**Privatization and Deregulation:** Milei has initiated the privatization of 41 state-owned companies across sectors such as energy, aviation, and agriculture, alongside deregulating government operations to boost exports and investment.

**Dollarization:** He has proposed replacing Argentina's currency with the US dollar to stabilize the economy, although this move would cede significant financial policy control to external entities.

**Fiscal Austerity:** Milei aims to achieve a budget surplus by slashing public spending, including terminating contracts of public employees with less than one year of service and increasing prices for basic services and public transportation.

**Central Bank and Currency Reforms:** He plans to eliminate the central bank and unify the exchange rate to control inflation.

**Emergency Powers and Legislative Bypass:** Milei has used emergency decrees and omnibus bills to bypass Congress, enabling him to implement reforms rapidly without legislative scrutiny.

**Reduction of Government Ministries:** He has promised to abolish ten of the government’s 18 ministries, reflecting his commitment to reducing the size of the state.

**Threats to Democratic Norms:** His approach includes weakening democratic institutions by bypassing traditional legislative processes, which has raised concerns about the erosion of democratic norms.

**Controversial Social Policies:** Milei has proposed liberalizing organ trade and privatizing public healthcare, alongside supporting conservative social stances such as banning abortion.

**Environmental Deregulation:** His reforms include weakening environmental protections, such as the Glacier Protection Law, to facilitate mining activities.

Milei's policies have sparked significant public dissent, with widespread protests against his drastic cuts to public spending and perceived threats to social welfare.

His administration faces challenges due to limited Congressional support, necessitating compromises on some elements of his agenda.

The impact of Milei's reforms on Argentina's future remains uncertain, as they could either lead to economic revitalization or exacerbate existing socio-economic issues.

**Privatization and Deregulation:** Milei has initiated the privatization of 41 state-owned companies across sectors such as energy, aviation, and agriculture, alongside deregulating government operations to boost exports and investment.

Title:

Content: Streets of Argentina Ablaze with Dissent as Milei’s Controversial Reforms Ignite Outrage

In a stunning turn of events, Argentina has become a battleground for public discontent following President Javier Milei’s introduction of a series of controversial proposals. Thousands of Argentinians have taken to the streets, enraged by the president’s push for drastic cuts to public spending.

Milei’s latest measures, unveiled on Wednesday evening, aim to revolutionize Argentina’s struggling economy through a variety of initiatives. These include deregulating the government and opening up state-run industries for privatization in order to spur both exports and investment.

However, the people’s outrage has manifested in widespread protests, often met with a heavy police presence. Gathering in front of the Argentine Congress, hundreds of demonstrators made their opposition to Milei’s proposals known.

Undeterred by the dissent, Milei appeared on national television to defend his agenda and offer reassurances of a prosperous future. He asserted, “Our objective is to rebuild our nation, restore individual freedom and autonomy, and dismantle the myriad of regulations that have impeded our economic growth for far too long.”

Acknowledging the mounting protests, Milei’s security minister, Patricia Bullrich, announced new measures aimed at maintaining public order. These measures grant federal forces the power to disperse protesters blocking streets without requiring a judicial order, and authorize the police to use video or digital evidence to identify and hold accountable those obstructing public thoroughfares. Moreover, the legislation empowers the state to apportion the costs of mobilizing security forces to the protesters themselves.

Milei’s presidential victory was built upon a campaign centered around reducing public spending. Since assuming office, he has already made significant changes to the country’s financial landscape. The value of the Argentinian currency has been adjusted, contracts of public employees with less than one year of service have been terminated, and the prices of basic services and public transportation have seen notable increases.

FAQ:

Q: What are President Milei’s proposals?

A: President Milei’s proposals include deregulating the government and allowing the privatization of state-run industries to boost exports and investment.

Q: Why are Argentinians protesting?

A: Thousands of Argentinians are protesting against Milei’s proposals due to their belief that the drastic cuts to public spending will adversely impact their lives.

Q: How is the government responding to the protests?

A: In response to the protests, the government has announced new measures to maintain public order, empowering federal forces to disperse protesters without a judicial order and enabling the identification of those obstructing public thoroughfares through video or digital means.

Q: What changes has Milei already implemented?

A: Since taking office, Milei has adjusted the value of the Argentinian currency, terminated contracts of public employees with less than one year of service, and increased the prices of basic services and public transportation.

(Sources: Information gathered from local news outlets)

Title:

Content: Argentina’s Javier Milei’s “Instant Democracy” and Neoliberalism

Javier Milei, YouTube screen grab.

Self-described “anarcho-capitalist,” Javier Milei became the president of Argentina in December 2023 promising “drastic” measures to temper the inflation crisis that has gripped the country. In the weeks since his election, Milei has brought forward an ambitious neoliberal restructuring program encompassing almost every aspect of the government.

Milei’s agenda confronts considerable opposition in Congress, where his governing coalition, Libertad Avanza, holds only a fraction of the seats. To adjust to these circumstances, Milei has cultivated a strategy of “turbo-politics,” bypassing legislative processes that risk delaying the implementation of his state reorganization plans.

Milei’s approach to Congress is symbolic of a decades-old strategy I have elsewhere called “neoliberal parliamentarism.” This concept describes a pattern of deliberate efforts to reform or subvert legislative institutions as a means of facilitating neoliberal reforms that do not have sufficient popular support to be actualized through usual democratic channels. These changes, even when temporary, often leave long-term scars on institutions by weakening norms of institutional forbearance.

The Emergency Decree and the Omnibus Bill

Milei has followed this blueprint, insulating the core elements of his agenda from democratic influence. The dismantling of the Argentine state began in earnest in mid-December when the executive branch presented an 83 page Necessity and Urgency Decree (NDU) aimed at repealing over 300 various laws and regulations, facilitating the privatization of core public assets.

This “mega-decree,” Milei claimed, was necessary to “start to undo the huge number of regulations that have held back and prevented economic growth”. It includes sweeping economic deregulation, such as the elimination of regulations on Argentina’s supermarket laws, which required the guarantee of low prices on basic products. It also includes measures to eliminate rent controls. Suggested labour reforms to cut pregnancy leave and increase the job probation period were suspended by the courts in January 2024.

Less than a week after issuing the NDU, the executive branch sent a massive omnibus bill titled Foundations and Starting Points for the Freedom of the Argentine People to Congress for consideration. The bill bundles the major elements of Milei’s neoliberal restructuring initiatives under the heading of a single piece of legislation with 664 articles. It will enable the government to carry out, in a matter of weeks, what would normally take years to achieve if these reforms were considered independently and subjected to the usual legislative scrutiny.

Reforms from the 351 page bill include an extraordinary provision declaring a state of public emergency on matters related to the economy, fiscal balance, social security, defence, health, and administration.

The emergency declaration delegates more than 1,000 extraordinary powers from the legislative to the executive until December 31, 2025, with the possibility of a two-year extension. This provision would enable Milei to make major reforms without having to consult Congress, thus eliminating a major hurdle to the implementation of neoliberal reforms.

Authors of the bill are attempting to facilitate the privatization of 41 state-owned companies across various sectors including energy, aviation, port administration, and agriculture. They also enable the reorganization of public administration, including embedding regulatory cuts from the NDU into law.

Additionally, the omnibus legislation proposes substantial reforms to environmental protection laws. These changes include the weakening of the Glacier Protection Law, allowing the mining of sensitive “periglacial” areas. The bill is presently being rushed through the legislative process by way of Extraordinary sessions of Congress, leading to marathon sittings during Argentina’s usual summer recess period.

“It’s impossible for people to have an idea of the enormous number of proposals Milei has sent,” said Ricardo Gil Laverda, a constitutional lawyer and former Argentine Justice Minister. “They cover dozens and dozens and dozens of laws, often on deep topics.”

To influence negotiations, Milei has threatened to put forward a non-binding referendum if the opposition parties do not agree to the main terms of his restructuring plan. Milei has also threatened to take away social welfare rights from protesters who block streets.

Despite these efforts, however, the reality of Milei’s lack of Congressional support has led him to compromise on some elements of his agenda as it makes its way through the legislative process. Although the structure of the bill remains, opposition politicians have made more than 100 changes to it, including curtailing the scope of the President’s emergency powers to one year rather than two, and retaining YPF, the national oil and gas company, in public hands, despite allowing most other state-owned companies to remain subject to privatization.

Neoliberalism and the Decline of the Legislature

Argentina is not unique. This most recent example of legislative subversion is a familiar tactic used to accommodate neoliberal restructuring, that has been utilized repeatedly by neoliberal reformers in recent decades, including the IMF-sanctioned omnibus bill rammed through Greece’s parliament in 2014.

This approach to the legislature is the consequence of the political limitations of neoliberal policy, which is opposed by considerable segments of society. A blueprint for this strategy is spelled out by former New Zealand Minister of Finance Roger Douglas in his 1993 book, Unfinished Business. The book recalls lessons from his experience implementing a neoliberal agenda dubbed ‘Rogernomics’ in the 1980s against the headwinds of widespread social and political opposition.

Douglas claimed it is “uncertainty, not speed, that endangers the success of structural reform programmes.” Neoliberal reforms should not be passed incrementally, but as a rupture, moving in “quantum leaps” to overcome popular opposition.

Democratic processes are typically slow and deliberate, designed to enable the legislative body to scrutinize the executive, foster compromise, and encourage debate. It was necessary, therefore, to streamline the democratic process to ensure that politicians could neither interfere with, nor demand meaningful changes to, neoliberal reorganization efforts.

Neoliberal governments should confront the legislature, not as an essential element of the process of democracy, but an instrument used by politicians and vested interests to interfere with the operations of the marketplace. “Speed is essential. It is almost impossible to go too fast,” Douglas said. “Once the programme begins to be implemented, don’t stop until you have completed it.”

This tactic did not occur in a vacuum, but emerged intrinsically from the content of a neoliberal theoretical framework that views democratic institutions as an additional layer of state administration to be overcome. Neoliberal thought is deeply skeptical in the capabilities of reason to infer or predict causality. Given the limitations of the mind, society should be governed, not by conscious modelling and careful planning, but according to spontaneous or “invisible hand” forms of social organization, which are the outcome of independent, unplanned individual decisions.

This position is most clearly expressed by Friedrich Hayek, who claimed that parliamentary sovereignty was in fact the “root of the evil” in modern society, since it facilitated the growth of the state. Legislatures constituted one limb of what Milton Friedman called the “iron triangle” of politicians, bureaucrats, as well as corporate and individual special interests that were perpetually reliant upon the government for rents, and therefore had an interest in obstructing market reforms.

‘Instant Democracy’ and the Rise of ‘Neoliberal Populism’

What should we make of Milei’s approach to Congress, then? Is it reflective of a new pattern in neoliberal governance, or merely the extension of an old one? The answer is both. While Milei’s approach clearly shares categorial similarities with the neoliberal legislative blueprint built for speed, his blending of these ideas with a coarse, populist rhetoric grounded in anti-statism, signifies an intensification of these patterns.

Milei’s populist neoliberal worldview contributes to a rising trend among far-right governments around the world to use this rhetoric to rationalize the subversion of democracy. This kind of “neoliberal populism” conflates democratic institutions with political actors, claiming that they are instruments of obstruction for self-serving politicians and bureaucrats.

This is a view Milei has proudly declared. “For me, the state is an enemy, as are the politicians who live off it,” he said. “We will put an end to the parasitic, stupid, useless political caste that is sinking this country.”

Grounded in the same logic as neoliberalism’s conventional demand for freedom from the state, democratic institutions increasingly appear as impediments to the logic of the marketplace. The elimination of cumbersome legislative processes, then, removes the obstacles that restrain market forces, generating popular economic independence, and restoring common-sense. This inverts the logic of democracy, making it appear as though executive rule is necessary to protect the interests of “the People” from Friedman’s “iron triangle.”

The anti-parliamentarism at the core of the neoliberal theoretical outlook has increasingly transformed into a populist program that mobilizes a general dissatisfaction with politicians against democratic institutions as such. Neoliberal politicians, such as Milei, use this reasoning to manufacture the conditions for the ongoing use of emergency powers and the concentration of authority in the executive branch.

The global elite, sensing “the smell of a big privatization wave coming,” are said to be “infatuated” with his take-no-prisoners approach to Congress. Thus, although not a new phenomenon, Milei’s brand of “instant democracy,” which conceives of speed and flexibility as the essence of legislative governance, has the support of both the financial elite as well as a growing populist dimension, giving it the hallmarks of a burgeoning political movement of the most regressive kind.

As the institutional forbearance that restrained most neoliberal governments to stay within the confines of liberal democratic constitutional structures continues to give way to a logic that sees the legislature as subordinate to the market, it is likely that we will continue to see the erosion of democratic standards.

Tom McDowell is a Lecturer in the Department of Politics and Public Administration at Toronto Metropolitan University. He is the author of Neoliberal Parliamentarism: The Decline of Parliament at the Ontario Legislature (University of Toronto Press, 2021).

How many state-owned companies would be privatized under Milei's mega bill?

What industries were affected by Milei's deregulations?

How many state-owned companies would be privatized under Milei's mega bill?

What industries were affected by Milei's deregulations?

**Dollarization:** He has proposed replacing Argentina's currency with the US dollar to stabilize the economy, although this move would cede significant financial policy control to external entities.

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Argentina presidential election: A runoff of economic ideals

Tobias Käufer
November 17, 2023

Argentina's Economic Minister Sergio Massa and libertarian Javier Milei face off in a nail-biting presidential runoff. The two candidates have radically different solutions to Argentina's economic woes.

https://p.dw.com/p/4YuiH

Economic policy is the key issue in Argentina's runoff election on Sunday, as voters decide between the economic policy of current Economy Minister Sergio Massa and his rival Javier Milei, a far-right libertarian economist known for his radical free-market liberalism.

Argentina's dire economic figures recently reported by the National Statistics Institute (INDEC) may speak for a change after the depressed Latin American country's cost of living surged a staggering 142.7% over the year. The poverty rate in September stood at 38.9%, according to the Buenos Aires-based Pontificia Universidad Catolica (UCA).

Argentina unveils new 2,000-peso bill as inflation bites

Milei's radical ideas for Argentina's economy

Argentina has for decades been plagued by financial chaos and weak economic growth which opposition candidate Javier Milei says is the result of successive left-leaning governments and their failed socialist economic policy.

"Those who have led us into inflation and poverty are now trying to instigate fear [among the population]. Argentina was a world power at the end of the 19th century, then came the decline under the socialist governments," Milei said this week at a campaign event in Rosario in the province of Santa Fe.

He's repeatedly accused his center-left rival of running a fear campaign that would denounce him as an ultra-right hardliner who would seek to undo basic rights and democracy in Argentina. In his campaign, Milei is styling himself as the defender of the country against populism as he aims to "reduce privileges, not rights."

Milei has attracted a lot of attention for his promises to radically overhaul the Argentine government and economy with a plan to eliminate the nation's central bank and replace its currency with the US dollar. He wants to significantly reduce the state apparatus, lift laws and regulations on the economy, and privatize state services. Other controversial proposals from his camp include liberalizing organ trade and privatizing Argentina's territorial waters.

With his radical free-market orthodoxy, Milei hopes to spur economic growth and subsequently lift more Argentines out of widespread poverty.

Massa's gentler economic reforms for Argentina

Sergio Massa is a veteran of Argentine politics and the new leader of the Peronist political movement which is based on the left-wing ideas of former President Juan Peron, who ruled Argentina several times between the 1940s and 1970s. The so-called Peronists have won nine of the last 12 free and fair presidential elections.

Massa has replaced Alberto Fernandez as the Peronist frontrunner after the hapless president voluntarily resigned in April this year. He was the winner of the first round of voting in October after making a surprise comeback from poor pre-election polls capturing nearly 37% of the vote, compared with 30% for Milei.

Massa, who has led Argentina's economy for more than a year, pushed through several policies in support of his candidacy, including programs that return sales tax to certain workers and eliminate income tax for others. He has promised to maintain some economic policies that conservative economists criticize, such as large subsidies for Argentines' energy costs.

In addition, he hopes to generate enough tax and trade surpluses to help negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on restructuring Argentina's massive debt.

Argentina's untapped economic potential

Argentina has much to offer to the rest of the world but has yet to leverage it for the benefit of the entire population. This includes large lithium deposits crucial for the transition to e-mobility, as well as offshore oil reserves and abundant natural gas reserves. Moreover, it has the potential to produce green hydrogen, its farming sector is competitive, and the country has a young, well-educated population.

"The biggest challenge for the next government is to develop an initial stabilization plan and then push through a series of structural reforms to profoundly change the economic system," Agustin Etchebarne, director of the Libertad y Progreso Foundation in Buenos Aires, told DW.

Etchebarne is part of a group of economists who condone radical structural changes to the economy to lift Argentina out of its current crisis. Others, including about 100 renowned international economic experts, are more skeptical.

In an open letter recently, some high-profile economists the likes of Thomas Piketty from France, Jayati Ghosh from India, and the former Finance Minister of Colombia, Jose Antonio Ocampo, have warned Milei's proposals are "full of risks that could potentially be very harmful to the Argentine economy and the Argentine people."

This article was originally written in German.

Title:

Content: Overview:

Argentina's latest presidential election offers plenty of sensational fodder for the presses. But there's a deeper issue here, a politics of desperation, that we would do well to watch as it rises in the world.

Reading Time: 6 minutes

On November 19, Argentina elected Javier Milei as its next president, to take office this December. His politics have been compared to those of Donald Trump (in his showmanship) and Jair Bolsonaro (in his rightwing extremism and denialism), but his ideas go further than both. Milei calls himself an anarcho-capitalist (a form of libertarian), whose stated aims are “blowing up” the central bank, changing the Argentinian peso for the dollar, permitting the private sale of human organs, and closing ministries for education, health, women, and culture while slashing welfare payments.

Milei has also been called a “minarchist” for his minimal-government belief that the state’s only purpose is to protect citizens’ rights to free action. To this end, proposed bans on abortion and loosened gun laws run in lockstep with his acceptance of trans identities and desire to legalize more drugs. He denies the scale of Argentina’s brutal history of state terror in 1976 to 1983, and when he first rose in the polls, there was a panicked rush among citizens to change their pesos for dollars, fearing economic disaster.

So why did he win?

And not just by a hair, but with 56% of the vote against his runoff opponent, Sergei Massa?

The historical underpinnings run deep, but human behavior in response to the current economic moment is also not complex. Urban poverty hit 40.1% in 2023, as inflation reached 50.7% earlier this year. When the official exchange rate was devalued by 22% the day after the primaries (in which Milei’s popularity caused panic), it caused a 12.4% inflation spike. This is in an enconomy where some 48.1% are informally or self-employed, and thus without salaried protections against the greatest financial hits.

An outsider expecting rational economic actors might assume that if Milei’s presence in the polls only destabilized an already precarious situation, surely humans would avoid voting for him again. But the logic of longstanding financial stress runs deeper than traditional economic configurations of the “rational actor”: when there is no confidence in existing state structures, perhaps it is best to pull off the bandaid quickly. The immediate pain will be hard, but maybe, just maybe, the destruction of the old order will bring about something new.

This is the politics of desperation and disillusionment.

The world would do well to pay attention to its rise.

Argentinian histories of low confidence in the state

There’s a famous, apocryphal, and above all cruel expression in economics: “There have only been four types of economies in the world: advanced, developing, Japan, and Argentina.” The point driven at here is that Japan seemed to rise from the ashes, with everything working against it, after World War II and even now with an aging workforce. Meanwhile Argentina, a country with a natural bounty, seemed to destroy confidence in itself at every turn.

This is a cruel expression for a few reasons: one being that Argentina is not alone even in South America, as a country with great internal resources that has struggled to turn its holdings into wealth for its citizens. Another reason is the why. While Japan recovered from WWII by growing a commercial empire through top-down industrial relationships with surrounding countries, Argentina under labor-nationalist Juan Domingo Perón had the audacity in the 1950s to try to nationalize its British-owned railways. This choice met with swift reprisal from Western powers, thereafter unwilling to invest. Before World War II, Argentina had relied heavily on military rule. After inflation spiked and labor strikes surged as global investors pulled out, it was back to decades of fraught authoritarianism.

One of the worst coups started with a 600 percent inflation surge in 1976. That seven-year period yielded up to 30,000 disappeared human beings during the state’s “Dirty War” against leftists, and ended only after the military attempted to take the Falkland Islands from the British. This failure would yield the modern democratic state, but with a low opinion of both the military and the bureaucracy. In 1989, ahead of a massive inflation crisis of up to 4,900 percent, only 30,000 out of 30 million citizens were paying income taxes.

Now, inflation can address domestic debt, but Argentina’s massive fiscal deficit was informed centrally by external debt, in dollars to the rest of the world. During the banking crisis of 1990, banks forced client deposits into bonds under the BONEX Plan, essentially taking citizens’ savings from them with a promise that their investment in the future of the country would pay off. Citizens were not happy about this, of course.

The government then introduced the Convertibility Plan in 1991, which tried to peg the Argentinian peso to the US dollar at a 1:1 rate. This process involved Argentina embracing US neoliberal state policies: relaxing labor protections, massively privatizing industries, and otherwise bringing the world back into Argentinian markets. Did the plan reduce inflation? Yes. It also raised unemployment, reduced wages, and stratified class outcomes. And it led to more austerity measures over time, because the government’s debt kept rising, forcing more of the annual budget into “debt servicing” to other countries.

Being open to world markets also meant being more vulnerable to their downturns, such as a major wobble in 2001, which sparked labor collapse and food riots in Argentina despite its local wealth of grain and beef. The peso was unpegged in 2002, after the government had restricted bank withdrawals to keep citizens from “financial flight” into other currencies and markets. Once the peso was floating freely, though, people panicked anyway. After years of seeing the dollar as the more valuable and stable currency, they rushed to exchange their holdings (which were now all in pesos) back into US dollars by other means. That rush caused another inflationary spike.

Argentina underwent two major debt restructuring deals in that decade, but they just created more problems. A deal in 2001 allowed Argentina to pay interest only to those who had opted in to the restructuring plan, and the exclusion of “holdouts” was reasserted after 2010, when the debt plan was agreed upon by 93% of bondholders. The remaining 7% weren’t having this, though: a few hedge fund creditors sued the Argentinian government for breach of a principle of equal treatment for bondholders, pari passu. The South District Court of New York agreed with them, and even though Argentina tried to continue paying its “holdin” creditors, as per the debt restructuring plan, those payments were not permitted until Argentina paid the holdouts, too, in compliance with the court’s rulings.

Argentina was forced into a massive default in 2014. And again in 2020. And this year, analysts believe it’s on track for another soon.

Why? Because Argentina’s banking system isn’t an independent force. It is yoked to a highly litigious set of international players, and vulnerable to every global market crash as well.

Seen this way, why wouldn’t the average Argentinian want to bring it down?

Dollarization and other flawed promises

The complex problem for Argentinians voting out of desperation is twofold:

For one, as much as they might associate the days of the dollar with a period of relative stability, it was never a simple matter of pegging one currency to another. The arrangement expressly came with Argentina’s willingness to embrace neoliberal policies that yielded stark divides in civilian life and other market outcomes. For Milei to “dollarize” the country now would require a similar willingness to play ball with international institutions and their policy demands. The moment the peso is eliminated, by being exchanged in its entirety for dollars, Argentina cedes a great deal of financial policy to external players.

And yet, that is precisely the issue currently plaguing Argentina’s banks.

But also, not just Argentina, despite the glibness of the apocryphal economics saying.

The problems of our global financial system are serious enough that they will require a much more holistic reckoning with the consequences of fifty years of neoliberal policy. In July, a UN joint commission released “Soaring Debt Threatens Global Prosperity”, a report that highlights the staggering rates of debt servicing endured by 40% of the developing world. If these debts were simply between states, that would be one matter, more easily resolved; but the hyper-privatized yet undertaxed nature of our global economy has the vast majority of these countries forced into austerity measures to pay off complex debts to groups like the hedge fund creditors who pushed Argentina into default in 2014.

In other words, this will keep happening until we develop policies that can offset the private-investment predation currently facing many countries in precarity.

The second problem is one that Colombia also experienced this past year, when many on both the left (with excitement) and the right (with trepidation) expected the first leftist president to bring about dramatic reforms: Milei is just one person in his government. Just as Gustavo Petro found himself embroiled in parliamentary quarrels between competing groups, so too does Milei’s victory not come with the resounding legislative presence needed to steamroll all his grand plans into operation. He, too, is going to have to negotiate.

In practice, this means that Argentinians currently thrilled by the possibility of change are again going to meet with disillusionment. Either Milei will pull off his dollarization, and they will learn that this move makes the country no less vulnerable to global shocks and creditors, or he won’t, and amid his interim achievement of “easier” goals (e.g., the demolition of whole ministries), Argentinians will experience socioeconomic shocks that again bring them to the streets in protest… or else to live, having nowhere else to go.

GLOBAL HUMANIST SHOPTALK M L Clark is a Canadian writer by birth, now based in Medellín, Colombia, who publishes speculative fiction and humanist essays with a focus on imagining a more just world.

**Fiscal Austerity:** Milei aims to achieve a budget surplus by slashing public spending, including terminating contracts of public employees with less than one year of service and increasing prices for basic services and public transportation.

Title:

Content: Milei Experiment

In the tangled web of Argentine politics and economics, one figure has emerged as both a lightning rod for controversy and a beacon of hope ~ President Javier Milei.

In the tangled web of Argentine politics and economics, one figure has emerged as both a lightning rod for controversy and a beacon of hope ~ President Javier Milei. His first 100 days in office have been marked by a whirlwind of fiscal manoeuvres, bold policy shifts, and commitment to economic reform. But as Argentina teeters on the edge of uncertainty, Mr Milei’s ambitious agenda raises questions even it offers solutions. At the heart of Mr Milei’s strategy lies a radical departure from conventional wisdom.

Brandishing a chainsaw as a symbol of fiscal austerity, he has pledged to slash spending and achieve a budget surplus, a feat unheard of in a country plagued by decades of fiscal mismanagement. His unorthodox approach has garnered both praise and scepticism, as Argentines grapple with the harsh realities of rising poverty and economic contraction. The cornerstone of Mr Milei’s economic vision is the elimination of money-printing and the pursuit of a unified exchange rate. By devaluing the peso and cutting interest rates, he aims to rein in inflation and restore confidence in the economy.

Yet the path to stability is fraught with pitfalls, as the spectre of recession looms large and investors remain wary of the government’s opaque monetary policies. While Mr Milei’s commitment to reform is commendable, his political isolation poses a significant obstacle to meaningful change. With little support in the Argentine Congress and a fragmented coalition, he faces an uphill battle. The recent defeat of a sprawling omnibus bill highlights the challenges ahead, as competing interests and entrenched political factions threaten to derail Mr Milei’s ambitions. Moreover, the uncertainty surrounding Argentina’s future monetary regime adds another layer of complexity to the equation. Will Mr Milei pivot towards dollarization or pursue a more gradual approach to currency reform? The lack of clarity on this front only serves to fuel investor anxieties and exacerbate economic volatility. Amidst these challenges, Mr Milei’s fate hangs in the balance. How much economic pain can Argentines endure before turning on their unconventional leader? And can Mr Milei muster the political support needed to navigate the treacherous waters of Argentine politics?

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In the end, the trajectory of Mr Milei’s presidency hinges on the delicate balance between economic resilience and political manoeuvring. Should he manage to maintain public support and secure crucial alliances, Mr Milei could emerge as a formidable force in next year’s mid-term elections. However, any slip in popularity could spell disaster for his ambitious agenda, opening the door for his adversaries to dismantle his presidency. Whether Mr Milei’s gamble will pay off remains to be seen. But one thing is certain. In a country accustomed to political upheaval and economic turmoil, the journey towards reform is bound to be fraught with uncertainty and adversity. Only time will tell whether Mr Milei’s vision for Argentina’s future will lead to prosperity or further hardship

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How will Milei's reforms impact workers?

What issue did Milei want to address without printing money?

How will Milei's reforms impact workers?

What issue did Milei want to address without printing money?

**Central Bank and Currency Reforms:** He plans to eliminate the central bank and unify the exchange rate to control inflation.

What economic issue did Milei want to address?

**Emergency Powers and Legislative Bypass:** Milei has used emergency decrees and omnibus bills to bypass Congress, enabling him to implement reforms rapidly without legislative scrutiny.

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And just like that, Argentina’s ultra-libertarian president, Javier Milei, sent the whole socio-political-economic ecosystem into disarray

Praised for his moderation and pragmatism during the first few weeks of his presidency, the self-proclaimed anarcho-capitalist has now put in place a series of controversial measures which have divided public opinion, generating a new iteration of Argentina’s infamous “grieta,” our very own version of the polarization that has now become the norm across the so-called ‘Western World.’ But, it’s no longer about the antagonism between Kirchnerites and their opponents, mainly represented by Mauricio Macri and the Juntos por el Cambio coalition, but about those blindly in favor of the wild-haired economist and those denouncing his every move as a diabolic, anti-democratic part of a ferocious plan to tear down the tenets of Argentine society.

Both sides seem to agree that he is executing a carefully crafted plan that will either elevate Argentina back to the lost status of “global power” of the late 19th century or ravage the nation in order put it on the chopping-block and conduct a fire sale to hand over the crown jewels to global financial elites. Those with access to the Casa Rosada tell a different story though, one of amateurism and incomplete staffing that would suggest the La Libertad Avanza coalition is acting more out of necessity than Machiavellian genius.

Milei finally broke out of his honeymoon period with those who didn’t vote for him after launching a massive package of reforms through a “decreto de necesidad y urgencia,” an emergency decree (DNU) which has become the standard practice for presidents seeking to bypass Congress and is generally used for less ambitious projects. The DNU is truly massive, with 366 articles including the repeal of multiple laws which call into question the constitutionality of the measure, even if governing via DNU is already contrary to the spirit of the Constitution and something that has happened in each of the last several administrations. It was quickly followed by the Omnibus law, equally as massive in its scope and ambition, and its capacitiy to divide the political field.

Put together by liberal economist Federico Sturzenegger, who ran the Central Bank under Macri and helds no role in the Milei-Villaruel administration until after the project was presented, the “mega-decree” was announced by national (and obligatory) broadcast several weeks in a dramatic scene that had Milei as the protagonist in the foreground and his whole team standing behind, statue-like, as the president read sternly.

Earlier that day they had scored a political victory with Security Minister Patricia Bullrich’s “anti-picket” protocol making its debut, effectively diluting the first public protest against the government. Some reports indicated there was more security than 'piquetero' protesters. Weeks later, the General Confederation of Labor united the pan-Peronist opposition in a massive march that managed to remain cordial, respecting Bullrich's protocol by trying to show political muscle in the streets.

The reform package conformed by DNU and Omnibus bill immediately generated the reaction of Milei's political opponents, along with a substantial portion of the population who took to the streets for a traditional “cacerolazo,” a protests with pots and pans reminiscent of the worst days of the 2001 crisis. There are no coincidences. Congressional leaders from the pan-Peronist Unión por la Patria coalition spoke with union strongmen from the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) umbrella union group. Members of the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) warned of unconstitutionality and specialist lawyers indicated Milei was trampling all over the Constitution by failing to respect the separation of powers. Buenos Aires Province governor Axel Kicillof, probably the leading member of the Peronist opposition, and his government decided to ignore Bullrich’s “anti-picket” protocol claiming it violated the constitutional right to protest. A few weeks before, Economy Minister Luis ‘Toto’ Caputo unveiled the government’s initial economic plan, generating a similar reaction in the political field which didn’t seem to make its way to the general population. The situation is beginning to change and as the actual implications of the Milei administration’s actions make an impact, social and political actors will begin to respond.

There should be few doubts that one of the strongest points of La Libertad Avanza’s electoral strategy had to do with communications, particularly on social media. These early moves suggest they will try and double down, betting on the use of their skills to try and compensate for the lack of political support, despite a strong victory over both Sergio Massa and the Peronists, and Bullrich and Juntos por el Cambio. Toto Caputo, however, is known to be particularly uncomfortable with the media. His pre-recorded message several weeks ago announcing tough economic measures — many of which contradicted Milei’s campaign promises, particularly tax hikes — was delayed several times reportedly due to the need for multiple takes and Milei’s direct involvement (or maybe indirectly through sister Karina). The second measure he announced, for example, was a year-long reduction of government advertising to zero – a direct strike to the beleaguered media industry and a measure that has practically zero impact on the deficit but high popular approval. The over-dramatization of the security operation to contain a moderate-to-small protest early into the presidency, together with pictures of Milei and Bullrich supervising from police headquarters, allowed them to take advantage of the far-left Partido Obrero to score an easy win and show his electorate that they can control the streets. Yet, controlling a couple of thousand protesters is one thing. The CGT protest that brought together the political and social power of the unions remained under control, and that's a win for the government, but it was a political protest. If the middle class begins to lose its temper, and expectations, Milei could face a much more difficult scenario.

The “basis for the reconstruction of the Argentine economy” reform package could be another attempt to win the communications game and take the spotlight to appear active in the eyes of the public opinion. With absolute minorities in both chambers of Congress and several controversial reforms included in a massive package passed by Milei’s mega-DNU, it's difficult to imagine that it will quickly pass in the Chamber of Deputies, despite an early win at the commission level with the help of the former Juntos por el Cambio coalition. Furthermore, several interest groups are putting together legal arguments to dispute the issue in court, especially the labor reform which has been stayed. It could quickly make its way to a Supreme Court that has already proven eager to interject politically.

Ultimately, most, if not all, of the regulations, laws, and measures included in the decree will have to make their way through Congress and will therefore be subject to negotiations and amendments. Yet, Milei has shown initiative and wants to maintain, or extend, the popular support which took him to victory in the run-off and has already generated a circumstantial majority in the Senate to defeat the Peronist caucus and at the commissions to get the Omnibus bill past the first obstacle.

There are risks that the ultra-libertarian could prove authoritarian and anti-democratic. He’s shown some of that in the past, particularly by claiming he would govern by plebiscite if he didn’t have the support of Congress (something Hugo Chávez did to amend the Venezuelan constitution) and by picking a dictatorship denialist as his running-mate. Many of his detractors have pointed to signs that suggest Argentina could descend into a state of totalitarianism, and this emergency decree fuels their suspicion.

It’s not clear whether the conditions for such a situation are in place. For now, he seems to be bluffing his political opponents. We’ll see if someone calls his hand.

This piece was originally published in the Buenos Aires Times, Argentina's only English-language newspaper.

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**Reduction of Government Ministries:** He has promised to abolish ten of the government’s 18 ministries, reflecting his commitment to reducing the size of the state.

Title:

Content: Argentina sees the light with Maverick Javier Milei – Ivo Vegter

In a surprising turn, libertarian firebrand Javier Milei secured Argentina’s presidency after a second-round victory against his left-wing rival. Vowing to end decades of socialist mismanagement, Milei, an outspoken economist, faces challenges in implementing radical reforms, including abolishing ministries and dollarising the economy. While hailed as the world’s first libertarian president, Milei’s uphill battle involves legislative opposition and managing economic pain amid promises of a freer, market-oriented Argentina. Skepticism remains, awaiting the true impact of his ambitious plans in a nation grappling with deep-rooted economic struggles.

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Argentinians see the light

By Ivo Vegter*

It took a second round of voting, but the libertarian Javier Milei has defeated his Peronist rival to become president of Argentina.

A month ago, Javier Milei unexpectedly lost the first round of the Argentinian general election to his left-wing Peronist rival, Sergio Massa, after the latter had cynically promised zero taxes as a way to bribe voters.

In my column on the lessons South Africa could draw from that election, I said: ‘Let’s hope Argentinians see the light before Massa and Milei face off in the run-off election.’

Happily, they did see the light.

After decades of economic malaise under a government that for most of the last 30 years has been socialist, corrupt, wasteful and incompetent, leaving Argentina eighth from last in the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World Report 2023, they elected Milei, a libertarian firebrand, in the biggest landslide since Juan Perón’s election in 1973.

Milei becomes the first libertarian president, not only of Argentina, but in the world. The closest precedent that comes to mind is that of Calvin Coolidge, the small-government conservative president during the Roaring Twenties in the US, but Milei is far more radical than that.

‘“oday the reconstruction of Argentina begins’, he said, after winning 56% of the vote in the head-to-head race. That was also his first lie as president-elect, since he doesn’t actually take office until 10 December, but we’ll let that slide.

Radical

To describe Milei as radical would be putting it mildly. He has described the country’s ruling elite as thieves and the government as ‘a criminal organisation’. He has promised to abolish ten of the government’s 18 ministries. He said he would do away with the central bank and dollarise the Argentinian economy.

‘The model of decadence has come to an end’, he told his supporters. ‘There’s no going back. We have monumental problems ahead. Inflation, lack of work, and poverty’.

Milei is an accomplished economist, and largely follows the Austrian School of individualist free-market economics. He has variously described himself as an anarcho-capitalist and a minarchist (an anarchist who accepts the legitimacy of a small government dedicated to protecting life, liberty and property).

He has been extraordinarily outspoken on the evils of socialism and statism, and how they turned Argentina from a once-wealthy world power into an over-indebted, poverty-stricken, underdeveloped basket case.

Mainstream media

The mainstream media, with its largely left-leaning bias, has compared Milei to former presidents Donald Trump of the US and Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil.

‘Argentina set for sharp right turn as Trump-like radical wins presidency’, trumpeted the Washington Post

‘Argentina Elects Javier Milei in Victory for Far Right’ was the headline in the New York Times, which added: ‘Argentina’s next president is a libertarian economist whose brash style and embrace of conspiracy theories has parallels with those of Donald J. Trump.’

The ‘embrace of conspiracy theories’ is a particularly vicious jab. Readers would have to follow a link to find an explanation, and it turns out that the Times only referred to Milei’s allegations of polling irregularities, which have not been tested.

It is entirely plausible that Argentina’s electoral system is less secure than that of the United States, and that the incumbents – who went as far as abolishing taxes in order to engineer a win – might have been involved in some electoral skulduggery.

Allegations of election fraud are very common on all sides of the political spectrum, and do not, in and of themselves, rise to the level of the debunked claims of Trump, and his attempt to derail the orderly election of his rival.

Authoritarians

More importantly, both Bolsonaro and Trump are alt-right populists. They are moral authoritarians – not liberals – and appeal to collectivist – not individualist – principles such as nationalism and protectionism. They have often, rightly, been described as fascist, which is just as antithetical to libertarians as is left-wing socialism.

That both former presidents expressed their support for Milei has a lot more to do with shared anti-socialist positions than any real congruence in their political philosophy.

Milei has himself rejected the right-wing label, and indeed, his classical liberalism (for which ‘libertarian’ in the American sense is a synonym) does not yield to a simplistic left-right analysis. Rather, it falls on the liberal end of an authoritarian-liberal scale, and on the progressive end of a conservative-progressive scale.

Sour-grape-ish

Milei does have some views that are questionable, or traditionally associated with the conservative right, such as his anti-abortion stance and his rejection of climate alarmism.

Neither define him, however, and both are issues on which libertarians can and do disagree.

By similar logic, Milei’s promise not to dismantle Argentina’s extensive social welfare programmes does not make him some sort of left-winger.

In focusing on incidental agreements between Milei and leaders like Trump and Bolsonaro, and ignoring the fundamental philosophical differences between the former’s individualist, free-market, small-government ideas and the authoritarianism, nationalism, populism and protectionism of the latter, the media does both Milei and their readers a great disservice.

That a politician does not perfectly reflect all one’s personal political or moral views is in any case far less of a concern when that very politician proposes as far as possible to keep government out of people’s personal affairs and to leave most of the world’s problems to the private sector.

‘When your response to everything that is wrong with the world is to say, “There ought to be a law,” you are saying that you hold freedom very cheap’, said Thomas Sowell.

Moreover, it seems extraordinarily petty and sour-grape-ish to complain about a few differences of opinion with a candidate who promises radical change in a country that is mired in economic crisis, thanks to the policies of its incumbent rulers.

Music to the ears

Sniping from the mainstream press aside, the rise of a truly libertarian president in one of the world’s most economically unfree countries should be music to a classical liberal’s ears.

Who doesn’t want to radically slash the size of government? Who doesn’t question the inflationary monetary policy of highly indebted countries? Who doesn’t want to see free enterprise flourish, and witness the departure of a government that strangles business with red tape and taxes, and tries to pick winners by throwing subsidies at favoured companies?

On the face of it, this should be an excellent experiment to show whether the libertarian prescriptions for government do, indeed, produce a better outcome than the socialist quagmire in which Argentina has been stuck for so long.

Pain and gain

Practically speaking, however, there are reasons to remain skeptical.

First, we’ve only seen Milei’s talk, and not his walk.

Second, making drastic changes in the structure of a country’s government and economy, as Milei proposes, will be painful.

It is arguable that the short-term pain is justified by the long-term gain, but electorates are rarely forgiving to those who inflict necessary pain. Witness Margaret Thatcher, who saved Britain from the socialist economic malaise of the 1970s, but remains hated to this day by those who bore the brunt of her reforms.

Dollarising an economy does not produce immediate results, for example. It can take years before the stabilising effect of dollarisation filters through to low inflation rates. It can, however, immediately harm people and even increase poverty levels, depending on the exchange rate at which existing deposits are converted.

Drastically reducing the size of government will also face much immediate opposition, especially from civil servants who stand to lose their jobs.

Privatising healthcare, education or other government functions is also fraught with transition difficulties. Much depends on exactly how such privatisation is carried out. It can fail, and even if the eventual outcome is a success, it could cause years of disruptions and dissatisfaction.

Then there are the entrenched patronage networks of the incumbent socialist government, who will be highly upset – and fight back vigorously – when the taps of corrupt fiscal spending get turned off.

Finally, few voters have the patience to wait five or ten years for radical free-market reforms to have a positive impact, and Argentina’s president only serves a four-year term before facing the electorate again.

Legislative opposition

A further obstacle to Milei’s reforms is that he will not be the philosopher-king of every libertarian’s dreams. He will not be a dictator.

He will simply be the head of the executive in a constitutional parliamentary democracy, with strictly circumscribed powers.

And the elections did not result in a similar landslide in the legislature.

Argentina has a 72-seat Senate, or upper house, and a 257-seat Chamber of Deputies, or lower house. Together, they make up the Argentinian National Congress.

In both houses, Milei’s libertarian coalition, Liberty Advances (La Libertad Avanza, or LLA) took more seats from the conservative coalition, Together for Change (Juntos por el Cambio, or JxC), than from the socialist Peronista coalition, Union for the Homeland (Unión por la Patria, or UxP).

In the Senate, this leaves the Peronistas as the largest coalition, with 32 seats. It would need 37 seats to command an outright majority. The conservative coalition, JxC, retains only 27 seats. As the third-largest party in the Senate, Milei’s LLA only has six seats, which even in coalition with the conservatives is not enough for an outright majority.

In the lower house, the picture is similar. UxP has 104 out of 257 seats, JxC has 93, and LLA has 38. The only difference is that here, a JxC and LLA coalition can command a simple majority.

This leaves Milei at the mercy first of the conservatives, who would welcome market-oriented reforms and a departure from socialism, but by their very nature would be reluctant to endorse Milei’s more radical, disruptive proposals. Once Milei has cleared that hurdle, he needs to gather a majority in the upper house, which will be even harder.

Argentina is also heavily indebted, including to the International Monetary Fund, and creditors are likely to have a say in how the country is run. Anything that scares them will raise the cost of credit, which Argentina can ill afford.

Wait and see

Once the initial euphoria of seeing a true libertarian in power has cleared, then, we are left with the sobering realisation that Milei may not be able to achieve anywhere near as much as he has promised.

Turning failing countries around is not for the faint-hearted, and it always comes with social upheaval and economic pain.

Even if Milei gets the good ship Argentina pointed in the right direction again, the prevailing winds and currents may still dash it – and its captain – upon the rocks.

Read also:

*Ivo Vegter is a freelance journalist, columnist and speaker who loves debunking myths and misconceptions, and addresses topics from the perspective of individual liberty and free markets.

This article was first published by Daily Friend and is republished with permission

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**Threats to Democratic Norms:** His approach includes weakening democratic institutions by bypassing traditional legislative processes, which has raised concerns about the erosion of democratic norms.

**Controversial Social Policies:** Milei has proposed liberalizing organ trade and privatizing public healthcare, alongside supporting conservative social stances such as banning abortion.

Title:

Content: Young Argentinians want change. Many see Javier Milei as their best option

Milei, one of two candidates in Sunday’s run-off election, has whipped up a devoted following among young male voters.

Buenos Aires, Argentina – David Urbani was 15 years old, barely in high school, when he first encountered the future far-right presidential candidate Javier Milei.

Now an economics student at the National University of Mar del Plata, Urbani remembers surfing on YouTube when he stumbled on a series of educational videos that Milei had put together, as part of his work as an economist and professor in Buenos Aires at the time.

“I think what moved me the most was the simple way he explained concepts,” Urbani, 20, said, holding up an introductory economics book with Milei’s autograph in it. “The guy is an academic, not a politician.”

A relative newcomer to Argentina’s politics, Milei has nevertheless catapulted to international fame as the dark horse candidate in this year’s presidential elections.

This Sunday, he faces centre-left Economy Minister Sergio Massa in a run-off race so tight that polls show the two candidates in a dead heat.

Part of the fuel behind Milei’s sudden political rise has been the devoted following he has whipped up among young, largely male voters like Urbani. Some are devoted libertarians. Others are merely curious and feeling disaffected with the political establishment.

But while pundits and opposition politicians lambaste Milei for his radical right-wing policy proposals, this young generation of “mileistas” say they’re all in.

“I believe we have to try, and that’s it,” Ramiro Gómez, a 21-year-old information technology (IT) technician from the province of Rosario, said of his decision to back Milei.

Elected to the lower chamber of Argentina’s congress in 2021, Milei was still in his freshman term when he launched his long-shot presidential bid in this year’s race.

But he quickly scored an upset. In August’s open primary, he rocketed to the top spot, earning more votes than establishment figures like Massa and former Security Minister Patricia Bullrich.

Milei has remained a frontrunner ever since. In October’s general elections, he finished in second place behind Massa, earning one of two slots in the run-off race.

Many experts credit Milei’s sudden popularity to the dire straits of Argentina’s economy. The country faces a long-running economic crisis, and inflation has topped 140 percent, driving down the value of Argentina’s national currency, the peso.

To address the crisis, Milei has promised to slash key government ministries, charge fees for Argentina’s public healthcare system, shutter the central bank, and adopt the United States dollar as Argentina’s national currency.

He has also adopted an eyebrow-raising mixture of libertarian and conservative social stances, offering support for banning abortion and legalising organ sales. Popular targets for his sharply worded broadsides include women, the LGBTQ community and even Pope Francis, an Argentinian himself.

Yet, while other right-wing populists like former US President Donald Trump and Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro have struggled to win over younger generations, Milei has consistently led polls of voters between the ages of 16 and 35.

Mark P Jones, a professor in Latin American studies at Rice University, credits the difference to the deep-seated frustration with Argentina’s crisis and Milei’s image as a political outsider.

“When younger voters look at Milei, they see someone who’s fighting against the system and a rebel,” Jones said. “And I think one thing Milei has been able to do is effectively dissociate himself with younger voters from his more conservative policies.”

A ‘chainsaw’ to the status quo

Milei’s most ardent supporters often connect through WhatsApp groups and on social media, where fan accounts feature silhouettes of the candidate’s signature sideburns and memes depict him locked in epic anime battles.

Milei’s eccentricity is central to his brand: He once was the frontman of a Rolling Stones cover band, and he currently owns five cloned dogs, each named after right-wing economists.

Videos have also gone viral during the election showing Milei tearing down Post-It notes with the names of the government ministries he intends to cut and shouting his catchphrase, “Long live f***ing liberty!”

Jones described Milei’s base as motivated less by ideology and more by desperation and exasperation with the traditional political establishment.

His bloc of supporters, Jones explained, is largely composed of middle- and working-class voters in their late teens and 20s who are frustrated with struggling to maintain gainful employment.

“Milei is their vehicle to effectively take a chainsaw to the status quo, but also to perhaps try something different,” Jones said, referencing Milei’s embrace of the chainsaw as a campaign symbol.

Alan Quiroga, 28, who lives in a working-class suburb of Buenos Aires and drives for Uber on his motorcycle, said he was first drawn to Milei when he saw the libertarian on television, speaking passionately about Argentina’s “golden age” in the early 20th century.

“What he wants to implement is what they do in the United States, in Spain, in normal countries,” Quiroga said. “What we are experiencing here is going towards Venezuela, Cuba.”

Though popular with many of his supporters, Milei’s proposal to adopt the US dollar faces steep opposition from the broader public. A September poll showed nearly 70 percent of Argentinians disapproved of the idea.

That month, 170 Argentinian economists also published an open letter predicting that a currency switch would lead to further inflation, mass unemployment and “absurd” increases in Argentina’s $400bn public debt.

‘A good crazy person’

But Milei’s appeal among young voters goes beyond his radical economic plan. The candidate has sought to position himself as a critic of corruption among the political elite, whom he calls “the caste”.

High-ranking members of Argentina’s main political parties have recently faced corruption charges. Last year, for instance, outgoing Vice President Cristina Fernandez was sentenced to six years in jail for fraud.

“The Javier Milei I like the most is the effusive Javier Milei, the honest Javier Milei,” Urbani said. “It’s the Javier Milei who gets mad when he’s faced with lies, faced with dishonest people.”

Milei has a penchant for the dramatic, at times appearing overcome with emotion during his public speeches.

“A good crazy person — that’s how I would describe him,” Quiroga said. “It comes from his heart. He can’t control it.”

Yet, even some of Milei’s longstanding supporters have their doubts about his ability to maintain his credentials as a corruption fighter, especially as he broadens his coalition to include the kinds of establishment figures he frequently criticizes.

Former President Mauricio Macri has offered Milei his backing, as has Bullrich, his former conservative rival in the presidential race.

“When he became involved in politics, without wanting to, he became part of the caste,” said Lucas González, a 28-year-old bookstore owner who said he still supports Milei.

Though Milei has built a strong movement, whether or not it survives will depend on the results of Sunday’s election and how the economy fares in the coming months, said Noam Lupu, a professor of political science at Vanderbilt University who researches Argentina.

“There will always be this kind of libertarian, pro-business vote in Argentina,” Lupu said. “But the sort of anti-establishment, anti-status quo, pro-disruption only succeeds if it continues to feel threatened by the status quo and the political class.”

Urbani disagrees. He believes that Milei has triggered a significant political shift among Argentinian youth that will persist regardless of Sunday’s election results.

“The majority of the youth are Milei voters, and especially boys,” Urbani said. “What is coming for Argentina is very good, because a lot of kids have started to reckon with capitalist ideas, with economic concepts in their heads that they were not talking about before.”

Source: Al Jazeera

What does Milei promote in terms of healthcare and education?

Individuals to pay for their own services

What does Milei promote in terms of healthcare and education?

Individuals to pay for their own services

**Environmental Deregulation:** His reforms include weakening environmental protections, such as the Glacier Protection Law, to facilitate mining activities.

Milei's policies have sparked significant public dissent, with widespread protests against his drastic cuts to public spending and perceived threats to social welfare.

How will Milei's reforms impact workers?

Who has opposed Milei's proposed layoff order?

His administration faces challenges due to limited Congressional support, necessitating compromises on some elements of his agenda.

The impact of Milei's reforms on Argentina's future remains uncertain, as they could either lead to economic revitalization or exacerbate existing socio-economic issues.


Its status as a UNESCO World Heritage Site adds to its global importance.

State Department, and Orthodox Christian institutions, who argue that the conversion undermines religious tolerance and freedom.

The Greek Prime Minister expressed dissatisfaction, viewing the move as an offense to Istanbul's rich cultural history.

The Archons of the Ecumenical Patriarchate criticized the decision as a sign of contempt for Turkey's Orthodox Christian heritage and a threat to religious freedom.

Politically, analysts suggest that Erdogan's decision may be an attempt to bolster his support among religious nationalists amid economic challenges and electoral setbacks.

The move is seen as part of a broader strategy to appeal to his base by emphasizing Turkey's Islamic heritage over its multicultural past.

Additionally, the reconversion has led to practical issues, such as the imposition of an entrance fee for tourists and concerns over the preservation of the site's structural integrity due to increased visitor numbers.

Its status as a UNESCO World Heritage Site adds to its global importance.

Title:

Content: Turkey’s iconic Hagia Sophia mosque to charge $28 entry fee for tourists

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Turkey’s Hagia Sophia mosque began charging tourists nearly $28 on Monday for entrance to the landmark site.

The UNESCO World Heritage site, renowned for its blue-tiled interior, will no longer allow free admission to foreigners, the Turkish tourism ministry announced.

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The former museum-turned mosque has a new entrance in front of the Topkapi Palace Museum open for tourists.

Tunnel entrance at Turkey's Hagia Sophia. (File photo)

The Hagia Sophia was a museum space from 1934 until 2020 when Turkey decided to change it to a mosque. Various historical reports say the mosque with byzantine architecture was an Orthodox cathedral decades ago.

“With the new application that will start on January 15 at the Hagia Sophia Mosque, tourists will be able to visit the mosque without disturbing the prayer environment,” the ministry said in a statement.

The entrance to the mosque will be “provided in a controlled manner through the tunnel and entrance ramp where visitors will be transported to the gallery floor and exited via the ramp in the northeast direction,” the statement said.

“Tourists who come to the gallery section will be able to see the sanctuary floor of the mosque and the Ottoman Period annexes, pass through the heaven-hell gate, and examine the Byzantine Period mosaics in this section,” it added.

Security cameras, fire detection and emergency announcement systems were reportedly installed in the mosque along the tour route. Cleaning and conservation work on the marble coverings and wooden railings on the gallery floor of the mosque was also carried out by restorers and conservators.

Visitors will also have access to a headset guide with QR codes where information on the sight is available in 23 languages.

People visit the Hagia Sophia, a UNESCO World Heritage Site, in Istanbul, Turkey, July 10, 2020. (Reuters)

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Content: After Hagia Sophia, Turkey converts a second ancient Byzantine church into a mosque

Hundreds of worshippers filled the narrow streets of Istanbul's Fatih district on Friday to hear the sounds of Friday prayers ringing out from the newly inaugurated Kariye Mosque.

Once known as the Chora Church, the site spent the last 79 years as a museum. But it is now the latest structure to be converted back into a mosque by the government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, following the conversion of Hagia Sophia in 2020. While viewed as a triumph by many Turkish Muslims, the Greek Orthodox Church has decried it as an "ill-advised decision" that "makes a mockery of the Turkish government's commitment to religious tolerance and religious freedom."

Chora's conversion was announced shortly after Hagia Sophia's, but its opening for prayer was delayed by years of restoration work.

The showing for the first Friday prayers at Kariye was relatively quiet compared to Hagia Sophia, which drew hundreds of thousands who filled the streets with prayer rugs for blocks and blocks away from the building. By contrast, the crowd on Friday was relatively average for a mosque in one of Istanbul's more religiously conservative neighborhoods, where Friday worshippers frequently spill out onto the streets.

Both the Chora Church and Hagia Sophia are 4th-century Byzantine constructions. They spent nearly a millennium as Christian holy sites before being converted to mosques by the Ottomans after their conquest of Constantinople in the 15th century. Despite their conversions, they remained revered by Orthodox Christians. After the founding of a secular Turkish Republic in the early 20th century, the decision was made for both to be neither mosque nor church but simply museums.

"Both Hagia Sophia and Chora embodied Byzantine and Ottoman pasts, and they became symbols of co-existence and multi-faith living practices. Their conversion fundamentally implies a hierarchy, prioritizing the Islamic past over all other layers, Greek Orthodox, Armenian, Jewish, Syriac, et al," Dr. Özgür Kaymak, a lecturer and researcher on minority rights at Istanbul's MEF University, told Religion News Service in an email.

Rededicating the sites as mosques is more than just a status change. According to Islamic tradition, artwork of human figures are forbidden in places of prayer, while in Orthodox Churches, icons of Christ, saints and other biblical figures are a defining feature.

In Hagia Sophia, the mosaics of Jesus and Mary have been covered with curtains since the conversion. While Erdoğan promised Hagia Sophia would remain fully accessible and free to all visitors, Turkey reneged on that earlier this year, reimposing an entrance fee on tourists and relegating them to the upper level, while the main floor is exclusive to Muslim worshippers.

Observers have also criticized the Turkish Directorate of Religion's caretaking of the site, noting damage that did not exist when it was under the purview of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism.

Though Chora is significantly smaller than Hagia Sophia, it is home to some of the best-preserved examples of late-Byzantine art, including mosaics, icons and frescoes, and is considered a UNESCO World Heritage site.

"For us it's a very important place because it remembers our culture and our traditions here," Father Evangelos Markantonis, an Orthodox priest who was leading a group of theology students to Chora on Friday, told Religion News Service.

"Though we cannot venerate as Orthodox Christians, we have to try to find things we can be united on. Only with dialogue and good deeds can we continue our lives," Markantonis, who is also a professor at the University of Athens, said when asked about the controversy.

Erdoğan had long refused calls from his right to convert churches like Hagia Sophia and Chora, telling supporters in 2018 to fill the nearby Sultan Ahmet Mosque (also known in English as the Blue Mosque) before they talked about needing to pray in Hagia Sophia.

Nonetheless, he made an about-turn in 2020.

"My dear nation, the conquest of Istanbul and the conversion of the Hagia Sophia into a Mosque are among the most glorious chapters in Turkish history," Erdoğan said at the time in a speech inaugurating the Hagia Sophia as a mosque.

"This is the most honorable day that Islam has been looking forward to, Greek Constantinople has become Turkish Istanbul," he added, quoting the Turkish poet Nazim Hikmet.

"The resurrection of Hagia Sophia heralds the liberation of the al-Aqsa Mosque. The resurrection of Hagia Sophia is the footsteps of the will of Muslims across the world to come out of the interregnum," Erdoğan said in his concluding remarks.

Chora's opening as the Kariye Mosque comes just weeks after Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) suffered its largest electoral defeat in two decades during Turkey's nationwide municipal elections.

"The recent conversion of Chora into a mosque may be due to Erdoğan's many problems, including his geopolitical power politics, his appeal to religio-nationalism to revive his electoral popularity after the March elections or his tactic to divert attention from Turkey's economic downturn," Kaymak said.

Many analysts have attributed the loss to AKP bleeding votes to the more Islamist-leaning New Welfare Party, which has pressured Erdogan over his response to the Israel-Hamas war and humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip.

Muslim worshippers at the mosque on Friday said they viewed its rededication as an Islamic site to be a national win for Turkey.

"This mosque is one of the symbols of the Conquest. We are proud and happy. There are very beautiful frescoes inside. They were also nicely renovated before they were closed. May it be good for our country and our nation," a bystander, Ahmet Öteyüzoğlu, told Turkish media.

"Thank God for these days. Not everyone has the opportunity in their lifetime," another bystander named Mehmet Çelik told the Turkish news service Anadolu Agency, in reference to having been able to pray at both the rededicated Hagia Sophia and Kariye Mosques.

However, Greece, the U.S. State Department and Orthodox Christian institutions worldwide have all criticized the decision to revert the structure into a mosque.

"I want to publicly express my intense dissatisfaction, interpreting the feelings of all Greek women and men, for the completely unnecessary conversion of a historic Byzantine temple, the Monastery of Chora, into a mosque. It is, I believe, an action that offends the rich history of Istanbul itself as a crossroads of cultures," Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis said shortly before leaving for Turkey for a planned meeting with Erdogan.

"We encourage the Turkish government to preserve and ensure access to sites and buildings that have hosted different religious communities in a way that respects their diverse histories," a State Department spokesperson said in response to questions from Greek media.

"The Turkish government's appropriation of both as the property of one faith group not only constitutes yet another sign of that government's contempt for Turkey's rich Orthodox Christian heritage but further imperils the religious freedom of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the remaining Christians of that land," the Archons of the Ecumenical Patriarchate said in a statement.

© Religion News Service

State Department, and Orthodox Christian institutions, who argue that the conversion undermines religious tolerance and freedom.

How did Muslims and Orthodox Christians react to the reconversion?

Who was angered by the reconversion of Hagia Sophia in July 2020?

The Greek Prime Minister expressed dissatisfaction, viewing the move as an offense to Istanbul's rich cultural history.

How did the Greek prime minister describe the reconversion in May 2024?

An act that belittles Istanbul's history

The Archons of the Ecumenical Patriarchate criticized the decision as a sign of contempt for Turkey's Orthodox Christian heritage and a threat to religious freedom.

How did Muslims and Orthodox Christians react to the reconversion?

Who was angered by the reconversion of Hagia Sophia in July 2020?

Politically, analysts suggest that Erdogan's decision may be an attempt to bolster his support among religious nationalists amid economic challenges and electoral setbacks.

Title:

Content: >
December 9, 2021

Christian leaders look forward to Turkey's new law on religious foundations

This is an issue of vital importance for local Christian communities whose places of worship are entrusted to and managed by their governing bodies

Religious minorities in Turkey are looking forward to the increasingly Islamo-nationalist government making good its promise of outreach to non-Muslims by giving them freedom to establish and run their religious and social institutions.

The Turkish government is preparing to issue a new regulation on the administrative management of foundations linked to non-Muslim faith communities, which have been paralyzed for years by a legislative impasse that blocks the renewal of their governing bodies.

This is an issue of vital importance for local Christian communities such as Armenians and Assyrians, whose places of worship – many of them historic --, other real estate and public institutions are entrusted to and managed by foundations.

Burhan Ersoy, head of the state-run Directorate of the Foundations, has confirmed that the plan for the drafting of a new regulation concerning the elections for the assignment of offices within the foundations has come into being, Fides reported.

The draft of the text has been drawn up, taking into account requests and proposals from the various minority communities, and it is expected that the new rules, after obtaining government approval, would be implemented by April 2022.

The previous electoral regulation for the top management of foundations had been suspended in 2013, after the government chose to establish new procedures to make the management of real estate more functional and transparent.

This led to some confusion with representatives of the various minority communities unable to come to a consensus to either accept or reject the new electoral rules, Ersoy said.

The Syrian Orthodox Christian Süleyman Can Ustabaşı, current representative of the non-Muslim Foundations within the Assembly of Foundations, has said that the structure of foundations and their membership profiles had changed over time.

The Turkish government already had consultations with the representatives of religious minorities to resolve the dispute over board elections for their foundations.

But Ustabaşı now urges Turkish authorities to carry out another consultation with representatives of minority communities before the new text is to be implemented in 2022.

The legal status of the Foundations is still based on the Peace Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923 by Turkey and the Entente powers (British Empire, France and Russian Empire) victorious from the First World War.

The treaty guaranteed equality before the laws and the freedom to promote and manage "religious and social institutions" for non-Muslim communities in Turkey.

However, the state had seized properties run by these foundations and had to contend with litigation as these foundations claimed the rights guaranteed by the Treaty of Lausanne.

Also, starting from 1936, legislative provisions had allowed foundations of non-Muslim communities to acquire new properties. But in 1974, this guarantee was canceled and the state begun seizing assets acquired by these foundations.

Between 2013 and 2018 about 1,084 properties were returned to the foundations linked to non-Muslim communities, and 20 places of worship restored and given back to the foundations, according to official data.

Greek Orthodox Laki Vingas, in a speech published by the Armenian-Turkish newspaper Agos, said that the legislative deadlock on the question of the regulation of the foundations has had a negative effect on the life of the different ecclesial communities.

The block in the processes of renewal of the governing bodies of foundations had led to the expulsion of young people from the institutions linked to their communities, and also that many voluntary activities were "unfortunately interrupted".

Non-Muslim places of worship

Within the general Assembly of the Turkish Foundations are some 167 minority foundations. The Turkish Greek community has 77, the highest number of foundations. The Armenian community has 54 and the Jewish community has 19 foundations.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan after a cabinet meeting held on October 25 announced that authorities had put on the agenda the question of the elections of the directorates of the foundations linked to religious minorities.

He also spoke of fundamental tools for the management of assets and resources destined for non-Muslim places of worship.

The issue of the foundations come at a time when Turkish authorities have expelled more and more Protestant Christians -- foreigners and Turkish converts-- on grounds they constitute a "threat to national security".

Turkey had also recently transformed museums into mosques, such as the Hagia Sophia and the Church of the Holy Saviour in Chora.

Both churches had been turned into museums after the end of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of modern Turkey.

The Church of the Holy Saviour in Chora was built by the Byzantines in the 5th century. The Ottomans then turned it into a mosque after they captured Constantinople in 1453. And it remained a Muslim worship space until the end of the Second World War when it was transformed into a museum.

The same happened to the Hagia Sophia Museum in Iznik, and the high-profile reconversion of the Hagia Sophia Museum, Istanbul's most identifiable monument.

Many observers believe that President Erdogan, weakened internally by a bad economy and a lack of political perspective, is compensating with erasing part of the country's multiculturalism, aimed at shoring up the ranks of his Islamo-nationalist base.

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What kind of domestic reaction did Erdogan's reconversion of Hagia Sophia receive?

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

The decision aimed to rally anti-Kemalist voters.

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

What kind of domestic reaction did Erdogan's reconversion of Hagia Sophia receive?

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

The decision aimed to rally anti-Kemalist voters.

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

The move is seen as part of a broader strategy to appeal to his base by emphasizing Turkey's Islamic heritage over its multicultural past.

What kind of domestic reaction did Erdogan's reconversion of Hagia Sophia receive?

What political motivations influenced Erdogan's decision to reconvert Hagia Sophia?

The decision aimed to rally anti-Kemalist voters.

Erdogan's decision was influenced by Turkey's Islamic resurgence.

Additionally, the reconversion has led to practical issues, such as the imposition of an entrance fee for tourists and concerns over the preservation of the site's structural integrity due to increased visitor numbers.

Title:

Content: [ditty_news_ticker id="27897"] Video Shows Fragments Falling from the Dome of Hagia Sophia - Orthodox Christian Laity

Video Shows Fragments Falling from the Dome of Hagia Sophia

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Source: Greek Reporter

A still from a recently released video shows visitors rushing to take cover as fragments fall from the dome of Hagia Sophia. Credit: Daily Motion/BirGün

A video from 2022 that came to light recently shows fragments falling on visitors from the dome of Hagia Sophia, the former epicenter of Christian worship at Constantinople, today’s Istanbul.

The footage released by the Turkish newspaper, BirGün, raises serious questions over the safety of the former Orthodox Christian cathedral, now a mosque.

BirGün notably quoted officials as saying that “pieces are falling from the roof, due to the humidity created by the crowd, but no precautions are being taken”.

The president of the Turkish Art History Association, Serif Yasar, argued for restoration of the monument as soon as possible, suggesting that “If Hagia Sophia is not restored, it will collapse with the first earthquake.”

The monument was restored as a mosque three years ago after serving as a museum from 1935-2020 and has since received 21 million visitors, according to Turkey’s tourism and culture minister.

Yasar added that when the church was a museum, the scientific council overseeing it urged that groups of no more than 25 people should be allowed to enter the building at any one time.

This enormous lift in visitation has likely brought to the forefront the need for repairs and it was indeed reported in September that the Turkish government had decided to start long-term maintenance of Hagia Sophia.

Turkey to implement visitor management policy at Hagia Sophia

In early October Turkish historian Ilber Ortayli expressed fears that the large number of visitors to Hagia Sophia could lead to a catastrophic structural failure if not addressed immediately.

Writing in the Hürriyet daily, Ortayli said that the monument, which attracts three million pilgrims annually apart from tourists, has undergone significant damage since its conversion into a mosque.

He asserted that even a modest number of 20-30 thousand people annually, including scientists, historians, archaeologists, representatives of the Muslim religion, politicians, and public officials, could be considered excessive for the endurance of the monument.

In June 2022 a number of tiles of the ancient marble floors in Hagia Sophia were damaged by heavy machines used to clean the site.

In April 2022, The Turkish Association of Art Historians stated that the historic Imperial Gate in Hagia Sophia had been badly damaged.

The group posted a picture clearly depicting the damage to the oak wood of the 15-century-old gate.

Turkey unveiled plans in late October for a visitor management policy at Hagia Sophia, including charging foreign tourists with an entrance fee to be implemented starting Jan. 15.

Minister of Culture and Tourism Mehmet Nuri Ersoy said that extensive restoration work is underway in various sections of Hagia Sophia, now a mosque, with plans to progress to other parts upon their completion.

He emphasized that, based on UNESCO’s recommendations, a visitor management plan would be enforced to enhance the quality and safety of visits while preserving the historical significance of the site.

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Officials argue for repairs to Hagia Sophia after footage shows fragments falling from the dome – Neos Kosmos

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