

Moat Investing
1.46K Followers

Summary

  • EDUC is the exclusive US co-publisher of educational children's books produced by famous Usborne Publishing by leveraging multilevel marketing (MLM) strategy.
  • It has strong fundamentals, fair valuation, and a compelling growth story that is being ignored by the market.
  • We arrived at a target price of $12.4 to $14.6 without incorporating any future growth and expansion in operating margins.

Investment Idea

Educational Development Corporation (NASDAQ:EDUC) has an attractive value proposition, strong financials, and optionality of significant growth ahead due to structural changes caused by COVID. On top of that, the valuation is reasonable, and management has skin in the game (owns 23% of shares outstanding). For these reasons, we remain bullish.

Business Overview

EDUC is the exclusive US co-publisher of educational children's books produced in the UK by Usborne Publishing, and EDUC also exclusively publishes books through their ownership of Kane Miller.

The business operates in two segments:

Home Business Division (Usborne Books & More or "UBAM") -(95% of revenues) - This segment sells books through consultants directly to consumers using a multilevel marketing model (MLM). Consultants sell books by hosting home parties, social media, and hosting book fairs with schools and public libraries.

Publishing Division – (5% of revenues) - Sells books to bookstores, toy stores, and other retail outlets.

If you would like to get the gist of our thesis, you can watch our YouTube video below.

Value Proposition

The children's books market is very competitive and fragmented. There are more than 135 publishers of children's books in the US. EDUC is competing with Scholastic and Pearson, which have extensive resources to run marketing campaigns and are well-positioned in both online and offline distribution channels. Although EDUC has a little moat, they have some strengths to their business model that will allow long-term value creation.

They have an exclusive and long-term relationship with Usborne. Therefore, clients of the Usborne in the US must acquire their books via EDUC. Also, there is a consensus that Usborne books are high quality and among the industry's best.

Their sales are a function of the number of active sales consultants. Commissions paid to consultants are a variable cost, and they are only paid when sales are made. Although this makes SG&A grow as the top line grows, since it's not a fixed cost to the business, it allows EDUC to achieve significant operating leverage. Also, it allows them to scale quickly and have flexibility.

Direct sales strategies like multilevel marketing are commonly referred to as pyramid and Ponzi schemes. However, the table below shows that it does work sustainably and increases revenue growth over the long run despite the negative press.

Source: S&P Capital IQ

Why might EDUC be mispriced?

There are multiple factors. Firstly, it's a micro-cap. This usually means there is limited analyst coverage, and due to the stock's illiquidity, there is low institutional interest. These factors, coupled with others, leave the company under the market radar despite its business is doing well and has promising perspectives.

Second, there is negative press around the MLM business models. The MLM model deployed by EDUC is vastly different from dodgy tactics used by other players. For example, many MLM models require the seller to purchase the inventory from the company before selling. However, this reduces the risk for the company and puts extra pressure on the seller, which can be left with expensive inventory that cannot be sold or returned. In the case of EDUC, there is no requirement to hold inventory.

Third, markets might be believing that the business's tailwinds are temporary due to COVID. Amidst Covid, schools were closed, and parents were working from home; this drove home-based learning and benefited EDUC. Additionally, unemployment rates soared, and many were left looking for work. This allowed EDUC almost to double its consultant count from 33 to 60 thousand. We believe the post-pandemic work from home trend will persist, supporting their sales. Furthermore, the active consultant might not fall back to the pre-pandemic level as these roles are usually part-time work which fits nicely with the trending gig economy.

The evidence speaks louder than words

There are also some clues from the management that revenue generated amidst pandemics might be sticky.

Management increased its dividend per share from $0.20 to $0.32. A dividend increase should be seen as a signal that a business is in solid financial shape and management is confident about its future.

Management increased capital expenditures to $4.15 million from $0.64 in 2020. This expenditure was primarily associated with equipment purchases to increase daily shipping capacity. These are some early signs that management is expecting positive growth going ahead. Additionally, this also improves their margins as amidst Covid they paid a premium for extra shifts.

EDUC has increased its inventory; the inventory build-up is approximately 60% of its total assets. This has been in anticipation of an increase in the sales, as it takes a four to six-month lead-time to have a title printed and delivered to them.

Source: Koyfin

Value Investing Approach: Asset Value

To calculate the actual asset value of the company, we tried to replicate the business from scratch. Therefore, below you will find the last reported balance sheet, where we have made some adjustments.

The value of the land recorded on books was $4.1 million. They own a 40-acre complex at 5402 South 122nd East Ave, Tulsa, with 400,000 square feet of office and warehouse space. They also own a facility located at 10302 East 55th Place, Tulsa, that has 105,000 square feet of usable space. According to our channel checks with realtors, the average price per square foot of their land lies between the range of $100 to $115. To remain conservative, we took the average price square feet to be $85. Therefore, we estimate the value of its land to be $42.9 million.

They also have a network of around 55,000 active consultants. To construct such a network from scratch is both costly and time-consuming. We estimate the replication cost of this network to be around $27.5 million ($500 per consultant). This is also roughly five months of sales commission cost incurred by EDUC in the fiscal year 2021.

The rest of the items are taken on book value.

Based on the above adjustment, we arrive at the total asset value of 106.7, and the fair value per share to be $12.4

Source: Moat Investing

Value Investing Approach: Earnings Power Value

This approach allows us to value EDUC without incorporating any growth. Here, we consider the business's historical figures (last five years) to get the normalized earnings and operating margin. To calculate the sustainable earnings, we smoothed out the company revenues for the previous five years to $131 million and then calculated the firm's average operating margin (6.5%) to arrive at the sustainable Operating Income of $8.5 million.

We add back the expenses typically spent on growth, and we estimate around 4.5% of sales is spent on growth marketing, i.e., promotion, advertisement, and discounts. Hence, we add this back as this expense is not required if the firm was not aiming to achieve growth.

We assume the normalized tax rate to be 26% and the estimated cost of equity at 9%. Therefore, we estimate Earning Power Value of the operating business to be $134 million. To that, we add the non-operational cash ($1.8 million), and we subtract long-term debt (10.8); we arrive at an implied market cap of $125.6 million or $14.6 price per share, with 12.3% upside potential, without incorporating any growth or expansion in operating margins.

Source: Moat Investing

Risks to Our Investment Case

  • Stringent regulation regarding MLM companies. For instance, the requirement to treat consultants as employees. This could have implication when it comes to taxation, wages paid and welfare concerns for workers. This could, in turn, shrink the bottom line or, worse, business model tatters.
  • The most straightforward risk is consultants quitting or switching to find other employment as the US economy improves. However, within our valuation model, we have smoothed the growth of revenue in the last five years, which is a function of l consultants recruited. Even if there is some mean reversion in terms of consultants working with EDUC due to the COVID base effect, our thesis would be less impacted.
  • As highlighted earlier EDUC’s inventory level is a significant portion of its asset. Whatever reason they become unsalable (i.e., change in taste or controversy in terms of published content) could impact our valuation.
  • Oil prices have increased significantly since last year (see below). Shipping costs are amongst the most significant component of its COGS; further rise in oil prices (consequently increasing shipping cost) could make it difficult for EDUC to remain profitable.

Source: Trading Economics

Conclusion

EDUC has an attractive value proposition, strong financials, and optionality of significant growth ahead due to structural changes caused by COVID. On top of that, the valuation is reasonable, management has skin in the game (owns 23% of shares outstanding), and investors are not even paying for any future growth at current prices. For these reasons, we remain bullish.

This article was written by

1.46K Followers
We are a group of experienced investors that like to dig deeper into stocks to find growth stories at a reasonable price with strong economic moats. We also aim to conduct high-quality analysis by deep diving into valuations, key business drivers, risk/reward, and different future scenarios.
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Disclosure: I/we have no stock, option or similar derivative position in any of the companies mentioned, and no plans to initiate any such positions within the next 72 hours. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

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The model relies heavily on recruitment, and the majority of profits are concentrated among the top 1% of participants.

This structure has led to criticism and accusations of being akin to pyramid schemes.

However, the high churn rates and low success rates for most participants highlight the risks involved.