**Nuggeted summary (approx.

2000 characters):**

- **Deepening Ties & Strategic Autonomy:** Under PM Modi and President Putin, India-Russia relations have sustained depth built on Cold War legacies, evolving with a focus on strategic autonomy.

Both states value independent foreign policies that resist aligning too closely with any single global power bloc.

This flexibility allows India to engage Russia for energy, defense, and strategic connectivity, even as New Delhi increases ties with the US and Indo-Pacific partners.

- **Eurasia & Trade Initiatives:** Recent agreements include new commitments for trade and joint investment, such as in Russia’s Far East, and efforts to enhance connectivity and security linkages across Eurasia and in the Indian and Pacific Oceans—aligning with the pursuit of a “Greater Eurasian Space.”

- **Modi’s Russia Visit & Great Power Signaling:** Modi’s high-profile trips to Russia, amidst US and European criticism post-Ukraine, underscore New Delhi’s pragmatic focus on national interest and autonomy.

India’s willingness to continue and even expand trade—especially cheap Russian oil imports—demonstrates a calculated balance, sometimes against Western expectations.

- **Balancing China:** The increasingly tense India-China border and China’s strategic assertiveness drive India’s need to keep close to Russia, seeking to avoid a Russia-China axis that could marginalize Indian interests.

In parallel, India strengthens security partnerships with the US, Quad members, and France, using these alignments to offset China.

- **US-India Rapprochement & Multialignment:** While India draws closer to the US (e.g., technology and maritime security initiatives), it avoids exclusive reliance, maintaining Russia as a crucial defense partner and energy supplier.

The backdrop is India’s long-standing priority—strategic autonomy—leveraged to maximize maneuverability amid shifting global alliances.

**Nuggeted summary (approx.

Title:

Content: ISSN 2330-717X

India Rethinks Ties With China – Analysis

By

By B R Deepak*

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The rise of China triggered a regional power shift that has been felt across East Asia and into the Himalayas. As China changes the status quo of the Indo-Pacific, it talks of promoting a multipolar world. But in practice it has a problem with multipolar Asia and is unwilling to accommodate India’s interests. In response to this, India is aligning itself more closely with the United States and its allies.

When evaluating India’s policy choices in East Asia, history cannot be overlooked. India–China rapprochement in the late 1970s, amid the Cold War and the rise of globalisation, saw the two countries grow closer. Their budding relationship found common ground in being at the same stage of development.

It was through this parity that a series of confidence-building measures (CBMs) were signed, enabling India and China to normalise and diversify their relationship into other areas. They became part of various multilateral mechanisms such as the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, East Asia Summit and the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).

Trade flourished and Chinese investment in India’s telecom, electronics, solar and, most notably, digital sectors increased by leaps and bounds. While India had a twinge of envy for China’s rise, it saw opportunities for win–win cooperation. Yet over the past two decades, India has become increasingly wary of the dangers of widening economic, military and technological asymmetries between the two countries.

The power shift in Asia has resulted in Chinese behavioural changes. With its growing regional power, China has felt less compulsion to abide by the CBMs. It has started flexing its muscles along the disputed border regions between India and China, resulting in bloodshed and prolonged standoffs.

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Until very recently, India acted like a ‘swing state’ between major powers in the region and avoided taking sides. This can be gleaned from India’s initial lukewarm reception to the idea of the Quad. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s keynote address at the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore wished for India and China to ‘work together in trust and confidence, sensitive to each other’s interests’.

Many believe it was the 2017 border standoff in Doklam that pushed India to rethink its involvement in the Quad. If that is the case, the 2020 border clash in Galwan likely played a decisive role in India’s move to incorporate the Quad and the Indo-Pacific Strategy into its military and foreign policy.

It is unsurprising that Chinese scholars now see India’s ‘Act East Policy’ and other sub-regional and multilateral mechanisms as subservient to the Indo-Pacific strategy. These multilaterals include the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, the Security and Growth for All in the Region vision and the Indian Ocean Rim Association — many of which are designed to counterbalance China’s growing influence.

Whether or not these mechanisms serve the goals of the Indo-Pacific strategy, India has indeed shifted its gaze away from China and towards Southeast Asia to initiate connectivity projects. One of them — the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway — has been extended to run through Cambodia and Vietnam and is expected to be completed by 2023

India supports the idea of ‘ASEAN centrality’ and envisages a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific region built on a rules-based international order. This obvious rebalancing has enhanced India’s security cooperation with the United States and other regional middle powers. The institutionalisation of the India–US 2+2 dialogue, the Quad, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and the US–India Malabar exercises point to this growing cooperation.

The growing India–US partnership has riled China. Some Chinese scholars have claimed that India refuses to support the ‘One China Policy’ over the Kashmir issue, which is home to a long-standing territorial dispute between India and China. But the late Indian minister of external affairs Sushma Swaraj has also called upon China to respect its own ‘One India Policy’.

Compared to China, India is relatively weak in economic and political power. In 2021, China–ASEAN trade accounted for US$878.2 billion, outstripping India–ASEAN trade, which stood at US$78 billion. But East Asian countries have always been positively inclined towards India’s engagement in the region, though most do not support India’s self-proclaimed role as a ‘net security provider’ — a role that they believe should be reserved for the United States.

China believes that India’s Act East Policy ‘will allow India to intervene’ and ‘warm up’ to other countries on issues surrounding the South China Sea. This may become a drag on China–ASEAN relations in future. But China will not cede the space it once did before its rise.

Similar anxieties have been expressed by India over China’s attempts to increase its footprints in the Indian Ocean. The docking of the Yuan Wang 5 — a Chinese ‘spy ship’ — at Hambantota, Sri Lanka, was particularly concerning for India.

In the face of a prolonged standoff on the India–China border and the growing US–China rivalry, India finds itself leaning more towards the United States and its allies. India sees this as best for its economic and technological advancement and for the realisation of its larger global aspirations.

*About the author: B R Deepak is Professor of Chinese and China Studies at the Centre of Chinese and Southeast Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Source: This article was published by East Asia Forum

East Asia Forum

East Asia Forum is a platform for analysis and research on politics, economics, business, law, security, international relations and society relevant to public policy, centred on the Asia Pacific region. It consists of an online publication and a quarterly magazine, East Asia Forum Quarterly, which aim to provide clear and original analysis from the leading minds in the region and beyond.

2000 characters):**

- **Deepening Ties & Strategic Autonomy:** Under PM Modi and President Putin, India-Russia relations have sustained depth built on Cold War legacies, evolving with a focus on strategic autonomy.

Title:

Content: 31 Dec, 2023 08:46

Deeper than diplomacy: There is a reason why New Delhi and Moscow rely on each other

Russia’s respect for India’s policy of strategic autonomy is the core strength of bilateral ties, as the Indian foreign minister’s latest visit proves

Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar’s five-day official visit to Russia was timely and significant for more than one reason.

India and Russia had held annual summits at the leadership level since 2000. This sent an important message in terms of the value attached by the two countries to bilateral ties, but it also conveyed a broader geopolitical message to other international partners of the two countries.

But this practice was broken largely because of Russia’s pre-occupation with the Ukraine conflict and its fallout. The last annual summit took place in 2021.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin could have held a summit on the margins of the BRICS summit in Johannesburg in South Africa or the G20 summit in New Delhi, but Putin did not attend either. While Jaishankar’s visit does not substitute for a summit meeting, it was intended to fill a political gap.

Jaishankar and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov have met six times during the year, and the Indian external affairs minister also met with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov during the year on the economic agenda. For Jaishankar to visit Russia before the end of the year, undeterred by the Russian winter and holiday season, reflects the importance both sides attach to the further expansion of ties.

Putin has on several occasions praised the Indian prime minister and positively noted the country’s economic progress. At the ‘Russia Calling’ Forum in early December this year, he said that despite pressure from others, he “cannot imagine that Modi could be frightened, intimidated or forced to take any actions, steps, decisions that would at variance with the national interest of India and the Indian people.” He noted that sometimes he is surprised at Modi’s tough stance on Indian national interests. He added that the policy pursued by Modi is the “main guarantor” of the developing bilateral ties.

This is high and unusual praise by Putin. It can be interpreted on several levels – particularly as an acknowledgement that India has resisted pressure from the US and others to condemn Russia over the Ukraine conflict, impose sanctions, and reduce defense ties with Russia. India has, on the contrary, bought discounted Russian oil to the point that Russia has become its biggest oil supplier. It has argued that ensuring this market flow of Russian oil has helped avoid a major spike in oil prices and checked global inflation. Indian-Russian trade has expanded, while the G7 has broken economic and trade ties with Russia.

India played a major role as G20 president in negotiating the part in the Leaders’ Declaration on the Ukraine conflict despite the hardening of the G7 position and that of Russia and China after the G20 summit in Bali. The final text does not mention Russia by name, while the G7 was satisfied that the general formulations in it could be sold as being directed at Russia’s military operation in Ukraine.

Not surprisingly, Putin complimented India for de-politicizing the G20. India chaired the SCO summit in July 2023 and participated in the BRICS summit in South Africa in August 2023. This countered G7 attempts to isolate Russia diplomatically. In fact, the New Delhi SCO Declaration spoke of more effective global institutions, a more representative, just, and multipolar world order based on international law and multilateralism, and criticized the unilateral application of economic sanctions – a clear critique of the Western-dominated global system.

It is against this backdrop that Putin received Jaishankar at the Kremlin, the first time that such a gesture has been made to him personally. The general unavailability of Putin to visiting foreign ministers is well-known.

Jaishankar delivered a personal message from Modi to Putin. During the meeting, Putin invited his “friend Modi” to visit Russia in 2024 and noted that Indian-Russian ties were on the whole developing well. He said that he had been briefing Modi on developments in Ukraine, remarking that he understands the Indian prime minister is willing to do his utmost to resolve the matter by peaceful means. He added that he would give additional information to Jaishankar on Ukraine.

India has continued to strengthen ties with the US, including in the defense domain. It is a member of the Quad and a strong supporter of the Indo-Pacific concept, both of which are intended to deter China’s regional ambitions. Russia has reservations about the Quad and the Indo-Pacific concept, which it sees as the US engaging in bloc politics in Asia.

Putin’s praise for Modi and India and the gesture of receiving Jaishankar takes into consideration these realities of India’s foreign policy which are meant to safeguard the larger national interests. At the core of this is Russia’s respect for India’s policy of strategic autonomy. Jaishankar’s high-profile visit and the vigorous language used to mark the importance of India’s traditional ties with Russia would have caught Washington’s attention.

Jaishankar noted that after talks with Lavrov, “what clearly came out was that India-Russia relations remain very steady, remain very strong, they are based on our strategic convergence, on our geopolitical interests, and because they are mutually beneficial.” The two leaders discussed political cooperation within international organizations such as BRICS, the SCO, etc.

Indian-Russian trade is at an all-time high, exceeding $50 billion last year, and should pass that figure this year. It includes energy, fertilizers, coking coal, and other items, for which long term arrangements were discussed. India intends to expand investments in Russia’s oil and gas sector.

On the nuclear side, two important amendments were agreed to which will take the Kudankulam nuclear power project forward. Mutual investments, progress on a bilateral investment treaty, and the resumption of negotiations between India and the Eurasian Economic Union for a free trade agreement will be resumed in the second half of January 2024.

Moscow and New Delhi will expand cooperation in the Russian Far East. India expects a large representation from this region at the Vibrant Gujarat Summit in January 2024.

Connectivity between India and Russia will be critical for expanding trade ties – connectivity from western India through the International North-South Transport Corridor, and connectivity from eastern India, from Chennai to Vladivostok, and the polar route. To promote tourism, India is open to increasing the number of flights from India every week.

The talks between Jaishankar and Lavrov were comprehensive. They discussed the global strategic situation, Ukraine, Gaza, the Indo-Pacific, ASEAN, Afghanistan, UN-related matters, the challenges facing the Global South, and the building of a multipolar order. China would undoubtedly have been discussed, but diplomatic discretion here would be normal.

In the joint press conference, Lavrov spoke of prospects for more defense cooperation, including joint production of modern weapons under New Delhi’s ‘Make in India’ program, and, importantly, expressed respect for India’s efforts to diversify its defense ties. He noted bilateral cooperation in rocket engine manufacturing and satellite navigation systems.

Jaishankar’s visit was productive in maintaining the momentum of Indian-Russian ties, which have been built over 60 years, a relationship that he believes is not just about politics, diplomacy, or economics, but is much deeper.

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In what fields are India and Russia cooperating?

Both states value independent foreign policies that resist aligning too closely with any single global power bloc.

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France and India: Two Nuances of 'Strategic Autonomy'

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Commentary by Mathieu Droin , Rajesh Basrur , Nicolas Blarel , and Jyotsna Mehra

Published July 13, 2023

“We know India will be a very difficult superpower—like a big France.” This comment by a former deputy national security advisor of Japanese prime minister Abe Shinzo echoes a widely shared sentiment across G7 capitals. This is also certainly what many think in the United States vis-à-vis these two indispensable, yet volatile partners.

In collective fora, France and India indeed take pride in not being free riders, as nuclear powers with robust national militaries and capacities, as well as in being free thinkers, developing an outlook of their own on global issues. French president Emmanuel Macron’s motto “allied, but not aligned” echoes Indian external affairs minister Dr. S. Jaishankar’s insistence that India is “entitled to have its own side” This posture is best encapsulated in a concept that both countries have regularly been using: “strategic autonomy,” defined as the capability to make decisions independent from external pressure, especially from great powers, in the main policy areas. This commonality is regularly emphasized in bilateral encounters between the two states.

The visit of Indian prime minister Narendra Modi as a guest of honor for France’s National Day on July 14, also known as Bastille Day, will be an occasion to showcase the strength and depth of the bilateral relationship. France and India established a strategic partnership in 1998, but this partnership has really gained traction in the past decade, with close cooperation initiated or enhanced on a wide range of issues, including in sensitive and sovereign domains, buttressed by a flourishing defense trade cooperation that has placed France as India’s second-largest arms supplier after Russia. Modi’s visit will be the occasion for new announcements in the fields of defense, space, and nuclear technology.

The visit will also be an occasion for both countries to reaffirm how a shared quest for strategic autonomy is guiding this partnership. Their differing histories and geographies bring nuances and distinct threat perceptions, notably regarding the war in Ukraine and relations with Russia and China. But their overall like-minded vision on multipolarity and multilateralism offers great potential to expand cooperation and advance an original outlook, with one eye in Europe and the other in Asia.

The Roots of French and Indian Strategic Autonomy
Strategic autonomy has been central to the two states’ foreign policies since the late 1940s. In the French context, French president Charles de Gaulle wanted more autonomy vis-à-vis the United States. One direct application of this was France’s decision to leave NATO’s military command structure in 1966, though it remained a member of the alliance. In addition, de Gaulle pleaded for a dialogue with the Soviet Union, recognized the People’s Republic of China in 1964, and argued for the need for France to maintain the control of the strike capacity of its nuclear weapons.

Following independence, India, under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, espoused a similar conviction in absolute sovereignty to maintain complete autonomy in international affairs, put into practice through the doctrine of nonalignment and neutrality from great power politics. India also developed its own indigenous nuclear program with an aim to develop energy and strategic autonomy. While contributing to the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement, India also remained a member of the British Commonwealth, negotiated defense equipment procurement from the United Kingdom and the United States, and later developed a strong partnership with the Soviet Union.

Concurrently, the shared understanding that strategic autonomy and sovereignty is only possible with strong indigenous capacities in key sectors has led to Indo-French cooperation in nuclear and space research since the 1950s. India’s defense contracts with France illustrated New Delhi and Paris’s common aim at maximizing their strategic autonomy. From India’s perspective, there has been a willingness to diversify its procurement sources beyond Russia. Political reliability and trust have been decisive criteria in choosing France as a prime partner. Defense deals have been determined not solely on the basis of the operational qualities of French equipment, but on guarantees that France will not stop the supply of spare parts and weapons, which other suppliers have not guaranteed. Third, India has wanted to transform its defense ties beyond buyer-seller relationships and to pursue opportunities for technological cooperation for co-development and coproduction of defense equipment, notably with France.

Over the last three decades, strategic autonomy has therefore been a feature of Indian and French foreign policies and has led both states to pursue closer, but not exclusive, ties with Washington while at times also developing ties with states that have been at odds with the United States, like Iran or Russia. Both states have historically lamented the rise of a bipolar order during the Cold War and of a unipolar order in the 1990s, while selectively aligning with great powers on specific instances, such as India’s support for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, or France’s participation in the Iraq war in 1991 (but not in 2003).

Strategic Autonomy in the Modi and Macron Era
Like their predecessors, Modi and Macron have fostered strong links with major powers without becoming overly dependent on any one of them, maintaining distance from Cold War–style bloc competition. Both countries are more integrated in collective defense or security frameworks than they used to be 70 years ago, but Modi’s India remains formally opposed to joining a military alliance, while Macron’s is regularly critical of NATO, in a very Gaullist manner.

Modi has pursued autonomy by enhancing India’s nuclear weapons profile and building military and economic networks with multiple great powers such as the United States, France, and Japan. The resultant escalation of India’s standing from a struggling developing nation to an emerging economy and further to a rising power has given it a seat at numerous tables such as the four-nation Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or “Quad,” with Australia, Japan, and the United States), the BRICS grouping (with Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa), the G20, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and bolstered its claim to permanent membership of the UN Security Council. France is in an opposite position of having to justify its presence at almost every table, being today the only country that is a member of the G7, the UN Security Council, NATO, and the European Union. Paris thus compensates for its relative economic decline with important diplomatic activism, which has included a flurry of initiatives such as the European Political Community, the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace, and the recently held Paris Summit for a New Global Financial Pact, to name a few.

Modi and Macron also have a shared aspiration to be “balance shapers,” not followers. Like Nehru and de Gaulle earlier, they favor a multipolar international order—one that allows no single power to be dominant and offers New Delhi and Paris the prospects of a major role in shaping the global agenda. To help them achieve their ambitions and to diminish their dependence on great powers, France and India both strive to build new, flexible partnerships. Indian policy has focused on a network of strategic partnerships characterized by defense cooperation that encompasses arms transfers, military exercises, and intelligence sharing but steers clear of integrating forces and war plans. Similarly, France is also closing ranks with selected partners to complement collective commitments within NATO or the European Union, via bilateral mutual defense clauses and via coalitions of European countries outside of the EU framework, such as the former Takuba grouping of special forces in the Sahel or the European Maritime Awareness operation in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH).

Strategic convergence between France and India is therefore obvious, but there are some limitations and nuances. First, although President Macron is keen on insisting on French history and advancing French soft power, Macron’s vision does not parallel the ideological revivalism of Modi’s India as a civilizational state through Hindutva (a right-wing ideology seeking to define Indian culture and nation around the values of Hinduism, literally meaning Hindu-ness). Second, and more practically, in terms of military readiness, though the contemporary Indian state has tended to be coercive internally, its external policies have been the opposite. India has not hesitated to employ force against combative neighbors like China and Pakistan, but it has exercised remarkable constraint, eschewing external intervention. By contrast, France has deployed its troops in numerous missions and operations through the European Union, NATO, and ad hoc coalitions.

Applied Strategic Autonomy
The conceptual like-mindedness around strategic autonomy translates into comparable foreign policies for France and India, especially in regard to their relations with major powers including the United States, China, and Russia.

Both countries have complex, often misunderstood relationships with the United States. They both aspire to a degree of independence from Washington policies, while being aware of their reliance on the United States for their defense and security. Therefore, critics of U.S. policies within Paris and Delhi are often seen as ungrateful by advocates of consolidated transatlantic and Indo-Pacific ties. But what the latter fail to capture is the vested U.S. interest in having capable and autonomous partners in key regions, even at the cost of painful diplomatic engagement and coordination. The best testament to this need to carefully cultivate these partnerships is that Macron and Modi are two of the three world leaders that have been invited by the Biden administration for state visits in Washington (along with South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol).

Modi’s visit to Paris is expected to give a boost to India’s quest for equipment diversification and defense indigenization. There is widespread speculation over possible announcements on India’s procurement of Dassault Rafale multirole fighters and Scorpène-class submarines, as well as agreements on technology transfer.

The real stress test for Franco-Indian strategic cohesion lies in their respective assessment of how to engage other major, problematic, powers such as China and Russia. Locked in a military stand-off with Beijing in the Himalayas since April 2020, India has admitted that its relations with China are “not normal.” In April, President Macron sparked a major controversy across Western capitals and drew praise from Beijing when he reinvoked the idea of strategic autonomy following his pomp-heavy state visit to China. Notably, Macron suggested that Europe should not adapt itself to an American pace and a Chinese overreaction over the Taiwan issue, effectively calling on the European Union to steer clear of “crises that are not ours.” In addition to Macron displaying openness to expanding business ties with China and seeking China’s mediatory role in the Ukraine conflict, this visit has been portrayed as a form of French leniency toward Beijing, which could be a source of concern for Delhi. But reactions in Washington and New Delhi were mild as, in practice they work together closely on balancing their shared rival, China, in this region.

In fact, the Indo-Pacific concept has provided a useful frame for the thriving Franco-Indian relations. France, more than the other Quad partners, has a direct interest in the stability of the Indian Ocean, thanks to its overseas territories in the southern Indian Ocean and military bases in the northern Indian Ocean, Djibouti, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This has given way to fruitful bilateral cooperation, enshrined in the Joint Strategic Vision of India-France Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region adopted in 2018. Paris and New Delhi are also stepping up their joint engagement with like-minded partners, through trilateral formats with Australia and the UAE and strategic partnerships with countries such as Greece and Egypt. Not only do these Indo-French partnerships underline linkages between the Indo-Pacific and the Mediterranean, they also complement a traditionally Washington-led security architecture in the region, while enhancing regional economic integration, together with “mini-lateral” partnerships such as the I2U2 (India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States).

Respective strategic autonomy can also lead to dissonance, such as in France’s and India’s positions on the war in Ukraine. France has continued to extend political, financial, humanitarian, and military support to Ukraine. It has vociferously condemned Russia’s military intervention and supported multiple rounds of sanctions against Moscow. Concurrently, President Macron has repeatedly called on “fence sitters” to take sides in this conflict of global implications, including in a resounding speech to the UN General Assembly. Despite its rapidly growing ties with the United States and Europe, India, as an energy-deficient developing country, resisted pressure to stop purchases of discounted oil from its traditional partner, Russia. At the same time, in veiled attempts to criticize Russia, Prime Minister Modi told President Putin that today’s era is not one of war and has repeatedly called for peaceful resolution to the conflict, including from the floor of the U.S. Congress.

Beyond strategic competition, the two countries also strive to be identified as leaders among the “middle powers” and in redefining multilateralism. While India has been strengthening its partnerships with countries identified as part of “the West,” it continues to safeguard its diplomatic maneuverability by remaining actively involved in organizations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization where Moscow and Beijing hold significant sway. India has been attending G7 meetings of advanced economies while using its G20 presidency to champion the interests of the developing world. Earlier this year, India hosted a first-of-a-kind summit of 125 Global South countries, which aimed to shed light on the disproportionate impact of global shock—from Covid-19 to the war in Ukraine—felt by the Global South. Even as France faces challenges in its ties with the Global South, particularly its former African colonies, it has been working on addressing gaps in the global financial architecture that disadvantage the developing world with the New Global Financing Pact. Together, the two are strengthening the multilateral architecture through organizations such as the International Solar Alliance, with a focus on transnational challenges.

Conclusion
A shared historical struggle to maintain strategic autonomy in a complex geopolitical landscape has helped both powers develop a degree of trust and a pragmatic partnership. Interestingly, both find the other partner valuable but not enough to develop a relationship of interdependence.

France is strong enough to have something to offer on the diplomatic, military, space, and nuclear sectors to India, but not strong enough to shape international order, norms, or rules, or to balance China if tensions escalate. For France, India is important, but not the most important partner when it comes to trade and defense cooperation in the context of threats like Russian aggression or terrorism in Africa.

Modi’s visit to Paris is therefore another important milestone to consolidate the Franco-Indian special relationship, but the latter remains unlikely to evolve into a proper military alliance. This fits with the objective of both states to maintain some strategic flexibility. Indeed, genuine strategic autonomy implies restrictions even to the closest of partnerships.

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What vision of global dynamics do India and Russia share?

polycentric system of international relations

This flexibility allows India to engage Russia for energy, defense, and strategic connectivity, even as New Delhi increases ties with the US and Indo-Pacific partners.

How did India react to the war between Russia and Ukraine?

India did not directly oppose Russia's actions

India did not join the Western sanctions against Russia

In what fields are India and Russia cooperating?

- **Eurasia & Trade Initiatives:** Recent agreements include new commitments for trade and joint investment, such as in Russia’s Far East, and efforts to enhance connectivity and security linkages across Eurasia and in the Indian and Pacific Oceans—aligning with the pursuit of a “Greater Eurasian Space.”

- **Modi’s Russia Visit & Great Power Signaling:** Modi’s high-profile trips to Russia, amidst US and European criticism post-Ukraine, underscore New Delhi’s pragmatic focus on national interest and autonomy.

Title:

Content:
India and Russia signed a program of cooperation to boost trade and joint investment projects in Russia's Far East Region during Modi-Putin talks on Tuesday. At the same time, they agreed to strengthen connectivity and security linkages in the Eurasian space and Indian and Pacific Oceans.

The 22nd Russia-India Annual Summit will lead to a greater collaboration between the two countries in Russian Far East and the Eurasian space, including the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), according to experts.

The 81-paragraphbilateral Joint Statement underscored the "shared vision" to enhance transport and connectivity cooperation, as well as a "solid commitment" to enhance economic linkages in Russia's resource-rich Far East, Pravesh Kumar Gupta, an Associate Fellow at New Delhi-based think tank Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF), told Sputnik India.

The 22nd Annual Summit, a "unique and pivotal event in the current global geopolitical context" according to Gupta, exposed the disappointment of Western countries.

"Amidst global turbulence, the summit served as a crucial platform for leaders to engage in constructive discussions and strategic dialogues, with the aim of bolstering cooperation in vital areas such as trade, energy, connectivity, defence, and technology. This event has been widely acknowledged as a significant milestone in the ongoing development of the close ties between India and Russia, a success that stood in stark contrast to the disappointment felt by the Western world," the Indian think-tanker asserted.

Lauding the Summit outcomes, Gupta remarked that the leaders would intensify effort to develop "promising production and marketing chains in Eurasia" and stick to the new plan for the Far East in providing enhanced cooperation in different sectors, including transport and connectivity.

Specifically both leaders shared a vision pointing to three projects – International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC), Chennai-Vladivostok Corridor as well as the Northern Sea Route (NSR), or the Polar Route.

"Most importantly, these connectivity projects are free from any political agenda, unlike the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as clearly mentioned in the joint statement. Their implementation will be based on the principles of transparency, broad participation, local priorities, financial sustainability, and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations," the VIF pundit underlined.

Gupta expressed confidence that the proposal to establish a joint working group on developing the NSR would speed up the project, which promised "significant cost savings and reduced shipping times" for goods traveling between Europe and Asia.

"The route's increased accessibility due to melting Arctic ice has sparked increased interest in its potential for commercial shipping and trade, offering a bright future for global trade," Gupta stated.

In the context of the INSTC, the expert underscored that it could turn out to be the most "cost-effective and favourable" connectivity project to increase Indian exports to Eurasia and vice-versa. He explained that the 7,200-kilometre-long multimodal corridor was in line with Moscow's geo-economic focus on Asia-Pacific following the Ukraine conflict.

Russia, India To Implement The Idea of A 'Greater Eurasian Space'

In terms of bolstering cooperation in Asia-Pacific, or near India's own neighbourhood, Modi and Putin shared approaches on building a "new architecture" of a 'Greater Eurasian space'.

Although, initially Russia was focused primarily on the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, the Ukrainian conflict completely changed the situation, Alexey Kupriyanov, an expert in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) at Moscow-based think tank IMEMO RAS told Sputnik India.

At the same time, the think-tanker highlighted that a growing trade turnover between Russia and India was pushing Moscow to return to the Indian Ocean Region, primarily to ensure the protecting of Russian vessels in areas not covered by Indian Navy's operations, which include the Red Sea and the Mediterranean region.

"In the long term, this means that Russian ships will soon operate more intensively in the Indian Ocean and expand their presence," Kupriyanov stressed.

It would bolster India's security efforts and help it manage the power competition between China and the US, even as Indian Navy has intensified inter-operability with western maritime forces in recent years, the expert asserted.

"Since India's focus is primarily on the eastern part of the region, Russian ships in the western part could help fill the vacuum of security there. This will reduce the need for East African countries to seek help from China and the US to combat pirates, smugglers and drug traffickers," Kupriyanov concluded.

(With Inputs From Agencies)

How did India react to the war between Russia and Ukraine?

India did not directly oppose Russia's actions

India did not join the Western sanctions against Russia

In what fields are India and Russia cooperating?

In what regions do India and Russia have common strategic interests?

India’s willingness to continue and even expand trade—especially cheap Russian oil imports—demonstrates a calculated balance, sometimes against Western expectations.

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Content: Homepage

Modi's Russia visit shows India isn't worried about making the US mad

  • In a move likely to anger the US, Modi is visiting Russia.
  • The move signals strong ties between Delhi and Moscow, and shows the world India is pursuing its own agenda.
  • Modi is aiming to correct the trade imbalance and address China's Indo-Pacific activities.
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In a move likely to anger the US, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is visiting Russia on Monday for his first bilateral trip after winning a historic third term in office.

Modi's two-day visit to Russia — where he is scheduled to meet with President Vladimir Putin — is significant in that it signals strong ties between Delhi and Moscow. It also shows the world that India is not afraid to pursue its own agenda.

Vinay Kwatra, India's foreign secretary, told reporters in New Delhi that issues between Russia and India have "piled up" and "need to be addressed," per Bloomberg.

Russia's relationship with India goes back to the Cold War, and trade between the two countries has grown since Russia started the war in Ukraine. India is a major buyer of Russian oil. Russia is also India's biggest arms supplier.

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Kwatra underscored that the two countries' trade relationship has remained "resilient."

Still, Modi's trip will "rankle many Western observers," Ved Shinde, a researcher and contributor to Australia's Lowy Institute think tank, wrote in a note on Wednesday.

"Since the Ukraine war began, India's purchase of cheap oil from Russia has been seen as profiting from troubles in the heart of Europe," Shinde added.

Modi's visit to Russia will make the US look bad

Just like Putin's visit to supply-chain hot spot Vietnam, India's engagement with Russia isn't a good look for the US, as it comes while Washington is isolating Putin's regime.

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The US has raised "some concerns" about India's relationship with Russia with New Delhi, Kurt Campbell, the US Deputy Secretary of State, said last month.

However, Washington acknowledges that India's ties with Russia are different from its ties with the US.

"We have many areas of alignment, but it is not surprising that there would be areas where we've had perhaps different perspectives, views, historical ties," Campbell said about America's relationship with India.

India, for its part, is looking to balance its relationship with the world's key powerbrokers — the US, Russia, and China.

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"There are different degrees in India's multi-alignment. Make no mistake — the United States and its allies are more consequential for India's future than its relationship with Russia," wrote Shinde.

India needs to leverage its historical ties with Russia to secure its economy and security, so Modi isn't just in Russia for a goodwill trip.

Reducing the trade imbalance

A key agenda item for the visit is to reduce a huge bilateral trade imbalance, said Kwatra.

India imports about $60 billion of goods a year from Russia, but Russia buys less than 10% of this amount from India, per Bloomberg.

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Modi may also touch on China's activities in the Indo-Pacific region, said Kwatra.

India is trying to manage its relationship with China, which has been testy since a border dispute in 2020. Modi skipped the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Kazakhstan last week.

There's also the matter of Russia's ties with China.

At the summit last week, Putin said Russia's relationship with China is in the "best period in history."

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Modi now needs to cozy up to Putin to counter China's advances.

"The reason for the time-tested stability in India-Russia ties is to maintain a continental balance in the Eurasian heartland. That is, to balance China," wrote Shinde.

"Or to put it another way, don't go around making new adversaries when there are already two open fronts — China and Pakistan," Shinde added.

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How did India react to the war between Russia and Ukraine?

India did not directly oppose Russia's actions

India did not join the Western sanctions against Russia

How has Russia/ India trade evolved since the start of the war in Ukraine?

India's purchases of Russian oil increased

How has trade level between India and Russia changed under Modi and Putin?

In what fields are India and Russia cooperating?

- **Balancing China:** The increasingly tense India-China border and China’s strategic assertiveness drive India’s need to keep close to Russia, seeking to avoid a Russia-China axis that could marginalize Indian interests.

In what fields are India and Russia cooperating?

Why is maintaining a relationship with Russia important for India?

In parallel, India strengthens security partnerships with the US, Quad members, and France, using these alignments to offset China.

What has negatively affected India/ Russia current relationship?

- **US-India Rapprochement & Multialignment:** While India draws closer to the US (e.g., technology and maritime security initiatives), it avoids exclusive reliance, maintaining Russia as a crucial defense partner and energy supplier.

How did India react to the war between Russia and Ukraine?

India did not directly oppose Russia's actions

India did not join the Western sanctions against Russia

In what fields are India and Russia cooperating?

energy
security & military
weapons supply

The backdrop is India’s long-standing priority—strategic autonomy—leveraged to maximize maneuverability amid shifting global alliances.

Title:

Content: Monday, Oct 31, 2022

Why foreign capitals are taking note of Modi government’s foreign policy

As the world's fifth largest economy with the third largest defence budget, India’s material capabilities gives it an opportunity to influence the international order. South Block has been aligning the national political will with new international possibilities.

Under previous governments, Delhi was often tempted to limit its relationship with the US and Europe for fear of offending the sensitivities of Moscow and Beijing. (Illustration by C R Sasikumar)

International approbation for Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s independent foreign policy is coming thick and fast. Despite the presumed Indian love for external validation, the new compliments from abroad are unlikely to swell the chests in South Block.

India’s mandarins know that foreign leaders are not in the business of giving free praise. Most of the time, compliments say more about the state offering them rather than the one receiving it. Last week, Imran Khan was at it again, commending India’s foreign policy as he launched the promised “long march” from Lahore to Islamabad.

Khan pointed to Delhi’s continuing purchase of oil from global markets while Islamabad is unable to do so. Recall that Imran Khan had pushed for oil and grain purchases from Russia before he was ousted from power in April just weeks after Moscow’s aggression against Ukraine. Beyond oil purchases, praising India is less about foreign policy than attacking what he calls the “imported government” of Pakistan. Khan had accused the Joe Biden Administration of a “conspiracy” to dethrone him because of his effort to pursue an independent foreign policy. Imran’s attack on the US conspiracy is directed at the army chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, who withdrew his patronage to Khan and facilitated the election of Shehbaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League as the new prime minister.

Notwithstanding his seemingly revolutionary rhetoric, Imran Khan is not an ideological opponent of the US. After returning from a meeting with President Donald Trump in 2019, Khan was rather chuffed with himself. On his return to Islamabad, Khan had declared that he felt like he had “won the (cricket) world cup again”.

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Last week also saw the UAE’s minister for artificial intelligence, Omar Sultan Al Olama, praise External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar’s stewardship of Indian diplomacy for deftly navigating the recent geopolitical headwinds. That the UAE is now talking about “not choosing sides” is certainly interesting. The Gulf kingdoms like the UAE and Saudi Arabia have long relied on the United States for their security. But the recent US moves to revive the nuclear deal with Iran have generated much unease among the Gulf Arabs.

The Biden Administration’s rough handling of the Saudi Crown prince on human rights issues has made it harder for Riyadh to oblige Washington on the question of isolating Russia in the oil market amidst the war in Ukraine. The determination of the Gulf countries to put their own interests first is a reminder to the major powers that foreign policy in the end is about give and take and not a one-sided relationship even between the powerful and not-so-powerful.

Addressing an international gathering last week, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, offered handsome personal praise to PM Modi and his independent foreign policy. Russia, of course, has not been too happy with India’s deepening ties with the US, but Putin recognises that there is a new paradigm in India’s foreign policy — Delhi now has the confidence to do its own thing.

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That is not always obvious from what the Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, says. Just a few months after the Chinese aggression in Ladakh in 2020, Lavrov had a condescending take on India’s China policy. Lavrov accused Western powers of pursuing an “aggressive and devious” policy to draw India into “anti-China games” by promoting the Indo-Pacific strategy. A spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi was quick to dismiss Lavrov’s mischievous line by underlining India’s independent foreign policy and expanding on India’s own approach to the Indo-Pacific.

The idea of an “innocent India” being hijacked by the “evil West” has been a popular trope not only in the discourse on India-Russia relations but also in Sino-Indian relations. Many in Delhi were long willing to suspend their disbelief in accepting the argument that India and China would get along happily forever but for “Western manipulation”. Delhi and Beijing don’t need third parties to create trouble between them — there is enough natural friction between the two large Asian giants that are also neighbours. Their unresolved boundary dispute has always been the biggest source of the conflict between the two. Over the decades additional problems have cropped up, including the Chinese strategic expansion into the Subcontinent and the Indian Ocean as well as massive trade deficits.

Today’s India might be accused of many things, but not “strategic innocence”. It is pursuing great power relations, with each on its own merit. It is not willing to cede a veto to any power over its relations with its rivals. Delhi does not let Moscow define India’s relations with the US: Similarly, Delhi can’t let Washington limit the character of India’s engagement with Russia. This was not always the case.

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Under previous governments, Delhi was often tempted to limit its relationship with the US and Europe for fear of offending the sensitivities of Moscow and Beijing. This was done either in the name of ideology or the fear that there will be unpleasant consequences in relations with Russia and China. The Modi government has broken out of that defensive and deferential mindset. Putting national interests above political correctness has given much strategic dividend for Delhi.

It has been evident for quite a while that a rising India has greater room for global manoeuvre. As the fifth-largest economy with the third largest defence budget, India’s material capabilities make it an increasingly attractive partner to others and give it an opportunity to shape the international system. But they did not automatically translate into strategic gains.

PM Modi’s real contribution has been in aligning the national political will with new international possibilities. India’s new diplomacy is not about doing whatever you like or saying what you please. It is about a careful judgement of the shifting global correlation of forces and the skill to adapt to the dynamic international environment.

Translating the objective possibilities generated by India’s rise into tangible strategic outcomes is what Indian diplomacy is beginning to get good at amidst extremely challenging external circumstances — including the Covid pandemic, the Chinese aggression and the war in Ukraine. Notwithstanding external encomiums, South Block knows that coping with this unstable world remains a relentless challenge.

The writer is senior fellow, Asia Society Policy Institute, Delhi and contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express

First published on: 01-11-2022 at 04:28:15 am
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**Summary of Relevant Nuggets from Extracts:**

- **Waste Management Systems Internationally**: No specific successful country or region is detailed in the provided extracts.

There is mention of efforts and systemic approaches in different sectors such as water management in Egypt (Rawd El Farag water plant SCADA system), but not directly about waste sorting or recycling.

- **Government Role**: In the Egyptian context, modernization of water systems is coordinated at high government levels, highlighted by the establishment of the Holding Company for Water and Wastewater via Presidential Decree.

This underscores the critical role of national and local governments in driving infrastructure improvements.

- **Cross-Applicability**: The success in Egypt’s utility upgrades (water plant control systems) indicates that substantial improvements in public service sectors require intentional government coordination, robust regulatory structures, and significant investment.

This experience could translate to solid waste/recycling sectors: clear regulatory authority, strong public oversight, and regular modernization are keys to effective system improvement.

- **Program Implementation**: The U.S. example of an AARP grant being used to pilot “tiny homes” for seniors shows the importance of pilot programs, targeted grants, and public-private collaboration in testing new models for public good—here, though, in housing, not waste.

- **Behavioral Shifts**: Both environmental impact (diet-related, energy-related) and infrastructural upgrades are portrayed as incremental and cumulative processes—advocating for shifts, not sudden overhauls.

This could inform communications about recycling systems—focus on gradual improvement and scalability.

- **Community Engagement**: Initiatives (like Napa Climate NOW!)

and public consultation processes in city planning are important, signaling that citizen involvement and transparent processes also contribute to the success of public projects.

**Summary of Relevant Nuggets from Extracts:**

- **Waste Management Systems Internationally**: No specific successful country or region is detailed in the provided extracts.

Title:

Content: Farming Sacks Tote Market Revenue, Gross Margin, Market Share, Manufacturing Process Analysis 2022-2028

Los Angeles, United State: The report is a comprehensive and one of the most accurate research studies on the global Farming Sacks Tote market. It sheds light on market competition, segmentation, regional growth, and dynamics such as drivers, restraints, trends, and opportunities. It provides validated and revalidated market figures, which include market size, CAGR, market share, revenue, gross margin, production, and consumption. It offers absolute dollar opportunity analysis, manufacturing cost analysis, Porter’s Five Forces analysis, qualitative and quantitative analysis, and PESTLE analysis to give a complete understanding of the global Farming Sacks Tote market. It is prepared with the use of top primary and secondary research techniques and tools.

Get Full PDF Sample Copy of Report: (Including Full TOC, List of Tables & Figures, Chart) https://www.qyresearch.com/sample-form/form/4363825/global-farming-sacks-tote-market

Besides a dashboard view of the vendor landscape and important company profiles, the competitive analysis offers an encyclopedic examination of the market structure. The company share analysis included in this study helps players to improve their business tactics and compete well against leading market participants. The intensity map prepared by our analysts helps to get a quick view of the presence of several players in the global Farming Sacks Tote market. The report also provides a footprint matrix of key players of the global Farming Sacks Tote market. It dives deep into growth strategies, sales footprint, production footprint, and product and application portfolios of prominent names of the industry.

Key Players Mentioned in the Global Farming Sacks Tote Market Research Report: Amcor plc, The Mondi Group plc, LC Packaging International BV, Novolex Holdings, Inc, WestRock Company, Segezha Group LLC, ProAmpac LLC, Sonoco Products Company

Global Farming Sacks Tote Market Segmentation by Product: Plastic, Paper

Global Farming Sacks Tote Market Segmentation by Application: Seeds & Pesticides, Food grains, Silage, Vegetable & Fruits

The segmental analysis section of the report includes a thorough research study on key type and application segments of the global Farming Sacks Tote market. All of the segments considered for the study are analyzed in quite some detail on the basis of market share, growth rate, recent developments, technology, and other critical factors. The segmental analysis provided in the report will help players to identify high-growth segments of the global Farming Sacks Tote market and clearly understand their growth journey.

The regional analysis provided in the report helps to become familiar with growth opportunities available in different regions and countries across the world. It provides market share, consumption, production, revenue, and other studies of important geographical markets. The competitive analysis includes company profiling of leading players on the basis of recent developments, revenue, gross margin, and other key factors. The report gives useful recommendations for players to secure a strong position in the global Farming Sacks Tote market. It comes out as a set of powerful guidelines to prepare for unforeseen challenges and ensure healthy growth in the global Farming Sacks Tote market.

Key Questions Answered

1. What is the size and CAGR of the global Farming Sacks Tote market?

2. Which are the leading segments of the global Farming Sacks Tote market?

3. What are the key driving factors of the most profitable regional market?

4. What is the nature of competition in the global Farming Sacks Tote market?

5. How will the global Farming Sacks Tote market advance in the coming years?

6. What are the main strategies adopted in the global Farming Sacks Tote market?

Request for customization in Report: https://www.qyresearch.com/customize-request/form/4363825/global-farming-sacks-tote-market

Table of Contents

 1 Study Coverage
1.1 Farming Sacks Tote Product Introduction
1.2 Market by Type
1.2.1 Global Farming Sacks Tote Market Size Growth Rate by Type, 2017 VS 2021 VS 2028
1.2.2 Plastic
1.2.3 Paper
1.3 Market by Application
1.3.1 Global Farming Sacks Tote Market Size Growth Rate by Application, 2017 VS 2021 VS 2028
1.3.2 Seeds & Pesticides
1.3.3 Food grains
1.3.4 Silage
1.3.5 Vegetable & Fruits
1.4 Study Objectives
1.5 Years Considered
2 Executive Summary
2.1 Global Farming Sacks Tote Sales Estimates and Forecasts 2017-2028
2.2 Global Farming Sacks Tote Revenue Estimates and Forecasts 2017-2028
2.3 Global Farming Sacks Tote Revenue by Region: 2017 VS 2021 VS 2028
2.4 Global Farming Sacks Tote Sales by Region
2.4.1 Global Farming Sacks Tote Sales by Region (2017-2022)
2.4.2 Global Sales Farming Sacks Tote by Region (2023-2028)
2.5 Global Farming Sacks Tote Revenue by Region
2.5.1 Global Farming Sacks Tote Revenue by Region (2017-2022)
2.5.2 Global Farming Sacks Tote Revenue by Region (2023-2028)
2.6 North America
2.7 Europe
2.8 Asia-Pacific
2.9 Latin America
2.10 Middle East & Africa
3 Competition by Manufacturers
3.1 Global Farming Sacks Tote Sales by Manufacturers
3.1.1 Global Top Farming Sacks Tote Manufacturers by Sales (2017-2022)
3.1.2 Global Farming Sacks Tote Sales Market Share by Manufacturers (2017-2022)
3.1.3 Global Top 10 and Top 5 Largest Manufacturers of Farming Sacks Tote in 2021
3.2 Global Farming Sacks Tote Revenue by Manufacturers
3.2.1 Global Farming Sacks Tote Revenue by Manufacturers (2017-2022)
3.2.2 Global Farming Sacks Tote Revenue Market Share by Manufacturers (2017-2022)
3.2.3 Global Top 10 and Top 5 Companies by Farming Sacks Tote Revenue in 2021
3.3 Global Farming Sacks Tote Sales Price by Manufacturers (2017-2022)
3.4 Analysis of Competitive Landscape
3.4.1 Manufacturers Market Concentration Ratio (CR5 and HHI)
3.4.2 Global Farming Sacks Tote Market Share by Company Type (Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3)
3.4.3 Global Farming Sacks Tote Manufacturers Geographical Distribution
3.5 Mergers & Acquisitions, Expansion Plans
4 Market Size by Type
4.1 Global Farming Sacks Tote Sales by Type
4.1.1 Global Farming Sacks Tote Historical Sales by Type (2017-2022)
4.1.2 Global Farming Sacks Tote Forecasted Sales by Type (2023-2028)
4.1.3 Global Farming Sacks Tote Sales Market Share by Type (2017-2028)
4.2 Global Farming Sacks Tote Revenue by Type
4.2.1 Global Farming Sacks Tote Historical Revenue by Type (2017-2022)
4.2.2 Global Farming Sacks Tote Forecasted Revenue by Type (2023-2028)
4.2.3 Global Farming Sacks Tote Revenue Market Share by Type (2017-2028)
4.3 Global Farming Sacks Tote Price by Type
4.3.1 Global Farming Sacks Tote Price by Type (2017-2022)
4.3.2 Global Farming Sacks Tote Price Forecast by Type (2023-2028)
5 Market Size by Application
5.1 Global Farming Sacks Tote Sales by Application
5.1.1 Global Farming Sacks Tote Historical Sales by Application (2017-2022)
5.1.2 Global Farming Sacks Tote Forecasted Sales by Application (2023-2028)
5.1.3 Global Farming Sacks Tote Sales Market Share by Application (2017-2028)
5.2 Global Farming Sacks Tote Revenue by Application
5.2.1 Global Farming Sacks Tote Historical Revenue by Application (2017-2022)
5.2.2 Global Farming Sacks Tote Forecasted Revenue by Application (2023-2028)
5.2.3 Global Farming Sacks Tote Revenue Market Share by Application (2017-2028)
5.3 Global Farming Sacks Tote Price by Application
5.3.1 Global Farming Sacks Tote Price by Application (2017-2022)
5.3.2 Global Farming Sacks Tote Price Forecast by Application (2023-2028)
6 North America
6.1 North America Farming Sacks Tote Market Size by Type
6.1.1 North America Farming Sacks Tote Sales by Type (2017-2028)
6.1.2 North America Farming Sacks Tote Revenue by Type (2017-2028)
6.2 North America Farming Sacks Tote Market Size by Application
6.2.1 North America Farming Sacks Tote Sales by Application (2017-2028)
6.2.2 North America Farming Sacks Tote Revenue by Application (2017-2028)
6.3 North America Farming Sacks Tote Market Size by Country
6.3.1 North America Farming Sacks Tote Sales by Country (2017-2028)
6.3.2 North America Farming Sacks Tote Revenue by Country (2017-2028)
6.3.3 U.S.
6.3.4 Canada
7 Europe
7.1 Europe Farming Sacks Tote Market Size by Type
7.1.1 Europe Farming Sacks Tote Sales by Type (2017-2028)
7.1.2 Europe Farming Sacks Tote Revenue by Type (2017-2028)
7.2 Europe Farming Sacks Tote Market Size by Application
7.2.1 Europe Farming Sacks Tote Sales by Application (2017-2028)
7.2.2 Europe Farming Sacks Tote Revenue by Application (2017-2028)
7.3 Europe Farming Sacks Tote Market Size by Country
7.3.1 Europe Farming Sacks Tote Sales by Country (2017-2028)
7.3.2 Europe Farming Sacks Tote Revenue by Country (2017-2028)
7.3.3 Germany
7.3.4 France
7.3.5 U.K.
7.3.6 Italy
7.3.7 Russia
8 Asia Pacific
8.1 Asia Pacific Farming Sacks Tote Market Size by Type
8.1.1 Asia Pacific Farming Sacks Tote Sales by Type (2017-2028)
8.1.2 Asia Pacific Farming Sacks Tote Revenue by Type (2017-2028)
8.2 Asia Pacific Farming Sacks Tote Market Size by Application
8.2.1 Asia Pacific Farming Sacks Tote Sales by Application (2017-2028)
8.2.2 Asia Pacific Farming Sacks Tote Revenue by Application (2017-2028)
8.3 Asia Pacific Farming Sacks Tote Market Size by Region
8.3.1 Asia Pacific Farming Sacks Tote Sales by Region (2017-2028)
8.3.2 Asia Pacific Farming Sacks Tote Revenue by Region (2017-2028)
8.3.3 China
8.3.4 Japan
8.3.5 South Korea
8.3.6 India
8.3.7 Australia
8.3.8 Taiwan
8.3.9 Indonesia
8.3.10 Thailand
8.3.11 Malaysia
8.3.12 Philippines
9 Latin America
9.1 Latin America Farming Sacks Tote Market Size by Type
9.1.1 Latin America Farming Sacks Tote Sales by Type (2017-2028)
9.1.2 Latin America Farming Sacks Tote Revenue by Type (2017-2028)
9.2 Latin America Farming Sacks Tote Market Size by Application
9.2.1 Latin America Farming Sacks Tote Sales by Application (2017-2028)
9.2.2 Latin America Farming Sacks Tote Revenue by Application (2017-2028)
9.3 Latin America Farming Sacks Tote Market Size by Country
9.3.1 Latin America Farming Sacks Tote Sales by Country (2017-2028)
9.3.2 Latin America Farming Sacks Tote Revenue by Country (2017-2028)
9.3.3 Mexico
9.3.4 Brazil
9.3.5 Argentina
10 Middle East and Africa
10.1 Middle East and Africa Farming Sacks Tote Market Size by Type
10.1.1 Middle East and Africa Farming Sacks Tote Sales by Type (2017-2028)
10.1.2 Middle East and Africa Farming Sacks Tote Revenue by Type (2017-2028)
10.2 Middle East and Africa Farming Sacks Tote Market Size by Application
10.2.1 Middle East and Africa Farming Sacks Tote Sales by Application (2017-2028)
10.2.2 Middle East and Africa Farming Sacks Tote Revenue by Application (2017-2028)
10.3 Middle East and Africa Farming Sacks Tote Market Size by Country
10.3.1 Middle East and Africa Farming Sacks Tote Sales by Country (2017-2028)
10.3.2 Middle East and Africa Farming Sacks Tote Revenue by Country (2017-2028)
10.3.3 Turkey
10.3.4 Saudi Arabia
11 Company Profiles
11.1 Amcor plc
11.1.1 Amcor plc Corporation Information
11.1.2 Amcor plc Overview
11.1.3 Amcor plc Farming Sacks Tote Sales, Price, Revenue and Gross Margin (2017-2022)
11.1.4 Amcor plc Farming Sacks Tote Product Model Numbers, Pictures, Descriptions and Specifications
11.1.5 Amcor plc Recent Developments
11.2 The Mondi Group plc
11.2.1 The Mondi Group plc Corporation Information
11.2.2 The Mondi Group plc Overview
11.2.3 The Mondi Group plc Farming Sacks Tote Sales, Price, Revenue and Gross Margin (2017-2022)
11.2.4 The Mondi Group plc Farming Sacks Tote Product Model Numbers, Pictures, Descriptions and Specifications
11.2.5 The Mondi Group plc Recent Developments
11.3 LC Packaging International BV
11.3.1 LC Packaging International BV Corporation Information
11.3.2 LC Packaging International BV Overview
11.3.3 LC Packaging International BV Farming Sacks Tote Sales, Price, Revenue and Gross Margin (2017-2022)
11.3.4 LC Packaging International BV Farming Sacks Tote Product Model Numbers, Pictures, Descriptions and Specifications
11.3.5 LC Packaging International BV Recent Developments
11.4 Novolex Holdings, Inc
11.4.1 Novolex Holdings, Inc Corporation Information
11.4.2 Novolex Holdings, Inc Overview
11.4.3 Novolex Holdings, Inc Farming Sacks Tote Sales, Price, Revenue and Gross Margin (2017-2022)
11.4.4 Novolex Holdings, Inc Farming Sacks Tote Product Model Numbers, Pictures, Descriptions and Specifications
11.4.5 Novolex Holdings, Inc Recent Developments
11.5 WestRock Company
11.5.1 WestRock Company Corporation Information
11.5.2 WestRock Company Overview
11.5.3 WestRock Company Farming Sacks Tote Sales, Price, Revenue and Gross Margin (2017-2022)
11.5.4 WestRock Company Farming Sacks Tote Product Model Numbers, Pictures, Descriptions and Specifications
11.5.5 WestRock Company Recent Developments
11.6 Segezha Group LLC
11.6.1 Segezha Group LLC Corporation Information
11.6.2 Segezha Group LLC Overview
11.6.3 Segezha Group LLC Farming Sacks Tote Sales, Price, Revenue and Gross Margin (2017-2022)
11.6.4 Segezha Group LLC Farming Sacks Tote Product Model Numbers, Pictures, Descriptions and Specifications
11.6.5 Segezha Group LLC Recent Developments
11.7 ProAmpac LLC
11.7.1 ProAmpac LLC Corporation Information
11.7.2 ProAmpac LLC Overview
11.7.3 ProAmpac LLC Farming Sacks Tote Sales, Price, Revenue and Gross Margin (2017-2022)
11.7.4 ProAmpac LLC Farming Sacks Tote Product Model Numbers, Pictures, Descriptions and Specifications
11.7.5 ProAmpac LLC Recent Developments
11.8 Sonoco Products Company
11.8.1 Sonoco Products Company Corporation Information
11.8.2 Sonoco Products Company Overview
11.8.3 Sonoco Products Company Farming Sacks Tote Sales, Price, Revenue and Gross Margin (2017-2022)
11.8.4 Sonoco Products Company Farming Sacks Tote Product Model Numbers, Pictures, Descriptions and Specifications
11.8.5 Sonoco Products Company Recent Developments
12 Industry Chain and Sales Channels Analysis
12.1 Farming Sacks Tote Industry Chain Analysis
12.2 Farming Sacks Tote Key Raw Materials
12.2.1 Key Raw Materials
12.2.2 Raw Materials Key Suppliers
12.3 Farming Sacks Tote Production Mode & Process
12.4 Farming Sacks Tote Sales and Marketing
12.4.1 Farming Sacks Tote Sales Channels
12.4.2 Farming Sacks Tote Distributors
12.5 Farming Sacks Tote Customers
13 Market Drivers, Opportunities, Challenges and Risks Factors Analysis
13.1 Farming Sacks Tote Industry Trends
13.2 Farming Sacks Tote Market Drivers
13.3 Farming Sacks Tote Market Challenges
13.4 Farming Sacks Tote Market Restraints
14 Key Findings in The Global Farming Sacks Tote Study
15 Appendix
15.1 Research Methodology
15.1.1 Methodology/Research Approach
15.1.2 Data Source
15.2 Author Details
15.3 Disclaimer

About Us:

QY Research established in 2007, focus on custom research, management consulting, IPO consulting, industry chain research, data base and seminar services. The company owned a large basic data base (such as National Bureau of statistics database, Customs import and export database, Industry Association Database etc), expert’s resources (included energy automotive chemical medical ICT consumer goods etc.

There is mention of efforts and systemic approaches in different sectors such as water management in Egypt (Rawd El Farag water plant SCADA system), but not directly about waste sorting or recycling.

Title:

Content: Cairo, Egypt – Contributing towards the realization of Egypt's Vision 2030, Giza Systems proudly announces the successful completion of the Rawd El Farag water plant SCADA system and control center revamp project for the Greater Cairo Water Company (GCWC).

This transformative project represents a significant milestone, encompassing cutting-edge solutions, including the latest in Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. Notably, this initiative stands out as the first large-scale implementation of a fully Egypt-developed SCADA solution in the country.

Giza Systems, renowned for its digital transformation enablement, also provided GCWC with remote workstations and mobile applications, enabling seamless remote monitoring of the water plant. To bolster communication capabilities, 4G communication protocol was deployed, offering diverse links and protocols for robust communication.

The Rawd El Farag project was driven by a multitude of challenges, including the scarcity of software and hardware spare parts for obsolete systems. With the integration of various communication links, particularly the 4G communication technology, the project significantly mitigates the risk of data loss. Additionally, the incorporation of remote monitoring tools has expedited issue identification and response, rendering the system more agile and efficient.

Despite the complexity and challenges inherent in the project, GCWC placed its trust in Giza Systems, cementing their decade-long business relationship and Giza Systems' commendable track record in similar projects. The project, originally slated for a one-year timeline, was completed successfully despite all obstacles, demonstrating the unwavering commitment and capability of Giza Systems.

This project stands as a crucial steppingstone towards the realization of Egypt's Minister of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Communities, Dr. Assem El Gazzar's vision to automate work systems and enhance citizen services. Leveraging its extensive knowledge and expertise in digital transformation, Giza Systems remains dedicated to envisioning a digital Egypt through further innovative solutions and integrations.

Sherif Elshimy, Giza Systems Customer Value Proposition Director, stated, "Our commitment to advancing Egypt's infrastructure and services is unwavering. The Rawd El Farag project is a testament to our dedication and ability to deliver transformative solutions that pave the way for a more connected and efficient Egypt."

About Giza Systems

Giza Systems, a leading digital transformation enabler and systems integrator in the MEA region, designs and deploys industry-specific technology solutions for asset-intensive industries such as the Telecoms, Utilities, Oil & Gas, Transportation and other market sectors. Giza Systems helps its clients streamline their operations and businesses through their portfolio of solutions, managed services, and consultancy practice. Giza Systems’ team of 2000 professionals are spread throughout the region with anchor offices in Cairo, Riyadh, Dubai, Doha, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Kampala and New Jersey, allowing the Company to service an ever-increasing client base in over 25 countries.

About the Greater Cairo Water Company (GCWC)

As a result of the state’s sense of the great necessity to restructure the drinking water and sanitation sector, in order to ensure the achievement of the strategic goals that are hoped to be implemented for the benefit of the Egyptian citizen; The state decided to establish the Holding Company for Water and Wastewater and the regulatory body for drinking water, sanitation, and consumer protection, by presidential decree in 2004.

The Holding Company for Water and Wastewater was established by Presidential Decree No. 135 of 2004 to establish a Holding Company for Potable Water and Wastewater and its subsidiaries, which shall have a legal personality and be subject to the provisions of Law No. 203 of 1991 and its executive regulations.

Pursuant to the third paragraph of the stated presidential decree, public economic authorities and public sector companies for drinking water and sanitation were transformed into subsidiaries of the holding company, subject to the provisions of the Public Business Sector Companies Law promulgated by Law No. 203 of 1991, so that the number of subsidiaries became 25 subsidiaries serving 27 governorates.

- **Government Role**: In the Egyptian context, modernization of water systems is coordinated at high government levels, highlighted by the establishment of the Holding Company for Water and Wastewater via Presidential Decree.

This underscores the critical role of national and local governments in driving infrastructure improvements.

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Content: Shifting Trends in U.S. Electricity Production: A Comprehensive Analysis

Recent statistics from the United States show a big change in where we get our electricity from. It turns out that coal is not the top source anymore. Now, renewable energies like solar and wind have taken the lead.

Major Decline of Coal and Rise of Renewables

  • In October, wind and solar energy together produced 16.8% of the US’s electricity, slightly more than coal’s 15.2%.
  • This change is a big deal because coal used to be way ahead of wind and solar.
  • From January to October this year, coal was barely ahead of wind and solar in energy production, but it’s clear that coal is losing ground.

Renewables vs. Fossil Fuels

  • Renewable energy made up 23.7% of the electricity produced in October, noticeably more than the 15.2% from coal.
  • But if you add up all the fossil fuels like natural gas, they lead with 57.2%, showing we still depend on them heavily.
  • Still, renewable energy is steadily increasing, hinting that we’re moving toward a greener future.

Analysis of 2023 Trends and Predictions

Data from the U.S. Energy Information Agency up to October gives us a good idea of the energy trends for 2023.

Stabilizing Renewable Growth and Electricity Consumption

  • Electricity production didn’t change much from last year, with demand being a little higher in October.
  • Renewable energies are catching up to coal and might even pass it by the end of the year.
  • Particularly, solar power is doing really well and now accounts for 6% of total electricity.

Hydroelectric and Nuclear Power

  • Hydroelectric production witnessed a slight decline, potentially allowing solar to surpass it among renewable sources.
  • Nuclear power remains stable, with new additions like the 1.1 Gigawatt reactor at Vogtle in Georgia.
  • Together, nuclear and renewables are closing in on accounting for 40% of U.S. electricity production, a milestone in carbon-free generation.

Opportunities and Challenges

Moving away from coal affects the economy, especially in places that rely on mining coal or coal power plants for jobs and money. On the flip side, the boom in renewable energy is sparking new tech developments and job openings in making and looking after green energy setups. There’s been great progress, but hitting a fully green energy grid isn’t easy. One big hurdle is how unpredictable renewable energy can be. To deal with this, we’re looking at things like better batteries and updating our power grids to keep our energy flow steady and sure.

Economic Implications

Rules and decisions made by the government play a big role in how quickly and where our energy systems change. Things like rewards for using renewable energy, putting a price on carbon, and rules about how much pollution is allowed are key in deciding what the energy world will look like tomorrow. The part that the US government, both at the federal and state levels, has in all this is super important.

Policy and Regulatory Landscape

The rules set by the government really steer where our energy future is headed. Things like tax breaks for green energy, charging for carbon emissions, and rules about pollution are key players in changing how we get and use our power. The role of both the federal and state governments in America is big here.

Conclusion and Future Outlook

The energy scene in the U.S. is really changing. Wind and solar power are stepping up their game while we’re still using a lot of natural gas. We’re clearly moving towards less polluting energy, and that’s a good thing to see. We’re a bit concerned about our pace. We need to hasten if we aim for a zero-emission electric grid by the late 2020s. It’s vital to keep up-to-date and involved in this key shift. Digging into the information and stats on the U.S. Energy Information Agency’s site is crucial for anyone keen on the energy prospects in the U.S. and around the world.

- **Cross-Applicability**: The success in Egypt’s utility upgrades (water plant control systems) indicates that substantial improvements in public service sectors require intentional government coordination, robust regulatory structures, and significant investment.

This experience could translate to solid waste/recycling sectors: clear regulatory authority, strong public oversight, and regular modernization are keys to effective system improvement.

- **Program Implementation**: The U.S. example of an AARP grant being used to pilot “tiny homes” for seniors shows the importance of pilot programs, targeted grants, and public-private collaboration in testing new models for public good—here, though, in housing, not waste.

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Trying a tiny solution to a big problem

The Council on Ageing of West Florida is taking a tiny bite out of the affordable housing crisis in Northwest Florida. With help from a grant from the AARP late last year, the council purchased two tiny homes to give two seniors a new start.

“Housing is not normally under our purview,” said Emily Echavaria, marketing and communications director for the Council on Aging of West Florida. “When we saw the AARP Livable Communities Grant, we decided we wanted to tackle something with housing because we know that it is such an issue in our community.”

The council is a nonprofit that provides home and community based services seniors in Escambia and Santa Rosa Counties. With the grant, they were awarded $50,000 to purchase the two homes from Incredible Tiny Homes, a Tennessee company that had been making the traditional tiny houses with multi-stores, 300 to 400 square feet of living space and price tags up to $100,000.

To be sure, these two houses are not the kind you see on HGTV, with multi-stories and granite countertops. These are single story units called the Incread-I-Box model.

“This is the tiniest that it gets,” said Echavaria. “It’s pretty bare-bones. But it’s certainly a livable space. It’s cute. You can add whatever your personal flair is to it within the 128 square feet. It is great for someone who is either extremely minimalist and is a step up for someone who is living in a vehicle or a camp.”

Incredible Tiny Homes is a company that had been building larger and more elaborate tiny homes.

“About two years ago (Randy Jones), the creator and the owner of the company got hit with the reality of the housing affordability crisis, and he said ‘Golly, I know I can make a small home that can pass building codes,’” said Rick Dye, a consultant for the Affordable Housing Advisory Group, an organization that partners with other groups and individuals to create affordable rental housing in the Pensacola area. “And he went out and found supplies and products and enough materials to begin to manufacture on an assembly line this Incred-I-Box, and is able to retail it for $20,000 utilizing stuff that would normally have gone to the landfill.”

While the size and construction materials and methods used to make the homes keep the price low, it limits where the houses can be placed. They are currently classified as RVs, even though they are not mobile or even on wheels. This means they can only be set up in RV parks and mobile home communities.

“These really ought to be called simple homes,” said Rick Dye. “Because when you say tiny homes everyone goes off on their own tangent of what they know. But if you introduce a new name like a simple home, then people can give you a chance to explain that this is for people who are living in their cars, who have been living out in the woods, who have income, but there’s not enough (affordable) vacancies in the community to supply the need. And that’s our case here in Pensacola.”

The two homes have been placed in an RV park in Pensacola and one senior is already getting settled into their new home. The Council of Ageing is set to relocate someone into the second home before the end of January.

“For us this is an advocacy project,” said Echavaria. “We don’t want to be landlords.”

Bob Barrett has been a radio broadcaster since the mid 1970s and has worked at stations from northern New York to south Florida and, oddly, has been able to make a living that way. He began work in public radio in 2001. Over the years he has produced nationally syndicated programs such as The Environment Show and The Health Show for Northeast Public Radio's National Productions.

- **Behavioral Shifts**: Both environmental impact (diet-related, energy-related) and infrastructural upgrades are portrayed as incremental and cumulative processes—advocating for shifts, not sudden overhauls.

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Climate Connection

The Climate Connection: A plant-rich Thanksgiving

  • Updated

According to Sarah Bridle, a researcher at the University of Manchester and author of "Food and Climate Change Without the Hot Air," “a traditional Thanksgiving dinner for an eight-person family — the turkey, the stuffing, the hours of oven time — is as harmful to the planet as a three-hour car trip.” But how can we embrace one of our favorite holidays and minimize our impact to the planet?

As big and complex as the climate change issue is, a growing body of research shows that we can make a tremendous impact on our planet’s future by switching to a plant-rich diet. A study described in the journal, Nature Food, found that food production accounts for 35 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions.

According to Project Drawdown, Paul Hawken’s compendium of climate solutions, “If cattle were their own nation, they would be the world’s third-largest emitter of greenhouse gases.” It’s for this reason that of the 80 ranked solutions proposed in Project Drawdown, adopting a plant-rich diet was number four on the most important and impactful changes to be made.

This means that cutting your meat intake, or taking the full plunge and becoming a vegetarian, could make a bigger dent in your personal carbon footprint than buying an electric vehicle, installing solar panels, or upgrading the efficiency of your home.

Note that Project Drawdown encourages a plant-rich diet; it doesn't recommend that everyone become a vegan. It is about a shift, not a complete overhaul, of our behavior. But it won’t work if business continues as usual, which means that we should not only retrain our palettes, but also bring an end to government subsidies that benefit the U.S. livestock market, so that the prices of meat more accurately reflect their husbandry and processing costs as well as their planetary impact.

Starting at your own table, adopting a plant-rich diet has tons of other benefits, as well: better gut health, lower blood pressure, lower cholesterol and a cheaper price tag. And unlike some other climate actions, a plant-rich diet can be implemented today with zero switching costs. No need to install anything, buy anything, or retrofit a grid. Climate action has never been so easy.

As a “flexitarian” (someone who sometimes eats vegetarian) myself though, I would add one final benefit that is particularly apparent at Thanksgiving: it’s flippin’ delicious!

Departing from the traditional meat-focused meal gave my family permission to experiment with other things as well. So while I would fully recommend a vegetarian or vegan Thanksgiving as a fresh take on a known menu, with things like spinach puffs, crispy potato skillet, green bean casseroles, cauliflower stuffing and mushroom wellington, I’d also say that you can dress the table up however you want.

In my household, we’ve decided to explore a different vegetarian cuisine every year and have (so far) hosted a Middle Eastern Thanksgiving meal, a Polynesian Thanksgiving meal, and this year a Mexican Thanksgiving feast.

For us, the thing that made the Thanksgiving meal “traditional” was sitting around a table, passing plates hand-over-wrist, telling stories and eating so much food that we had to lie down gasping with laughter. Everything else was just an opportunity to explore new culinary frontiers, play new music and unpack seldom-used tablecloths.

So give yourself permission to try something new and remake the holiday in a new light, both for yourself and the planet. You can find some napkin-dropping vegetarian recipe options at the Napa Climate NOW! website for inspiration: http://napa.350bayarea.org/thanksgiving-vegetarian-recipes

Actions you can take:• Host a vegetarian Thanksgiving or minimize the meat dishes on your table and rotate in some new veggie ones. After all, this is an opportunity to get creative and have fun! Share the results with Napa Climate NOW! on our Facebook or Instagram pages. Check out some recipes at http://napa.350bayarea.org/thanksgiving-vegetarian-recipes.

• If a vegetarian meal doesn’t seem possible, consider serving smaller portions or eat less meat ahead of the holiday splurge (basically you’re balancing the cost in your carbon wallet).

• Track the US Food & Agriculture bills here and contact committee members about supporting a climate-friendly Farm Bill at http://bit.ly/agandfoodbills

• Contact places where you dine (your favorite restaurant, your cafeteria) and encourage them to provide more meatless options or institute Meatless Monday.

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Jessica Day, is co-founder and chief marketing officer at IdeaScale - a crowdsourcing software. She holds an MFA in creative writing, is a member of Napa Climate NOW! and regularly speaks about climate action.

Napa Climate NOW! is a local non-profit citizens’ group advocating for smart climate solutions based on the latest climate science, part of 350 Bay Area. Like, comment, and share our daily Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter posts @napaclimatenow or visit us at: http://napa.350bayarea.org.

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Napa Climate NOW! has drafted a proposed mandate for adoption county-wide Reusable Foodware and Waste Reduction Ordinance to transition food establishments and customers from disposable plates, cups, straws, napkins, condiment packages, and so on to reusable and compostable foodware.

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This could inform communications about recycling systems—focus on gradual improvement and scalability.

- **Community Engagement**: Initiatives (like Napa Climate NOW!)

and public consultation processes in city planning are important, signaling that citizen involvement and transparent processes also contribute to the success of public projects.

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Early proposal for Jericho Lands development includes three, 38-storey towers, and 10,000 new homes

After years of consultation and anticipation over the future of this prime site, the public got a look at what could be built in one of the most expensive and least developed parts of the city, and what it might look like

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The City of Vancouver is seeking feedback on bold, but preliminary ideas for the Jericho Lands, 90 acres in the city’s West Point Grey area that is owned and will be developed by three Indigenous Nations and a federal Crown corp.

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After years of consultation and anticipation over the future of the prime site, a sketch of what could be built and what it might look like was presented Monday. It showed the building of 10 million square feet of floor area with three, tall, condo towers of up to 38-storeys and some 10,000 new homes in one of the most expensive and least-developed parts of the city, near the University of B.C. and overlooking Jericho Beach Park.

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By comparison, the expansive Oakridge Centre redevelopment at 41st Avenue and Cambie Street is building 5.5 million square feet in floor area and about 2,330 new homes.

The Jericho project is a partnership between MST Development Corp., which is run by the Musqueam, Squamish and Tsleil-Waututh Nations, and Canada Lands Co.

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“It is still an early stage of the overall development process,” said Elisa Campbell, who is leading the project for CLC and working with MST.

The public has until Nov. 14 to comment on two options, named “Eagle” and “Weave,” which each offer different design features. Both include dozens of shorter buildings, community centres, parkland and the potential for a SkyTrain station.

“What I like about it is we’re not saying, ‘This is what is going to be done on the site.’ We’re saying, ‘Here’s two examples of what it could be like. We really want to hear from you,’ ” said Campbell.

She added: “Our work with the Musqueam, Squamish, Tsleil-Waututh is really at the core of this and when you listen to their culture, their tradition, it’s fascinating to then take some of those stories and apply it to this development.”

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West Point Grey is currently home to about 13,000 residents. The Jericho lands house a former army garrison, some low-rise homes rented to military families and an independent school.

“I think they were all shocked at the size of the (proposed) development,” said Murray Hendren, president of the strata for Mayfair House condo, which is on Highbury Street across from the Jericho Lands.

He’s also a member of the West Point Grey Residents Association but said he was speaking about his own, initial feelings and those of others in his building.

“It’s just completely out-of-context with the rest of West Point Grey. It’s not to say, some time in the future, the whole city isn’t going to be like this and there would be a different standard,” Hendren said.

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Campbell said, “We’ve heard really positive response to the concept of using this site as an example of how to, through development, address reconciliation, how to address the climate emergency and so overall, we’ve been really happy with the positive tone. That doesn’t mean there aren’t people who are concerned about transformation because transformation can be hard.”

The Jericho Lands development must comply with city policies and regulations unlike the Senakw development that the Squamish Nation is planning near the Burrard Bridge, which is on reserve land.

MST bought the part of Jericho Lands owned by the B.C. government, a 39-acre site, in 2016 for $480 million. MST had previously partnered with Canada Lands to buy a 52-acre portion owned by the federal government in 2014 for $237 million.

jlee-young@postmedia.com

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